David J. Rudometkin v. Daniel Driscoll, in His Capacity As Secretary of the U.s. Army

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 27, 2026 Decided August 21, 2026
No. 25-5033
DAVID J. RUDOMETKIN,
APPELLANT
v.
DANIEL DRISCOLL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
U.S. ARMY,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:22-cv-01968)
Christina R. Gay, appointed by the court, argued the cause
as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With her on the briefs
were Alexandra O’Keefe and Roman Martinez.
David J. Rudometkin, pro se, was on the briefs for
appellant.
Johnny H. Walker III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanine Ferris
Pirro, U.S. Attorney, and Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Assistant U.S.
Attorney.

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No. 25-7011
EVANGELISTIC GODSON,
APPELLANT
v.
JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE AND PATRICK WALSH, DR.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:23-cv-03824)
Christina R. Gay, appointed by the court, argued the cause
as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With her on the briefs
were Alexandra O’Keefe and Roman Martinez.
M. Peggy Chu argued the cause for appellees. With her on
the brief was Derek M. Stikeleather.
Before: KATSAS, WALKER, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA.
Opinion concurring in the judgments filed by Circuit
Judge KATSAS.
GARCIA, Circuit Judge: David J. Rudometkin and
Evangelistic Godson, two pro se litigants, each filed an
untimely notice of appeal. The question before us is whether
those filings should be construed to include a motion to extend
or reopen the time to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(5) or (6).

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We hold that if a pro se notice of appeal can reasonably be
read as recognizing that the appeal is late, providing reasons
for that lateness, and requesting relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6),
then it should be construed to include a Rule 4(a)(5) or (6)
motion. Rudometkin’s notice of appeal meets that standard,
but Godson’s does not. We accordingly order a limited remand
in Rudometkin’s case, and we dismiss Godson’s appeal as
untimely.1
I
A
Congress has required that a notice of appeal in a civil case
be filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order
appealed from, or within 60 days if a party is a United States
officer sued in an official capacity. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)–(b);
accord Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A)–(B). These time limits are
“mandatory and jurisdictional.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S.
205, 209 (2007); accord Kidd v. District of Columbia, 206 F.3d
35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
As relevant here, Congress has provided two exceptions to
these time limits. First, “[t]he district court may, upon motion
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.” 28
U.S.C. § 2107(c) (emphasis added). Second, “the district court
may, upon motion filed within 180 days after entry of the
judgment or order or within 14 days after receipt of such notice,
whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal” if the district
1 Although we “did not formally consolidate the separate
appeals,” they were “argued on the same day before the same panel,
and we find it convenient to dispose of both appeals with a single
opinion.” Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 583 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1980).

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court finds “that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a
judgment or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or
any party within 21 days of its entry” and “that no party would
be prejudiced.” Id. (emphasis added).
Consistent with Congress’s directive, Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a) sets forth the standards governing
motions to extend or reopen the time to appeal. Rule 4(a)(5)
provides that “[t]he district court may extend the time to file a
notice of appeal” if “a party so moves” within 30 days after the
time to appeal expires, and if “that party shows excusable
neglect or good cause.” Rule 4(a)(6) provides that “[t]he
district court may reopen the time to file an appeal,” but “only
if”: (A) “the court finds that the moving party did not receive
notice” within 21 days of entry of the judgment; (B) “the
motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is
entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives
[proper] notice” of the entry, “whichever is earlier”; and
(C) “the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.”
By their plain text, Rule 4(a)(5) and Rule 4(a)(6) “require[]
appellants to file a motion” with the district court before relief
may be granted. Kidd, 206 F.3d at 38.
B
Before us are two pro se litigants who missed their default
deadlines to file a notice of appeal.
The first, David J. Rudometkin, sued the Secretary of the
Army under the Freedom of Information Act. On December 4,
2024, the district court entered an order denying Rudometkin’s
motion for a preliminary injunction. On February 11, 2025—
69 days after the district court entered its order—the district
court clerk received and docketed a document from
Rudometkin titled “Notice of Appeal & Motion to Transfer
Appeal to a Related Case Currently in Appeal.”

