Marriage of Vendetti

23CA2204 Marriage of Vendetti 01-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2204
Fremont County District Court No. 23DR30021
Honorable Lynette M. Wenner, Judge

In re the Marriage of

John Michael Vendetti,

Appellee,

and

Michelle Ray Vendetti,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Grove and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 2, 2025

Knies Helland & McPherson Law, Alexander Masterson, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

The Harris Law Firm PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding involving Michelle

Ray Vendetti (wife) and John Michael Vendetti (husband), wife

appeals from the property division entered as part of the district

court’s permanent orders. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand the case with directions to redetermine the property

division and revisit the denial of spousal maintenance and attorney

fees.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 The parties married in 2011 and separated in March 2023,

when wife left the marital residence. Shortly after, the parties filed

a petition for dissolution.

¶3 During the marriage, wife worked for the United States Postal

Service (USPS). Husband managed the day-to-day operations of

their jointly owned roofing company (marital business), and wife

handled the bookkeeping. In September 2023, the district court

ordered that Amber Conover assume all bookkeeping

responsibilities.

1
¶4 Two months later, the district court dissolved the marriage

and issued written permanent orders. The court made the following

findings:

• Although wife was allowed to get an evaluation of the

marital business, none was provided on time.

• It was unclear how wife arrived at a value of $325,000 for

the marital business.

• Ms. Conover testified credibly that the business’s books

had not been adequately maintained for over a year and

that wife appeared to lack the knowledge to manage them

accurately.

• Both husband and Ms. Conover testified credibly about

the marital business’s value. Their testimony established

that the business primarily served as a source of income

for husband and did not hold significant value beyond

that. Thus, based on their assessment, the business’s

value was $71,619, which included seven vehicles.

• Husband reported receiving a monthly salary of $7,000

from the marital business. The evidence, however,

suggested that his income was much lower historically.

2
• Wife’s monthly salary from USPS was $4,328.

• Husband’s subsequent appraisal of the marital residence

provided a more accurate valuation than the joint

expert’s appraisal because it was more recent and

correctly reflected the property’s current condition.

• Wife’s Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS)

pension was worth $14,798 at the hearing, but the

present-day value of the future marital interest was

$177,448.

¶5 Based on those and other findings, the district court divided

the marital estate and ordered husband to pay wife an equalization

of $204,123.

Marital Asset/Debt Marital Wife’s Award Husband’s
Value Award
Marital Business $71,619 $71,619
Marital Residence $560,000 $560,000
Wife’s FERS Pension $177,448 $177,448
Wife’s Thrift Savings $42,088 $42,088
Plan
Husband’s USAA $5,094 $5,094
Mutual Fund
Bank Accounts $8,993 $8,222 $771

3
Vehicles $78,653 $45,345 $33,308
Debts ($10,558) ($10,558)
SUBTOTAL $933,337 $262,545 $670,792
Equalization Payment $204,123 ($204,123)
TOTAL $466,668 $466,669

The court denied spousal maintenance, emphasizing wife’s ability to

meet her financial needs through her current employment and

husband’s inability to pay. Last, the court ordered each party to be

responsible for their attorney fees.

II. Property Division

¶6 Wife contends that the district court erred in its valuation of

the marital business and residence, her pension, and by failing to

allocate four vehicles. We address each argument in turn.

a. Preliminary Issue

¶7 We first consider husband’s argument that wife’s appeal is

barred because she “demanded the effectuation of the property

division and benefitted from the [district] court’s judgment.” He is

mistaken.

4
¶8 Generally, a party cannot accept the benefits of a judgment

and seek reversal of that judgment on appeal. In re Marriage of

Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 5, aff’d, 2021 CO 12, ¶ 5; In re Marriage

of Jones, 627 P.2d 248, 251 (Colo. 1981). But that rule is relaxed

in dissolution of marriage cases. See Zander, ¶ 5; see also In re

Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶9 By “demanding” the equalization payment, wife did not accept

the benefits of the district court’s property division. Nor was this

action inconsistent with the basis of her appeal. Thus, she is not

deprived of her right to seek review of the property division. See

Powell, 220 P.3d at 954; see also In re Marriage of Antuna, 8 P.3d

589, 592 (Colo. App. 2000) (the husband’s acceptance of a court-

ordered payment did not constitute a waiver of his right to appeal);

In re Marriage of Lee, 781 P.2d 102, 105 (Colo. App. 1989) (the

wife’s acceptance of maintenance payments did not waive her right

to appeal because public policy prohibits requiring a former spouse

to choose between the necessities of life and the right to appeal).

