Marriage of Smith

23CA1944 Marriage of Smith 11-21-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1944
El Paso County District Court No. 22DR30140
Honorable David Prince, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Remington Smith,

Appellant,

and

Cassaundra Alexa Smith, n/k/a Cassaundra Alexa Iler,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
J. Jones and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 21, 2024

Travis Law Group, PLLC, Richard M. Travis, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant

Cassaundra Alexa Smith, n/k/a Cassaundra Alexa Iler, Pro Se
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Remington Smith

(husband) appeals the district court’s order allocating an increased

share of the marital home’s equity to Cassaundra Alexa Smith,

n/k/a Cassaundra Alexa Iler (wife), and awarding her attorney fees.

We affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand the case for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

¶2 Husband initiated dissolution proceedings in January 2022.

During the final orders hearing in November 2022, both parties

testified regarding their separate and marital property, including

their opinions of the marital home’s value.

¶3 In its decree of dissolution, the court ordered that the marital

home be sold and the proceeds divided between the parties, with

70% going to wife and 30% to husband. The court said that, if the

parties couldn’t agree on a certain aspect of marketing or selling the

home (for example, the listing price or whether to accept an offer),

then the parties were to follow the real estate agent’s

recommendation. The court instructed the parties to either agree

on a real estate agent or submit nominations for the court to

appoint one. After both parties submitted nominations, the court

1
appointed Bre Rinkema, one of wife’s recommended real estate

agents, in January 2023.

¶4 In violation of the court’s order and unbeknownst to either

wife or the court, however, husband had already entered into a

listing agreement with his preferred real estate agent, Chelsea

Tisdale, with whom he had a romantic relationship, and placed the

home under contract. Concerned that husband’s unauthorized sale

might reduce her share of the proceeds, wife recorded a notice of lis

pendens and filed a separate fraudulent transfer action to stop the

pending sale.

¶5 In April 2023, the parties stipulated to (1) dismiss the

fraudulent transfer action and (2) appoint a different real estate

agent, Gytha Hinkle, to list the marital home for sale. The

stipulation explicitly said that it didn’t affect the court’s prior orders

regarding the home’s sale.

¶6 After Hinkle listed the home for sale at $495,000, husband

received an offer for the listing price from the same buyers with

whom he previously contracted. Without consulting wife, and

against Hinkle’s recommendation, husband immediately accepted

the offer. The sale closed in May 2023.

2
¶7 Based on husband’s disregard for the court’s orders, wife filed

several C.R.C.P. 60(b) motions in which she asked the court to

reopen its division of the marital home’s equity and increase wife’s

allocation. After holding a hearing in September, the court issued a

detailed order chronicling husband’s repeated misconduct.

Although the court didn’t value the marital home or the parties’

mortgage debt, it estimated the parties’ equity in the home at

$110,000 and ordered that wife’s share be increased from 70% to

80%, resulting in husband having to make an equalization payment

to wife of $88,000 (80% of $110,000). The court also awarded wife

a portion of her requested attorney fees.

¶8 Husband now appeals. He contends that the court (1) lacked

authority under C.R.C.P. 60(b) to grant wife affirmative relief and

violated his right to due process; (2) erred by making unsupported

findings regarding the parties’ equity in the marital home; and (3)

abused its discretion by awarding wife a portion of her attorney

fees. We address each contention in turn.

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II. Discussion

A. “Affirmative Relief” Under C.R.C.P. 60(b) and Due Process

¶9 Relying on Affordable Country Homes, LLC v. Smith, 194 P.3d

511, 513-16 (Colo. App. 2008), husband first contends that the

court abused its discretion by granting wife “affirmative relief” that

isn’t authorized by C.R.C.P. 60(b). He also argues that, assuming

affirmative relief was available, the court violated his right to due

process by failing to notify him that wife could receive both an

increased equity allocation in the marital home and an award of

attorney fees. We conclude that husband failed to preserve these

arguments for appellate review.

1. Additional Background

¶ 10 In her C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion and two amended motions, wife

requested that the court apportion to her a larger share of the

proceeds from the home’s sale as a consequence of husband’s

misconduct. She requested, in the alternative, that the court award

her the attorney fees and costs that she had incurred due to

husband’s misconduct, “in addition to her [original 70%] share of

the proceeds from the sale of the marital home.”

