Peo in Interest of RN

26CA0536 Peo in Interest of RN 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0536
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JV31024
Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of R.N., a Child,
and Concerning S.T.C.,
Appellant,
and D.N.,
Appellee
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Freyre and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Miko Brown, City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee The People of the State of Colorado
Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for R.N.
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado for
Appellee D.N.

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¶ 1 S.T.C. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment
allocating parental responsibilities for R.N. (the youth) to D.N.
(father). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 In 2024, Denver Human Services (the Department) received
multiple referrals raising concerns about the youth’s safety in
mother’s home. After the third referral and mother’s refusal to
accept services, the Department filed a petition in dependency or
neglect, alleging that mother and her boyfriend had physically
abused the youth.
¶ 3 Mother requested an adjudicatory jury trial, and the jury
returned special verdicts finding that the youth was dependent or
neglected. The court then adjudicated the youth dependent or
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother.1 Father agreed
to, and the court adopted, a stipulated deferred adjudication and
treatment plan.
1 Mother appealed the adjudication, and a division of this court
affirmed. People in Interest of R.C.N., (Colo. App. No. 25CA1317,
Feb. 12, 2026) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

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¶ 4 Almost a year after the Department filed the petition, father
and the counsel for youth filed a joint motion and asked the court
for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to father. The
court held a contested hearing and entered an order allocating
parental responsibilities (APR judgment) to father. The court
allocated sole decision-making responsibility to father, limited
mother’s parenting time to virtual contact, and limited mother’s
access to the youth’s medical and education information.
II. Applicable Law
A. APR
¶ 5 A juvenile court may enter an order allocating parental
responsibilities and addressing parenting time when it maintains
jurisdiction in a case involving a child who is dependent or
neglected. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2026; People in Interest of E.Q.,
2020 COA 118, ¶ 10. When allocating parental responsibilities in a
dependency or neglect proceeding, the court must consider the
legislative purposes of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102,
C.R.S. 2026. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo.
App. 2005). The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to
protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through

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which the child’s best interests can be served. L.G. v. People in
Interest of K.G., 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). Therefore, the
court must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the
child’s best interests. L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d
1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996); see also People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017
COA 70, ¶ 13 (while the court may consider the factors listed in the
Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, section 14-10-124, C.R.S.
2026, including the child’s wishes if he is sufficiently mature, the
focus must be on the protection and safety of the child and not the
custodial interests of the parents).
B. Standard of Review
¶ 6 Allocating parental responsibilities is within the juvenile
court’s discretion. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D.,
2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its discretion when its decision
is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or based on a
misapplication of the law. People in Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72,
¶ 12. The court, as the fact finder, determines the sufficiency,
probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and assesses the
credibility of witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,
249-50 (Colo. 2010). When the court’s factual findings have record

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support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on appeal.
B.R.D., ¶ 15.
III. Analysis
A. Reasonable Efforts for Family Time
¶ 7 Mother asserts that section 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV), C.R.S. 2026,
requires the Department to provide her with family time services.
She contends that, despite the court authorizing her to have family
time as part of her treatment plan, the Department didn’t facilitate
family time or family therapy with the youth, which she asserts
infringed on her constitutional right to parent and denied her “the
opportunity to show that she could safely exercise family time.”
¶ 8 To the extent that mother argues that the Department failed to
make reasonable efforts to provide her with family time, the court
wasn’t required to consider that because it allocated parental
responsibilities between parents, not a nonparent. Cf. People in
Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 20 (holding that the court is
required to consider reasonable efforts when it enters an APR to a
nonparent). Mother provides no authority, and we are aware of
none, requiring a court to find that reasonable efforts have been

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made before allocating parental responsibilities between two
parents.
¶ 9 Furthermore, mother had an active protection order that
prohibited her from having contact with the youth for seven months
after the Department filed the petition.2 And after the protection
order was modified to allow contact between mother and the youth
for mother’s family time objective, the youth refused to attend
family time or family therapy with mother. Mother doesn’t explain,
and we can’t discern, what more the Department could or should
have done to facilitate family time under these circumstances.
B. Parenting Time Ordered in the APR Judgment
¶ 10 Next, mother asserts that the court infringed on her
fundamental liberty interest in parenting the youth by “effectively
end[ing] her parental role through [an] overly restrictive APR
[judgment].” We disagree.
¶ 11 First, although the court limited mother’s parenting time, it
did not — as mother asserts — end her parental role. Unlike a
2 The protection order was issued in a criminal case in which
mother was charged with, among other things, child abuse against
the youth. At the time of the APR hearing, the child abuse case
remained pending.

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termination of a parent-child legal relationship, the APR judgment
here allows mother to ask for a modification in the future. L.L. v.
People in Interest of R.W., 10 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2000)
(recognizing that an APR order isn’t a termination of parental
rights); cf. § 19-1-103(139), C.R.S. 2026 (defining the termination of
the parent-child relationship as “the permanent elimination by
court order of all parental rights and duties”); see also People in
Interest of M.R.M., 2021 COA 22, ¶ 38 (“[A]ll orders concerning
parenting time and decision-making responsibility may be modified
if a sufficient showing is made that circumstances warrant a
change.”).
¶ 12 Second, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by limiting
mother’s parenting time to virtual visits and allocating sole
decision-making to father. The court found, among other things,
that the youth suffered physical and emotional abuse while he was
in mother’s care and custody and that mother posed a substantial
risk to the youth’s emotional and physical health. These findings
have record support.
¶ 13 A doctor who performed two medical exams on the youth on
two separate occasions testified that she diagnosed the youth with

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child physical abuse in November and December 2024. The
November incident involved mother’s boyfriend hitting the youth in
the face, and the December incident involved mother forcibly
cutting the youth’s hair.3 The doctor said that the youth had
abrasions on his scalp and bruises on his arms from the forcible
haircut. Furthermore, she opined that forcible haircutting was a
form of psychological or emotional abuse. Mother denied forcibly
cutting the youth’s hair and said that the hospital shaved the
youth’s hair. She did admit, however, that she “whooped [the
youth’s] ass” in 2022.
¶ 14 The youth, who was fourteen years old when he testified, said
he wanted to live with father. When asked if he wanted to live with
mother, he responded “no” because “she abuses me and stuff.” He
further described the interactions that he had with mother during
family team meetings throughout the case as “not great” because
mother was angry and didn’t show any improvement. Ultimately,
3 The doctor testified that this was the second time in one year that
mother had forcibly cut the youth’s hair. Earlier that year, the
youth told a different doctor that mother had cut his hair in the
shape of a “V,” which stood for “vagina.” The youth alleged that
mother called him “a pussy.”

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the youth confirmed that he didn’t want to have any contact with
mother.
¶ 15 Given this record, the juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion
by concluding that it was in the youth’s best interests to limit
mother’s parenting time to virtual contact and grant father sole
decision-making responsibility. B.R.D., ¶ 15.
IV. Disposition
¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GROVE concur.