Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management, An Agency of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued October 1, 2025 Decided February 20, 2026
No. 24-5155
F RIENDS OF ANIMALS ,
APPELLANT
v.
UNITED S TATES B UREAU OF LAND M ANAGEMENT, AN AGENCY
OF THE UNITED S TATES AND S TATE OF UTAH,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:18-cv-02029)
Jennifer Best argued the cause for appellant. With her on
the briefs was Stephen Hernick.
Ezekiel A. Peterson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellee U.S. Bureau of Land
Management. With him on the brief were Adam R.F.
Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Robert
Lundman, Attorney. Rebecca Jaffe, Attorney, entered an
appearance.
Steve Geary, Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the

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Attorney General for the State of Utah, argued the cause for
appellee State of Utah. With him on the brief were Derek
Brown, Attorney General, and Stanford Purser, Solicitor
General.
Before: KATSAS and C HILDS , Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
EDWARDS .
EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge: The Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (the “Act”),
authorizes and directs the Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) “to protect and manage wild free-roaming horses and
burros as components of the public lands.” Id. § 1333(a).
Pursuant to this role, BLM is responsible for culling the wild
horse population on public lands to promote their long-term
sustainability. In assuming this responsibility, BLM is obliged
to adhere to certain statutory requirements that were enacted to
ensure the protection of wild horses.
The dispute in this case is focused on “ten-year plans” that
were issued by BLM to manage wild horse populations on
public lands. These plans authorize BLM to gather and remove
wild horses from four different geographic areas during the
course of a ten-year period. In August 2018, Appellant, Friends
of Animals, filed a lawsuit in the District Court against BLM
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) initiating a
challenge to the ten-year plans. In pursuing this action,
Appellant claimed that the contested plans should be struck
down because they impermissibly “allow BLM to conduct an
indefinite number of subsequent removals of wild horses
despite (1) not identifying a specific overpopulation or excess
horses that need to be removed, (2) not making excess

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determinations based on current information, and (3) not
consulting with independent parties.” Appellant’s Br. 2.
According to Appellant, “[n]othing in the [Act] . . . authorizes
BLM to issue long-term, open-ended [plans] to continually
roundup and remove an undisclosed number of wild horses at
unknown times over the course of ten years.” Id. at 23. BLM
responded that nothing in the Act prohibits it from authorizing
multiple gathers over a period of years in a single plan.
The District Court found merit in some of the claims
advanced by Appellant. In particular, the court held unlawful
and vacated each of the contested ten-year plans to the extent
that each authorized additional gathers after the plan has
achieved the stated population goal for a specified geographic
area. See Friends of Animals v. BLM, 728 F. Supp. 3d 45, 80-
81 (D.D.C. 2024). No party contests this judgment. The District
Court also held that the ten-year plans are unlawful to the extent
they authorize future gathers that disregard the Act’s “duty to
act promptly and to ensure that gather decisions are informed
by current information and consultation.” Id. at 81. No party
contests this judgment. The District Court then remanded the
case to BLM to “revise” each of the contested plans “to clarify
which future gathers will require further process before they
can proceed.” Id. at 79 (citation omitted); see also Joint
Appendix (“J.A.”) 406. Therefore, the parties’ principal
disagreements were left unresolved by the District Court
pending remand.
Appellant now appeals, seeking to invoke this court’s
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, that section
limits our jurisdiction to “final decisions of the district courts
of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added), and
controlling case law instructs us that “a district court’s remand
order is not normally ‘final’ for purposes of appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1291,” N.C. Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 550