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Rudometkin’s document, reproduced in Appendix A,
begins by stating that Rudometkin “hereby appeal[s]” the
district court’s December 4, 2024, order. Rudometkin J.A. 13.
It then explains that Rudometkin “has not received an order
from the Court denying the preliminary injunction” and “only
became aware through a third party that an order was entered.”
Id. “Accordingly,” the filing continues, “in the event this
notice of appeal does not reach the court in time, Plaintiff
requests an[] extension of time as per Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(5)(A)(i)(ii) [sic], as this notice of appeal is within 30 days
of the sixty day time limit and there is good cause to grant an
extension, as per Rule 4(a)(6)(A)—Plaintiff has never received
notice of the Court’s order.” Id.
The second pro se litigant, Evangelistic Godson, sued The
Johns Hopkins Hospital and a doctor, alleging that they
mistreated him during a medical appointment.2 On December
4, 2024, the district court dismissed Godson’s case without
prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. On January 10,
2025—37 days after entry of the district court judgment—
Godson filed a document titled “Notice of Appeal” in the
district court.
Godson’s document, reproduced in Appendix B,3 is titled
“Notice of Appeal” and begins with: “Plaintiff now files
appeal due to gross miscarriage of justice in the above matter.”
Godson J.A. 13. It then accuses the district court of “repeatedly
den[ying] plaintiff to express his pos[i]tion throughout the
filing of this action.” Id. The document states that “plaintiff
2 The defendants note that Godson incorrectly named The Johns
Hopkins Hospital as “Johns Hopkins Medicine.” Godson Appellees’
Brief i.
3 The document was filed with every letter capitalized and
italicized. Throughout this opinion we adjust those features for
readability.

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should have been awarded summary judg[]ment since
defendants never properly answered his complaint”; that the
court “denied [his] right to appear before” it; that he had
difficulty “contact[ing] the courtroom deputy”; and that he
“was only made aware of his dismissal of December 4, 2024
while here in Washington, DC for the day of rememb[ra]nce
for President Jimmy Carter.” Id. at 13–14. The document also
accuses the defendants’ attorney of “refus[ing] to accept
service on behalf of []his clients,” and the defendants
themselves of having “plaintiff followed on various occasions
and even [having] his home watched.” Id. It also includes
lamentations about President Trump, the racial composition of
President Trump’s staff, the Supreme Court, and the “death of
democracy.” Id. The document, moreover, states that Godson
“has suffered in agony as a 100% disabled American veteran
and PTSD and [military sexual trauma] survivor” and that he
has been “denied adequate [health] care and ha[s] become leery
of trusting doctors.” Id. at 13.
The district court promptly transmitted both Rudometkin’s
and Godson’s filings to this court. In Rudometkin’s case, we
ordered Rudometkin to show cause why his appeal should not
be dismissed as untimely. In Godson’s case, the defendants
moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. We then appointed
Christina R. Gay as amicus counsel to present arguments for
Rudometkin and Godson, and she ably discharged her
responsibilities.
II
Rudometkin and Godson did not file their notices of
appeal by the default deadlines. But their notices of appeal are
not necessarily time-barred. If their notices also included a
“motion” under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6), and if those motions were
meritorious, their appeals would be timely. These cases thus
present the question whether, and under what circumstances, a

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pro se notice of appeal should be construed to include a Rule
4(a)(5) or (6) motion.
We hold that if a pro se notice of appeal can reasonably be
read as recognizing that the appeal is late, explaining why, and
requesting relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6), then it should be
construed to include a Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motion.
Rudometkin’s filing satisfies that standard. But Godson’s does
not.
A
As a threshold matter, we review de novo a district court’s
failure to construe a pro se notice of appeal to include a Rule
4(a)(5) or (6) motion.
Absent an “explicit statutory command,” we “traditionally
look to two factors” to decide “whether a district court’s
decision should be subject to searching or deferential appellate
review.” McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U.S. 72, 79 (2017). First,
“we ask whether the history of appellate practice yields an
answer.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Second, “at least”
where no “historical tradition exists,” we ask whether, “as a
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor
is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question.” Id. These factors point toward de novo review here.
To start with appellate practice, in an analogous context,
courts of appeals have reviewed de novo whether a district
court has properly “construe[d]” a prisoner’s motion for relief
from judgment as a successive habeas petition, the latter of
which requires “obtain[ing] prefiling authorization from a
court of appeals.” United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 397
(4th Cir. 2015); see also In re Coleman, 768 F.3d 367, 371 (5th
Cir. 2014); Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 2009).
That inquiry turns on the substance of the motion at hand—
whether it “seeks to add a new ground for relief” or “attacks

