2025 CO 49, 23SC871, Bianco v. Rudnicki

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
September 8, 2025

2025 CO 49

No. 23SC871, Bianco v. Rudnicki-Civil Appeals-Health Care Availability
Act-Good Cause Exception to Liability Limitations-Interest on Damages
Awards.

Colorado's Heath Care Availability Act (the "HCAA") generally imposes a
$1 million limit on medical malpractice damages awards. § 13-64-302, C.R.S.
(2024). But the HCAA also provides an exception: in cases where good cause is
shown, courts may find that applying the cap would be unfair and award
economic damages beyond the $1 million cap. The HCAA further provides that
prefiling interest is deemed part of the damages awarded in the action. In this
case, the supreme court holds that prefiling interest accruing on economic
damages is part of the economic damages award and thus falls within the good
cause exception to the HCAA's general $1 million cap.

<!-- PageBreak -->

# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2025 CO 49

Supreme Court Case No. 23SC871
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 22CA1246

Petitioner:
Peter Bianco, D.O.,

V.

Respondents:
Alexander Rudnicki; and Francis Rudnicki and Pamela Rudnicki, as parents,
guardians, and next friends of Alexander Rudnicki.

Judgment Affirmed
en banc
September 8, 2025

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Womble Bond Dickinson LLP

Kendra N. Beckwith

Joseph Hykan

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondents:

Wahlberg, Woodruff, Nimmo & Sloane LLP

David S. Woodruff

Megan K. Matthews

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Coloradans Protecting Patient Access:
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP

<!-- PageBreak -->

Theresa Wardon Benz
Kylie Ngu
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Medical Society and American Medical
Association:
Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP
Daniel E. Rohner
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association:
Henry Miniter, Esq., LLC
Henry Miniter
Parker, Colorado

5280 Appellate Group, a division of
The Paul Wilkinson Law Firm, LLC
Nelson Boyle
Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART,
JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 Due to a negligent delivery performed by petitioner Dr. Peter Bianco,
respondent Alexander Rudnicki was born with brain damage resulting in
significant physical and intellectual disabilities. Nine years later, Rudnicki's
parents, Francis and Pamela Rudnicki, sued on his behalf. After a jury found
Bianco liable for $4 million in damages, the trial court found good cause to exceed
the Health Care Availability Act's ("HCAA") generally applicable $1 million
damages cap. See § 13-64-302(1)(b), C.R.S. (2024). The court later awarded
Rudnicki an additional $319,120 in prefiling interest that had accrued on the
economic damages portion of the jury's award. Bianco appealed this prefiling
interest award, arguing that it was barred by the HCAA's $1 million cap despite
the trial court's good cause finding. A division of the court of appeals disagreed
and affirmed the prefiling interest award. Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2023 COA 103, 1 53,
542 P.3d 1198, 1209 ("Rudnicki II"). Bianco petitioned, and we granted certiorari.1
12 We now hold that prefiling interest accruing on economic damages is part
of the economic damages award and thus falls within the good cause exception to

1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:

Whether, under the HCAA, prefiling, prejudgment interest on past
and future economic damages may exceed the statutory damages
limitation.

<!-- PageBreak -->

the HCAA's general $1 million cap. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
court of appeals.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

T3
During delivery, Bianco's negligent use of a vacuum extractor caused
Rudnicki permanent brain damage. The injury required both immediate and
ongoing medical treatment and made it unlikely that Rudnicki would be able to
live independently in the future. Rudnicki's parents sued Bianco nine years later,
both in their individual capacities and on Rudnicki's behalf. The court dismissed
the parents' individual claims as time-barred, but their claim on Rudnicki's behalf
moved forward.

14 After a jury found Bianco liable for $4 million in damages, the trial court
found that there was good cause for exceeding section 13-64-302(1)(b)'s $1 million
cap, concluding that applying the cap would be "manifestly unfair" to Rudnicki
given his need for "constant supervision" and "considerable assistance with
performing the basic tasks of living." But the court reduced the jury award by
$391,000, finding that Rudnicki couldn't recover his pre-majority medical
expenses under then-existing precedent. Rudnicki appealed that decision, and we
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Rudnicki v. Bianco,
2021 CO 80, TT 44, 49, 501 P.3d 776, 785-86 ("Rudnicki I") (overruling contrary
court of appeals precedent).

<!-- PageBreak -->

15 On remand, the trial court reinstated the $391,000 in pre-majority medical
expenses and ordered Bianco to pay prejudgment interest on that amount,
including prefiling interest.2 Specifically, the court awarded $319,120 in prefiling
interest, which, combined with $647,223 in post-filing interest and $391,000 in
reinstated pre-majority damages, resulted in a new judgment of roughly
$1,357,000.3 The court sustained its earlier finding of good cause and unfairness
and awarded the entire amount in excess of the $1 million cap (which the original
judgment had already exceeded), reasoning that the cap "d[id] not limit the proper
inclusion of prejudgment interest." Bianco appealed, contending, as relevant here,
that courts may only award prefiling interest on economic damages up to and until

2 There are two categories of prejudgment interest: prefiling and post-filing. Each
type of interest is calculated differently. Prefiling interest accrues 9% annually
between the time the cause of action arises and the time of filing and, hence, is
calculated only on the original principal; post-filing interest compounds 9%
annually between the time of filing and the court's judgment and is, therefore,
calculated on both the principal and the accumulated interest from previous
periods. § 13-21-101(1), C.R.S. (2024); see also § 13-64-302(2).

