Baker v. Rincon

24CA0323 Baker v Rincon 11-14-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0323
El Paso County District Court No. 23CV30775
Honorable Eric Bentley, Judge

Rachel Elizabeth Baker,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Eduardo Ivan Rincon,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Dunn and Navarro, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 14, 2024

Modern Family Law, Craig R. Valentine, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

Janko Family Law, Sabra Janko, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Eduardo Ivan Rincon, appeals the judgment

entered in favor of plaintiff, Rachel Elizabeth Baker, following a trial

to the court. Rincon contends that the trial court reversibly erred

by (1) determining that he was unjustly enriched by Baker’s

conveyance of a one-half undivided interest in her house to him and

(2) not considering the rent payments Baker received from others

who lived in the house in its calculation of Rincon’s equitable share

of the house. We disagree and affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Baker and Rincon were in a romantic relationship for about

five years, from sometime in 2018 to March of 2023. In early 2021,

Baker purchased a house and took out a mortgage on it. Baker was

the sole owner of the house and the sole person responsible for the

mortgage payments.

¶3 Baker and Rincon lived in the house together, along with

several other friends and family members, all of whom paid rent to

Baker. Rincon initially paid $500 per month in rent, but it wasn’t

revealed how much the other people paid.

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¶4 The house needed substantial work, so Baker made significant

improvements to it with the help of friends and family. Rincon also

helped with some of the improvements.

¶5 In April 2022, Baker executed a quitclaim deed conveying a

one-half undivided interest in the house to Rincon as joint tenants.

Baker recorded the deed. Baker later added Rincon to the title in

response to, as the trial court described it, “[Rincon’s] repeated

demands that she do so or he would leave the relationship.” Baker

also recorded this transaction. Afterwards, Rincon began paying

$750 per month in rent, but he didn’t take on any other obligations

relating to the house.

¶6 In March 2023, the couple broke up, and Rincon moved out of

the house and stopped paying rent.

¶7 Baker then brought this action to quiet title on the house

based on the transfer to Rincon having been a gift conditioned on a

marriage that never took place. She also brought claims in the

alternative to partition the house and for unjust enrichment.

Rincon counterclaimed for breach of a settlement agreement the

parties had allegedly entered into relating to the house.

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¶8 Following a trial to the court, the court orally ruled from the

bench. The court rejected Baker’s claim to quiet title, rejected

Rincon’s counterclaim, and reserved a ruling on Baker’s partition

and unjust enrichment claims.

¶9 In a written order, the trial court resolved the two remaining

claims. The court first addressed the partition claim by calculating

Rincon’s and Baker’s equitable shares for partition of the house;

based on the court’s calculations, Rincon’s share was $42,456.

Then, turning to the unjust enrichment claim, the court found that

Rincon was unjustly enriched because he had coerced Baker into

executing the deed and adding him to the title in order to keep their

relationship going. The court concluded that “[t]he appropriate

remedy . . . is for Rincon to quitclaim his interest in the [p]roperty

back to Baker and to receive, in turn, an amount representing his

contribution to the [p]roperty after he was added to the title.” The

court determined that Rincon was entitled to $4,000, calculated by

adding $2,000 in additional rent he had paid over the eight-month

period between when he was added to the title and when he moved

out (the additional $250 he paid each month over the $500 he’d

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previously paid each month) and $2,000 for the work he put into

improvements in the house.

¶ 10 Accordingly, the court entered judgment directing Baker to

pay $4,000 into the court registry and directing Rincon to execute a

quitclaim deed to the property and deliver it to the court registry.

II. Unjust Enrichment

¶ 11 Rincon first contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by determining that he was unjustly enriched. Specifically, he

argues that the court erroneously found Baker’s conveyance of an

interest in the house was the result of coercion.1 We aren’t

persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 Unjust enrichment is “a judicially-created remedy designed to

undo the benefit to one party that comes at the unfair detriment of

another.” Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008).

