Shahnaz Haeri Mehneh and Aliasghar Nejat v. Marco Rubio

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Submitted November 17, 2025 Decided January 16, 2026
No. 25-5001
S HAHNAZ HAERI M EHNEH AND ALIASGHAR NEJAT ,
APPELLANTS
v.
M ARCO R UBIO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS U.S. S ECRETARY
OF S TATE AND R OBERT J ACHIM, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ACTING DIRECTOR OF S CREENING, A NALYSIS AND
C OORDINATION ,
APPELLEES
Consolidated with 25-5180
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:24-cv-01374)
(No. 1:24-cv-01029)
Curtis Lee Morrison, Garrett Carter May, Spencer Faber,
and Andrew T. Tutt were on the briefs for appellants.
Leslie K. Dellon, Katherine Melloy Goettel, and Jonathan
Weinberg were on the brief for amici curiae American

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Immigration Council and American Immigration Lawyers
Association in support of appellants.
Felicia H. Ellsworth was on the brief for amicus curiae
Cato Institute in support of appellants.
Brian Scott Green was on the brief for amicus curiae
National Iranian American Council in support of appellants.
Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, Benjamin Mark Moss, Acting Senior
Counsel Office of Immigration Litigation, and Christopher Ian
Pryby, Trial Attorney, were on the brief for appellees.
Before: C HILDS , Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and
GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
GINSBURG.
GINSBURG , Senior Circuit Judge: These consolidated
appeals involve claims of unreasonable delay in the adjudica-
tion of two visa applications placed in administrative pro-
cessing by the Department of State. The applicants each filed a
complaint seeking to compel the Department to finish adjudi-
cating his application. Both complaints were dismissed for fail-
ure to state a claim, and the applicants appealed. While their
appeals were pending, the Department concluded the adminis-
trative processing of the applications, issuing a visa to one
applicant and refusing a visa to the other.
Based upon these intervening events, we conclude the
appeals are moot because we cannot grant any effectual relief
to the applicants. Because no exception to mootness applies,
we dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

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I. Background
Shahnaz Haeri Mehneh and Saeid Motevali are U.S. citi-
zens who petitioned for immigrant visas on behalf of their rel-
atives: Mrs. Mehneh on behalf of her husband, Aliasghar Nejat;
Mr. Motevali on behalf of his father, Alireza Motevaly
Alamouti. Mr. Nejat and Mr. Alamouti each interviewed with
a consular officer. Following the interviews, their applications
were placed in administrative processing, and they were asked
to take additional steps. Shortly after their interviews, they sub-
mitted additional information and then waited for the State
Department to conclude the administrative processing of their
applications. Sixteen months after Mr. Nejat’s interview, he
and his wife filed a complaint in the district court alleging an
unreasonable delay in the adjudication of his application. Mr.
Alamouti and his son did the same seven months after Mr.
Alamouti’s interview.
Both complaints were dismissed for failure to state a claim
pursuant to the factors for a claim of unreasonable delay set
forth in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v.
FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See Motevali v.
Rubio, No. 24-cv-1029, 2025 WL 885116, at *6-8 (D.D.C.
Mar. 21, 2025); Mehneh v. Blinken, No. 24-cv-1374, 2024 WL
5116521, at *7-9 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2024). Mr. Nejat and Mr.
Alamouti each filed a notice of appeal. While their appeals
were pending, the Department completed the administrative
processing of their applications. The Department issued Mr.
Nejat a visa, and he has since entered the country and applied
for a green card. The Department refused Mr. Alamouti a visa.
II. Discussion
Under Article III of the Constitution of the United States,
a federal court “may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controver-
sies.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). A case becomes

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moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction “when, by
virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant
any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant.”
Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (cleaned up).
The Supreme Court has recognized “two principal exceptions
to mootness.” Cierco v. Mnuchin, 857 F.3d 407, 414 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (quoting HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., F EDERAL
S TANDARDS OF R EVIEW 135 (2d ed. 2013)). First, when “a
party voluntarily ceases the challenged activity,” the case is not
moot “unless it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Pub.
Citizen, Inc. v. FERC, 92 F.4th 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2024)
(cleaned up). Second, the exception for cases that are “capable
of repetition yet evading review” applies when “(1) the chal-
lenged action is too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation
or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.” Am. Forest Res. Council v. Williams, 96 F.4th 417, 421
(D.C. Cir. 2024). “The party seeking jurisdictional dismissal
must establish mootness, while the opposing party has the bur-
den to prove that a mootness exception applies.” Reid v.
Hurwitz, 920 F.3d 828, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2019).*
* The appellants argue the Department bears the burden of showing
that the voluntary-cessation exception does not apply. To be sure, the
Supreme Court and our court have held “a defendant claiming that
its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden
of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior
could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000); see
FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 241 (2024); see also Row 1 Inc. v.
Becerra, 92 F.4th 1138, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2024). That burden,
however, “does not apply automatically whenever the prospect of
mootness is raised by a party’s voluntary conduct.” Pub. Citizen,
92 F.4th at 1128. As we recently explained, we will impose this