3 Bianco had already satisfied the original judgment.

<!-- PageBreak -->

the total judgment reaches $1 million, even when the good cause exception
applies.4

16 On appeal, the division interpreted section 13-64-302 to define prefiling
interest as an element of the category of damages awarded, either economic or
noneconomic. Rudnicki II, T1 42-43, 542 P.3d at 1207. The division generally
agreed with Scholle v. Ehrichs, 2022 COA 87M, 1 107, 519 P.3d 1093, 1112, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 2024 CO 22, 546 P.3d 1170, which held that "prefiling,
prejudgment interest is part of 'damages' capped under the HCAA, subject to
being uncapped upon a showing of good cause and unfairness." Rudnicki II, 11 3,
40-41, 542 P.3d at 1201, 1206-07. In doing so, the Rudnicki II division disagreed
with Wallbank v. Rothenberg, 74 P.3d 413, 420 (Colo. App. 2003), which held that
even if the trial court found good cause to exceed the cap, prefiling interest "may
not be awarded for that portion of the judgment that exceeds one million dollars,
because prefiling interest is included in the total limit." See Rudnicki II, 11 47-48,

4 Bianco does not contest that, absent the prefiling interest award, he would remain
liable for roughly $360,000 in post-filing interest. But because the court awarded
$319,120 in prefiling interest, which began compounding at the time of filing,
Bianco instead owed $647,223 in post-filing interest. Thus, as we understand it,
the total amount Bianco is contesting is approximately $606,000 ($319,120 in
prefiling interest, plus roughly $287,000 in additional post-filing interest that
compounded as a result of the prefiling interest award).

<!-- PageBreak -->

542 P.3d at 1208 (commenting, "How the Wallbank division reached its conclusion
about prefiling, prejudgment interest is unclear to us.").

17 Accordingly, the division concluded that the prefiling interest on the
$391,000 pre-majority medical expense award constituted past and future
economic damages subject to both the cap and the good cause exception. Id. at
TT 44, 53, 542 P.3d at 1207, 1209. Thus, because Bianco had not contested the trial
court's finding of good cause and unfairness, the division upheld the court's
award. Id. at 1 53, 542 P.3d at 1209. We granted Bianco's petition for certiorari.

## II. Analysis

18 We begin by summarizing the relevant standard of review and principles of
statutory interpretation. We then discuss the law governing limitations on tort
damages under the HCAA. Next, we assess Bianco's contention that courts may
only award prefiling interest on economic damages up to and until the total award
reaches $1 million, even upon a court's finding of good cause. Following our
analysis of the statute's plain language, we hold that prefiling interest accruing on
economic damages is part of the economic damages award and thus falls within
the good cause exception to the HCAA's general $1 million cap.

## A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Interpretation

19
This case turns on our interpretation of the HCAA. We review questions of
statutory interpretation de novo. Nieto v. Clark's Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, 1 12,

<!-- PageBreak -->

488 P.3d 1140, 1143. In doing so, we seek to effectuate the legislature's intent by
giving "consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect" to the statutory scheme,
interpreting words and phrases based on their plain and ordinary meanings. Id.
(quoting Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 2020 CO 73, 1 14, 474 P.3d 46, 49). When the
plain language of a statute is unambiguous, we apply it as written. Id.

## B. The HCAA's Liability Limitations and Good Cause Exception

110 The HCAA generally limits healthcare providers' tort liability to $1 million
in an effort to contain the costs of medical malpractice insurance and thereby the
growing costs of healthcare more generally. § 13-64-102, C.R.S. (2024); § 13-64-302.
Section 13-64-302 of the HCAA details the Act's liability limitations.5

111 Subsection (1)(b) caps liability at $1 million, of which a maximum of
$300,000 may compensate for noneconomic losses.6 § 13-64-302(1)(b)-(c).
However, the statute provides an exception: "[I]f, upon good cause shown," the
court finds that applying the $1 million cap "would be unfair, the court may award

5 The legislature amended the statute in 2024, increasing the liability caps and
allowing ongoing adjustment for inflation beginning in 2025. Ch. 325, sec. 6,
§ 13-64-302, 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws 2170, 2176-78. The language relevant to our
inquiry remains unchanged in the updated version. § 13-64-302, C.R.S. (2024)
(effective Jan. 1, 2025). We reference and analyze the caps as they existed at the
time of the events in this case.

6 We refer to the $300,000 limit on noneconomic damages as a "hard cap" because
courts may not exceed it, even upon a finding of good cause and unfairness.
§ 13-64-302(1)(b)-(c).

