Peo in Interest of MMV

24CA0412 Peo in Interest of MMV 11-14-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0412
Mesa County District Court No. 22JV71
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.M.V., a Child,

and Concerning M.F.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Harris and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 14, 2024

Todd Starr, County Attorney, Brad Junge, Assistant County Attorney, Grand
Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.F. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parent-child

legal relationship with M.M.V. (the child). Mother’s sole contention

on appeal is that the court erred by finding that no less drastic

alternatives to termination existed. We disagree and therefore

affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2023, the Mesa County Department of Human Services

(Department) received reports about mother’s substance abuse,

mental health, and incarceration, as well as concerns of neglect.

Based on these reports, the Department initiated a dependency and

neglect proceeding.

¶3 Mother admitted the allegations in the petition and the child

was adjudicated dependent and neglected. The court then adopted

a treatment plan for mother.

¶4 Later, the Department moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights. The court granted the motion after holding a three-day

hearing. As relevant here, the court found that there were no less

drastic alternatives to termination that would be in the best interest

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of the child because the child needed the stability and consistency

that only termination would provide.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied

with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has

not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶6 Implicit in the statutory scheme for termination is a

requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives before entering an order of termination. People

in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 51; People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 19. In considering less drastic alternatives, the

court must give primary consideration to the child’s physical,

mental, and emotional conditions and needs. See § 19-3-604(3);

People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 35. The court may also

consider other factors, including whether the alternative placement

option favors adoption rather than an allocation of parental

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responsibilities (APR), People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 31,

and whether the child needs a stable, permanent home that can be

assured only by adoption. People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211,

214 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶7 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs. A.M., ¶ 27. Rather, the

proposed alternative must be the “best” option for the child. Id.

Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic alternative but finds

that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the

proposed alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. The less

drastic alternative of long-term or permanent placement with a

relative or kinship provider may not be appropriate when it does not

provide adequate permanence or otherwise meet the child’s needs.

People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶8 We must accept the juvenile court’s determination that no less

drastic alternative to termination was available unless the finding

was so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record. People

in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 64. Therefore, when the juvenile

court considers a less drastic alternative and still determines that

the termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, we

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are bound to affirm that decision if the court’s findings are

supported by the record. B.H., ¶ 80.

III. Analysis

¶9 Mother argues that the child’s best interests would be better

served by an alternative placement with one of several proposed

kinship providers. She also argues that the Department did not

adequately explore these placement options, including with the

father, the child’s maternal grandparents, the child’s maternal

uncle, and two family friends. We are not persuaded.

¶ 10 Although the juvenile court did not make specific findings

regarding each placement option, it found that there were no less

drastic alternatives to termination that would be in the child’s best

interests. The court “considered the possibility of an allocation of

parental rights,” but concluded “that the benefits of termination

outweigh the detriment” because of the child’s need for stability and

consistency. It noted that the child, who was three years old when

the dependency and neglect proceeding was initiated, was “in a

permanent home with people that would like to adopt her and raise

her, and give her a safe and secure upbringing.”

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¶ 11 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker

testified that she believed termination was in the child’s best

interests, as the child needed stability, consistency, and certainty

about her future. Although the child had bonded with mother and

their supervised visits went well, mother had not completed “[t]he

real hard work of getting a job, getting a place, proving [her]

sobriety.” She also testified that she still had safety concerns. The

caseworker did not believe additional time to comply with the

treatment plan was appropriate, considering that the case had

already been open for nearly a year and a half with little progress.

See People In Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 25 (when the child

is under six years old, the expedited permanency planning

provisions “require that the child be placed in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible”). And the child’s foster parent testified

that she would prefer to adopt the child rather than have an APR,

as she believed that it was difficult for the child to “continue to be

in limbo” and that an APR would be too hard on the child.

¶ 12 Furthermore, the caseworker testified that the Department

considered less drastic alternatives and investigated the various

placement options, including those offered by mother. However, all

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those placement options were ruled out because of safety concerns,

their request to be withdrawn from consideration, or the

Department’s inability to investigate due to a lack of available

information. For example:

• The father was not considered for placement because he

repeatedly indicated he was not the child’s biological

parent and he did not want to retain his parental rights

to the child.

• The child’s maternal grandmother was excluded due to

safety concerns related to her criminal history and

allegations of ongoing drug activity and unsafe living

conditions.

• The maternal step-grandfather was excluded because

mother had previously told the caseworker that he had

sexually abused her.

• While the maternal uncle filed several documents

requesting placement of the child, he was denied

placement because of his failure to respond to the

Department and safety concerns given that he lived with

the maternal grandmother.

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• J.B., a family friend, was excluded due to safety concerns

because she refused to cooperate and complete the

fingerprint and urinalysis testing necessary for the

placement and substance use investigation.

• S.P., another family friend, did not request placement of

the child until less than a week before the termination

hearing. The caseworker testified that she had safety

concerns about placing the child with S.P. because none

of the necessary investigations — such as background

checks, fingerprinting, and a home study — had been

completed.

¶ 13 Given this record, we conclude the juvenile court did not err

by finding that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination

and that termination was in the child’s best interests.

IV. Disposition

¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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