4
¶ 11 Husband opposed wife’s motions by arguing that wife hadn’t

shown fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct that might

justify relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), nor had she shown any other

reason justifying relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5). Husband also

asserted that wife hadn’t alleged sufficient facts to justify revisiting

the court’s property division and that she improperly sought

attorney fees for matters that were either unnecessary, dismissed,

or already decided.

¶ 12 At the September 2023 hearing on wife’s motions, wife asked

the court to award her “100% of the remaining proceeds” from the

home’s sale and “$70,000 of lawyer fees” that she had incurred due

to husband’s misconduct.

2. Analysis

¶ 13 We conclude that husband failed to preserve for appellate

review his argument that C.R.C.P. 60(b) doesn’t authorize

“affirmative relief.” To preserve an issue for appellate review, a

party must make a timely objection that is specific enough to

provide the trial court with a meaningful opportunity to correct the

alleged error. See Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567,

570 (Colo. App. 2010). Husband’s counsel never argued to the

5
court, either in his written responses to wife’s C.R.C.P. 60(b)

motions or at the hearing, that “affirmative relief” wasn’t available

under C.R.C.P. 60(b), nor did counsel mention Affordable Country

Homes. As a result, the court wasn’t afforded a meaningful

opportunity to correct the error that husband now alleges on appeal

regarding affirmative relief being unavailable under C.R.C.P. 60(b).1

¶ 14 To the extent husband argues that the court’s decision

granting wife “affirmative relief” under C.R.C.P. 60(b) created a

jurisdictional defect that he can raise at any time, we disagree. If a

trial court erroneously grants a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion that doesn’t

allege sufficient grounds for relief from a prior judgment, the order

may be “vulnerable to reversal upon appeal” for simple “legal error,”

but the order isn’t “void” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In

re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168, 172 (Colo. 1981) (“[I]t is not a

prerequisite to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under

C.R.C.P. 60(b) that the grounds asserted in the motion to set aside

a judgment be legally adequate.”).

1 Because husband failed to preserve this issue, we express no

opinion on whether the court properly invoked C.R.C.P. 60 to
modify the parties’ property division.

6
¶ 15 We similarly conclude that husband didn’t preserve his due

process argument. See In re S.O., 795 P.2d 254, 257 (Colo. 1990) (a

party’s right to notice and an opportunity to be heard can be

waived); see also Zavala v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 759 P.2d 664,

668 (Colo. 1988) (“[B]y fully participating in the hearing and failing

to object to any notice provisions, the appellants waived any right to

later claim these defects constituted a violation of their due process

rights.”). Although husband fully participated in, and was

represented by counsel at, the September 2023 hearing, husband

never argued to the court that he lacked notice of the different

forms of relief that wife sought.

¶ 16 Even if husband had preserved his due process argument, the

record reveals that husband received adequate notice that wife

sought both an increased share of the proceeds from the home’s

sale and an award of her attorney fees. Specifically, all three of

wife’s C.R.C.P. 60(b) motions alerted husband that she sought both

forms of relief, enabling husband to prepare defenses to both before

the hearing. See, e.g., Fueston v. City of Colorado Springs, 713 P.2d

1323, 1326 (Colo. App. 1985) (purpose of notice component of due

7
process is to “convey[] enough information to allow preparation for a

hearing”).

¶ 17 Although wife, in her motions, framed her requests as

alternative forms of relief, wife clarified at the hearing that she

sought both 100% of the proceeds from the home’s sale and

attorney fees totaling $70,000. The court ultimately declined to

grant wife everything she requested, awarding her 80% of the

home’s estimated equity and attorney fees totaling $30,212.40.

Husband cites no authority, and we are aware of none, prohibiting

a court from awarding a party portions of multiple alternative forms

of requested relief.

B. Equity Valuation of the Marital Home

¶ 18 Husband argues that the court erred by (1) failing to value the

marital home and the parties’ mortgage debt and (2) making an

unsupported factual finding that the parties’ equity in the marital

home totaled $110,000. According to husband, the court should

have used the home’s May 2023 sale price of $495,000 when

determining its value. We conclude that a remand is necessary for

additional factual findings.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

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¶ 19 “The court has great latitude to equitably divide the marital

estate based on the facts and circumstances of the case, and we

won’t disturb its decision absent a showing of an abuse of

discretion.” In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28. A

court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on a misapplication of the

law. In re Marriage of Bergeson-Flanders, 2022 COA 18, ¶ 10.