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F.3d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In this case,
the District Court ordered BLM to reconsider Appellant’s
claims on remand. BLM must “adopt reasonable limitations
regarding when (and with what information in hand) it may
conduct follow-on gathers before achieving [the target
population] for each of the four [ten-year plans].” J.A. 406; see
also Friends of Animals, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 81.
The District Court’s order remanding the case to the
agency was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Therefore, on the record before us, we are required to dismiss
this appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I. B ACKGROUND
A. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
Congress enacted the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros Act in 1971 to preserve and protect wild free-roaming
horses and burros. Congress believed that doing so would
“enhance and enrich the dreams and enjoyment of future
generations of Americans.” H.R. R EP . NO. 92-681, at 7 (1971)
(Conf. Rep.). To that end, the 1971 enactment only permitted
BLM to destroy horses or burros “because of overpopulation”
if it determined that “such action [was] the only practical way
to remove excess animals from the area.” Pub. L. No. 92-195
§ 3(c), 85 Stat. 649, 650 (1971).
Congress soon realized that the 1971 law may have
overreached in pursuing its goal of protecting wild horses and
burros. The legislative history underlying the 1978
amendments to the Act notes that wild horses and burros had
“exceed[ed] the carrying capacity of the range” and “pose[d] a
threat to their own habitat” as well as other wildlife and
rangeland values. H.R. R EP . NO. 95-1122, at 2 (1978).

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Although Congress remained committed to “protecting wild
free-roaming horses and burros from capture, branding,
harassment, or death,” it also recognized the necessity of
“facilitating the removal and disposal of excess wild free-
roaming horses and burros.” Id. Congress enacted the 1978
amendments to serve both goals.
The amended Act directs BLM, as delegate for the
Secretary of the Interior, to “protect and manage wild free-
roaming horses and burros . . . in a manner that is designed to
achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on
the public lands.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a); see also id. § 1332(a).
To carry out these responsibilities, the Act tasks BLM with
“maintain[ing] a current inventory of wild free-roaming horses
and burros” in order to:
[1] make determinations as to whether and where
an overpopulation exists and whether action should be
taken to remove excess animals;
[2] determine appropriate management levels of
wild free-roaming horses and burros on these areas of
the public lands; and
[3] determine whether appropriate management
levels should be achieved by the removal or
destruction of excess animals, or other options (such
as sterilization, or natural controls on population
levels).
Id. § 1333(b)(1). “In making such determinations[,]” BLM
must consult with state and federal wildlife agencies,
independent individuals recommended by the National
Academy of Sciences, and “such other individuals” with
“scientific expertise and special knowledge of wild horse and
burro protection, wildlife management and animal husbandry
as related to rangeland management.” Id.

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BLM has some discretion in determining whether an
overpopulation of horses exists and whether removal is
necessary. However, once it has made an excess and necessary-
to-remove determination based on the statutorily required
information, it must act “immediately” to remove excess wild
horses. The Act states:
Where the Secretary determines on the basis of (i) the
current inventory of lands within his jurisdiction; (ii)
information contained in any [statutorily required]
land use planning . . . ; (iii) information contained in
court ordered environmental impact statements . . . ;
and (iv) such additional information as becomes
available to him from time to time, including that
information developed in the research study mandated
by this section, or in the absence of the information
contained in (i–iv) above on the basis of all
information currently available to him, that an
overpopulation exists on a given area of the public
lands and that action is necessary to remove excess
animals, he shall immediately remove excess animals
from the range so as to achieve appropriate
management levels.
Id. § 1333(b)(2). BLM must take action in the “order and
priority” specified by the Act, “until all excess animals have
been removed.” Id.
BLM carries out its functions under the Act in “localized
‘herd management areas’ (‘HMAs’).” Fund for Animals, Inc.
v. BLM, 460 F.3d 13, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
For example, BLM determines and sets appropriate
management levels (“AMLs”) for each herd management area.
The AML is the number of wild horses that achieves “a thriving
natural ecological balance” and is usually expressed as a range.

