Peo in Interest of BBM

26CA0231 Peo in Interest of BBM 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0231
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV267
Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of B.B.M a/k/a J.A.B., a Child,
and Concerning J.B.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE TOW
Harris and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
John Christofferson, Interim County Attorney, Tamra White, Assistant County
Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant

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¶ 1 J.B. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating
his parent-child legal relationship with B.B.M n/k/a J.A.B. (the
child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 In August 2023, the Arapahoe County Department of Human
Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding the
then-newborn child. The Department alleged that the child’s
mother admitted to substance use and that the child tested positive
for amphetamine and fentanyl and was experiencing withdrawal
symptoms. At that time, the Department did not know father’s
whereabouts. The Department later discovered that father was
incarcerated, and he remained incarcerated throughout the case.
¶ 3 In March 2024, following father’s no-fault admission, the
juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and
adopted a treatment plan for father. The treatment plan, adopted
without objection, required father to (1) communicate with the
Department; (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation and follow
all recommendations; (3) attend family time; (4) complete a mental
health evaluation and participate in recommended treatment; and
(5) demonstrate protective parenting capacity.

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¶ 4 Fifteen months later, the Department moved to terminate
father’s parental rights. In January 2026, following a contested
hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion and terminated
father’s legal relationship with the child.
II. Indian Child Welfare Act
¶ 5 Father first asserts that the juvenile court did not inquire as to
whether the child was an Indian child as required by the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, and the
Colorado Indian Child Welfare Act, §§ 19-1.2-101 to -132, C.R.S.
2026. We discern no reversible error.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 6 If a dependency or neglect proceeding involves an Indian child,
ICWA applies. See People in Interest of A.G.-G., 899 P.2d 319, 321
(Colo. App. 1995); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (defining “Indian
child” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen” and
(1) “a member of an Indian tribe,” or (2) “eligible for membership in
an Indian tribe” and “the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe”).
¶ 7 To ascertain whether the case involves an Indian child, at the
commencement of each emergency, voluntary, or involuntary child

3
custody proceeding, the court must ask each participant whether
“the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child or whether the participant has information that is
relevant to determining whether the child is an Indian child.” § 19-
1.2-107(2), C.R.S. 2026; see 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2026). This
means the court must ordinarily make an inquiry (1) when the state
seeks to place the child in an out-of-home placement; (2) at the
dispositional hearing; and (3) when a party moves to terminate the
parent-child legal relationships. People in Interest of C.A., 2017
COA 135, ¶¶ 2, 10; People in Interest of M.V., 2018 COA 163, ¶¶ 41-
42, overruled on other grounds by E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42,
¶ 56 n.10.
¶ 8 Whether ICWA applies to a proceeding, and whether a court
correctly applied a legal standard to the particular facts of a case,
are questions of law that we review de novo. M.V., ¶ 32; M.A.W. v.
People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31.
B. Additional Background
¶ 9 Two weeks after the Department filed the petition, father
submitted a declaration in which he averred that he did not have
Indian heritage, the child was not an enrolled member of a tribe,

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and he did not believe the child was eligible for membership in a
tribe.
¶ 10 Fourteen months later, in October 2024, the juvenile court
conducted the first ICWA inquiry by asking the child’s mother if she
had any Native heritage. Mother denied having any such heritage.
Based on mother’s response and father’s previously filed
declaration, the court made a “[n]on-ICWA” finding.
¶ 11 During the termination hearing, the Department asked the
court to take judicial notice of the October 2024 non-ICWA finding.
The court granted the request without objection and took judicial
notice of the finding. No further ICWA inquiries were made during
the termination hearing. Following the termination hearing, the
juvenile court found that ICWA “does not apply.”
C. Analysis
¶ 12 We agree with father that the juvenile court erred by not
making ICWA inquiries during his dispositional hearing and the
termination hearing. But we conclude that this error was harmless.
See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court may disregard any error or
defect not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.”); People in
Interest of C.C., 2022 COA 81, ¶ 20 (noting that an error is