<!-- PageBreak -->

in excess of the limitation ... additional past and future economic damages only."
§ 13-64-302(1)(b) (emphasis added).

112 Subsection (2) provides that prefiling interest is "deemed to be a part of the
damages awarded in the action ... and is included within each of the limitations
on liability" established by subsection (1). § 13-64-302(2). The question here is
whether prefiling interest on economic damages may fall within the good cause
exception.

## C. Prefiling Interest and the Good Cause Exception

113 Bianco contends that prefiling interest is not included within the good cause
exception, and therefore courts may only award prefiling interest on economic
damages up to and until the total award reaches $1 million, even upon a finding
of good cause. In doing so, Bianco urges us to adopt the holding from Wallbank,
in which a division of the court of appeals concluded that even if a court finds
good cause and unfairness, "prefiling interest ... may not be awarded for that
portion of the judgment that exceeds one million dollars, because prefiling interest
is included in the total limit." 74 P.3d at 420. While the Wallbank division did not
elaborate on this conclusion, see id., Bianco submits two plain language arguments
in support.

114 First, Bianco points out that under subsection (2), prefiling interest is "part
of the damages awarded ... and is included within each of the limitations on

<!-- PageBreak -->

liability" established by subsection (1)(b). § 13-64-302(2) (emphasis added). Those
"limitations on liability" are the $300,000 hard cap on noneconomic losses and the
$1 million overall cap. § 13-64-302(1)(b)-(c). Bianco notes that while subsection (2)
is explicit that prefiling interest falls "within each" of these limitations, it is silent
as to whether prefiling interest is also "within" the good cause exception. See
§ 13-64-302(2). He insists that if the legislature intended for prefiling interest to
fall within the exception, it would have said so.

115 Second, Bianco argues that section 13-64-302 creates three distinct categories
of damages: past damages, future damages, and prefiling interest. Bianco appears
to reach this understanding by combining select portions of subsections (1)(b)
and (2). Subsection (1)(b) provides that "[t]he total amount recoverable for all
damages ... whether past damages, future damages, or a combination of both, shall
not exceed one million dollars," while subsection (2) explains that prefiling interest
"is deemed to be a part of the damages awarded in the action."
§ 13-64-302(1)(b), (2) (emphasis added). Bianco thus contends that prefiling
interest is a separate category of damages, hence including it within the good cause
exception would violate the legislature's directive that the exception applies to
"past and future economic damages only." § 13-64-302(1)(b).

116 We find these arguments unavailing. While we recognize that
subsection (1)(b) mentions both past and future damages, we see no meaningful

<!-- PageBreak -->

distinction between the two under the statute. To the contrary, the statute's use of
"whether" ("whether past damages, future damages, or a combination of both")
evinces the legislature's intent to treat both types of damages equally. Id. Indeed,
section 13-64-302 treats noneconomic damages the same ($300,000 hard cap),
regardless of whether those damages compensate for injuries that happened in the
past or are likely to occur in the future. The same is true for economic damages
($1 million cap, subject to good cause exception, whether past or future). Hence,
the operative distinction in subsection (1)(b) is between economic and
noneconomic damages, not past and future damages.

117 Moreover, interpreting subsection (1)(b) as creating two categories of
damages, economic and noneconomic, flows logically into subsection (2), which
states that prefiling interest is "deemed to be a part of the damages awarded in the
action." § 13-64-302(2) (emphases added). That is, subsection (2) dictates that
where damages result from noneconomic injuries, the associated prefiling interest
is part of the noneconomic damages award; if damages result from economic
injuries, then the associated prefiling interest is a part of the economic damages
award. Therefore, we conclude that prefiling interest is not a separate category of
damages.

118 This interpretation also gives proper effect to subsection (2)'s subsequent
language, which states that prefiling interest is "included within each of"

<!-- PageBreak -->

subsection (1)'s limitations on liability. Id. As discussed, those limits are the
$300,000 hard cap on noneconomic damages and the $1 million general cap.
§ 13-64-302(1)(b)-(c). Thus, prefiling interest on noneconomic damages awards is
included within the $300,000 hard cap, while prefiling interest on overall awards
is included within the general $1 million cap.

119 We further conclude that the General Assembly included prefiling interest
"within" the $1 million general cap with full knowledge that the cap is subject to
the good cause exception for economic damages. § 13-64-302(2); see Colo. Water
Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 434 (Colo. 2005) (noting that
"[w]hen the General Assembly chooses to legislate, it is presumed to be aware of
its own enactments" (quoting Anderson v. Longmont Toyota, Inc., 102 P.3d 323, 330
(Colo. 2004))). Hence, because the exception applies to "economic damages only,"
prefiling interest on economic damages may fall within subsection (1)(b)'s good
cause exception. § 13-64-302(1)(b).

120 Accordingly, we hold that prefiling interest accruing on economic damages
is part of the economic damages award and thus falls within the good cause
exception to the HCAA's general $1 million cap.7

7 To the extent Wallbank conflicts with our decision, we overrule it. 74 P.3d at 420.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## III. Conclusion

121
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.