¶ 20 To achieve an equitable property division, the court must

consider all relevant factors, including (a) the contribution of each

spouse to the acquisition of the marital property; (b) the value of the

property set apart to each spouse; (c) the economic circumstances

of each spouse at the time the division of property becomes

effective; and (d) any change in a spouse’s separate property during

the marriage or the depletion of separate property for marital

purposes. § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2024; see In re Marriage of Powell,

220 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo. App. 2009). Although the court has broad

discretion when valuing the parties’ property, it must classify the

property as marital or separate, value the marital property, and

equitably distribute the marital property after considering the

9
statutory factors. See § 14-10-113(1), (5); LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO

3, ¶ 63.

¶ 21 The same “principle[s] appl[y] to marital debt, which must be

valued in the same way [that] marital property is valued.” In re

Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 22 When valuing property, the court may select the valuation of

one party over that of the other party or make its own valuation. In

re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23. The court’s decision

valuing the property will be upheld on appeal unless clearly

erroneous. Id. However, the court’s order “must contain findings of

fact and conclusions of law sufficiently explicit to give an appellate

court a clear understanding of the basis of its order and to enable

the appellate court to determine the grounds upon which it

rendered its decision.” In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822

(Colo. App. 2008).

2. Additional Background

¶ 23 At the November 2022 final orders hearing, husband testified

that the marital home was worth approximately $505,000, while

wife testified that its value fell between $505,000 and $515,000.

10
¶ 24 In its dissolution decree, the court estimated the remaining

balance on home’s mortgage at $410,000 and valued the home’s

equity at approximately $100,000. The court ordered that the

marital home be sold and apportioned 70% of the net proceeds to

wife and 30% to husband. The court also ordered the parties to

follow the appointed real estate agent’s recommendation if husband

and wife couldn’t agree “on an aspect of marketing or selling the

house (e.g., listing price, whether to accept an offer).”

¶ 25 Instead of following the court’s order, husband unilaterally

retained his own real estate agent, Tisdale. Tisdale listed the home

for sale at $474,900, well below the estimates both husband and

wife gave at the November 2022 hearing. In January 2023,

husband placed the home under contract for $483,900. Wife asked

the court to stop the pending sale, arguing that she would lose

money if it proceeded. The court, however, explained that it didn’t

have authority to halt the sale.

¶ 26 Wife then recorded a notice of lis pendens and filed a separate

fraudulent transfer action to stop the sale. Wife eventually agreed

to voluntarily dismiss the fraudulent transfer action and release the

lis pendens when the parties entered into a stipulation to appoint

11
Hinkle as the real estate agent to list the marital home for sale. The

stipulation didn’t modify the court’s prior order requiring the

parties to either (1) reach consensus on how the home would be

marketed and sold or (2) follow the appointed real estate agent’s

recommendations.

¶ 27 Hinkle listed the home for sale for $495,000. The same buyers

who previously contracted with husband to buy the home for a

lower price again tendered an offer, this time for the listing price of

$495,000 but with $10,000 in seller concessions. Hinkle forwarded

the offer to husband and reminded him that the parties had to

reach a consensus before moving forward. Hinkle also

recommended against accepting the offer “as is.”

¶ 28 Despite Hinkle’s recommendation, husband accepted the offer

the same day. After husband accepted the offer, Hinkle emailed

husband saying that she was “surprised” at husband’s quick

acceptance and that she had intended to reach out to other real

estate agents to solicit competing offers. The sale closed in May

2023, with closing costs exceeding $60,000, including a disputed

“holdover” commission going to Tisdale.

12
¶ 29 At the September 2023 hearing on wife’s C.R.C.P. 60(b)

motions, husband admitted that he had fabricated multiple invoices

for work to prepare the home for sale.