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harmless unless “it can be said with fair assurance that the error
substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the
basic fairness of the trial itself” (citation omitted)).
¶ 13 Father does not assert — and the record does not suggest —
that either parent is a member of an Indian tribe or that the child is
enrolled, or eligible for membership, in any tribe. In fact, the record
establishes the contrary. Father’s counsel asserted in writing on
father’s behalf that the child was “not a member of a tribe or
believed to be eligible for membership in one or more tribes and
that a biological member of the child’s family does not have
American Indian or Alaska Native heritage.” And mother denied
any such heritage in open court. Given this, there is no reason to
believe that the child is an Indian child. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4);
see also H.J.B. v. People in Interest of A-J.A.B., 2023 CO 48, ¶¶ 64-
65 (concluding that, even if the juvenile court erred by concluding
that a department satisfied its due diligence obligations, any error
was harmless because “there was no reason to believe [that the
child was] an Indian child” based on the parties’ representations).
¶ 14 Father asserts that the error could not have been harmless
because “the juvenile court . . . failed to make the inquiry

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throughout the entire case,” and, therefore, “[t]he record regarding
whether there was a reason to know that [the child] was an Indian
child is insufficient.” But even without the required inquiries, there
is sufficient information in the record to show that the child is not
an Indian child. And father does not identify what new information
the parties would have disclosed had the court conducted further
inquiry or how additional inquiries would have altered the outcome
of the proceeding. See C.C., ¶ 20; see also Curry v. Brewer, 2025
COA 28, ¶ 54 (“The party asserting the error has the burden of
showing that it was not harmless.”). Thus, regardless of the
number of inquiries made by the juvenile court, the record confirms
the finding that ICWA did not apply.1
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 15 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by concluding
that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him
and reunify him with the child. We disagree.
1 Our determination in this case that the court’s failure to inquire at
every stage of the proceeding was harmless error should not be seen
as condoning the juvenile court’s noncompliance with the statute.
It simply is an acknowledgement that a failure to conduct the
required inquiries does not automatically result in reversible error.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 16 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not
been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct
or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable period of time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2026.
¶ 17 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether the department made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. See §§ 19-3-
100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2026; People in Interest of S.N-V.,
300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts” means
the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in out-of-
home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2026. Services provided
in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2026, satisfy the
reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the services
required under section 19-3-208 are screenings, assessments, and
individual case plans for the provision of services; home-based
family and crisis counseling; information and referral services to

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available public and private assistance resources; family time
services; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).
¶ 18 In assessing a department’s efforts, the juvenile court
considers whether the services provided were appropriate to
support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915, by
“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
services and resources provided to a parent,” People in Interest of
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. The parent is ultimately
responsible for using the services provided to obtain the assistance
needed to comply with the treatment plan. People in Interest of
J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 19 A parent’s incarceration does not excuse a department from
making reasonable efforts. See § 19-3-508(1)(e), C.R.S. 2026.
When the department learns of a parent’s incarceration, it must
communicate with the facility where the parent is held regarding
the requirements of the parent’s treatment plan and provide
information to the court detailing the services and treatment
available to the parent at that facility. § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), (III). If
the caseworker is unable to determine any treatment or services

9
available to the parent, they must still report their efforts to obtain
such information. § 19-3-508(1)(e)(III).
¶ 20 Whether the Department satisfied its obligation to make
reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in
Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Therefore, we review the
juvenile court’s factual findings related to reasonable efforts for
clear error but review de novo the court’s legal determination, based
on those findings, as to whether a department satisfied its
reasonable efforts obligations. Id. The credibility of witnesses; the
sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the
inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidentiary facts
are within the juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of S.K.,
2019 COA 36, ¶ 41.
B. Analysis
¶ 21 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and reunify him with the
child. In so concluding, the court acknowledged that the first
caseworker “didn’t always follow through when she should have”
and “missed some opportunities.” But the court also found that the
caseworker made efforts to communicate with father to which he

