Marriage of MacLaird

24CA0344 Marriage of MacLaird 12-12-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0344
El Paso County District Court No. 22DR31669
Honorable Frances R. Johnson, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Matthew L. MacLaird,

Appellee,

and

Emma L. MacLaird,

Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART
AND ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Gomez and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 12, 2024

No Appearance for Appellee

Emma L. MacLaird, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 In this domestic case involving Emma L. MacLaird (wife) and

Matthew L. MacLaird (husband), wife appeals the district court’s

permanent orders, several post-decree orders, and an order denying

her “Petition to Modify Original Order” (petition to modify the

decree). We affirm the order denying wife’s petition to modify the

decree and dismiss the rest of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 In June 2023, the district court entered a decree dissolving the

parties’ marriage.

¶3 In the permanent orders, the district court awarded wife the

marital residence, including all associated expenses and the

existing mortgage. But the court also required that within ninety

days, wife had to either assume the mortgage or refinance it to

remove husband’s name. If she could not meet either condition, the

residence had to be listed for sale. Husband had the final say over

selecting a realtor, provided that his choice was “not closely

affiliated” with him. Once the residence was sold, husband would

receive his premarital contribution to the down payment and, after

deducting any sale costs, the remaining proceeds would be split

evenly.

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¶4 Because wife did not assume or refinance the mortgage within

ninety days, the marital residence was listed for sale. Though the

parties agreed on a realtor, wife refused to sign the listing

agreement.

¶5 In October 2023, the district court issued an order authorizing

the clerk of the court to sign on wife’s behalf any documents related

to the sale of the marital residence. The court also required wife to

give the realtor, husband, and his agents reasonable access to the

residence to photograph, inspect, and show it.

¶6 Later that month, husband alerted the court that wife was

frustrating the sale of the marital residence by, among other things,

denying the real estate photographer access, alleging that the

realtor was closely affiliated with him, and insisting on a new

realtor.

¶7 In November 2023, the district court ordered wife to vacate the

marital residence within thirty days.

¶8 In February 2024, wife filed a petition to modify the decree,

arguing that:

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• under the permanent orders, she continued to pay the

utilities on the marital residence because the “expenses

[had] yet to be defined”;

• the permanent orders did not provide sufficient time for her

to assume the mortgage;

• husband’s failure to communicate and cooperate regarding

the sale of the marital residence caused her “homelessness,

legal bills, and uncertain budgets due to undefined

expenses”;

• husband disregarded the permanent orders by selecting an

“affiliated” realtor, which hindered a “safe” sale of the

residence and disallowed a seller’s fee;

• husband’s failure to provide defined expenses caused her

“eviction” from the residence and her financial uncertainty;

• by authorizing the clerk of the court to sign documents on

her behalf, the court enabled husband to sell the residence

in secret, depriving her of information needed to budget and

plan her life;

• husband’s attorney engaged in unethical behavior, costing

her legal fees;

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• husband’s actions throughout the sale process were

“unethical,” “abusive,” and “criminal,” while she was

“ignored consistently” despite abiding by the law and the

court’s orders; and

• husband “stole” $30,000 in June 2022 and potentially

avoided paying capital gains taxes as evidenced by

“extravagant billing” designed “to create time and drama.”

¶9 In February 2024, the district court denied wife’s petition to

modify the decree because it “[did] not cite any legal authority to

support any portion of [the] motion.”

¶ 10 Wife then filed another petition, this time with legal authority

and analysis. The court did not rule on it.

¶ 11 Wife timely appealed the order denying her petition to modify

the decree.

II. The Order Denying the Petition to Modify the Decree

¶ 12 Wife contends that the district court erred by denying her

petition to modify the decree because the petition did not include

any supporting legal authority. We disagree.

¶ 13 The district court may deny a motion if the moving party fails

to cite any supporting legal authority. C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(3); see

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also Box v. Wickham, 713 P.2d 415, 416 (Colo. App. 1985) (“[m]ere

reference to a procedural rule was insufficient ‘legal authority’” to

support motion for relief from judgment; district court correctly

denied the motion). The rule applies equally to all parties,

represented or not. See In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 33

(pro se litigants are required to follow the same procedural rules as

lawyers and must accept the consequences of mistakes and errors).