¶ 30 In its ruling on wife’s motions, the court determined that its

original equity estimate of $100,000 had been “undermined” by

husband’s misconduct, including his manipulation of financial

records. The court also determined that the home’s sale price of

$495,000 wasn’t a reliable indicator of its value because (1)

husband’s misconduct over the life of the case delayed the sale to a

less favorable market; (2) husband’s sale to the “insiders” who

previously attempted to purchase the home wasn’t an arm’s-length

transaction; and (3) husband’s quick acceptance of the insiders’

$495,000 offer, without consulting wife, didn’t reflect adequate

market exposure to achieve a maximum price. However, the court

didn’t assign an alternative value to the home but instead estimated

the parties’ equity at $110,000, or $10,000 more than its prior

estimate. The court then increased wife’s share of the home’s

equity from 70% to 80% and ordered husband to make an $88,000

equalization payment to wife.

3. Analysis

13
¶ 31 At the outset, we commend the court on its extensive efforts to

arrive at an equitable property division after husband’s admitted

misconduct came to light. The court’s detailed orders reflect its

diligence in attempting to reach a “just” property division under

challenging circumstances. § 14-10-113(1).

¶ 32 Turning to the evidence before the court, we disagree with

husband that the court abused its discretion by rejecting the

home’s $495,000 sale price as its value. The court found that

husband’s actions rendered the sale “too tainted” to give a plausible

indication of the home’s market value. The record supports the

court’s finding. Hinkle testified that, although she listed the home

for sale at $495,000, she hoped that the competitive listing price

would entice other buyers to make competing offers that would

drive the price up. Hinkle explained that she recommended against

husband accepting the first offer and that she intended to solicit

competing offers from other agents who had previously expressed

interest. Husband’s immediate acceptance of the $495,000 offer

from the “insiders,” however, prevented Hinkle from seeking higher

offers.

14
¶ 33 The court also found that husband accepted the first offer, in

part, to ensure that his unauthorized real estate agent, Tisdale,

would receive an “unequivocally improper commission.” This

finding, too, is supported by the record. Hinkle testified that

husband’s quick acceptance of the first offer allowed the sale to

close within Tisdale’s sixty-day “holdover period,” thus entitling her

to receive a significant commission. Given Hinkle’s testimony,

which the court was free to credit, and the broad discretion afforded

to the court in determining an asset’s value, we can’t say that the

court abused its discretion by finding that the $495,000 sale price

was too tainted to serve as a reliable indicator of the home’s value.

See In re Marriage of Mohrlang, 85 P.3d 561, 563 (Colo. App. 2003)

(“[C]redibility determinations lie within the sole discretion of the

trial court.”); see also Krejci, ¶ 23 (trial court may “make its own

valuation”).

¶ 34 We agree with husband, however, that the court didn’t make

adequate findings to support its decision regarding the value of the

marital home’s equity. After valuing the home’s equity at $110,000,

the court increased wife’s apportionment from 70% to 80%,

resulting in an $88,000 equalization payment owed by husband to

15
wife. But the court didn’t say what evidence it relied on to reach its

revised equity valuation. See Rozzi, 190 P.3d at 822 (court’s

findings must provide “a clear understanding of the basis of its

order” to “enable the appellate court to determine the grounds upon

which it rendered its decision”); cf. In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d

267, 270 (Colo. App. 2010) (“some evidence in the record” must

support the court’s findings). Nor did the court separately

determine the marital home’s market value and the parties’

mortgage debt in a way that would allow us to discern how it

reached its equity valuation. See Jorgenson, 143 P.3d at 1172 (both

marital property and marital debt must be valued).

¶ 35 It appears that the court may have credited wife’s testimony

that the home was worth $515,000 on the high side, and then

subtracted the outstanding mortgage balance of $406,748.50 that

appeared on the settlement statement that wife admitted into

evidence. The resulting equity of $108,251.50 is remarkably close

to $110,000. But we can’t be certain that these calculations

accurately reflect the evidence on which the court relied. Even if we

could be certain, such calculations don’t account for the

approximate $60,000 in closing costs that also appeared on wife’s

16
settlement statement. See In re Marriage of Burford, 950 P.2d 682,

685 (Colo. App. 1997) (remanding for further findings where trial

court’s property division failed to account for husband’s surrender

of a $90,000 note).

¶ 36 Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the court’s order

awarding wife an equalization payment and remand for further

proceedings. On remand, the court must (1) make findings

separately valuing the marital home and its debt as of the earlier of

the date of the decree or the date of the hearing on the disposition

of property, see § 14-10-113(5), including any closing costs

associated with the home’s sale, and (2) equitably apportion the

resulting equity in the marital home between husband and wife

under section 14-10-113(1). The court’s findings shall explicitly

state the evidence on which it relied to enable a later reviewing

court to determine the grounds upon which it rendered its decision.