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did not respond. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285. Moreover, the court
found that, despite the caseworker’s efforts, father’s incarceration
in multiple Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities during the
case created barriers to the provision of services. Specifically, the
court found that (1) there was very little appropriate or necessary
substance abuse or mental health treatment offered by the DOC;
(2) the DOC was “extraordinarily difficult to deal with” and “totally
unresponsive”; and (3) because “barriers with [the DOC] impeded
the visits,” establishing family time for father and the child was “a
huge ordeal.” Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances,
the court determined that the Department made reasonable efforts.
¶ 22 The record supports the court’s findings. The supervisor for
the first permanency caseworker testified that father was relocated
multiple times to different DOC facilities, which made it difficult for
the caseworker to ensure that she had the best contact information
for father or his case manager. Nevertheless, each time father was
moved to a new facility the caseworker “made several efforts” to
identify the appropriate case manager, send them her contact
information, and inquire about father’s treatment plan compliance,
services available to him at the facility, and the process to begin

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visitation. But often the case managers did not respond, or respond
timely, which impeded the caseworker’s ability to establish virtual
family time. The caseworker also sent letters to father providing her
contact information and requesting updates. But although father
confirmed receipt of the letters, he did not respond. The second
permanency caseworker testified that she was in “constant
communication” with the DOC liaison and, although visits were not
easy to schedule and required multiple communication attempts,
she was able to meet with father twice via video during her five
months on the case. Indeed, even father’s witness, accepted as an
expert in clinical social work with an emphasis in child protection,
acknowledged the communication difficulties between the
Department and the DOC and that father’s numerous facility
changes complicated the caseworker’s ability to establish family
time.
¶ 23 We next reject father’s argument that the Department failed to
make reasonable efforts because the caseworker did not have
monthly, in-person meetings with him while he was in custody, as
required under the Social Services Rules (Volume 7). See Dep’t of
Hum. Servs. Reg. 7.204(B)(1), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-3.

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Although we acknowledge that the Department is expected to follow
its governing regulations, we note that nothing in section 19-3-208
requires a specific number of outreach efforts or contacts with a
parent each month to satisfy the Department’s reasonable efforts
obligation. And the juvenile court’s determination of whether the
Department made reasonable efforts must be guided by the
Children’s Code, rather than Volume 7. See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-
3-208. We do not suggest that the Department has no obligation to
conduct outreach or contact a parent to ensure that the parent
receives appropriate services and support. But here, the
caseworker attempted to set up visitation with father through his
case managers, sent him letters with her contact information, and
communicated with him regarding his treatment plan during
meetings (which father attended virtually) addressing the needs of
the family, including any barriers faced by the parents.
¶ 24 We also disagree with father’s assertion that, because of the
lack of in-person family time and the nineteen-month delay between
the filing of the petition and the start of video family time, the
Department failed to make reasonable efforts. The juvenile court
found, with record support as discussed above, that it was barriers

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from the DOC, and not a lack of effort by the Department, that
caused a delay in the start of family time. Moreover, considering
the distance between the child and father, the child’s age, and the
conditions of the facility, the juvenile court found that in-person
family time was not in the child’s best interests. And father does
not contest this finding.
¶ 25 We are similarly unpersuaded by father’s argument that the
Department failed to timely communicate the terms of his treatment
plan to the DOC and submit referrals to outside service providers
who could provide treatment during his incarceration. Nothing in
the record suggests that, had the first caseworker informed the
facilities of father’s treatment plan objectives earlier in the case or
explored outside service providers, any additional treatment or
services would have become available to father, especially
considering the undisputed barriers the caseworker experienced
when trying to communicate with father’s various incarceration
facilities and case managers. See C.C., ¶ 20.
¶ 26 Citing information contained in the Department’s termination
report, accepted as an exhibit, father contends that he would have
been able to engage in services outside of the DOC facility and,