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A. Nejat’s Appeal
Mr. Nejat received his visa while his appeal was pending.
Because the Department completed administrative processing
and issued the visa, we “cannot grant any effectual relief” to
Mr. Nejat. Calderon, 518 U.S. at 150 (cleaned up). His case is
moot. Mr. Nejat nonetheless invokes the voluntary-cessation
exception to mootness, but that exception does not save his
appeal.
The Department has explained why there is no reasonable
expectation that Mr. Nejat will be subject to a similar delay
again. Mr. Nejat entered the country after receiving his visa.
The Department represented that once Mr. Nejat receives his
green card, for which he has applied, “he would not need a visa
to reenter the United States unless he leaves for longer than one
year (or loses that status).” Appellees’ Br. 17; see 8 C.F.R.
§ 211.1(a)(2). Nothing in the record indicates that either event
is likely to occur or that Mr. Nejat would face a similar delay
in the future if he did need to apply again for a visa.
Mr. Nejat does not dispute this. Instead, he claims the
Department “tactically mooted this case” as “part of a nation-
wide pattern.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 30. His only evidence,
however, is the Department’s timing in this case and in a case
dismissed as moot in an unpublished decision by a different
court of appeals. See Chen v. Noem, No. 24-2058, 2025 WL
“heavy burden” under the voluntary-cessation doctrine “only if there
is some evidence that the party sought to manipulate the court’s
jurisdiction.” Samma v. Dep’t of Def., 136 F.4th 1108, 1114 (2025);
see also Pub. Citizen, 92 F.4th at 1128 (“Courts have declined to
apply the doctrine when the facts do not suggest any arguable
manipulation of our jurisdiction” (cleaned up)). Even if the
Department were, however, to bear the burden of showing neither
exception applies, it has done so in this case for the reasons stated.

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1466205, at *2 (2d Cir. May 22, 2025). In that case, the court
rejected a similar claim of “gamesmanship” by the Department
because the appellant offered “no adequate basis for his con-
tention.” Id. Here, too, the evidence is not sufficient for us “to
impute such manipulative conduct to a coordinate branch of
government.” Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 705 (D.C.
Cir. 1990). Far from attempting to evade review, when explain-
ing why it filed a motion to strike the briefs of the amici instead
of seeking an extension of time to file its reply brief, the
Department expressed its desire for this court to rule on the
merits of these appeals “expeditiously.” Simply put, “this is not
a case in which a party sought to strategically avoid judicial
review by ceasing a challenged activity.” Samma, 136 F.4th at
1114 (cleaned up). We therefore agree with the Department
that the appeal in Mehneh should be dismissed as moot.
B. Alamouti’s Appeal
The Department refused Mr. Alamouti a visa seven weeks
before his case was to be argued in this court. Because the
Department completed administrative processing and refused
the visa, we cannot grant any relief to Mr. Alamouti. His case
is also moot.
Mr. Alamouti claims both exceptions to mootness apply.
We see no reason, however, to believe he will again face a sim-
ilar delay in the adjudication of a visa application. The consular
officer refused Mr. Alamouti a visa under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B), which makes an alien inadmissible due to his
“terrorist activities.” The consular officer also indicated on the
refusal notice that no waiver is available for a person denied a
visa for that reason. Mr. Alamouti claims he will face a similar
delay if he reapplies for a visa, but a consular officer reviewing
a future application would see the reason for his first denial and
necessarily refuse him a visa. There is, therefore, no reason to

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expect the Department again would spend significant time on
processing a future application by Mr. Alamouti.
Mr. Alamouti also claims the Department refused him a
visa while his appeal was pending in order to avoid judicial
review. We reject this argument for the reasons discussed
above with respect to Mr. Nejat. See Pub. Citizen, 92 F.4th at
1128; Clarke, 915 F.2d at 705.
For these reasons, the appeal in Motevali should also be
dismissed as moot.**
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we dismiss the appeals as moot.
When a pending appeal becomes moot, it is our “general prac-
tice” to “vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss.”
Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Azar, 942 F.3d 512, 519
(D.C. Cir. 2019); see, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 92 F.4th at 1131
(vacating where “no party argues against vacatur, and it will
further the public interest by precluding any potential reliance
on the challenged orders we lack authority to review” (cleaned
up)). We therefore vacate the judgments of the district court
and remand with instructions to dismiss the cases as moot.
So ordered.
** In the alternative, the appellants ask us to create a new mootness
exception for claims of unreasonable delay. We decline to do so. Cf.
Alphabet Workers Union-Commc’n Workers of Am., Local 9009 v.
NLRB, 134 F.4th 1217, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (recognizing only
“two exceptions to the [mootness] doctrine”).

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