State of New York v. Donald J. Trump, in His Official Capacity As the President of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 7, 2025 Decided July 14, 2026
No. 23-5103
STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
Consolidated with 24-5047
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:20-cv-02340)
McKaye L. Neumeister, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs
were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Brian M.
Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, at the
time the opening brief was filed, and Mark B. Stern, Adam C.
Jed, and Daniel Tenny, Attorneys.
Kwame N. Akosah, Assistant Solicitor General, Office of
the Attorney General for the State of New York, argued the
cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Barbara D.

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Underwood, Solicitor General, Ester Murdukhayeva, Deputy
Solicitor General, Lori N. Tanigawa, Deputy Attorney General,
Department of the Attorney General for the State of Hawaii,
Justine M. Longa and Andrew H. Yang, Deputy Attorneys
General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New
Jersey, MacKenzie Fillow, Assistant Corporation Counsel,
New York City Law Department, and David Chiu, City
Attorney, City Attorney’s Office of San Francisco. Michael J.
Myers, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of New York, and Mayur P. Saxena,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
State of New Jersey, entered appearances.
Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, WILKINS and RAO,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.
RAO, Circuit Judge: In 2020, the United States Postal
Service made changes to the collection, processing, and
delivery of the mail. Several states and municipalities sued in
district court, arguing in part that the postal changes would
affect voting by mail in the November 2020 election. The
district court entered a preliminary injunction against the postal
changes and later granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs
on one of their claims.
We conclude the district court had no jurisdiction over that
claim. Congress created a review scheme that channels certain
complaints about Postal Service policies first to the Postal
Regulatory Commission, with subsequent review in this court.
This statutory review scheme displaced the district court’s
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim. See Thunder Basin Coal
Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994). We therefore vacate the
grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs.

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I.
In the summer of 2020, the Postal Service implemented a
set of operational changes that we refer to as the “Postal Policy
Changes.” The Postal Policy Changes included a reduction in
the number of high-speed mail sorting machines, a decrease in
employee overtime, the elimination of late or extra mail
delivery trips, and a change in the sequence by which some
mail carriers sort and deliver the mail. Federal law requires the
Postal Service to seek an advisory opinion from the Postal
Regulatory Commission before making a “change in the nature
of postal services” that will “generally affect service on a
nationwide or substantially nationwide basis.” 39 U.S.C.
§ 3661(b). The Postal Service did not request an advisory
opinion from the Commission before making the Postal Policy
Changes.
In the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act,
Congress provided that complaints about certain Postal Service
actions may be filed with the Commission, with review of
Commission orders available exclusively in this court. Id.
§§ 3662–63.
The states of New York, New Jersey, and Hawaii, the city
of New York, and the city and county of San Francisco (the
“States”) opposed the Postal Policy Changes. Instead of
making use of the Postal Commission review scheme, the
States filed suit in district court. The States argued that the
changes, implemented just months before the November 2020
general election, impeded their provision of public services and
the ability of their residents to vote by mail. They raised three
claims in their August 2020 complaint, including a claim that
the Postal Service failed to request an advisory opinion from
the Commission before making the Postal Policy Changes.

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In September 2020, the district court held that the States
were likely to succeed on the advisory opinion claim and
granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
Postal Policy Changes. The court rejected the government’s
argument that, under Thunder Basin, the Postal Commission
review scheme precluded district court jurisdiction over the
States’ advisory opinion claim. In the district court’s view, the
review scheme provided a separate avenue for relief that did
not displace the court’s original jurisdiction over suits against
the Postal Service. The court also emphasized that the review
scheme would not provide the States with meaningful judicial
review because the Commission may take up to 90 days to act
on an administrative complaint, and the States needed
immediate relief ahead of the November election. See 39
U.S.C. § 3662(b).
Two years later, the district court granted summary
judgment for the States on the advisory opinion claim and for
the government on the States’ other claims. The court affirmed
its previous holding that it had jurisdiction over the advisory
opinion claim because the Postal Commission review scheme
was merely supplemental and district court review was
necessary for the States to obtain prompt relief from the Postal
Policy Changes. Concluding that the States’ advisory opinion
claim succeeded on the merits, the district court permanently
enjoined the Postal Service from implementing one of the
Postal Policy Changes—the elimination of late or extra trips—
without first requesting an advisory opinion from the
Commission.

