26 CO 6, 23SC659, Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Cuevas

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court’s opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader’s
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
January 26, 2026
2026 CO 6
No. 23SC659, Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Cuevas—Public Utilities—Electricity—
Personal Injury.
In this personal injury action, the supreme court granted certiorari to
consider whether (1) a provision in Public Service Company of Colorado’s
(“PSCo’s”) tariff purporting to limit its liability to “persons” applies to non-PSCo
customers like respondent; (2) the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”)
had the authority to approve a tariff limiting PSCo’s liability to non-PSCo
customers; (3) respondent was a “person” subject to the notification requirements
of the High Voltage Safety Act (“HVSA”); and (4) section 9-2.5-104(2), C.R.S.(2025),
of the HVSA requires a causation analysis.
The court now concludes that (1) assuming without deciding that the tariff’s
limitation of liability provision is broad enough to apply to non-PSCo customers
like respondent, the PUC lacked the authority to approve such a tariff; (2) because
respondent was not the contracting party, he was not subject to the HVSA’s

notification requirement; and (3) section 9-2.5-104(2) of the HVSA does not require
a causation analysis.
Accordingly, the court vacates the division’s conclusion that the tariff, by its
terms, does not extend to non-PSCo customers like respondent but otherwise
affirms the division’s judgment.

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
2026 CO 6
Supreme Court Case No. 23SC659
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case Nos. 22CA301 & 22CA1108
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent:
Public Service Company of Colorado d/b/a Xcel Energy,
v.
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner:
Outdoor Design Landscaping LLC,
and
Respondent:
Francisco Cuevas.
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part
en banc
January 26, 2026
Attorneys for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent:
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
Franz Hardy
John R. Mann
Greg S. Hearing, II
Stephanie S. Brizel
Abigail H. Kregor
Denver, Colorado

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Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner:
Lambdin & Chaney, LLP
L. Kathleen Chaney
Amber F. Ju
Eric D. Hevenor
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
Connelly Law, LLC
Sean Connelly
Denver, Colorado
The Law Office of Sean McDermott LLC
Sean M. McDermott
Denver, Colorado
Stuart & Ward LLP
Thomas R. Ward
Denver, Colorado
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Black Hills Colorado Electric, LLC:
Greg Sopkin
Denver, Colorado
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Colorado Rural Electric Association:
Craig N. Johnson
Lakewood, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association:
Leventhal Puga Braley P.C.
Nathaniel E. Deakins
Julia T. Thompson
Denver, Colorado
Burg Simpson Eldridge Hersh & Jardine, P.C.
Dean Batchelder
Englewood, Colorado

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Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Edison Electric Institute:
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP
Theresa Wardon Benz
Cormac Bloomfield
Denver, Colorado
Vinson & Elkins LLP
Jeremy C. Marwell
Washington, District of Columbia
JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE
BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE
BERKENKOTTER joined.
CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ dissented.

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.*
¶1 In this personal injury action between and among a contractor, Francisco
Cuevas, and his company, Outdoor Design Landscaping LLC, on the one hand,
and Public Service Company of Colorado d/b/a Xcel Energy (“PSCo”), on the
other, PSCo has petitioned and Outdoor Design has cross-petitioned for certiorari
from the court of appeals division’s unanimous, published decision in Cuevas v.
Public Service Co. of Colorado, 2023 COA 64M, 537 P.3d 418. In that case, the division
concluded, as pertinent here, that (1) a limitation of liability clause contained in
PSCo’s tariff applied only to PSCo customers, guests of such customers, and those
who contracted to work on the electric line at issue, and Cuevas did not fall within
any of those categories; (2) the Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”) lacked the
authority to abrogate the common law duty owed by electric companies to
non-customers; (3) Cuevas was not a “person” subject to the requirement in the
High Voltage Safety Act (“HVSA”) that advance notice be given before
undertaking work near a power line; and (4) section 9-2.5-104(2), C.R.S. (2025), of
the HVSA, which requires a contractor to indemnify persons liable to those injured
by contact with a power line when the contractor did not give PSCo advance notice
* This opinion was originally assigned to another Justice but was reassigned to
Justice Gabriel on September 11, 2025.