¶ 14 While we recognize wife is self-represented and sympathize

with the many challenges that presents, her petition to modify the

decree had no legal citations or analysis. Thus, the district court

didn’t err by denying it for lack of legal support. See C.R.C.P. 121,

§ 1-15(3); see also In re Marriage of Snyder, 701 P.2d 153, 155

(Colo. App. 1985) (district court did not err by denying the

husband’s C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion because he cited no legal

authority).

¶ 15 In any event, modifying the property division requires the

movant to assert, and the court to find, conditions that justify

reopening a judgment under C.R.C.P. 59 or C.R.C.P. 60. See § 14-

10-122(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; see also In re Marriage of McKendry, 735

P.2d 908, 909 (Colo. App. 1986). And even if we assume wife’s

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petition to modify the decree was brought under either Rule 59 or

Rule 60, the court still properly denied it. That’s because it was

untimely under Rule 59, see C.R.C.P. 59(a), and didn’t allege any

sufficient grounds under Rule 60 justifying relief from the

permanent orders, see C.R.C.P. 60(b). And to the extent wife

alleged a post-decree change of circumstances, “a decree

determining property rights in a divorce matter is final and cannot

be subsequently modified by reason of a change of circumstances.”

McDonald v. McDonald, 374 P.2d 690, 690-91 (Colo. 1962).

¶ 16 For these reasons, we disagree that the court erred by denying

the petition to modify the decree.

III. Challenges to Other Orders

¶ 17 As best we understand it, wife also challenges several other

orders and rulings that we lack jurisdiction to review.

¶ 18 Wife challenges portions of the June 2023 permanent orders.

But the deadline to appeal the permanent orders was forty-nine

days from the date of entry. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1). Because wife did

not timely appeal the permanent orders, we must dismiss this part

of the appeal. See In re Marriage of Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 12

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(appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review issues resolved in

orders not appealed).

¶ 19 For the same reason — because they are untimely — we lack

jurisdiction to review wife’s challenges to the October 2023 order

authorizing the clerk of the court to sign documents on her behalf

for the sale of the marital residence and the November 2023 order

requiring her to vacate the residence. We therefore dismiss the

portions of the appeal challenging these orders. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1);

Roddy, ¶ 12.

¶ 20 To the extent wife contends that the district court erred by not

ruling on her second petition to modify the decree, there’s no order

for us to review; thus, we must dismiss this portion of the appeal

for lack of a final order. See In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA

141, ¶ 11; see also State ex rel. Suthers v. CB Servs. Corp., 252 P.3d

7, 10 (Colo. App. 2010) (“The final judgment requirement is

jurisdictional. Without a final judgment, we must dismiss the

appeal.”); In re Marriage of West, 94 P.3d 1248, 1250 (Colo. App.

2004) (an order is not final and reviewable “until it has been

reduced to writing, dated, and signed”); C.A.R. 1(a)(1); § 13-4-

102(1), C.R.S. 2024.

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¶ 21 And, finally, insofar as wife appeals orders entered after she

filed her notice of appeal, we again lack jurisdiction to review those

orders. That’s because wife didn’t file separate notices of appeal as

to those orders or amend the existing notice of appeal to include

them. See Amada Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Pomeroy, 2021 COA 73,

¶¶ 74-75 (appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review order

because it was not appealed and the existing notice of appeal was

not amended); see also In re Estate of Anderson, 727 P.2d 867, 869-

70 (Colo. App. 1986) (notice of appeal not effective to initiate appeal

of order entered after notice of appeal).

IV. Disposition

¶ 22 We dismiss the portions of the appeal relating to the 2023

orders and any post-decree orders that either were not appealed or

were entered after the notice of appeal. We affirm the district

court’s order denying wife’s petition to modify the decree.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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