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the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the
merits.” Coleman, 768 F.3d at 371. Here too, the inquiry turns
on whether the contents of a filing titled one way—a notice of
appeal—warrant construing the filing as something else—a
Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motion.4
Moreover, district courts are not much “better positioned”
than courts of appeals to determine whether a notice of appeal
should be construed to include a Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motion.
McLane, 581 U.S. at 79. As explained below, that threshold
inquiry—distinct from the question whether relief should be
granted—turns on an objective reading of the substance of a
filing. Cf. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (“[T]he
notice afforded by a document, not the litigant's motivation in
filing it, determines the document's sufficiency as a notice of
appeal.”). It does not involve the kind of “multifarious,” fact-
dependent assessment generally reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.,
572 U.S. 559, 563–64 (2014); see also Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 561–62 (1988). Applying de novo review here
also promotes “unifo[rmity]” by “providing” the district court
and future litigants with a “defined set of rules” for this
recurring issue. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697
4 We once stated in passing that the district court “did not abuse
its discretion by refusing to view” a “Motion for Leave to File Notice
of Appeal pro se by Plaintiff” as a motion for relief from a final
judgment. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing
Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Toolasprashad v.
BOP, 286 F.3d 576, 582–83 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). The two cited cases,
however, did not prescribe any standard of review governing a
district court’s construction of a filing, and their analysis is, if
anything, more consistent with a de novo approach. See Hall, 437
F.3d at 99 (“[T]he district court properly construed [the filing].”);
Toolasprashad, 286 F.3d at 582–83 (construing a filing in the first
instance when the district court had not done so).

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(1996) (quotation marks omitted) (de novo review applies to
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause).
B
We now turn to the central question presented: whether,
and under what circumstances, a pro se notice of appeal should
be construed as both a notice of appeal and a Rule 4(a)(5) or
(6) motion.
We begin with two principles that establish what is not
required for a filing to constitute a “motion.”
First, the filing need not be titled a “motion” or explicitly
invoke the relevant rules. That is so because “erroneous
nomenclature does not prevent” courts “from recognizing the
true nature of a motion.” Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d
1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Courts are instead “required to
determine” whether the substance of a filing makes it the
“functional equivalent” of a particular motion. Smith, 502 U.S.
at 248. This principle applies especially in pro se cases: Courts
regularly “ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches
to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it
within a different legal category.” Castro v. United States, 540
U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (collecting cases); accord Toolasprashad
v. BOP, 286 F.3d 576, 582–83 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (construing a
pro se “Motion Requesting an Enlargement of Time to File a
Motion and Brief for Reconsideration” as a motion for relief
from judgment); United States v. Gooch, 842 F.3d 1274, 1278
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (construing a pro se “Request for Extension
of Time” as a notice of appeal).
Second, “a single filing can serve multiple purposes.”
Parrish v. United States, 605 U.S. 376, 387 (2025). For
example, a single filing “can serve simultaneously as the
principal merits brief and the notice of appeal that would
ordinarily precede it.” Id. A single filing can also “serve as a

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notice of appeal as well as an antecedent request for certificate
of appealability.” Id. Nothing in the Federal Rules, moreover,
requires that Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motions be filed separately
from the notice of appeal.
Together, these principles mean that a litigant can move
for Rule 4(a)(5) and (6) relief without explicitly using the word
“motion” or citing those provisions. And he can do so in a
document labeled—and simultaneously serving—as a notice of
appeal.
With what is not required out of the way, we turn to what
is required for a notice of appeal to also constitute a motion to
extend or reopen the time to appeal. The closest thing to a
definition of a “motion” in the Federal Rules appears in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1). That Rule states that “[a]
request for a court order must be made by motion,” and that
“[t]he motion must . . . state with particularity the grounds for
seeking the order; and . . . state the relief sought.” More
simply, to be a motion, a filing must identify what the filer
seeks and the basis for seeking it.
We hold that a pro se notice of appeal should be construed
as including a Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motion if it can reasonably
be read as recognizing that the appeal is late, providing reasons
for that lateness, and requesting extra time to appeal. See
Winters v. Taskila, 88 F.4th 665, 668, 670 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[A]
notice of appeal that adds other information—say, that the
appeal is late, that explains what happened, that explains why
the appellant could not have filed it earlier—may in some
circumstances be construed as a motion for extension or to
reopen.”). The principle that pro se filings are “to be liberally
construed” is central to that inquiry. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). “Unlike seasoned attorneys, pro se [litigants]
may be unfamiliar with the details of a given court’s