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The government timely appealed.1 We review the district
court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Vanda Pharms.,
Inc. v. FDA, 123 F.4th 513, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
II.
We begin and end with jurisdiction. The States were
required to bring the advisory opinion claim in an
administrative complaint filed with the Commission, not in a
lawsuit filed with the district court. Because the district court
lacked jurisdiction, we reverse.2
When Congress channels claims for initial review by an
administrative agency, rather than a district court, we must
respect that jurisdictional choice. Congress may channel claims
by explicitly precluding judicial review. See, e.g., Shalala v.
Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 7–9
(2000) (detailing the channeling of Medicare claims via an
express statutory preclusion clause). Congress may also
channel claims “implicitly, by specifying [an administrative]
method to resolve claims about agency action.” Axon Enter.,
Inc. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct. 890, 900 (2023).
To determine whether a statutory review scheme channels
a claim for initial administrative review and thereby precludes
1 The government separately appealed from the district court’s
permanent injunction and denial of the government’s post-trial
motion, and from the district court’s later final judgment. We
consolidated the two appeals.
2 Since we can “address jurisdictional issues in any order,” and we
conclude that the statutory review scheme precluded the district
court’s jurisdiction, we do not address the States’ standing to raise
the advisory opinion claim. Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 144
S. Ct. 18, 21 (2023).

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district court jurisdiction, we employ the two-step Thunder
Basin framework. Fed. L. Enf’t Officers Ass’n v. Ahuja, 62
F.4th 551, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Under that framework,
Congress’s creation of a statutory review scheme implicitly
displaces district court jurisdiction when (1) “such intent is
fairly discernible in the statutory scheme,” and (2) the claim at
issue is “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within
[the] statutory structure.” Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 212
(cleaned up). Applying this framework, we conclude the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the States’ claim
that the Postal Service was required to seek an advisory opinion
before implementing the Postal Policy Changes.
A.
At Thunder Basin step one, we hold that Congress created
a specialized review scheme for challenges to Postal Service
policy changes, and that scheme generally displaces district
court jurisdiction.
“Generally, when Congress creates procedures designed to
permit agency expertise to be brought to bear on particular
problems, those procedures are to be exclusive.” Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010)
(cleaned up). With respect to challenges to agency action, the
scheme Congress “typically chooses” is initial review by an
agency followed by judicial review in a court of appeals. Axon,
143 S. Ct. at 900; cf. id. (“The agency effectively fills in for the
district court, with the court of appeals providing judicial
review.”). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has “several times
held that the creation of such a review scheme for agency action
divests district courts of their ordinary jurisdiction over the
covered cases.” Id.; see Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207–12;
Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 10–15 (2012). This
court has further highlighted that a “detail[ed]” or

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“comprehensive” statutory review scheme provides additional
evidence that Congress channeled claims for initial
administrative review. Miriyeva v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs., 9 F.4th 935, 939–40 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up); see
also Patten v. District of Columbia, 9 F.4th 921, 927 (D.C. Cir.
2021) (“[T]he detailed, precise, and comprehensive nature of
an administrative-review scheme counts against immediate
resort to federal district court.”).
The Postal Commission review scheme contains all the
hallmarks of a statutory scheme that precludes district court
jurisdiction. The scheme provides for initial administrative
review followed by judicial review in the court of appeals. See
Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 900. Interested persons may file a complaint
against the Postal Service with the Commission. 39 U.S.C.
§ 3662(a). After the Commission has adjudicated a complaint,
aggrieved parties may petition for review in the D.C. Circuit.
Id. § 3663. The statutory scheme also provides a detailed
process for Commission review. See Miriyeva, 9 F.4th at 939–
40. Within 90 days of receiving a complaint, the Commission
must either begin proceedings to adjudicate the complaint or
dismiss it. 39 U.S.C. § 3662(b)(1). The Commission’s failure
to address a complaint within 90 days constitutes dismissal. Id.
§ 3662(b)(2). If a complaint is found to be justified, the
Commission must order the Postal Service to comply with
federal law and, in cases of deliberate noncompliance, may
impose a fine. Id. § 3662(c)–(d).
Given the structure and nature of the statutory review
scheme, we hold that it generally precludes district court
jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion, we draw support from
the unanimous agreement of our sister circuits. See, e.g., White
v. U.S. Post Office, No. 23-1239, 2024 WL 2973705, at *2–3
(10th Cir. June 13, 2024); Foster v. Pitney Bowes Corp., 549
F. App’x 982, 985–86 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam); cf. LeMay