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of its work, contains no element of causation. Id. at ¶¶ 32–33, 41, 43, 537 P.3d at
426–28.
¶2 We granted certiorari to consider three principal questions, namely,
whether (1) the tariff’s limitation of liability provision applies to bar Cuevas’s
claims; (2) Cuevas was subject to the HVSA’s notification requirement; and (3) the
relevant provision of the HVSA requires a causation analysis.1
¶3 We now conclude as follows:
¶4 First, assuming without deciding that the limitation of liability provision in
the PSCo tariff is broad enough to include non-PSCo customers like Cuevas, the
1 Specifically, we granted certiorari to review the following four issues, the first
two of which relate to whether the tariff’s limitation of liability provision applies
to bar Cuevas’s claims:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a provision in
a utility’s tariff purporting to limit the utility’s liability only
applies to customers of the utility.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the General
Assembly had not expressly delegated authority to the Public
Utilities Commission to approve a tariff limiting tort liability in
derogation of common law.
3. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Respondent
was not a “person” subject to the notification requirements of the
High Voltage Safety Act, § 9-2.5-102(1), C.R.S. (2023).
4. Whether the court of appeals erred in interpreting C.R.S.
§ 9-2.5-104(2) such that it renders the words “results in,” “caused
by the contact,” and “due to the contact” superfluous.

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PUC did not have the authority to approve a tariff limiting PSCo’s liability to
non-customers.
¶5 Second, because Cuevas was not the contracting party (Outdoor Design
was), he was not subject to the HVSA’s notification requirement.
¶6 And finally, section 9-2.5-104(2) of the HVSA does not require a causation
analysis, and therefore Outdoor Design, which violated the HVSA’s notification
requirement, must indemnify PSCo for any liability incurred by it as a result of
Cuevas’s claims against it.
¶7 Accordingly, we vacate the division’s conclusion that the tariff, by its terms,
does not extend to non-PSCo customers like Cuevas, but we otherwise affirm the
division’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶8 Outdoor Design, a company owned by Cuevas, contracted with a
homeowner to install Christmas lights on a spruce tree on her property. Although
the top of the tree was located within twenty-six inches of a high voltage power
line operated by PSCo, neither Outdoor Design nor Cuevas notified PSCo in
advance of the planned work.
¶9 Cuevas, among others, performed the work on Outdoor Design’s behalf.
While standing on a ladder and hanging the lights, Cuevas came into contact with
the tree, which apparently had become “electrified” due to its contact with the

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power line. Cuevas fell from the ladder to the ground and fractured his spine,
leaving him with permanent injuries, including paraplegia.
¶10 Cuevas sued PSCo for, among other things, negligence. He argued that
PSCo had a duty to maintain the power lines and the spruce tree so that the tree
would not pose a safety risk and that it had not done so, thereby causing Cuevas’s
injuries.
¶11 PSCo moved to dismiss Cuevas’s complaint, arguing that his negligence
claim was barred by a limitation of liability provision contained in Tariff Sheet
No. R87 of the PSCo Electric Tariff, Colo. PUC No. 8 (“Tariff Sheet R87”).
Specifically, PSCo asserted that Tariff Sheet R87 provides that PSCo “shall not be
held liable for injury to persons . . . caused by its lines . . . when contacted or
interfered with by . . . trees . . . or other objects not the property of [PSCo]” unless
those lines are “in a defective condition.” The district court, however, denied this
motion, concluding that the court was “without sufficient information . . . as to
whether the line was defective, and what caused [Cuevas] to be electrocuted.” In
so ruling, the court observed that if the lines were in a defective condition, then
Tariff Sheet R87 would not limit PSCo’s liability.
¶12 PSCo then answered Cuevas’s complaint, asserting as defenses, among
others, that Cuevas’s claims were barred or limited by Tariff Sheet R87 and also
by the HVSA, which imposes duties on certain parties to notify PSCo before