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requirements of form and process.” Nelson v. SEC, 138 F.4th
514, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Accordingly, although “pro se
litigants do not have a license to ignore the Federal Rules,” we
have an “obligation to give appropriate leeway” in construing
their filings. Naz v. Wright, 177 F.4th 1242, 1248 (D.C. Cir.
2026).
Other courts of appeals considering similar questions have
adopted a fairly uniform approach that is instructive here. For
example, the Sixth Circuit has construed a pro se notice of
appeal as a motion to reopen the time to appeal when that
notice simply stated:
Notice is hereby given that [petitioner] hereby
appeals to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit from the final judgment
dismissing his habeas corpus petition entered in
this action on the 10 day of March, 2021.
Petitioner received this judg[]ment via prison
legal mail and was signed on or about the 18th
of May, 2021.
Winters, 88 F.4th at 668, 671. The Ninth Circuit, similarly, has
construed a pro se notice of appeal as a motion to reopen the
time to appeal when that notice simply stated:
NOTICE IS hereby, given that [the defendant]
appeals to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
from the district court’s final denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2255 petition. That judgment was
entered in [sic] on July 5, 2005. The defendant
received notice on November 4, 2005.
United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011);
Notice of Appeal 1, United States v. Withers, No. 97-cr-01085
(C.D. Cal.), Dkt. No. 622. And the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have construed pro se notices of appeal as including

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Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motions when the filing “asserted reasons
for [the appellant’s] untimely filing,” Hutchings v. County of
Llano, 34 F.4th 484, 485 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam), such as
alleging “that [the appellant] did not receive notice of the
district court’s order dismissing the case,” Ogden v. San Juan
County, 32 F.3d 452, 454 (10th Cir. 1994); Sanders v. United
States, 113 F.3d 184, 187 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).5
We agree with the straightforward logic underlying these
holdings. Take the recurring fact pattern from Winters,
Withers, and other cases: A pro se litigant files a late notice of
appeal that plainly states the date on which he received the
judgment or order he seeks to appeal. Construed liberally, the
inclusion of that statement in a document labeled a notice of
appeal conveys three things: (1) an implicit recognition that the
notice is late; (2) an explanation of why it is late; and (3) an
implicit request for additional time to appeal. There is
ordinarily no reason to state the date on which one received a
court order in a notice of appeal unless the filer is aware that
the notice of appeal is late and is seeking to invoke Rule 4(a)(5)
5 Some have suggested that Poole v. Family Court of New
Castle County, 368 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004), created a “disagreement
among circuit courts” on this issue. Bradac v. Jewell, 2014 WL
12664800, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2014). That characterization is
unwarranted. Poole held that Rule 4(a) “expressly require[s]” the
“filing of a motion” to “obtain an extension of time,” but it did not
address whether or under what circumstances a notice of appeal
should be construed to include a motion. See Poole, 368 F.3d at
267–69. It appears that the latter question was simply not put before
the court: The appellant in Poole did not argue that the district court
should have construed his notice of appeal to include a motion
seeking relief under Rule 4(a); he instead argued that the court of
appeals should directly “subtract[] from calculation of time for
appeal” any “delay[s]” beyond his control. Appellant’s Brief 1–4,
Poole, 368 F.3d 263 (No. 02-2364), 2003 WL 24193006, at *1–4.

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or (6). Indeed, such a filing explicitly “state[s] with
particularity the grounds for seeking” relief, Fed. R. Civ. P.
7(b)(1)(B)—namely, that the litigant did not timely receive the
order he seeks to appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii)
(requiring district court to “find[] excusable neglect or good
cause”); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(A) (requiring district court to
“find[] that the moving party did not receive” proper notice of
“the entry of the judgment” within “21 days after entry”).
Our decision in Ladeairous v. Garland, 45 F.4th 188 (D.C.
Cir. 2022), illustrates one type of filing that will not suffice: a
bare-bones notice of appeal that simply identifies the judgment
or order appealed from. Id. at 190–92. The notice in that case
stated only: “Notice is hereby given that [the plaintiff] in the
above said matter, will appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia for the judgment of this Court filed
February 24, 2021.” Id. at 190. We held that nothing in that
filing could be construed as a motion for relief. Id. at 192. It
did not allege any facts that could even arguably suggest the
filer recognized the appeal was late, much less that he sought
to explain why and seek relief from that untimeliness. Id.;
accord Winters, 88 F.4th at 670 (“[A] barebones notice of
appeal that is late will not serve by itself as a motion for an
extension or a motion to reopen.” (collecting cases)).
C
Assessing Rudometkin’s and Godson’s notices of appeal
de novo, we hold that Rudometkin’s notice meets the standard
we articulate today, but Godson’s does not.
1
Rudometkin’s notice of appeal can reasonably be read as
recognizing its lateness, providing reasons for that lateness,
and requesting Rule 4(a)(5) and (6) relief. It states that
Rudometkin “has never received notice of the [district court’s]