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v. USPS, 450 F.3d 797, 799–801 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding
the same about an earlier version of section 3662 that did not
provide for appellate review).
The States disagree, claiming the statutory review scheme
is not exclusive and district courts retain concurrent jurisdiction
over challenges to Postal Service actions. We find their
arguments unpersuasive.
The States cite other statutes that provide district courts
with original jurisdiction over suits related to the Postal
Service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1339; 39 U.S.C. § 409(a). But such
grants must give way when Congress explicitly or implicitly
channels claims for initial administrative review. Axon, 143
S. Ct. at 900; cf. LeMay, 450 F.3d at 799 (holding that broad
jurisdictional grants “may be preempted when another,
precisely drawn, detailed statute places jurisdiction
elsewhere”) (cleaned up). The Postal Commission review
scheme channels claims to the Commission and implicitly
precludes district court jurisdiction.
The States also emphasize how interested persons
“may”—but are not required to—file a complaint with the
Commission. See 39 U.S.C. § 3662(a). That language,
however, merely recognizes that a decision by an interested
person to challenge actions of the Postal Service is not
mandatory. It does not undermine Congress’s channeling
decision, as confirmed by other statutory schemes containing
similar language that courts have found to preclude district
court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Elgin, 567 U.S. at 12–13; Thunder
Basin, 510 U.S. at 207–08; Miriyeva, 9 F.4th at 939–40.
Finally, the States attempt to distinguish our sister circuits’
decisions. They contend those decisions involved claims of
inadequate postal services cognizable under 39 U.S.C.
§ 3661(a), while their advisory opinion claim is brought under

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39 U.S.C. § 3661(b). This distinction is immaterial given the
statutory review scheme. The scheme applies to, among other
things, claims that the Postal Service is violating Title 39,
Chapter 36, which includes sections 3661(a) and (b). See 39
U.S.C. § 3662(a). The out-of-circuit decisions are therefore
relevant and persuasive.
The detailed statutory review scheme provides for initial
administrative review of claims against the Postal Service,
followed by appellate judicial review. The scheme thus
channels claims to the Commission and away from district
courts.
B.
“Claims will be found to fall outside of the scope of a
special statutory scheme in only limited circumstances.”
AFGE, AFL-CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up). At Thunder Basin step two, the States bear the
burden to show that the statutory review scheme, “though
exclusive where it applies,” does not reach their advisory
opinion claim. Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 900–01.
The Supreme Court has identified three factors to guide
this part of the Thunder Basin analysis: (1) “could precluding
district court jurisdiction foreclose all meaningful judicial
review of the claim”; (2) “is the claim wholly collateral to the
statute’s review provisions”; and (3) “is the claim outside the
agency’s expertise.” Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 900 (cleaned up).
These factors do not function as “inputs into a strict
mathematical formula,” but rather as “general guideposts
useful for [determining] … whether the particular claims at
issue fall outside an overarching congressional design.”
Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “The ultimate
question is how best to understand what Congress has done.”
Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 900. Guided by these factors, we conclude

