Peo in Interest of ZM

24CA0999 Peo in Interest of ZM 01-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0999
Jefferson County District Court No. 23JV30195
Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z.M., a Child,

and Concerning B.K.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Tow and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 2, 2025

Kimblery Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, B.K.M. (father)

appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal

relationship with Z.M. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In June 2023, the Jefferson County Division of Children and

Families filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding the

then-seven-day-old child, alleging concerns about the parents’

substance use and the child’s exposure to illicit drugs. The

Division noted that the child had tested positive for fentanyl,

methamphetamine, and marijuana at birth and was experiencing

withdrawal symptoms that required neonatal intensive care. After

about a month in the hospital, the child was placed in a foster

home, where she remained for the duration of the case.

¶3 In August 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan that required

father to address his substance abuse issues, develop stability,

comply with all criminal case requirements, and attend family time.

¶4 In December, the Division moved to terminate father’s parental

rights. In April 2024, following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile

court granted the motion.

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II. Discussion

¶5 Father contends the juvenile court erred by finding that he

could not become a fit parent within a reasonable time. We

disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably

complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the

plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable

time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶7 A parent is unfit if they are unable or unwilling to give a child

reasonable parental care. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 23. “Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that

the parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to meet the

child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.” People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 9. A parent’s noncompliance

with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a lack of

commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore, may also

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be considered in determining unfitness.” People in Interest of D.P.,

181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶8 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a

treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental

rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.

2007). The determination of a reasonable period is necessarily fact

specific, and thus, what constitutes a reasonable time to comply

with a treatment plan may vary from case to case. Id. But a

reasonable time is not an indefinite time, and it must be determined

by considering the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and

needs of the child. S.Z.S., ¶ 24.

¶9 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change and whether the parent can become fit in a

reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider several factors,

including whether any change in the parent’s behaviors occurred

during the dependency and neglect proceeding, the parent’s social

history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct

or condition. K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006).

¶ 10 When a child is under six years old at the time of filing the

petition in dependency and neglect, the juvenile court must

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consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions,

which require that such children be placed in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-

702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024; see also S.Z.S., ¶ 25.

¶ 11 A juvenile court’s termination of parental rights presents a

mixed question of law and fact because it involves application of the

termination statute to evidentiary facts. S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10. We

review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but we review de

novo the court’s legal conclusions based on those facts. Id.

¶ 12 The credibility of the witnesses, as well as the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, are all subject to the

juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d

244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We do not reweigh the evidence or

substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. People in

Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.

B. Analysis

¶ 13 The juvenile court considered whether father could become fit

within a reasonable period and ultimately concluded he could not.

The court found that father did not comply with his treatment plan

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“in any significant respect” and that he exhibited the same

problems addressed in the plan “without adequate improvement” at

the time of the termination hearing. The court also found that

father had a “long standing history of substance use” as well as a

history in the criminal justice system that was largely “related to

drug use and the ongoing untreated substance use.” The court

found that this case quickly followed “a prior dependency and

neglect case that resulted in termination” of father’s parental rights

with respect to two older children and that both cases were

“substance use cases.” The court also noted that this case was

subject to the EPP provisions. The court concluded that the child’s

newborn status and need for permanency, the stability of her

placement in the same home as her two older sisters, and the policy

of promptly achieving permanency in EPP cases supported

termination of father’s parental rights.

¶ 14 The record supports these findings. It shows that although

treatment and services were available to father throughout the case,

by the time of the termination hearing, he had not successfully

resolved the concerns that initially brought the child to the

Division’s attention. Specifically, the caseworker’s testimony and

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report indicated that father never completed a substance abuse

evaluation or provided any urinalysis tests; had several pending

criminal cases, many of which involved “drug charges” and were

“picked up” during the pendency of this case; and only attended one

family time session with the child, which occurred about nine

months before the termination hearing.

¶ 15 As father points out on appeal, he testified that he had largely

served the sentences in his criminal cases and started substance

abuse treatment about one week before the termination hearing.

But the caseworker testified that although father told her he was

going to enter a treatment program a week before the hearing, he

never signed a release for her to verify that he was actually in

treatment. And, even assuming father had entered a treatment

program on the eve of the hearing, the juvenile court considered his

recent progress but noted that any such progress must be

considered in the context of this entire case, the long term nature of

father’s substance abuse issue, and the resulting child welfare

cases. As the court noted, father’s claimed engagement started

“nine months into an EPP case following the closing of another case

that ended in termination.” Given these findings, we are

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unpersuaded by father’s argument that the juvenile court should

have allowed him more time to become a fit parent.

¶ 16 The record also shows, as the juvenile court found, that

father’s issues with substance abuse were “long standing.” See

K.D., 139 P.3d at 700 (the juvenile court may consider the chronic

or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition in

determining whether they can become fit within a reasonable

amount of time). The record indicates that father was a respondent

parent in two prior dependency and neglect cases, the first of which

opened in 2017. The caseworker testified that both prior cases

were opened based on concerns about father’s substance use and

neither ended with the children returning home to father. The

court also took judicial notice of several criminal cases dating back

to 2020 in which father was charged with various drug crimes. The

caseworker also noted that father had been charged with multiple

drug offenses since the filing of the petition in this case.

¶ 17 At the time of termination hearing, the child had been out of

the home for her entire nine-month life. In her report, the

caseworker stated that the child was “very young” and needed a

“safe, sober caregiver.” The caseworker also stated that “[a]t this

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point, [the child] does not even know who her parents are and her

parents are not aware of her needs.” Thus, based on the parents’

lack of engagement, the caseworker opined that termination was in

the child’s best interests.

¶ 18 In sum, because the juvenile court’s findings enjoy record

support, we conclude that it did not err by finding that father could

not become a fit parent within a reasonable time.

III. Disposition

¶ 19 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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