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order” and “only became aware through a third party that an
order was entered.” Rudometkin J.A. 13. As explained, this
allegation implicitly recognizes a timeliness problem, provides
a reason for the delay, and, because it is made in a notice of
appeal, seeks relief from the problem. In fact, Rudometkin’s
notice of appeal presents an easy case because although he was
not required to expressly request relief or cite the Federal
Rules, he did so, stating that “Plaintiff requests an[] extension
of time as per Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(i)(ii) [sic]” and “Rule
4(a)(6)(A).” Id. This eliminates any doubt about the “true
nature” of Rudometkin’s filing. Sacks, 593 F.2d at 1239.
Accordingly, the district court erred by failing to construe
Rudometkin’s notice of appeal to include Rule 4(a)(5) and (6)
motions. And that error was not harmless. Most notably,
Rudometkin filed his notice of appeal 69 days after the district
court entered its order, which was within the time allowed to
seek relief under either Rule 4(a)(5) or (6). See Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(5)(A)(i) (party must “move[] no later than 30 days after
the time [to appeal] expires”); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (60
days to appeal in case involving a federal agency); Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(6)(B) (party must move “within 180 days after the
judgment or order [from which the appeal was taken] is
entered” or “within 14 days after the moving party receives
notice” of the entry, “whichever is earlier”). Furthermore, his
allegation that he “has never received notice of the [district
court’s] order,” Rudometkin J.A. 13, both suggests “good
cause” for an extension under Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) and bears
directly on the threshold condition for reopening under Rule
4(a)(6)(A)—that “the moving party did not receive” proper
notice of “the entry of the judgment” within “21 days after
entry.” That distinguishes Rudometkin’s appeal from those in
which dismissal was warranted when the notice of appeal,
however construed, was filed too late to satisfy either Rule
4(a)(5) or (6). See, e.g., Order, Haapaniemi v. Bondi, No. 25-

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5258 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 2025) (per curiam) (notice of appeal
acknowledged timeliness problem but was filed 132 days after
entry of district court judgment and did not claim delayed
notice of its entry); accord Order, Petrozzi v. Bowser, No. 25-
5470 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 13, 2026) (per curiam) (similar).
Because only the district court may extend or reopen the
time to appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), we order a limited
remand for the district court to rule on Rudometkin’s motions.
We express no view on the merits of those motions, including
whether Rudometkin has shown “excusable neglect or good
cause,” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), or whether any “party
would be prejudiced,” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(C).6
6 Rudometkin argues in the alternative that we should excuse
any timeliness problem under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
2(a). But Rule 2(a) permits us to “for . . . good cause . . . suspend
any provision of these [Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure] in a
particular case . . . except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).” And
Rule 26(b)(1), in turn, provides that “the court may not extend the
time to file . . . a notice of appeal (except as authorized in Rule 4).”
Rudometkin also argues that his notice of appeal was timely
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c). Rule 4(c) deems a
prisoner’s notice of appeal “timely if it is deposited in the
institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing
and . . . accompanied by . . . a declaration . . . or a notarized
statement setting out the date of deposit and stating that first-class
postage is being prepaid[,] or [by] evidence . . . showing that the
notice was so deposited and that postage was prepaid.”
Rudometkin’s notice of appeal, however, was accompanied by no
such declaration, notarized statement, or evidence. And we find no
good reason to “exercise[]” our “discretion to permit the later filing
of a declaration or notarized statement.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(B).

