United States of America v. Jonathan Johnson, Also Known As Johnathan Johnson

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 18, 2025 Decided November 4, 2025
No. 24-3003
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
JONATHAN JOHNSON, ALSO KNOWN AS JOHNATHAN JOHNSON,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cr-00008-1)
Howard B. Katzoff, appointed by the court, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Mark Hobel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for
appellee. With him on the brief were Edward R. Martin, Jr.,
U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Nicholas P. Coleman,
and Joshua Gold, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: HENDERSON and KATSAS, Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
EDWARDS.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant Jonathan
Johnson was convicted in 2023 for being a felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At the time
of his arrest, Appellant was already serving a term of
supervised release following convictions for armed robbery
and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence.
Appellant was indicted in this case because, when he was
arrested, he possessed a loaded semiautomatic gun, illegally
modified to enable automatic firing.
On July 26, 2023, the jury returned a verdict against
Appellant. The day after the verdict was issued, Juror 8 emailed
the District Court to say that she had been diagnosed with
chronic anxiety and depression. She claimed that she was
shunned and disparaged by other jurors and that her “mind was
not in the right place” during jury deliberations. Juror 8’s email
also expressed a concern that, because of her alleged mental
infirmities, she did not believe that Appellant had received
“fair justice” from the jury. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 90.
Appellant requested that the District Court hold an evidentiary
hearing to assess Juror 8’s statements regarding her self-
asserted mental health conditions.
The District Court denied Appellant’s request for an
evidentiary hearing. The trial judge concluded that, under
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), the court was forbidden from
relying on evidence regarding jury deliberations that was
offered to challenge a verdict. The District Court additionally
pointed out that nothing occurred during voir dire, jury
selection, Appellant’s trial, jury deliberations, or polling to
suggest that Juror 8’s mental competence was at issue. The trial
judge thus ruled that there were no viable grounds for
conducting an evidentiary hearing.

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On appeal, Appellant challenges the District Court’s
application of Rule 606(b). He argues that Juror 8’s asserted
chronic anxiety and depression diagnoses undermined his due
process right to be tried by mentally competent jurors and thus
required further inquiry. He also contends that the portion of
Juror 8’s email that references her mental health conditions
does not disclose anything about jury deliberations and thus
does not fall within the compass of Rule 606(b). We disagree.
We hold that the District Court did not err in declining to
hold an evidentiary hearing because Rule 606(b) expressly bars
evidence of the sort offered in Juror 8’s email. The email
references Juror 8’s interactions with other jurors during jury
deliberations, and it questions the propriety of the verdict. The
email also addresses a “juror’s mental processes concerning the
verdict.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1). In these circumstances, we
can find no fault with the District Court’s judgment.
Appellant also contests the facial validity of § 922(g)(1)
and its application to him. He argues that the Supreme Court’s
decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), requires us to reject our precedents
upholding § 922(g)(1). Appellant argues that, “because the
government is unable to meet its burden to demonstrate that the
prohibition as a class of all persons with felony convictions
from possessing a firearm is consistent with this country’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation, the statute must be
struck down as unconstitutional on its face.” Appellant’s Br.
10. In addition, Appellant argues that his “possession of a
firearm is entitled to the protection of the Second Amendment
because his prior convictions do not establish that he is
currently a danger to others and his instant offense did not
involve violence with a firearm.” Id. Appellant thus contends
that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. We reject

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Appellant’s facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).
We first note that Appellant’s challenges were not timely
raised with the District Court. Under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(b)(3), Appellant was required to assert his
challenges to § 922(g)(1) in a pretrial motion, but he failed to
do so. And he has provided no “good cause” justification for
this failure. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3) (“If a party does not
meet the deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, . . . a
court may consider the defense, objection, or request if the
party shows good cause.”). The plain error standard also
provides an avenue for the appeal of unpreserved claims, see
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), but it places a heavy burden on the
appealing party to demonstrate not only that an error is
“obvious” and “affects” his or her “substantial rights,” but also
that it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States,
520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (cleaned up). It is unnecessary for
us to decide whether an untimely Rule 12(b)(3) motion is
subject to review for plain error without a showing of a good
cause. Assuming plain error review is available without
showing good cause, Appellant has not shown any error that
affected his “substantial rights.” United States v. Campos, 137
F.4th 840, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).
In Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019), we
upheld the facial validity of § 922(g)(1). We do not find it
“obvious” that Bruen disturbed Medina. So on plain error
review, we reject Johnson’s facial challenge, and we also apply
Medina’s guidance for as-applied challenges, which requires
Appellant to show that his predicate felonies were minor or
regulatory. “To the extent that it may be possible for a felon to
show that his crime was so minor or regulatory that he did not
forfeit his right to bear arms by committing it, [Appellant] has