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B UREAU OF LAND M GMT ., U.S. DEP ’T OF THE INTERIOR , BLM
HANDBOOK H-4700-1, WILD HORSES AND B URROS
M ANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 17 (2010), J.A. 856. BLM then
monitors population levels in each HMA or “Complex,” a
group of HMAs managed collectively, to determine whether
AML is being achieved. As mentioned, if based on current
inventory and other applicable information, BLM makes a
determination that an overpopulation exists and removal is
necessary, the agency must act promptly to remove excess
animals.
Prior to taking action, BLM must create a gather plan that
includes a site-specific environmental analysis compliant with
the National Environmental Policy Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C); BLM, WILD HORSES AND B URROS
M ANAGEMENT HANDBOOK at 47-48, J.A. 857-58. A gather plan
often includes alternative proposed actions. BLM then issues a
decision record that documents the excess and necessary-to-
remove determinations, adopts a proposed action from the
gather plan, and provides a rationale for the selected action.
BLM typically implements gathers pursuant to a final decision
record.
B. Ten-Year Plans
“Historically, after making an excess determination and
explaining why removal is necessary, BLM would issue a
gather plan that authorized a single gather and removal
operation.” Br. for Fed. Appellee 8 (cleaned up). In other
words, each decision record gave BLM one attempt to bring the
wild horse population to AML, and, if that attempt failed, BLM
would have to restart the entire regulatory process. BLM
explains that, over time, this approach proved untenable. As
wild horse populations continued to grow, it became

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“impracticable” for BLM to achieve AML in a single gather.
Id. The resource and logistical challenges were too great.
BLM decided to follow a “longer-term approach” when
aiming to achieve AML. Id. BLM thus adopted gather plans
that authorize it to conduct as many removal operations as
necessary to achieve and maintain AML over a ten-year time
horizon in each HMA or Complex.
At issue on appeal are four decision records approving ten-
year gather plans for the following geographies: the Eagle
Complex, the Onaqui Mountain HMA, the Muddy Creek
HMA, and the Pine Nut Mountains HMA. We refer to the four
decision records at issue as the “ten-year plans.” Each of the
ten-year plans contains an excess and necessary-to-remove
determination and approves a gather plan that authorizes BLM
to gather and remove horses over the course of ten years to
achieve and then maintain the population within the region’s
approved AML range. The AML ranges for all four areas were
approved prior to their inclusion in the ten-year plans and are
not at issue in the present proceeding.
1. Eagle Complex
The Eagle Complex consists of three HMAs: the Eagle,
Mount Elinore, and Chokecherry HMAs. In August 2018,
BLM issued the decision record for the Eagle Complex. BLM
estimated that 2,220 wild horses were then-present in the
region and determined that removal was necessary to achieve
the approved AML range of 145-265 wild horses. The decision
record approves a gather plan that authorizes the relevant field
offices to gather and remove approximately 90% of the existing
horses and to return as needed over ten years to achieve and
maintain the AML range.

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BLM has completed several gather operations in the Eagle
Complex HMAs pursuant to the decision record. Although
more than 2,500 wild horses have been removed from the
Complex, the March 2025 population estimate was 2,400 wild
horses.
2. Muddy Creek HMA
BLM issued the decision record for the Muddy Creek
HMA in July 2018. At that time, BLM estimated that 224 wild
horses were present in the region and determined that removal
of excess horses was necessary to bring the population within
the approved AML range of 75-125 wild horses. The decision
record approves a gather plan that authorizes an initial gather
and subsequent maintenance gathers to be conducted in the
Muddy Creek HMA for ten years from the date of the initial
gather to achieve and maintain the low end of the AML range.
BLM conducted a gather and removal operation pursuant
to the decision record in September 2018, bringing the region’s
wild horse population near the low end of the AML range.
BLM represented that it “will not conduct any further gather
and removals in the Muddy Creek HMA under the [d]ecision
[record] challenged here.” Br. for Fed. Appellee 20.
3. Onaqui Mountain HMA
When BLM issued the decision record for the Onaqui
Mountain HMA in December 2018, the estimated wild horse
population was approximately 510 animals. BLM determined
that removal of excess wild horses was necessary to bring the
population within the approved AML range of 121-210 wild
horses. The decision record adopts a gather plan to initially
remove 465 wild horses and then authorizes BLM to “return
periodically over a period of ten years to maintain AML.” J.A.