See Rozzi, 190 P.3d at 822.

¶ 37 To the extent necessary based on its new equity

determination, the court may in its discretion reconsider the overall

property and debt division to achieve an equitable result. See In re

Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 38 (“If any new division

17
impacts the fairness of the overall property and debt division, on

remand, the court may revisit its entire property and debt division,

but it need do so only if reconsideration is necessary to achieve an

equitable result.”).

C. Attorney Fees

¶ 38 Husband also contends that the court abused its discretion by

awarding wife attorney fees (1) that she incurred in her separate

fraudulent transfer action; (2) under section 13-17-102, C.R.S.

2024,2 without first finding that husband knew or should have

known that his conduct lacked substantial justification; and (3)

without making findings regarding the parties’ relative incomes,

assets, and liabilities, contrary to In re Marriage of Aragon, 2019

COA 76, ¶ 9. We perceive no abuse of discretion.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 39 We review a trial court’s decision awarding attorney fees for an

abuse of discretion, whether they were awarded under section 13-

17-102 or the court’s inherent authority. See, e.g., Laleh v.

2 We cite the current version of the statute.
Although the General
Assembly amended the statute after the court entered its attorney
fee award in November 2023, see Ch. 131, § 5, 2024 Colo. Sess.
Laws 466-67, those amendments don’t affect our analysis.

18
Johnson, 2016 COA 4, ¶ 33; In re Marriage of Tognoni, 313 P.3d

655, 660-61 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 40 As relevant here, a court may award attorney fees under

section 13-17-102(4) when it finds that a party brought or defended

an action that lacked substantial justification, was interposed for

delay or harassment, or unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by

other improper conduct. A claim or defense lacks substantial

justification when it’s substantially frivolous, substantially

groundless, or substantially vexatious. § 13-17-102(9)(a); Mitchell v.

Ryder, 104 P.3d 316, 321 (Colo. App. 2004). “A vexatious claim is

one brought or maintained in bad faith to annoy or harass. It may

include conduct that is arbitrary, abusive, stubbornly litigious, or

disrespectful of truth.” Bockar v. Patterson, 899 P.2d 233, 235

(Colo. App. 1994).

¶ 41 Under section 13-17-102(6), before a court may impose

attorney fees against an unrepresented party, the court must find

that the party “clearly knew or reasonably should have known” that

the party’s conduct was substantially frivolous, substantially

groundless, or substantially vexatious. See Bockar, 899 P.2d at

235.

19
¶ 42 A court may also award attorney fees under its inherent

authority “to administer justice fairly.” Johnston v. Dist. Ct., 580

P.2d 798, 799 (Colo. 1978). A court may levy attorney fees, for

example, to curb “abusive litigation practices,” Roadway Express,

Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980), or in response to a party’s

“bad faith action” that resulted in another litigant incurring

unnecessary attorney fees, Johnston, 580 P.2d at 799.

2. Additional Background

¶ 43 Based on the evidence presented at the September 2023

hearing, the court found that husband engaged in “a multi-month

scheme to subvert the process created to yield a plausibly

reasonable value” for the marital home. Husband’s scheme, the

court found, threatened to deprive wife of an equitable share of the

marital estate.

¶ 44 After removing entries for time that wife’s attorneys spent on

wife’s separate contempt motion, the court awarded wife

$30,212.40 in attorney fees, citing both section 13-17-102 and its

inherent authority as supporting legal authority.

3. Analysis

a. Attorney Fees for Fraudulent Transfer Action

20
¶ 45 Relying on In re Marriage of Burns, 717 P.2d 991 (Colo. App.

1985), husband contends that the court abused its discretion by

awarding wife her attorney fees incurred in her separate fraudulent

transfer action. In Burns, the trial court awarded the wife attorney

fees under the fee-shifting provision of the Uniform Dissolution of

Marriage Act (the Act) in effect at the time, § 14-10-119, C.R.S.

1985, even though wife brought the subject claim in an

independent equitable action. See id. at 993. A division of this

court reversed, explaining that the wife’s fees weren’t recoverable

under the Act in an independent equitable action, especially as the

parties’ dissolution decree had never been reopened. See id.