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not done so.” Medina, 913 F.3d at 160. The violent nature of
Appellant’s previous convictions makes this impossible.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Appellant’s Arrest and Trial
The facts in this case are taken from the trial record. See
United States v. Baxter, 761 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014). They
are not in dispute.
In 2008, Appellant was convicted of armed robbery and
possession of a firearm during a crime of violence. During the
armed robbery, he physically restrained the victim while his
co-conspirator shot the victim in the chest twice. Appellant
then took the victim’s wallet and fled, leaving the wounded
victim in an elevator.
Appellant was arrested again in 2020, while on supervised
release for his 2008 convictions. Police officers saw Appellant
standing next to a parked car. When Appellant noticed the
officers, he turned to face his car and then appeared to crouch
down and drop a gun on the floor. Officers recovered a Glock
23 .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun near Appellant. The gun
was loaded, had a 22-round magazine attached, and was
modified to include an unlawful “giggle switch.” The “giggle
switch” allows a user to fire automatically with one pull of the
trigger.
A grand jury indicted Appellant on one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The statute states:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—

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(1) who has been convicted in any court of,
a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year;
. . .
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce,
or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.
During jury selection, the District Court read prospective
jurors a list of 22 questions and instructed them to note whether
they had “yes” answers to any question. Prospective Juror 138
did not have a “yes” answer for either Question 20 (“Are you
presently . . . experiencing any medical condition or other
physical, mental, or emotional condition that might in any way
affect your ability to give your full attention to this case?”) or
Question 22 (“Is there any other reason that . . . might make it
difficult for you to sit fairly, impartially, and attentively as a
juror?”). She affirmed that she could be a fair juror and was
seated in the jury as Juror 8.
The jury began deliberating after three days of trial. Mid-
deliberation, it notified the District Court that “[d]iscussion
[was] at an impasse.” The District Court instructed the jury to
continue deliberating and “keep an open mind.” After further
deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict.
B. Post-Trial Proceedings Before the District Court
The day after the verdict had been entered, Juror 8 sent an
email to the District Court. Her email said:

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I have been diagnosed [with] chronic anxiety and
depression. I feel like the decision I made was made
under serious pressure by the court and my fellow
jurors which triggered a spin off panic attacks, manic
episodes and depression during this time. I made my
decision the first day and we were told to go back. At
that point I should have dismissed myself as the panic
attacks worsened. When I came in the next day I was
shunned by my fellow jurors which caused a severe
series of more panic attacks. I even broke down in
tears in the jury room as people glared at me with evil
st[ares]. At the end speaking with the lawyers the
panic increased as my comments were dismissed. I
quickly exited as chest tightened, hands became
sweaty and my head started spinning. My mind was
not in the right place. For that reason, I believe this
was not . . . fair justice for the defendant. No one
should pay for someone else’s mental illness. And no
one should be pressured into making a decision in this
state.
J.A. 90.
After reviewing Juror 8’s email, Appellant requested that
the District Court hold an evidentiary hearing to further probe
Juror 8’s mental health. Appellant indicated that he sought to
obtain evidence to support a motion for a new trial in which he
would argue that Juror 8 was not competent to serve as a juror
and had lied during voir dire. The District Court denied this
request in a written order. It explained that Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b) largely prohibited the submission of such
post-trial testimony or other evidence about jury deliberations
that was offered to undercut the jury’s verdict.