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2
Godson’s notice of appeal, unlike Rudometkin’s, cannot
reasonably be read as acknowledging that his appeal was late,
explaining why, and requesting relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6).
Godson’s multi-page notice is rife with grievances that
obscure any recognition of the appeal’s untimeliness, let alone
any request for relief from it. Those grievances take aim at,
among other things, the district court judge, the district court
clerk, the defendants’ attorney, the defendants, the President,
and the Supreme Court.
To be sure, buried among Godson’s grievances is a
statement that Godson “was only made aware of” the district
court’s judgment “while here in Washington, DC for the day
of remembrance for President Jimmy Carter.” Godson J.A. 13.
And from that statement, one might piece together that Godson
learned of the district court’s judgment sometime after
President Carter’s death on December 29, 2024—more than
three weeks after the district court entered judgment on
December 4. See Jimmy Carter, The Carter Center,
https://perma.cc/5QFF-E32B. From here, one might then
conclude that Godson intended to assert grounds for excusing
his late appeal. But given the amount of reconstruction
necessary to recast that statement as a request for relief and that
it is buried in the midst of a filing overwhelmingly directed at
criticizing the district court’s conduct throughout the litigation
and raising other grievances, Godson’s notice of appeal cannot
reasonably be read as acknowledging a timeliness problem and
seeking relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6). Cf. Traguth v. Zuck,
710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourt[s] [should] make
reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants.” (emphasis
added)); Gooch, 842 F.3d at 1278 (“[A] request for an
extension of time to file an application for a certificate of
appealability can serve as the functional equivalent of a notice

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17
of appeal where an intent to appeal can be reasonably inferred
from the request.” (emphasis added)). Instead, read in context,
Godson’s reference to learning of the district court’s judgment
while in Washington, D.C. communicates support for his
broader allegations about a “miscarriage of justice” and the
district court’s “blatant disregard for the law.” Godson J.A. 13,
14.
The district court, accordingly, did not err by failing to
construe Godson’s notice of appeal as including a Rule 4(a)(5)
or (6) motion. And because there are no other grounds to
excuse the untimeliness of Godson’s notice of appeal, we
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Bowles, 551
U.S. at 209.
III
The record in Case No. 25-5033 is remanded for the
district court to rule on Rudometkin’s pending motions. The
appeal will be held in abeyance pending further order of this
court and the district court is requested to notify this court
promptly upon ruling.
Case No. 25-7011 is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
So ordered.

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18
Appendix A: Rudometkin’s Notice of Appeal
NOTICE OF APPEAL & MOTION TO TRANSFER
APPEAL TO A RELATED CASE CURRENTLY IN
APPEAL
Notice is hereby given DAVID J. RUDOMETKIN, Pro
se, Plaintiff in the above named case, hereby appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, an
Order of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
dated December 4, 2024 denying a motion for preliminary
injunction.
Plaintiff has not received an order from the Court denying
the preliminary injunction, as per Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d)(l)
“Immediately after entering an order or judgment, the clerk
must serve notice of the entry, as provided in Rule 5(b) on each
party who is not in default for failing to appear. The clerk must
record the service in the docket.” Id. Plaintiff only became
aware through a third party that an order was entered, and that
this case was transferred to Judge Chutkan as the subject matter
of this case is related to Rudometkin v. Department of Defense,
Civ. A. No. 20-2687 (D.D.C.), that is currently on appeal in
Rudometkin v. Department of Defense, No. 23-5180 (D.C.
Cir.).
Accordingly, in the event this notice of appeal does not
reach the court in time, Plaintiff requests and extension of time
as per Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(i)(ii), as this notice of appeal
is within 30 days of the sixty day time limit and there is good
cause to grant an extension, as per Rule 4(a)(6)(A)—Plaintiff
has never received notice of the Court’s order as per Fed. R.
Civ. P. 77(d)(l).
Additionally, because the subject matter of the preliminary
injunction is directly related Rudometkin v. Department of
Defense, Civ. A. No. 20-2687 (D.D.C.) that is currently on

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19
appeal in Rudometkin v. Department of Defense, No. 23-5180
(D.C. Cir.), that the D.C. Circuit incorporate this notice of
appeal within their ongoing proceedings.
Dated: February 3, 2025
Respectfully Submitted,
DAVID J. RUDOMETKIN
1300 N. Warehouse Road
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
RECEIVED
FEB 11 2025
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
Courts for the District of Columbia