8
performing work that could reasonably be expected to bring them or their
equipment within ten feet of PSCo’s high voltage overhead lines.
¶13 PSCo also filed a third-party complaint against Outdoor Design, alleging
that Outdoor Design had not complied with section 9-2.5-103(1), C.R.S. (2025), of
the HVSA, which required the company to provide PSCo with prompt notice of
its pending work and to reach “satisfactory mutual arrangements” before starting
the work. PSCo further alleged that as a result of this statutory violation, Outdoor
Design was obligated to indemnify it for any liability incurred by PSCo as a result
of Cuevas’s claim. See § 9-2.5-104(2).
¶14 After the parties had conducted discovery, PSCo moved for summary
judgment against Cuevas under both the liability-limitation provision contained
in Tariff Sheet R87 and the HVSA, and against Outdoor Design under the HVSA.
As pertinent here, PSCo argued that Tariff Sheet R87 limited PSCo’s liability for
injury to “persons” caused by its lines when contacted or interfered with by trees
or other objects not the property of PSCo, which, it asserted, was what had
occurred here. PSCo further contended that because Cuevas had violated section
9-2.5-103’s notification requirement, as a matter of law, PSCo did not owe him any
duty of care and therefore his claims against PSCo necessarily failed. Finally, PSCo
argued that, in light of Outdoor Design’s own violation of the HVSA’s notification

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requirement, section 9-2.5-104(2) rendered that company liable to PSCo for any
liability incurred by PSCo due to contact with its power lines.
¶15 Outdoor Design then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting,
as pertinent here, that the HVSA did not apply because no evidence suggested that
on the date of the incident at issue, Cuevas or any other person, equipment, tools,
or materials came within ten feet of the power line while performing the work. To
the contrary, in Outdoor Design’s view, the evidence established that none had
done so.
¶16 The district court subsequently granted PSCo’s motion for summary
judgment against Cuevas, concluding, as a matter of law, that Tariff Sheet R87
barred Cuevas’s claims. In support of this ruling, the court rejected Cuevas’s
contention that Tariff Sheet R87’s limitation of liability provision applied only to
PSCo customers and not to third parties like Cuevas. The court observed that
Tariff Sheet R87 distinguishes between “[t]he Customer” and “persons” and uses
those terms in distinct ways. Specifically, the tariff places responsibility for any
injury “to persons” on “the Customer” and limits PSCo’s liability for injury “to
persons.” The court noted that it had to assume that this language choice was
deliberate and that the PUC intended the tariff to limit PSCo’s liability to more
than just customers.

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¶17 The district court, however, denied PSCo’s summary judgment motion to
the extent that the motion asserted that Cuevas’s claims were barred due to his
failure to give notice under the HVSA. The court concluded that the HVSA applies
only to persons or business entities that had contracted to perform the work. Here,
Cuevas was not the contracting party (Outdoor Design was). So, the HVSA did
not bar Cuevas’s claims.
¶18 Turning then to PSCo’s assertions as to Outdoor Design, the district court
concluded that Outdoor Design was the contracting party and that it had failed to
notify PSCo of the proposed work, as required by section 9-2.5-103(1), but then
permitted Cuevas to perform the work, thus violating section 9-2.5-102(1), C.R.S.
(2025). The court further determined that because Outdoor Design was required
to refrain from the work at issue until safety arrangements had been made, the
HVSA shifted liability to that company for any liability that PSCo had incurred as
a result of the accident.
¶19 Finally, the court denied Outdoor Design’s cross-motion for summary
judgment, noting that the relevant question was not whether the company’s
employees or tools actually came within ten feet of the line, but whether it could
reasonably be expected that they would. On the evidence presented, the court
concluded that this condition was satisfied and Outdoor Design was thus required
to provide notice under the HVSA.