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Rule 606(b) reads as follows:
(b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict
or Indictment.
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other
Evidence. During an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify about any statement made
or incident that occurred during the jury’s
deliberations; the effect of anything on that
juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any
juror’s mental processes concerning the
verdict or indictment. The court may not
receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a
juror’s statement on these matters.
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about
whether:
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury’s attention;
(B) an outside influence was improperly
brought to bear on any juror; or
(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict
on the verdict form.
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
The District Court could find no evidence that Juror 8 was
mentally incompetent to serve on the jury. The trial judge
surveyed Juror 8’s participation in voir dire, jury selection, the

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trial, and the jury poll. The judge also relied on her
observations of Juror 8’s demeanor throughout the
proceedings. Nothing gave the District Court reason to
question Juror 8’s mental capacity.
The District Court entered a judgment of conviction and
sentenced Appellant to 57 months in prison, to be followed by
three years of supervised release. Appellant now appeals the
District Court’s ruling denying his request for an evidentiary
hearing. Appellant also challenges the application of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), raising claims that were never timely brought
before the District Court.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review the District Court’s decision denying
Appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 634-35
(D.C. Cir. 1992). The District Court’s underlying factual
determinations are subject to clear error review. United States
v. Bryant, 111 F.4th 105, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
Appellant concedes that he failed to raise his constitutional
challenges with the District Court. Both parties agree that these
arguments are thus untimely. We have not yet decided whether
an untimely Rule 12(b)(3) motion is subject to review for plain
error without a showing of a good cause. See United States v.
Burroughs, 810 F.3d 833, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2016). However, we
need not decide this question because, as noted in the
introduction to this opinion, Appellant has not shown any error
that affected his substantial rights in this case. See Campos, 137
F.4th at 847.

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B. The Evidentiary Hearing
Appellant’s appeal of the District Court’s ruling denying
his request for an evidentiary hearing faces two insurmountable
hurdles. First, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally bars
evidence of jury deliberations, with only narrow exceptions
that are not relevant in this case. Second, “we have . . . left trial
courts especially broad discretion to determine what manner of
hearing, if any, is warranted about intra-jury misconduct.”
United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 505 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
1. Rule 606(b) Excludes Juror 8’s Email
Rule 606(b) was adopted in 1975 to “promote[] full and
vigorous discussion [among jurors]” and “give[] stability and
finality to verdicts.” Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S.
206, 217-18 (2017). It prohibits “the use of any evidence of
juror deliberations, subject only to the express exceptions for
extraneous information and outside influences.” Warger v.
Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 48 (2014).
The Supreme Court has applied Rule 606(b) strictly to
ensure that jury deliberations stay in their “black box.” It has
insisted on so protecting the jury process even when presented
with serious allegations of juror misconduct or dishonesty. For
example, in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), a
juror reported that he and other jurors consumed multiple
drinks and took drugs (including marijuana and cocaine)
during the trial. Id. at 115-16. He also said that a juror sold
marijuana to another juror and jurors were falling asleep. Id. at
116. The defendants argued that the District Court erred in
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding this

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misconduct. Id. The Court disagreed. It concluded that,
“[h]owever severe their effect and improper their use, drugs or
alcohol voluntarily ingested by a juror seems no more an
‘outside influence’ than a virus, poorly prepared food, or a lack
of sleep.” Id. at 122. As an issue internal to the jury, the Court
found that the evidence of alcohol and drug consumption
proffered in Tanner was properly excluded under Rule 606(b).
Id. at 121. In so ruling, the Court noted that “[t]here is little
doubt that postverdict investigation would in some instances
lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible
or improper juror behavior.” Id. at 120. But the Court explained
that leaving those verdicts intact is an acceptable cost of
shielding the jury system from undue post-verdict interference
and scrutiny. See id. at 120-21.
In Warger, the Court reiterated the points made in Tanner.
Warger was a negligence case about a car accident that led to
the amputation of the plaintiff’s left leg. 574 U.S. at 42. After
a verdict in favor of the defendant, a juror informed plaintiff’s
counsel that the jury foreperson revealed during deliberations
that her daughter had been at fault in a car accident that killed
a man. Id. at 43. “[I]f her daughter had been sued,” the
foreperson reportedly said, “it would have ruined her life.” Id.
(citation omitted). The Court ruled that the District Court did
not err in refusing to consider the foreperson’s statements
pursuant to Rule 606(b). Id. at 44, 51. The foreperson’s
personal experience was a matter “internal” to the jury and thus
excluded by Rule 606(b). Id. at 51. As in Tanner, the Court
appeared to understand that its strict adherence to Rule 606(b)
imposes costs on individual proceedings but again concluded
that these costs are outweighed by the systemic benefits of jury
finality and confidentiality. Id. at 50. Each defendant’s rights
are “sufficiently protected by voir dire, the observations of
court and counsel during trial, and the potential use of