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20
Appendix B: Godson’s Notice of Appeal
NOTICE OF APPEAL
PLAINTIFF NOW FILES APPEAL DUE TO GROSS
MISCARRAIGE OF JUSTICE IN THE ABOVE MATTER.
JUDGE MOSS REPEATEDLY DENIED PLAINTIFF TO
EXPRESS HIS POSTION THROUGHOUT THE FILING OF
THIS ACTION. FURTHERMORE, PLAINTIFF WAS ONLY
MADE AWARE OF HIS DISMISSAL OF DECEMBER 4, 2024
WHILE HERE IN WASHINGTON, DC FOR THE DAY OF
REMEMBERANCE FOR PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER.
PLAINTIFF BROTHER AND PRESIDENT CARTER BOTH
PASSED AWAY ON DECEMBER 29TH 2024. PLAINTIFF
WAS ADVISED TO CONTACT THIS COURTROOM
DEPUTY ON YESTERDAY AND HER MESSAGE STATED
THAT SHE SPENDS MOST OF HER DAY IN COURT SO TO
EMAIL HER. I EMAILED HER AND GOT A RESPONSE OF
WHAT DID I EXPECT FROM HER? GOING ON RECORD
THAT OUR HEAVENLY FATHER KNEW AHEAD OF TIME
OF WHAT WOULD TRANSPIRE DURING THE HOLIDAYS
AND THUS PREVENTED ME FOR RECEIVING THJS
HORRIFIC ACTION FROM THE COURT. PLAINTIFF HAS
FOLLOWED ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COURT
AND DESPITE HAVING TO HIRE A PROCESS SERVER TO
“PROPERLY” SERVE THE DEFENDANTS, THE JUDGE
STILL SIDED WITH ATTORNEY WHO REFUSED TO
ACCEPT SERVICE ON BEHALF OF THIS CLIENTS,
IFEANYI EZEIGBO, WHOM PLAINTIFF REPORTED TO
MARYLAND BAR ASSOCIATION AND PROVIDED
EVIDENCE UNDER SEAL TO JUDGE MOSS. PLAINTIFF
HAS ONGOING COMPLICATIONS FROM PERSONAL
ASSAULT BY DR WALSH AND BY HIM BEING A PILLAR IN
THE UROLOGY FIELD, COMPOSED MOSTLY OF WHITE
MEN, PLAINTIFF HAS BEEEN DENIED ADEQUATE CARE
AND HAVE BECOME LEERY OF TRUSTING DOCTORS

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21
WHO MOSTLY LOOK LIKE DEFENDANT WITH HIS
UROLOGY CARE. PLAINTIFF HAS HAD TO CHANGE
DOCTORS ON MULTIPLE OCCASSIONS AND ONLY CAN
RELY ON HIS HEAVENLY FATHER TO CONTINUE TO
ENDURE THE LASTING EFFECTS OF THIS ATTACK
YEARS AGO. WITH THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY
LOOMING AND A CONVICTED FELON POISED TO TAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE REV. DR MARTIN LUTHER
KING JR HOLIDAY, PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFERED IN
AGONY AS A 100% DISABLED AMERICAN VETERAN AND
PTSD AND MST SURVIOR. THE SUPREME COURT HAS
SIDED WITH DONALD TRUMP AND TAKEN OFFESE
AGAINST LAWYERS WHO BROUGHT HIS ILLEGAL
ACTIVITIES TO THE NATION, I.E. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
IN ATLANTA GA AND NEW YORK CITY, BOTH AFRICAN
AMERICANS.
PLAINTIFF ALTHOUGH HAVING LIMITED RESOURCES
CANNOT ALLOW JUDGE MOSS TO CONTINUE TO
DISPLAY HIS BLATANT DISREGARD FOR THE LAW.
PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT SINCE DEFENDANTS NEVER PROPERLY
ANSWERED HIS COMPLAINT. DEFENDANTS WAS ALSO
GRANTED UNCONDITIONAL LEEWAY TO CIRCUMVENT
THE SYSTEM UNDER JUDGE MOSS AND HE EVEN OR
CLERK’S OFFICE POSTED INITIAL COMPLAINT
DETAILING DEFENDANT’S ASSAULT ON THE PACER
SYSTEM. DEFENDANT’S HAVE HAD PLAINTIFF
FOLLOWED ON VARIOUS OCCASSIONS AND EVEN HAD
HIS HOME WATCHED. PLAINTIFF HAD TO RELOCATED
AND INSTALL A STATE OF ART SECURITY SYSTEM JUST
TO HAVE PEACE. PLAINTIFF NOW FINDS HIMSELF
LOOKING FOR A DOCTOR HE CAN TRUST IN THE
UROLOGY FIELD AND IS EXPLORING THE POSSILITY OF
RELOCATING IN 2025 DUE TO THE VICE PRESIDENT OF