Unjust enrichment claims require the trial court to “engage in fact-

based inquiries and make ‘extensive factual findings.’” Indian

1 While Rincon frames his argument as a challenge to any findings

of coercion, duress, or undue influence, we perceive his argument
to be more cognizable as a challenge to the trial court’s
determination on the unjust enrichment claim.

4
Mountain Corp. v. Indian Mountain Metro. Dist., 2016 COA 118M,

¶ 26 (quoting Lewis, 189 P.3d at 1140-41).

¶ 13 Because the power to craft equitable remedies lies within a

trial court’s discretion, we review the court’s factual findings and its

determination that a party was unjustly enriched for an abuse of

discretion. Id. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or is based on a

misapprehension or misapplication of the law. Far Horizons Farm,

LLC v. Flying Dutchman Condo. Ass’n, 2023 COA 99, ¶ 17.

However, we review de novo whether the trial court applied the

proper legal test for determining the existence of unjust enrichment.

Redd Iron, Inc. v. Int’l Sales & Servs. Corp., 200 P.3d 1133, 1136

(Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 14 To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must

prove that “(1) the defendant received a benefit (2) at the plaintiff’s

expense (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the

defendant to retain the benefit without commensurate

compensation.” Gravina Siding & Windows Co. v. Gravina, 2022

COA 50, ¶ 34 (quoting Pulte Home Corp., Inc. v. Countryside Cmty.

Ass’n, 2016 CO 64, ¶ 63). Where a claim involves a “failed gift or

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failed contract between close family members or confidants” who

share a “mutual purpose,” the third element doesn’t require

malfeasance. Lewis, 189 P.3d at 1142. Instead, that element may

be satisfied “when one party benefits from an action that is a

significant deviation from that mutual purpose.” Id. at 1143.

B. Application

¶ 15 In assessing Baker’s unjust enrichment claim, the trial court

noted that the first two elements were satisfied because “Rincon

unquestionably received a substantial benefit at Baker’s expense

when she added him to the title of the [p]roperty.” Accordingly, the

court focused on the third element — that is, whether it would be

unjust for Rincon to retain the benefit.

¶ 16 Relying largely on the supreme court’s opinion in Lewis, the

trial court reasoned,

As in the Lewis case, this case involves a
“failed gift” between — if not family
members — intimate partners. As in Lewis,
the gift was made with a “mutual purpose”: it
was intended, as Rincon demanded, to prove
Baker’s commitment and to keep Rincon from
leaving the relationship. Further, it was the
product of a coercive relationship, and it was
specifically the result of coercion. And the
mutual purpose of the gift — to serve as the
glue that would keep the relationship going —

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was defeated when the relationship ended 11
months later, in March 2023. The result was
that Rincon was left with a very substantial
benefit that he had obtained by coercion and
that he in no way equitably deserved. Under
these circumstances, it would be grossly
unjust for Rincon to retain the benefit at
Baker’s expense.

¶ 17 Rincon’s challenge to the court’s determination of unjust

enrichment is focused on “whether coercion was validly found” and

“whether the coercion rose to the level of behavior that should make

performance on a property transfer unfair by an adult with full

capacity and a free ability to make choices.”

¶ 18 As a preliminary matter, we conclude that Rincon’s challenge

is misplaced to the extent that it relies on the law of duress and

undue influence. The trial court didn’t invalidate the quitclaim

deed from Baker to Rincon based on a standalone determination

that Baker had executed it under duress or as a result of undue

influence. See generally Benway v. Nat’l State Bank of Boulder, 357

P.2d 912, 913-14 (Colo. 1960); First Nat’l Bank of Denver v.

Groussman, 483 P.2d 398, 401 (Colo. App. 1971), aff’d, 491 P.2d

1382 (Colo. 1971). Instead, the court determined, under the law of

unjust enrichment, that Rincon received a benefit at Baker’s

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expense under circumstances that would make it unjust for Rincon

to retain the benefit without commensurate compensation.