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‘nonjuror evidence’ of misconduct.” Id. at 51 (citation
omitted). So even if a juror should have been struck during voir
dire but was not, that “mere fact . . . does not make admissible
evidence regarding that juror’s conduct and statements during
deliberations.” Id. at 53.
We have followed the Supreme Court’s directions
regarding the application of Rule 606(b). In United States v.
Stover, 329 F.3d 859 (D.C. Cir. 2003), for example, the District
Court rejected further inquiry after receiving a post-verdict
note from the jury indicating that some jurors wanted to revisit
an issue. Id. at 864. We affirmed, writing that Rule 606(b)
“precludes taking testimony from . . . jurors . . . regarding their
belated misgivings” about their unanimous verdict. Id. at 865;
see also United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061, 1064-65 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (applying Rule 606(b) to affirm the District Court’s
decision not to accept evidence of a juror’s attempted
repudiation of her vote hours after the jury was polled). And in
United States v. Brooks, 677 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1982), we
affirmed the District Court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing
on a juror’s post-verdict revelation that he had seen the
defendant in public before the trial. Id. at 910-11. The
defendant argued that this may have prejudiced the juror
against him. Id. at 909-11. But Rule 606(b), we said, made the
juror “incompetent to testify as to his mental processes or the
effect of ‘anything’ upon his mind or emotions that might have
influenced him on the verdict.” Id. at 913.
Just as in these cases, a straightforward application of Rule
606(b) here requires the exclusion of Juror 8’s email. Appellant
sought to use the email to “inquir[e] into the validity of [the]
verdict” against him, so Rule 606(b) applies. Fed. R. Evid.
606(b)(1). The email reports on the jury’s deliberations (“I
made my decision the first day and we were told to go back,”

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“I was shunned by my fellow jurors,” “people glared at me”),
which is clearly prohibited testimony about “any statement
made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations.”
Id. The email also says that Juror 8 felt her chronic anxiety and
depression influenced her participation in deliberations,
including by “trigger[ing] . . . panic attacks, manic episodes[,]
and depression” that led her to feel that her “mind was not in
the right place” during deliberations. Rule 606(b) excludes this
information as testimony about “the effect of anything on that
juror’s or another juror’s vote” and about “any juror’s mental
processes concerning the verdict.” Id. (emphasis added). Nor
does Appellant contend that any of Rule 606(b)(2)’s exceptions
for extraneous information, outside influence, or a clerical
mistake apply. As in Stover and Dakins, this appears to be a
case of buyer’s remorse. Rule 606(b) does not allow
consideration of such “belated misgivings” about the verdict.
Stover, 329 F.3d at 865.
We do not find any of Appellant’s contrary arguments to
be persuasive. First, Appellant argues that Rule 606(b) does not
apply to the portion of Juror 8’s email that states her two
diagnoses because her disclosure of these diagnoses was not
offered to explain her participation in deliberations. However,
reading Juror 8’s email in its entirety shows that Appellant is
mistaken. Juror 8 states that she has chronic anxiety and
depression and, as a result of how those conditions manifested
during deliberations, felt that “the decision [she] made was
made under serious pressure.” Juror 8 discloses her conditions
precisely to explain why she felt that the jury deliberations
went wrong. As we have already explained, Juror 8’s
statements about her diagnoses are therefore exactly the kind
of information Rule 606(b) was designed to exclude: “the
effect of anything on [Juror 8’s] . . . vote,” and “[Juror 8’s]
mental processes concerning the verdict.”