11
¶20 All of the parties appealed, and a division of the court of appeals ultimately
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s judgment.
Cuevas, ¶ 65, 537 P.3d at 431. As pertinent here, the division reversed the district
court’s entry of summary judgment against Cuevas on the tariff issue, concluding
that (1) tariffs have “contractual roots” and regulate a utility’s provision of services
to customers but not a utility’s interaction with non-customers like Cuevas; (2) the
legislature had not granted to either PSCo or the PUC “the authority to abrogate
the common law duty that electric companies owe to persons who are not
customers or using a customer’s electric service”; and (3) even if the PUC had such
authority, Tariff Sheet R87 “does not contain a clear expression of intent to
abrogate the common law heightened duty of care imposed on electrical utilities.”
Id. at ¶¶ 21, 32–33, 35–36, 537 P.3d at 425–27. The division, however, affirmed the
district court’s denial of summary judgment against Cuevas under the HVSA,
agreeing that the HVSA’s notification requirement applies only to the contracting
party and that Cuevas was not that party. Id. at ¶¶ 43, 46, 537 P.3d at 428. Finally,
the division affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment against
Outdoor Design, concluding, as pertinent here, that (1) the HVSA does not
“contain a causation element regarding any contact or resulting injury”;
(2) Outdoor Design had failed to notify PSCo of the planned work and proceeded
with the work nonetheless, in violation of the HVSA; and (3) in light of that

12
statutory violation, the HVSA requires violators like Outdoor Design to indemnify
utilities such as PSCo for any liability incurred due to injuries stemming from
contact with the utility’s power lines. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 49–52, 537 P.3d at 428–29. In so
concluding, the division determined that, given the undisputed facts, the district
court had correctly found that Outdoor Design should have reasonably expected
that the planned work would require its employees or their equipment to come
within ten feet of the overhead lines. Id. at ¶ 51, 537 P.3d at 429.
¶21 Both PSCo and Outdoor Design petitioned this court for certiorari review,
and we granted their respective petitions.
II. Analysis
¶22 We begin by setting forth our standard of review. Next, we address the
applicability of the limitation of liability provision in the circumstances presented
here, including determining whether the PUC had the authority to approve a
limitation of liability provision that would bind non-customers of a utility. We
then consider whether Cuevas, as a non-contracting party, was subject to the
HVSA’s notification requirement. Finally, we review whether section 9-2.5-104(2)
of the HVSA requires a causation analysis.
A. Standard of Review
¶23 Constitutional and statutory interpretation present questions of law that we
review de novo. Kulmann v. Salazar, 2022 CO 58, ¶ 15, 521 P.3d 649, 653. In

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interpreting constitutional and legislative provisions, we seek to determine and
effectuate the intent of those who adopted those measures. Id. at ¶ 16, 521 P.3d at
653. To do so, we begin with the language employed, and we give words and
phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id.
¶24 If the language of the provision is unambiguous, then we apply it as written
and need not turn to other tools of construction. Id. at ¶ 17, 521 P.3d at 653. If,
however, the provision is ambiguous, then we may look to the intent of those who
adopted the provision, the circumstances of its adoption, and the possible
consequences of different constructions. Id. A provision is ambiguous when it is
reasonably susceptible of multiple interpretations. Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88,
¶ 18, 477 P.3d 694, 698.
¶25 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Rocky Mountain Expl.,
Inc. v. Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, 2018 CO 54, ¶ 27, 420 P.3d 223, 229. When the
material facts are undisputed, summary judgment is appropriate only when the
pleadings and supporting documents show that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id.; accord C.R.C.P. 56(c). In determining whether
summary judgment is warranted, a court must grant the nonmoving party the
benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the
undisputed facts, and it must resolve all doubts against the moving party. Rocky
Mountain Expl., Inc., ¶ 27, 420 P.3d at 229.