¶ 19 Turning to the trial court’s analysis of unjust enrichment —

and, in particular, its finding that Baker proved the third element of

that claim — we conclude that the court didn’t abuse its discretion.

The court applied the correct test, reciting the three required

elements and citing the supreme court’s analysis in Lewis as to how

the third element may be satisfied in cases involving failed

contracts or gifts between close family members or confidants. And

the record supports the court’s findings — including the challenged

findings that Baker’s transfer of a one-half undivided interest in the

property to Rincon “was the product of a coercive relationship” and

“was specifically the result of coercion.” While Rincon cites

evidence that could’ve supported findings in his favor on this point,

the trial court was entitled to rely on other evidence, such as the

following testimony from Baker:

• She didn’t want to deed half the house to Rincon, but he

threatened to leave the relationship if she didn’t do so.

• Rincon demanded, as a condition to get back together after

they’d briefly broken up, that she send him a text message

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saying he’d get half the house if something happened

between them.

• She sent two emails to her realtor about dividing the house

with Rincon at Rincon’s demand, as she was crying and he

was standing over her.

• Rincon coerced her in other areas of her life, such as

making her delete her Instagram account and stop talking

to friends and family, by threatening to break up with her.

¶ 20 We therefore perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

determination of unjust enrichment or in its finding of coercion in

support of the third element of unjust enrichment.

III. Partition

¶ 21 Rincon also contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by not including the rental payments Baker received from other

people living at the house in calculating Rincon’s equitable share of

the house. We decline to address this issue because any error was

harmless.

¶ 22 “We will deem an error harmless, and thus will not reverse a

judgment, unless the error resulted in substantial prejudice to a

party.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Goddard, 2021 COA 15,

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¶ 56; see also C.R.C.P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the

proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding

which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

¶ 23 The trial court’s judgment wasn’t based on its calculation of

Rincon’s equitable share of the house. Instead, after calculating

each party’s respective equitable share, the court turned to the

issue of unjust enrichment, found for Baker on that claim, and

entered judgment accordingly. Because we found no error in the

court’s unjust enrichment determination, and that determination

gave rise to the judgment the court ultimately entered, any error in

the court’s calculation of Rincon’s equitable share was necessarily

harmless. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582,

601-02 (Colo. App. 2007) (because the plaintiffs prevailed on one

claim, any error in addressing an alternative theory of liability that

wouldn’t entitle them to any additional damages was harmless).

And because any potential error was harmless, we decline to

consider this issue. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., ¶¶ 57-63

(declining to consider an issue where any error was harmless).

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IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 24 Finally, we consider Baker’s request for an award of her

appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2024,

which authorizes us to assess attorney fees upon finding that a

party or attorney brought a civil action that was, in whole or in

part, substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious.

¶ 25 Baker asserts that the first issue raised by Rincon was

frivolous. Although we have resolved that issue in Baker’s favor, we

do not find his argument on the issue to have been frivolous. See

Calvert v. Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 45 (An appeal is frivolous if

“there are no legitimately appealable issues because the judgment

below ‘was so plainly correct and the legal authority contrary to the

appellant’s position so clear’” or if “the appellant ‘fail[s] to set

forth . . . a coherent assertion of error, supported by legal

authority.’” (quoting Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292

(Colo. App. 2006))) (alteration in original).

¶ 26 Baker also asserts that Rincon’s opening brief didn’t comply

with the appellate rules requiring identification of the applicable

standard of review and the precise location where an argument was

preserved. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A). While Rincon’s opening brief may

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not have fully complied with these requirements, the deficiencies in

his brief didn’t hamper our ability to conduct a meaningful review of

the issues raised in the appeal. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning D.P.G., 2020 COA 115, ¶ 14. Nor do we conclude that

any deficiencies rendered the appeal frivolous.

¶ 27 Accordingly, we decline to award attorney fees in this appeal.

However, we caution counsel to be careful in the future to abide by

the appellate rules.

V. Disposition

¶ 28 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE NAVARRO concur.

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