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Second, Appellant contends in his reply brief that Juror 8’s
email is subject to a common-law exception for post-verdict
investigation into a juror’s competence. First, we note that
“[a]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are
forfeited.” Fore River Residents Against the Compressor
Station v. FERC, 77 F.4th 882, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2023). However,
even if we consider the argument, it is meritless. Appellant
grounds the common-law exception in Tanner, but Tanner did
not hold that such an exception exists. It merely commented
that Rule 606(b) could be “interpreted to retain” the exception,
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125, when there is “substantial if not
wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 1974)).
Dioguardi required “proof of an adjudication of insanity or
mental incompetence” to make that showing. 492 F.2d at 80.
There is no conclusive evidence of incompetency in this case.
Indeed, as noted above, the District Court found that nothing
occurred during voir dire, jury selection, Appellant’s trial, or
jury deliberations to suggest that Juror 8’s mental competence
was at issue. In sum, we hold that the District Court’s
application of Rule 606(b) did not infringe Appellant’s due
process rights.
Finally, also for the first time in his reply brief, Appellant
suggests that the District Court erred in applying Rule 606(b)
to his motion for an evidentiary hearing because he had not yet
challenged the verdict. Setting aside that Appellant also
forfeited this argument, see Fore River Residents, 77 F.4th at
889, the claim cannot be squared with the record. Appellant’s
stated reason for requesting an evidentiary hearing was to
obtain information for his upcoming motion for a new trial
based on Juror 8’s lack of competency. Rule 606(b) applies to
any “inquiry into the validity of a verdict,” and the only point

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of the evidentiary hearing on Juror 8 was to challenge the
verdict she voted for. Appellant’s purpose – to unsettle the
verdict – is exactly what Rule 606(b) contemplates and seeks
to avoid.
2. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
in Denying Appellant’s Request for an
Evidentiary Hearing
Appellant concedes that there is no evidence, other than
Juror 8’s email, that Juror 8 struggled with her mental health.
Juror 8 participated in voir dire, sat through Appellant’s trial,
and deliberated without any apparent difficulty, and the
District Court judge’s personal observations of Juror 8’s
demeanor throughout the proceedings confirmed that there was
no issue. The District Court was thus well within its “especially
broad discretion” to deny Appellant’s request for a hearing on
Juror 8’s mental health. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 505; see
also Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127 (“[T]he District Court did not err
in deciding, based on the inadmissibility of juror testimony and
the clear insufficiency of the nonjuror evidence offered by
petitioners, that an additional postverdict evidentiary hearing
was unnecessary.”). We will not second guess this
determination, which was based in large part on the District
Court judge’s firsthand impressions of Juror 8.
Appellant suggests that the District Court ignored Juror
8’s disclosure that she was diagnosed with chronic anxiety and
depression and experienced panic attacks and manic episodes
during deliberations. But the District Court did not ignore this
information. It considered Juror 8’s statements carefully and
decided – correctly, as we explained – that Rule 606(b) did not
permit reliance on the statements to challenge the verdict. So
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

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Appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing.
C. The Felon-in-Possession Statute
1. Appellant’s Facial Constitutional Challenge
Fails
We find no merit in Appellant’s facial challenge to
§ 922(g)(1). As noted above, Appellant offers no “good cause”
for his failure to adhere to the filing requirements under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c)(3). However, even if we
apply the standard in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52(b), we reject Appellant’s claim that § 922(g)(1) is facially
unconstitutional and that his prosecution under the statute was
plain error.
Following the issuance of District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010), federal circuit courts “coalesced around a
‘two-step’ framework for analyzing Second Amendment
challenges.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. At the first step, the court
asked whether the “activity or offender subject to the
challenged regulation falls outside the Second Amendment’s
protections.” Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 988-89 (D.C.
Cir. 2013). If so, the analysis ended. If not, then the court
“determine[d] whether the provision passe[d] muster under the
appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 989 (citation
omitted).
As noted above, this court rejected a challenge to the facial
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in Medina v.
Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Medina examined the
“public understanding of the [Second Amendment] right [in
1791, when the Second Amendment was ratified] to determine