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587. The adopted gather plan also authorizes BLM to return to
the HMA to remove excess horses above the low end of the
AML range if the initial gather fails to do so.
BLM began an initial gather in September 2019 and
conducted a subsequent gather in July 2021. As of March 2025,
the population was still estimated to exceed AML at
approximately 315 wild horses.
4. Pine Nut Mountains HMA
BLM issued the decision record for the Pine Nut
Mountains HMA in November 2017. At the time, the estimated
wild horse population was about 700 animals, which BLM
determined was in excess of the approved AML range of 118-
179 wild horses. The decision record adopts a gather plan to,
over the course of ten years, “achieve and maintain a
population size within the established AML.” J.A. 689.
The initial gather conducted pursuant to the decision
record began in February 2019 and was completed in July
2019. BLM estimates that 383 wild horses were gathered and
removed, but the population still exceeded AML at 317 wild
horses as of March 2025.
C. Procedural History
The District Court’s decision at issue on appeal is far from
“the first chapter in this long-running dispute, which has
already generated two lengthy opinions, and four versions of
Plaintiff’s complaint.” Friends of Animals, 728 F. Supp. 3d at
59 (citations omitted). We summarize the aspects of the saga
that are relevant to the pending appeal.

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Appellant’s operative complaint against BLM challenged
the lawfulness of the four decision records described above,
i.e., the ten-year plans. The State of Utah moved to intervene,
and the District Court granted that motion. All parties moved
for summary judgment.
Appellant argued that the ten-year plans exceed BLM’s
authority under the Act and should be held unlawful and set
aside pursuant to the APA. In Appellant’s view, the Act does
not permit BLM to issue “long-term, open-ended roundup
decisions” because the Act requires BLM to make separate
excess and necessary-to-remove determinations for each gather
operation, to make each of those determinations based on
“current information and consultation with independent
parties” and, after making such determinations, to
“immediately” remove excess animals but only until AML has
been achieved. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 7-8, Friends of Animals v. BLM, No. 1:18-cv-
02029 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2022) (citation omitted).
The District Court declined to hold the ten-year plans
“facially unlawful merely because they authorize multiple
gathers over a period of years.” Friends of Animals, 728 F.
Supp. 3d at 79. At the same time, the court found some merit
to a number of Appellant’s arguments and agreed that aspects
of the challenged plans require reconsideration.
First, the District Court held that after BLM has achieved
AML in a particular HMA or Complex, the Act does not permit
BLM to continue conducting gathers to “maintain” the
population without issuing a new gather plan and decision
record. The court explained that after BLM has made an excess
and necessary-to-remove determination, the Act “authorizes
[BLM] to remove excess animal[s] only to the extent needed
‘to achieve appropriate management levels’ and only ‘until all

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excess animals have been removed so as to restore’ the range.”
Id. at 78 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)). The court added that
because BLM’s authorization to continue a gather ends when
it achieves AML, any subsequent gather to “maintain” the
population is, effectively, premised on a new determination that
an overpopulation or excess of animals exists. Thus, BLM must
undertake the full statutory process to make the requisite
determinations. Accordingly, the District Court vacated each
of the ten-year plans to the extent it authorizes BLM to conduct
additional gathers in the region after AML has been achieved.
Second, while the District Court found the precise “line
. . . more difficult to draw based on the existing record,” it held
that the ten-year plans “are also unlawful to the extent that they
authorize future gathers that are not conducted as promptly as
reasonably possible or that authorize future gathers even
where, by the time those gathers occur, [BLM] knows (or has
reason to know) that they are based on information or
consultations that are materially out-of-date.” Id. at 79.
The court explained that the Act “places a premium on
‘current’ information” and “requires [BLM] to act based on the
best information that is currently available to it.” Id. at 72. And
while “[t]hat requirement does not preclude staged gather
plans,” it also does not permit BLM to “disregard significant
information that comes to its attention even before it has
achieved AML.” Id. Accordingly, the court also agreed with
Appellant that “a point may come when, based on all
information then-available,” BLM may have to consider
whether completing a staged gather is unnecessary and thus
unauthorized under an existing plan. Id. at 73. Similarly, the
court recognized that given the Act’s “clear” directive that
BLM consider and take “seriously” expert input, “there may be
limits on [BLM’s] authority to use a multi-year gather plan as
a means of circumventing the consultation requirement.” Id. at