¶ 46 Unlike in Burns, however, the court in this case awarded wife

attorney fees under section 13-17-102 and its inherent authority,

not under the Act. Contrary to husband’s argument, the Burns

division didn’t examine whether a party’s attorney fees incurred in a

separate action are awardable under either section 13-17-102 or

the court’s inherent authority as a sanction for an opponent’s

litigation misconduct. As a result, Burns doesn’t help husband.

¶ 47 While we are unaware of any authority specifically addressing

whether a party’s attorney fees incurred in a separate action are

21
awardable as a sanction for an opponent’s litigation misconduct

under section 13-17-102, we conclude that the court could award

such fees under its “well-acknowledged” inherent authority to

remedy “abusive litigation practices.”3 Roadway Express, 447 U.S.

at 765 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962));

accord Johnston, 580 P.2d at 799 (upholding award of attorney fees

based on court’s inherent authority where the defendant’s bad faith

was “directly responsible” for the plaintiff’s expenditure of attorney

fees).

¶ 48 To the extent husband argues that the court’s inherent

authority to fashion appropriate sanctions for litigation misconduct

doesn’t extend to awarding a party its attorney fees incurred in a

3 In Roberts v. Bruce, 2018 CO 58, the supreme court addressed the

related question of whether section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024,
authorizes a trial court to award a party its attorney fees for having
to respond to a frivolous lawsuit in another state. Rather than
restrict the trial court to awarding fees incurred only in the case
before it, the supreme court held that the statute imposes a
geographic limit, authorizing courts to award fees only for conduct
occurring “in Colorado courts.” Id. at ¶ 20. Thus, the supreme
court’s analysis appears to embrace, or at least leaves open the
possibility, that a court can use section 13-17-102 to award a party
attorney fees incurred in a separate Colorado lawsuit as a sanction
for an opponent’s litigation misconduct. We need not resolve this
question, however, because we conclude that the court’s inherent
authority provided a sufficient basis for its fee award.

22
separate lawsuit, we disagree. See Lauren Corp. v. Century

Geophysical Corp., 953 P.2d 200, 204 (Colo. App. 1998) (discussing

courts’ inherent authority to award attorney fees, including when a

party’s wrongful act has proximately caused the wronged party to

become engaged in other litigation); see also Bernhard v. Farmers

Ins. Exch., 915 P.2d 1285, 1287 n.3 (Colo. 1996) (collecting cases

illustrating the same).

b. Section 13-17-102(6)

¶ 49 We also disagree with husband that the court abused its

discretion by awarding wife attorney fees under section 13-17-102

without first finding under subsection 102(6) that husband, while

proceeding pro se, knew or reasonably should have known that his

conduct was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or

substantially vexatious.4

¶ 50 The court found both that (1) husband’s conduct was

substantially vexatious and unnecessarily expanded the

4 Although husband was represented by an attorney at both the

November 2022 and September 2023 hearings, the court found that
husband wasn’t represented by counsel during the “bulk” of the
case. Based on this finding, we will assume without deciding that
section 13-17-102(6) applies to husband.

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proceedings and (2) husband acted knowingly and willfully when he

violated the court’s orders. The court’s findings, which enjoy record

support, satisfy the requirements for an attorney fee award under

subsection 102(6). See Bockar, 899 P.2d at 235.

c. In re Marriage of Aragon

¶ 51 Finally, we aren’t persuaded by husband’s argument that the

court ran afoul of Marriage of Aragon, ¶ 9, by failing to make

findings regarding the parties’ relative incomes, assets, and

liabilities. Aragon’s requirement that the court make findings

regarding the parties’ relative incomes, assets, and liabilities applies

when the court awards attorney fees under section 14-10-119. See

Aragon, ¶¶ 8-9. But as already discussed, the court in this case

didn’t award wife attorney fees under section 14-10-119.

¶ 52 Husband also argues that (1) wife didn’t substantiate her

request for attorney fees with an affidavit and (2) wife should have

pursued her attorney fees through a contempt proceeding under

C.R.C.P. 107. But husband fails to cite the point in the record

where he preserved these arguments. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A). We

therefore decline to address them. See Shiplet v. Colo. Dep’t of

Revenue, 266 P.3d 408, 412 (Colo. App. 2011).

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III. Disposition

¶ 53 We affirm the judgment in part and reverse it in part, and we

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

25