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if a convicted felon would fall outside the scope of its
protection.” 913 F.3d at 158. Around that time, we observed
that felonies – both violent crimes like murder and rape and
nonviolent crimes like forgery and embezzlement – were
capital crimes. Id. This made it “difficult [for us] to conclude
that the public, in 1791, would have understood someone
facing death and estate forfeiture to be within the scope of those
entitled to possess arms.” Id. We thus held that “a felony
conviction removes one from the scope of the Second
Amendment” and rejected the challenge to § 922(g)(1) at the
first step of the Schrader test. Id. at 160. We did not proceed to
the second step. Id. at 161.
No intervening Supreme Court decision establishes that it
was plain error to apply Medina in this case. In Bruen, the
Court rejected the second step’s means-end balancing as
inconsistent with Heller’s text-and-history approach. See 597
U.S. at 22-24. Thus, the Court said that federal circuit courts
had erred in interpreting Heller to authorize means-end
balancing. Id. at 24. Instead, if “the Second Amendment’s plain
text covers an individual’s conduct,” the government can only
justify the regulation “by demonstrating that it is consistent
with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
Medina held, based on a historical analysis of the meaning
of the Second Amendment at the time of its ratification, that
felons are not protected by the Second Amendment. Bruen
endorsed that first-step analysis. See id. at 19 (observing that
“[s]tep one of the predominant framework is broadly consistent
with Heller”). Medina is consistent with the Justices’ repeated
reassurances, since Heller, that their emphasis on text and
history in Second Amendment cases does not necessarily put
§ 922(g)(1) on questionable grounds. In Heller, Justice Scalia
wrote for the majority that “nothing in [the] opinion should be

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taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons.” 555 U.S. at 626. Justice
Alito “repeat[ed] th[at] assurance[]” in McDonald. 561 U.S. at
786 (plurality opinion). Justice Kavanaugh, in his Bruen
concurrence, 597 U.S. at 81, and Chief Justice Roberts, in his
opinion for the Court in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680
(2024), did as well. Id. at 699. Our approach is also consistent
with how some other circuits have decided post-Bruen
challenges to § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Canada, 123
F.4th 159, 161 (4th Cir. 2024) (“No federal appellate court has
held [since Bruen] that Section 922(g)(1) is facially
unconstitutional.”); see also United States v. Forbis, 2025 WL
2778834, at *3 (10th Cir. Sep. 30, 2025) (observing that
multiple circuits, including the Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh, have concluded they remain “bound by their pre-
Bruen decisions upholding § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality”).
In sum, Appellant’s prosecution under § 922(g)(1) was not
plain error. As mentioned above, we do not find it “obvious”
that Bruen disturbed Medina. So, in undertaking plain error
review, we reject Appellant’s facial challenge.
2. Appellant’s As-Applied Constitutional
Challenge Fails
We also reject Appellant’s as-applied challenge to
§ 922(g)(1). Appellant offers no “good cause” for his failure to
adhere to the filing requirements under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12(c)(3). However, even if we apply the
standard in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), we find
no plain error in the application of § 922(g)(1) to Appellant.
In Medina, we held open the possibility that a “felon
[could] show that his crime was so minor or regulatory that he

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did not forfeit his right to bear arms by committing it.” 913
F.3d at 160. But we also said that Medina’s convictions for
felony and misdemeanor fraud indicated a “disregard for the
basic laws and norms of our society” that is “precisely what
differentiates a criminal from someone who is ‘law-abiding.’”
Id. If nonviolent fraud convictions are not sufficiently “minor
or regulatory” to succeed on an as-applied challenge under
Medina, Appellant’s convictions for violent crimes do not
come close.
Appellant’s predicate felonies are not remotely
comparable to those in Range v. Attorney General of the United
States, 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc). Range is the
only post-Bruen circuit decision holding § 922(g)(1)
unconstitutional as applied to a specific defendant. See Forbis,
2025 WL 2778834, at *3. Range pleaded guilty to one count of
food stamp fraud after he signed a food stamp application,
prepared by his wife, that underreported his income. Range,
124 F.4th at 222-23. He was sentenced to three years of
probation, but his crime was punishable by up to five years
imprisonment under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 223. Range was
thus subject to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession
by anyone convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1)). In holding § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied
to Range, the Third Circuit emphasized that there was “no
evidence that [Range] poses a physical danger to others or that
food-stamp fraud is closely associated with physical danger.”
Id. at 230. It also noted that “Range’s crime . . . did not involve
a firearm.” Id. at 231. None of that can be said about
Appellant’s personal involvement in seriously harming another
person using a firearm.
As we have already explained, Medina says that

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§ 922(g)(1) may only be unconstitutional as applied to
defendants with “minor or regulatory” predicate felonies. 913
F.3d at 160. Appellant’s crimes surely do not qualify, so it was
not plain error to apply § 922(g)(1) to Appellant. We do not
address whether there are any preserved as-applied challenges
that would succeed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District
Court is affirmed.
So ordered.

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