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73-74 (citation omitted). Last, the court was not persuaded that
the Act requires BLM to “immediately” achieve AML after
making an excess and necessary-to-remove determination. Id.
at 77. However, the District Court heeded this court’s
observation that the Act requires “prompt action” and “thus
directs that excess horses should be removed expeditiously.”
Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Watt,
694 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Applying that directive,
the court found that the Act does not permit BLM “to take an
entire decade to act.” Id.
In short, the court found that the ten-year plans had gone
too far. The court explained that BLM “may not grant itself
carte blanche to conduct gathers many years from now, without
regard to the statutory requirements.” Id. at 79. However,
recognizing that BLM “is better situated than the court to draw
those lines in the first instance,” id. (cleaned up) (citing Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978)), the court remanded to BLM to
“adopt reasonable limitations regarding when (and with what
information in hand) it may conduct follow-on gathers before
achieving AML,” id. at 81. In clarifying the scope of its
holding, the District Court observed that “each of the [ten-year]
plans appears to leave [BLM] unlimited discretion to conduct
gathers intended to achieve AML at any time over the next
decade.” Id. at 80. While the court recognized that BLM “is
entitled to some leeway,” it also held that BLM may not grant
itself blanket authorization “to continue initial gathers for many
years to come, notwithstanding the duty to act promptly and to
ensure that gather decisions are informed by current
information and consultation.” Id. at 80-81.
All parties filed notices of appeal. BLM and Utah
subsequently moved to voluntarily dismiss their appeals, and

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this court granted both motions. Only Appellant’s appeal
remains pending before this court.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the parties continue to dispute BLM’s authority
under the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses Act to conduct
multiple gather operations over a period of years pursuant to a
single decision record. The parties take largely the same
positions that they took before the District Court. Appellant
continues to assert that the ten-year plans are unlawful because
the Act requires BLM to undertake the full statutory process
for each gather and removal operation. Meanwhile, BLM
maintains that the ten-year plans are lawful because the Act
authorizes it to “conduct[] multiple gathers and removals as
necessary to achieve AML based on a single excess [and
necessary-to-remove] determination.” Br. for Fed. Appellee
30.
In addressing these positions, the District Court rendered
two principal legal conclusions that are not in dispute on
appeal.
First, no party disputes the District Court’s holding that the
ten-year plans violate the Act to the extent they authorize
additional gather operations after the plan has achieved AML.
The District Court’s order for partial vacatur is, therefore, not
at issue on appeal.
Second, no party disputes the District Court’s holding that
the ten-year plans are “also unlawful to the extent that they
authorize future gathers that are not conducted as promptly as
reasonably possible or that authorize future gathers even
where, by the time those gathers occur, [BLM] knows (or has
reason to know) that they are based on information or

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consultations that are materially out-of-date.” Friends of
Animals, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 79.
Neither BLM nor Utah maintained its cross appeal, and,
therefore, neither may “press arguments that would change or
modify the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s judgment to [its] benefit.”
Shatsky v. Pal. Liberation Org., 955 F.3d 1016, 1028 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (citing Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 276 (2015)).
Appellant, for its part, generally urges this court to adopt
more decisive holdings in its favor. But Appellant does not
contest the District Court’s holdings that the ten-year plans are
“unlawful” in certain respects and must be revisited on remand.
Any disputes between the parties regarding the application of
the standards enunciated by the District Court are beyond the
jurisdiction of this court to consider. They will be subject to
resolution on remand, as necessary.
A. The District Court’s Remand Order Is Not Final
As noted above, Appellant seeks to invoke this court’s
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to challenge the ten-year
plans. That section limits our review to “final decisions of the
district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see
Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188 (2011). Appellant asserts,
and BLM does not dispute, that the District Court’s remand
order is final and, thus, appealable. However, “[b]ecause the
question relates to our jurisdiction to hear the case, we are
obligated to conduct an independent inquiry, notwithstanding
the parties’ agreement.” Lacson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 726 F.3d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)). Having
done so, we disagree with both Appellant and BLM. The
remand order at issue is not final, and we do not have
jurisdiction to review it.