5
b. Standard of Review and Governing Law

¶ 10 The district court has considerable discretion to achieve an

equitable property division, and we will uphold its decision absent

an abuse of that discretion. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA

42M, ¶ 28. The court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies

the law. Id.

¶ 11 We will not disturb the district court’s valuation findings if

they are reasonable in light of the competent evidence as a whole.

In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23. The court may select the

valuation of one spouse over that of the other spouse or make its

own valuation, and the court’s determination will be upheld on

appeal unless clearly erroneous, meaning no evidence in the record

supports it. See id.; see also Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA

194, ¶ 12.

c. The Marital Business

¶ 12 We reject wife’s first argument that the district court abused

its discretion by valuing the marital business at $71,619 based on

husband’s testimony.

6
¶ 13 On October 6, 2023, wife moved for an evaluation of the

marital business and asked that the cost be split evenly. She

indicated that the evaluation would be completed within ten days.

The court ordered that if she wanted the evaluation, she would have

to pay for it.

¶ 14 Twenty days later, the district court held the permanent

orders hearing. Wife did not provide a business evaluation. She

explained that husband failed to timely give her a “management

report,” which she alleged was essential for finishing the evaluation.

She did not, however, request a continuance. At the close of

evidence, the court directed the parties to submit proposed

permanent orders.

¶ 15 Wife appended to her proposed permanent orders a November

9, 2023, evaluation that assessed the marital business’s worth at

$1,382,000. The district court granted husband’s motion to strike

the evaluation because the new evidence was offered too late. On

November 27, 2023, the court issued its written permanent orders,

determining that the business had a value of $71,619.

¶ 16 Wife asserts that upon receiving the business evaluation, the

district court should have sua sponte granted a new trial under

7
C.R.C.P. 59(c) or reopened the evidence. We disagree for two

reasons.

¶ 17 First, C.R.C.P. 59 is inapplicable as the district court had yet

to issue a final judgment when wife filed her proposed permanent

orders. See C.R.C.P. 59(a) (authorizing relief from final or otherwise

appealable judgments as provided in C.R.C.P. 58); see also C.R.C.P.

58 (“The term ‘judgment’ includes an appealable decree or order as

set forth in C.R.C.P. 54(a)); C.R.C.P. 54(a) (“‘Judgment’ as used in

these rules includes a decree and order to or from which an appeal

lies.”); Przekurat v. Torres, 2016 COA 177, ¶ 53 (“[A] C.R.C.P. 59

motion may only be filed to challenge a final order or judgment, not

a non-final or interlocutory order or judgment.”), aff’d, 2018 CO 69,

¶ 53.

¶ 18 Second, wife never requested to reopen the evidence. In her

proposed permanent orders, she simply stated that the business

was worth $1,382,000 and appended the business evaluation. Nor

did she file a response to husband’s motion to strike.1 On appeal,

1 Husband filed his motion to strike on November 13, 2023, and the

court denied it fourteen days later. Although wife was not given the
full twenty-one days to respond to husband’s motion to strike

8
wife fails to cite any case law, and we can find none, requiring a

district court, absent a motion by a party, to reopen the evidence

before the entry of a dissolution decree and permanent orders. In

fact, our review of the relevant case law shows just the opposite.

See People v. Hall, 2021 CO 71M, ¶¶ 16, 24 (a district court is

permitted to reopen a case and allow both parties to present

additional argument, either following a party’s motion or sua

sponte, as long as “there is no prejudice to either party and,

accordingly, justice is served”) (citation omitted); see also Medeiros,

¶¶ 16, 22 (the district court has the legal authority to rule on a

party’s request to reopen a case before the entry of a dissolution

decree and permanent orders based on alleged changed economic

circumstances, but in doing so, must consider certain factors); In re

Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1222 (Colo. App. 2006) (district

court may in its discretion permit a party who has rested to reopen

a case to present further evidence). Because wife did not request to

reopen the evidence and there is no requirement that a court, on its

before the district court issued its ruling, she does not raise this as
an issue. See C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(1)(b)).

9
own initiative, must do so, we cannot say that the court’s decision

was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See Medeiros,

¶ 28; see also In re Marriage of Eisenhuth, 976 P.2d 896, 901 (Colo.

App. 1999) (the district court considers the evidence presented to it;

it does not act as a surrogate attorney for the parties).

¶ 19 While wife insists that the district court should have

continued the permanent orders hearing to allow her to complete

the business evaluation given husband’s admitted failure to timely

provide an allegedly essential document, we decline to address this

undeveloped argument. See Zander, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may

decline to consider an argument not supported by legal authority or

any meaningful legal analysis); see also Vallagio at Inverness

Residential Condo. Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40

(an appellate court will “decline to assume the mantle” when parties

offer no supporting arguments for their claims).