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22
THE UNITED STATES BEING DEFEATED BY A
CONVICTED FELON FOR THE HIGHEST OFFICE IN THE
UNITED STATES. OUR PRESIDENT ELECT HAS ALIGNED
HIMSELF WITH A 99% PERCENT ALL WHITE STAFF OF
PEOPLE WHO OPPOSE CIVIL RIGHTS, INSULT AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND OTHER MINORITIES AS WELL AS ON
COURSE TO MAKE AMERICA THE LAUGHING STOCK OF
THE WORLD. PLAINTIFF DUE TO HIS AGE 66 IS
TOTALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE CHOICES WHEN
IT COMES TO SELECTING A UROLOGIST SINCE
AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN ONLY COMPRISE A VERY
SMALL PERCENTAGE OF PROVIDERS. PLAINTIFF
PRAYS COURT WILL REVERSE THIS MISCARRIAGE OF
JUSTICE AND GRANT PLAINTIFF SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT. PLAINTIFF ALSO WAS DENIED THE
RIGHT TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT. THIS IS
EQUIVALENT TO THE UNITED STATES DENYING THE
FREED SLAVES THEIR FORTY ACRES AND A MULE
WHICH TODAY PUTS SENIOR AFRICAN AMERICANS
LIKE PLAINTIFF AS RISK DUE TO THE LOSS OF
ECONOMIC ASSESTS, AFRICAN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOODS ARE BEING TRAUMATIZED BY
WAYWARD YOUTHS WHO HAVEN’T BEEN TAUGHT TO
RESPECT THEIR SENIOR COMMUNITIES. IN THIS
SOCIETY THIS IS TRUE TO WHITE AND OTHER
COMMUNITIES, I.E. THE KILLING OF THE HEALTHCARE
CEO BY A WEALTHY WHITE MALE. PRAYING THIS
COURT DOESN’T ALLOW DEMOCRACY TO BE
ERADICATED!
1/10/2025
EVANGELISTIC CHAPLAIN UNI’QUE GODSON
…

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23
PLAINTIFF IS ASKING ALL MAILING TO BE TRACKED
CERTIFIED ETC
RECEIVED
JAN 10 2025
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
Courts for the District of Columbia

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KATSAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgments: I
agree with the majority’s disposition of these cases. Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6) condition a
district court’s authority to extend or reopen the time to appeal
a civil judgment upon the filing of a “motion.” In the context
of legal procedure, the ordinary meaning of the term motion is
a “written or oral application requesting a court to make a
specified ruling or order.” Motion, Black’s Law Dictionary
(12th ed. 2024). So, to be eligible for relief under Rules 4(a)(5)
or (6), a would-be appellant must ask the district court to extend
or reopen the filing deadline. Rudometkin clearly did that, and
Godson clearly did not.
I also agree with much of the majority’s reasoning and
with its general statement of the governing legal standard.
Specifically, a notice of appeal can qualify as a Rule 4(a)(5)
or (6) “motion” if it can reasonably be read as recognizing that
the appeal is late, providing reasons for the lateness, and
requesting relief from the deadline. Ante at 10–11. However,
I doubt this standard is met simply because a notice of appeal
states the date on which the would-be appellant received the
order that he seeks to appeal. Id. at 11–13 (endorsing Winters
v. Taskila, 88 F.4th 665 (6th Cir. 2023), and United States v.
Withers, 638 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2011)). Of course, such a
statement may support a request for relief. But in my view, it
cannot reasonably be understood as itself requesting relief, for
merely listing out a date does not ask anyone to do anything.
The majority leans heavily on the proposition that pro se
filings should be liberally construed. Ante at 10–11. While
that is true up to a point, it is equally true that “pro se litigants
do not have a ‘license’ to ‘ignore the Federal Rules.’” Oviedo
v. WMATA, 948 F.3d 386, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Moore
v. USAID, 994 F.3d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Here, Rule 4
requires litigants to file a “motion” to become eligible for an
extended or reopened deadline, not simply to make factual
assertions that might support such a motion.

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