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“It is black letter law that a district court’s remand order is
not normally ‘final’ for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.” N.C. Fisheries, 550 F.3d at 19 (citations omitted).
This rule generally forecloses a private party from obtaining
immediate appellate review of an order that remands a case to
an agency for further proceedings. See id. at 19-20; see also,
e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 231 F.3d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir.
2000). We have not departed from this rule even where, as here,
the district court has declined to vacate the contested agency
action. See, e.g., N.C. Fisheries, 550 F.3d at 18, 20-21.
In practice, we have recognized only limited exceptions to
this rule. These exceptions occur in instances where the remand
order effectively terminates the action, Limnia, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, 857 F.3d 379, 385-86 (D.C. Cir. 2017), such
as where the order “finally dispose[s]” of the petitioner’s
claims, Am. Great Lakes Ports Ass’n v. Schultz, 962 F.3d 510,
515 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted), or remands for “solely
‘ministerial’ proceedings,” Pueblo of Sandia, 231 F.3d at 881
(compiling cases). “Conversely, if an order does not terminate
an action, but instead ‘leaves the core dispute unresolved’ for
‘further proceedings,’ it is not final for purposes of § 1291.”
Limnia, 857 F.3d at 385 (cleaned up) (quoting Am. Haw.
Cruises v. Skinner, 893 F.2d 1400, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
Here, it is plain that the District Court did not fully resolve
the parties’ “core dispute” and that BLM must give further
consideration to Appellant’s claims on remand. The District
Court observed that “each of the [ten-year] plans appears to
leave [BLM] unlimited direction to conduct gathers intended
to achieve AML at any time over the next decade.” Friends of
Animals, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 80. It added that each plan
authorizes future gathers “to be conducted at unspecified times,
based on unspecified information and consultation.” Id. The
court found that the Act does not authorize BLM to grant itself

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such broad and unfettered discretion to conduct gathers. But it
added that “based on the existing record,” it could not “draw
those lines in the first instance.” Id. at 79. So, it remanded to
BLM to consider the peripheries of its authority under the Act
and to incorporate those limits into each of the ten-year plans.
The question of the boundaries of BLM’s authority under
the Act and how those boundaries map onto the four decision
records at issue is the parties’ “core dispute” in this case. The
District Court provided guidance and set some outer limits.
BLM must address the particulars on remand, including “when
(and with what information in hand) it may conduct follow-on
gathers before achieving AML for each of the four decision
records.” J.A. 406 (cleaned up); see also Friends of Animals,
728 F. Supp. 3d at 81. And it must revise each of the decision
records accordingly. BLM is mistaken if it views this exercise
as optional. Therefore, it is clear that there is more for the
agency to do on remand.
In a circumstance such as this, we cannot view the remand
order as final. See Limnia, 857 F.3d at 385; Pueblo of Sandia,
231 F.3d at 880-81; see also, e.g., Am. Haw. Cruises, 893 F.2d
at 1402 (stating that a remand order instructing an agency “to
engage in reasoned decisionmaking surely [does] not end the
litigation on the merits” (citations omitted)). The fact that the
District Court described the order as final, purported to
relinquish jurisdiction to BLM, and terminated the action from
its docket does not change our analysis. See Limnia, 857 F.3d
at 386 (“[T]hat characterization cannot bind us.” (citation
omitted)). That is especially true where, as here, the remand
order is otherwise “not final in character.” Am. Haw. Cruises,
893 F.2d at 1403 (cleaned up).
Deferring review of a non-final order “best serves the
interests of judicial economy and efficiency.” Pueblo of

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Sandia, 231 F.3d at 880 (citation omitted). By declining to
interject at this juncture, we refrain from engaging in the
“piecemeal appellate disposition of what is, in practical
consequence, but a single controversy.” Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). We avoid the prospect of
duplicative appeals and, in the meantime, give BLM the
opportunity to remediate and perhaps even reach a solution that
satisfies all parties without further judicial intervention. See
Pueblo of Sandia, 231 F.3d at 880.
If Appellant remains aggrieved following remand, it will
“be able again to seek judicial review, including review in the
court of appeals, raising not only new issues but all those on
which it got no satisfaction in its original challenge.” Lakes
Pilots Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 359 F.3d 624, 625 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see generally id. (dismissing for
lack of jurisdiction where it was likely that the petitioner’s
members would “still be aggrieved by the outcome” but would
have a subsequent opportunity for review).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
So ordered.

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