¶ 20 Given our disposition, we need not resolve husband’s

assertion that wife failed to preserve this issue. See In re Marriage

of Mack, 2022 CO 17, ¶ 12 (because a contention was unavailing,

the appellate court need not decide whether it was preserved);

accord In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 48.

10
d. Marital Residence

¶ 21 Wife challenges the district court’s finding that the marital

residence had a value of $560,000. We discern no error.

¶ 22 The record reflects that a joint appraiser assessed the marital

residence at $600,000 as of June 2023. The joint appraiser

indicated that the residence was well-maintained and in good

condition. Later, husband obtained another appraisal. His

appraiser opined that the residence was worth $560,000 as of

August 2023, observing “some deferred maintenance” on the

property.

¶ 23 Wife asked the district court to accept the higher value of

$600,000, claiming that husband did not adequately maintain the

marital residence. She described the residence as being in

“gorgeous” condition when she vacated the property. Husband, on

the other hand, asserted that the decrease in value was not due to

his actions or inactions. He testified that the second appraisal

corrected certain inaccuracies from the initial appraisal and was

conducted closer in time to the current condition of the residence.

¶ 24 Ultimately, the district court sided with husband and valued

the residence at $560,000. The court then allocated it to him.

11
¶ 25 Because there is evidence in the record to support the district

court’s finding that the residence was worth $560,000, we will not

disturb it. See Krejci, ¶ 23; see also Van Gundy, ¶ 12.

¶ 26 Still, wife argues that the district court did not address her

“concerns” that husband depleted or dissipated the marital estate

by “failing to care” for the marital residence during the proceedings.

But we may presume that the court considered all the evidence

before it, even if it did not make express findings regarding that

evidence. See Collins, ¶ 21.

e. Wife’s FERS Pension

¶ 27 Next, wife maintains that the district court erred by allowing

husband, a lay witness, to render an expert opinion on the present-

day value of her FERS pension, and by adopting that valuation. We

agree.

¶ 28 A district court has wide latitude in accepting or refusing

evidence, and its rulings may only be overturned if there is a clear

abuse of discretion. City of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d

595, 610 (Colo. 2005); see In re Marriage of Humphries, 2024 COA

12
92M, ¶ 26 (a district court has broad discretion to determine the

admissibility of expert testimony).

¶ 29 In determining whether testimony is lay testimony under CRE

701 or expert testimony under CRE 702, the district court must

examine the basis for the opinion. Grand Junction Peace Officers’

Ass’n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024 COA 89, ¶ 77 (quoting

Venalonzo v. People, 2017 CO 9, ¶ 23).

¶ 30 Under CRE 701, lay witness testimony is limited to opinions or

inferences that are (1) rationally based on the witness’s perception;

(2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the

determination of a fact in issue; and (3) not based on scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of CRE

702. Thus, if the testimony relies on the witness’s personal

experiences or knowledge that an ordinary person could be

expected to have, then it constitutes lay testimony.

¶ 31 By contrast, CRE 702 governs expert witness testimony, which

is admissible if the witness is qualified by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education, and if the testimony will help the

trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.

13
Expert testimony “requires experience, skills, or knowledge that the

ordinary person would not have.” Venalonzo, ¶ 22.

¶ 32 Here, neither party called an expert to opine on the value of

wife’s FERS pension.

¶ 33 Wife testified that the pension’s present-day value should be

limited to $14,798.36 — the amount of contributions she had made

up to the time of the hearing.

¶ 34 Husband, on the other hand, offered Exhibit 38 showing the

present-day value of wife’s FERS pension to be $177,448. This

figure was derived using a web-based calculator with the following

inputs: $14,798.36 in annual payments, beginning in seventeen

years and eight months, to be paid over twenty-three years, with an

annual “investment interest rate” of 2.34%, and monthly payments

commencing at the start of each month. Wife objected to the

exhibit, asserting that a qualified actuary was required. See In re

Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003) (the

valuation of future retirement payments is often the subject of

expert testimony, usually provided by an actuary; see also In re

Marriage of Riley-Cunningham, 7 P.3d 992, 994 (Colo. App. 1999)

(“Under the net present value method, the [district] court, guided by

14
actuarial data, values the future benefit . . . .”). The district court

admitted Exhibit 38.

¶ 35 Husband explained that once wife turns fifty-seven (in

seventeen years and eight months), her annual retirement income

would include the marital interest of $14,798.36. He anticipated

that if she lives to the age of eighty, she would receive $14,798.36

every year for twenty-three years totaling $340,362. Then, by

discounting wife’s future payments using the “[thirty-]year average

inflation rate” of 2.34%, he arrived at a present-day value of

$177,448.