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the States’ advisory opinion claim is squarely “of the type” that
must first be brought to the Commission, and therefore the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Thunder Basin,
510 U.S. at 212.
1.
To begin with, the statutory review scheme provides for
meaningful judicial review. “The first Thunder Basin factor
recognizes that Congress rarely allows claims about agency
action to escape effective judicial review.” Axon, 143 S. Ct. at
901. In this case, the States could have brought their advisory
opinion claim in a complaint filed with the Commission and
then petitioned this court for review of the Commission’s
decision. We have repeatedly held that the availability of
appellate review of an administrative decision can satisfy the
requirement for meaningful judicial review. See, e.g., Fed. L.
Enf’t Officers Ass’n, 62 F.4th at 560–61; AFGE, AFL-CIO, 929
F.3d at 758–59.
The States raise two objections to the adequacy of the
statutory review scheme, but neither is persuasive.
First, the States argue that pursuing a complaint before the
Commission instead of suing in district court would have
resulted in irreparable harm that could not have been later
remedied by this court. With the impending November 2020
election, the States contend that the Postal Policy Changes
would have sharply undermined their ability to provide public
services and the ability of their residents to vote by mail.
Because the Commission can take up to 90 days to act on a
complaint, the States argue they would have suffered
irreparable harm if they were unable to obtain immediate relief
from a district court.

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We decline to adopt a general “irreparable harm”
exception by which parties can evade jurisdictional channeling
provisions. When Congress channels claims to a particular
forum, it imposes the constraints of that forum on the
channeled claims. AFGE v. Sec’y of Air Force, 716 F.3d 633,
638–39 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Here, Congress has channeled claims
against the Postal Service to the Commission and allowed the
Commission up to 90 days to adjudicate those claims. 39
U.S.C. § 3662(a)–(b). An irreparable harm exception would
undermine Congress’s creation of the exclusive review scheme
and the remedial limitations that accompany it. Cf. Patten, 9
F.4th at 928 (“Allowing challengers to proceed through a more
general statute is particularly inappropriate when doing so
would eviscerate specific requirements of the narrower
scheme.”). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that
many statutory review schemes “require parties to wait before
[obtaining appellate review], even when doing so subjects them
to significant burdens.” Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 904 (cleaned up).
With a few exceptions, such burdens do not permit parties to
circumvent review schemes established by Congress.3 Id.
Second, regardless of whether the States could have
brought their advisory opinion claim before the Commission
prior to seeking a preliminary injunction from the district court,
the government contends that the States should have filed a
complaint with the Commission even after the preliminary
3 Because the government challenges the district court’s 2022 grant
of summary judgment, we need not address whether the statutory
review scheme would have foreclosed all meaningful judicial review
at the preliminary injunction stage, when the States sought to halt the
Postal Policy Changes only months before the November 2020
general election. Cf. Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 903–04 (recognizing that a
statutory review scheme may not provide meaningful judicial review
of certain “here-and-now” injuries that are “impossible to remedy” if
judicial review is deferred).

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injunction issued. The States maintain, however, that the
injunction made such a complaint “moot,” and therefore they
would have been unable to seek appellate review of a
Commission decision.
The States essentially argue that because they successfully
obtained an injunction, Postal Commission review could no
longer result in meaningful judicial review.4 This argument is
flawed. Even under the States’ theory, the preliminary
injunction did not foreclose all meaningful judicial review
through the statutory review scheme. Instead of maintaining
their request for summary judgment in district court, the States
could have moved to dismiss the case and dissolve the
injunction, and then filed a complaint with the Commission.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). Their refusal to do so is
understandable, but it demonstrates that their objection is really
a disagreement with the limits of the statutory review scheme
and the possibility of a 90-day wait. And as we have already
explained, the States cannot evade Postal Commission review
because it is not their preferred remedial path. Sec’y of Air
Force, 716 F.3d at 638–39. In deciding this appeal, we must
give effect to Congress’s channeling decision, which includes
the timing and scope of administrative review. See Patten, 9
F.4th at 927–28.
4 Although the States frame this problem as one of mootness, it more
accurately sounds in standing. The States would, of course, need to
show standing to petition this court for review of an adverse
Commission ruling. See Lewis v. Becerra, 111 F.4th 65, 69–70 & n.1
(D.C. Cir. 2024).