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therefore, the caseworker’s failure to explore outside services
providers impacted his ability to comply with his treatment plan.
True, based on reports from father’s case manager the Department
noted that if father remained “at low custody” he would be “eligible
to be picked up for treatment when his number [was] called.” But
there was no evidence that father’s “number [was] called” such that
he was eligible to begin outside treatment. Indeed, during father’s
meeting with the caseworker two months before the termination
hearing, he reported that completing the substance abuse and
mental health evaluation “was not something that was feasible for
him at that time.” And during the hearing, the caseworker testified
that father was still on the waitlist for treatment.
¶ 27 In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances, we discern
no reversible error in the juvenile court’s conclusion that the
Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and
reunite him with the child.
IV. Judicial Bias
¶ 28 Father contends that the juvenile court judge erred by not
recusing herself because of actual bias. We are not persuaded.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 29 In Colorado, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to
recuse from a case when her involvement might create the
appearance of impropriety or when she has a personal bias
concerning a party or counsel. C.J.C. 2.11(A); see also People in
Interest of A.G., 262 P.3d 646, 650-51 (Colo. 2011) (describing the
two bases for disqualification as the “appearance of impropriety”
and “actual bias”).
¶ 30 To disqualify a judge for actual bias, a party must show that
the judge has “a substantial bent of mind,” People in Interest of A.P.,
2022 CO 24, ¶ 30 (citation omitted), that “in all probability will
prevent [the judge] from dealing fairly with a party,” A.G., 262 P.3d
at 650 (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has
clarified that a judge’s “remarks during the course of a trial that are
critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or
their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.”
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Moreover,
adverse legal rulings by themselves are insufficient to establish a
bias claim. See A.P., ¶ 32.

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¶ 31 We review de novo a claim for disqualification based on actual
bias. People v. Jennings, 2021 COA 112, ¶ 27.
B. Analysis
¶ 32 First, we reject father’s generalized and unsupported claim
that “the judicial officer repeatedly indicated that, despite the law,
she did not personally believe that children should spend time with
incarcerated parents, that despite the laws, she did not think it was
reasonable to provide services and referrals — reasonable efforts —
to an incarcerated parent.” See A.P., ¶ 30 (“Bare assertions and
speculative statements are insufficient to satisfy the burden of
proof.”). In fact, our review of the record demonstrates that the
judge emphasized the importance of family time, even during
father’s incarceration, and issued a contempt citation ordering the
DOC to appear and show cause for its failure to comply with the
family time order. If anything, the judge’s comments and actions
throughout the case demonstrated frustration with the barriers the
Department faced from the DOC, rather than any belief that the
Department should be excused from providing efforts to rehabilitate
incarcerated parents as father alleges.

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¶ 33 Second, we are unpersuaded by father’s assertions that the
judge showed bias by (1) concluding that father failed to comply
with his treatment plan because he did not communicate with a
caseworker who “never contacted him”; (2) failing to acknowledge
the Department’s lack of reasonable efforts to obtain substance
abuse and mental health treatment for father; and (3) concluding
that the Department made reasonable efforts despite the delay in
video family time and lack of in-person family time. These
contentions are based almost entirely on the judge’s adverse
rulings. And “rulings of a judge . . . are not sufficient in themselves
to show bias or prejudice.” A.P., ¶ 32 (citing Schupper v. People,
157 P.3d 516, 521 n.5 (Colo. 2007).
¶ 34 Father’s only allegation not entirely grounded in an adverse
ruling concerns the judge’s remark that she did not believe
in-person family time at the DOC to be “safe” or “trauma-informed.”
True, section 19-3-507(1)(f)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2026, requires the
Department to provide “[o]pportunities for meaningful family time
between the child and [the incarcerated] parent,” including in-
person family time if “reasonably practicable,” and does not allow a
court to “determine that family time is not in the child’s best

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interests based solely on the fact that in-person family time would
occur in a facility or jail.” But, here, the juvenile court also
expressed concern about in-person family time based on the child’s
age and distance from father. Thus, while father may disagree with
the court’s statements and determinations — and may even believe
they are unsupported by the statute — we conclude they do not rise
to the level of showing “a substantial bent of mind” against father.
A.P., ¶ 30 (citation omitted).
¶ 35 For these reasons, we reject father’s argument that the
juvenile court judge was required to recuse herself from the
proceeding.
V. Disposition
¶ 36 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE BROWN concur.