¶ 36 The district court, citing Exhibit 38, accepted husband’s

valuation.

¶ 37 We acknowledge the challenges the district court faced in

valuing the present-day value of wife’s FERS pension given the

evidence, particularly in the absence of an expert witness. We

nevertheless conclude that the court abused its discretion by

admitting and relying on husband’s valuation, which was based on

mere guesswork rather than competent evidence. See City of

Aurora, 105 P.3d at 610; see also Eisenhuth, 976 P.2d at 901 (the

15
district court must rely on competent evidence to ensure an

equitable property division).

¶ 38 Husband’s evidence exceeded the scope of permissible lay

testimony. His valuation was a projection based on several

assumptions such as wife’s life expectancy, the investment return

rate, and the inflation rate. His calculation necessitated specialized

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education which he did not

have. See CRE 702; see also Venalonzo, ¶ 22. And there was no

evidence to establish that multiplying the current marital interest

by the number of years of expected payments and then applying

either the investment return rate or the inflation rate would yield an

accurate present-day value.

¶ 39 We therefore reverse this portion of the permanent orders and

remand the case for the district court to reconsider the

characterization and value of wife’s FERS pension and redetermine

an equitable property division. See In re Marriage of Corak, 2014

COA 147, ¶ 31; see also Krejci, ¶ 18. On remand, the court may

take additional evidence concerning the value of the pension as of

the date of the decree. See In re Marriage of Mohrlang, 85 P.3d 561,

564 (Colo. App. 2003); see also § 14-10-113(5), C.R.S. 2024

16
(property must be valued at the time of the decree or of the hearing

on disposition, whichever is earlier).

f. Vehicles

¶ 40 Wife asserts that the district court omitted a 1984 Toyota

truck, purportedly worth $28,000. We agree.

¶ 41 In general, the district court must allocate all marital assets

and debts. See In re Marriage of Page, 70 P.3d 579, 582 (Colo. App.

2003). And it must make sufficient findings concerning its

allocation so that an appellate court can understand the basis of its

ruling. See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9; cf. Powell,

220 P.3d at 959 (stating that a court’s property division findings

must “allow the reviewing court to determine that the [court’s]

decision is supported by competent evidence”). “If property is

omitted from permanent orders without explanation, the property

division cannot stand.” In re Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806,

815 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 42 Husband testified that he owned a 1984 Toyota truck, having

recently invested $9,400 for new axles and spent up to $14,000 on

it during the marriage. While he did not include the truck in his

17
proposed permanent orders, wife did, valuing it at $28,000 and

asking that husband keep it. The court did not allocate the truck in

the permanent orders. We instruct the court on remand to

characterize, value, and allocate the truck.

¶ 43 We reject wife’s related assertion that the following vehicles

were omitted from the property division: (1) a 2005 Wells Cargo

trailer, purportedly worth $2,500; (2) a 1998 flatbed trailer worth

$2,000; and (3) a 2007 CAT Skid and attachments, purportedly

worth $25,000. The court found that those vehicles were part of

the marital business; valued them at $2,000, $2,000, and $10,000,

respectively; included them in the marital business’s overall

valuation; and awarded the marital business to husband.

III. Maintenance and Attorney Fees

¶ 44 Because we have reversed the district court’s property

division, we necessarily reverse its order regarding maintenance

and section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2024, attorney fees. See In re

Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 26 (when a district court is

required to revisit a property division, it must also reevaluate

maintenance and attorney fees in light of the updated property

18
division, because the issues are interdependent). The court must

reconsider maintenance and attorney fees after it reconsiders its

property division. See Medeiros, ¶ 62. In doing so, it must base its

decision on the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of the

remand. See In re Marriage of Stradtmann, 2021 COA 145, ¶ 35

(because maintenance is based on the parties’ financial

circumstances at the time the order is entered, the court should

consider the parties’ current circumstances on remand).

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 45 Husband argues that this appeal lacks substantial

justification and seeks an award of his appellate attorney fees

under C.A.R. 39.1 and section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024. Given our

disposition, we deny his request.

V. Disposition

¶ 46 That part of the judgment regarding the values of the marital

business and residence is affirmed. The portions of the judgment

valuing wife’s FERS pension, omitting the 1984 Toyota truck, and

denying maintenance as well as attorney fees are reversed, and the

case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings

19
consistent with this opinion. The portions of the judgment not

challenged on appeal remain undisturbed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE LUM concur.

20