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2.
Next, the States’ advisory opinion claim fits squarely
within the statutory review scheme and is therefore not at all
collateral to that scheme.
The second Thunder Basin factor reflects the “point of
special review provisions—to give the agency a heightened
role in the matters it customarily handles.” Axon, 143 S. Ct. at
901. A claim is therefore not collateral if it is merely “an
attempt to accomplish what’s contemplated by the review
scheme,” Miriyeva, 9 F.4th at 941, or “obtain the same relief [a
plaintiff] could seek in the agency proceeding,” Jarkesy, 803
F.3d at 23. By contrast, structural constitutional claims, such as
a challenge to an agency’s existence, are wholly collateral.
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 490–91. This is in part because
agencies do not normally resolve such constitutional
objections. Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 904–05; cf. Carr v. Saul, 141
S. Ct. 1352, 1360 (2021) (“[A]gency adjudications are
generally ill suited to address structural constitutional
challenges.”).
The States’ advisory opinion claim is a procedural
objection within the heartland of the Postal Commission review
scheme. The claim implicates one of the Commission’s
statutory responsibilities, namely providing advisory opinions
regarding Postal Service policy changes. Interested persons can
file a complaint with the Commission alleging a violation of
the advisory opinion procedures. 39 U.S.C. § 3662(a). If the
complaint is justified, the Commission “shall order” the Postal
Service to comply with the statutory requirement. Id.
§ 3662(c). In fact, the Commission has “regularly adjudicated”
complaints like the one brought by the States that the Postal

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Service imposed changes without first seeking an advisory
opinion from the Commission.5 Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22.
The States’ advisory opinion claim is therefore not like a
structural constitutional claim, which would normally be
resolved by courts. Because the States’ claim fits squarely
within the statutory review scheme, it should have been
brought first to the Commission.
3.
Finally, determining whether the Postal Service should
seek an advisory opinion is a question well within the
Commission’s expertise. Agencies possess expertise regarding
the substantive requirements of statutes that they regularly
administer. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 23. This third Thunder Basin
factor reflects Congress’s decision to channel claims so that
agencies can apply this “distinctive knowledge” at the initial
stage of review. Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 901. Here, the Commission
provides advisory opinions when requested by the Postal
Service, and the Commission regularly construes the advisory
opinion requirement when resolving complaints against the
Postal Service. 39 U.S.C. §§ 3661–62. By administering its
statutory obligations, the Commission has distinctive
knowledge about when an advisory opinion is necessary.
The States respond that the legal questions in this case are
also within the expertise of federal courts. It goes without
5 See, e.g., Order No. 6067 - Order Granting Motion to Dismiss
Complaint, PRC Docket No. C2022-1 (Dec. 17, 2021),
https://perma.cc/9S7Z-SC98 (reviewing and dismissing an advisory
opinion complaint filed by 21 states); Order No. 2136 - Order
Dismissing Complaint, PRC Docket No. C2014-1 (Jul. 28, 2014),
https://perma.cc/69SJ-XGKE (reviewing and dismissing an advisory
opinion complaint).

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saying that legal questions are within the expertise of the courts
and that the recognition of agency expertise in the Thunder
Basin framework does not preclude an appellate court from
exercising “independent judgment” about legal questions when
resolving a subsequent petition for review. See Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024). But at
Thunder Basin step two, the presumption is that a statutory
review scheme is exclusive with respect to claims within its
scope. Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 17. The Commission’s expertise is
just one of several reasons why the review scheme extends to
the States’ advisory opinion claim. Initial review by the
Commission, followed by review in this court, allows both the
agency and this court to apply their expertise to claims
channeled through the Postal Commission review scheme.
* * *
When Congress has channeled claims away from district
courts, we must enforce that jurisdictional choice. Because of
the Postal Commission review scheme, the district court had no
jurisdiction over the States’ advisory opinion claim.
Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary judgment for the
States and remand with instructions for the court to dismiss the
advisory opinion claim.
So ordered.

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