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B. Applicability of the Limitation of Liability Provision
¶26 PSCo contends that the division erred in concluding that (1) the limitation
of liability provision in Tariff Sheet R87, by its terms, applies only to a utility’s
customers (and therefore not to a contractor like Cuevas); and (2) the PUC lacked
the authority to approve a tariff limiting liability in circumstances like those
present here.
¶27 We need not resolve the first question because even assuming without
deciding that the liability-limiting language of Tariff Sheet R87 is broad enough to
cover non-utility customers like Cuevas, we conclude that the PUC did not have
the authority to approve a tariff limiting the liability of utilities to non-customers
of the utility.
¶28 Article XXV of the Colorado Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “[A]ll
power to regulate the facilities, service and rates and charges therefor . . . as a
public utility . . . is hereby vested in such agency of the State of Colorado as the
General Assembly shall by law designate,” and “[u]ntil such time as the General
Assembly may otherwise designate, said authority shall be vested in the [PUC].”
¶29 Similarly, section 40-3-102, C.R.S. (2025), provides, in pertinent part:
The power and authority is hereby vested in the [PUC] . . . and it is
hereby made its duty to adopt all necessary rates, charges, and
regulations to govern and regulate all rates, charges, and tariffs of
every public utility of this state to correct abuses; . . . to generally
supervise and regulate every public utility in this state; and to do all

15
things . . . which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such
power. . . .
¶30 As our case law makes clear, the PUC’s authority to regulate public utilities
in this state is broad. City of Montrose v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 629 P.2d 619, 622 (Colo.
1981). It is not, however, unlimited. Id. By way of example, under both
article XXV of our constitution and section 40-3-102, the PUC has “a general
responsibility to protect the public interest regarding utility rates and practices.”
City of Montrose, 629 P.2d at 624.
¶31 We cannot agree with PSCo, however, that the PUC’s authority is so broad
as to encompass anything that may somehow impact a utility’s rates. Were we to
conclude that it is, then because virtually everything can be said to impact rates,
the PUC’s authority would be essentially limitless. In particular, if, as PSCo
argues, a utility’s liability exposure always implicates rates, then nothing would
preclude the PUC from authorizing a tariff granting a utility complete immunity
from any and all liabilities. In our view, the PUC’s authority does not reach that
far, and it particularly does not allow the PUC to limit a utility’s liability to
non-customers.
¶32 A tariff is not a state statute. U S W. Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Longmont,
948 P.2d 509, 516 (Colo. 1997). It is “a publicly filed document that sets forth the
rates a public utility will charge and the rules and regulations it must follow.”

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Carestream Health, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2017 CO 75, ¶ 2, 396 P.3d 669,
670.
¶33 In light of the foregoing, we have cited with approval a court of appeals
division’s conclusion that a tariff limiting a utility company’s liability to a customer
may extinguish the customer’s conflicting common law remedies. U S W.
Commc’ns, Inc., 948 P.2d at 516 (citing Shoemaker v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
559 P.2d 721, 723 (Colo. App. 1976)). But we are aware of no applicable authority
upholding a tariff’s limitation of liability to a non-customer, and case law from other
jurisdictions persuasively indicates that, absent an express or necessarily implied
grant of authority to the regulatory body overseeing public utilities, a regulatory
body may not adopt such a provision in a tariff.
¶34 For example, in Tyus v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 134 N.E.3d 389, 395
(Ind. Ct. App. 2019), the plaintiffs suffered severe injuries when their vehicle was
struck by another vehicle at an intersection at which the lighting and traffic signals
were inoperable. The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“IURC”) had
legislative authority to set rates for regulated public utilities, and an electric utility,
the Indianapolis Power & Light Company (“IPL”), was responsible for operating
traffic signals in Indianapolis. Id. at 396, 405, 407. As relevant here, the IURC had
approved a tariff that contained a liability release stating, “[IPL] shall not be liable
for damages resulting to the Customer, or to third persons, from the use of

17
electricity, [or the] interruption of service or supply . . . unless due to willful
default or neglect on the part of [IPL].” Id. at 397 (first and third alterations in
original) (emphasis omitted).
¶35 The plaintiffs sued IPL for negligence, and IPL subsequently moved for
judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the
above-quoted liability release. Id. at 393–94. The plaintiffs responded that the
tariff exceeded the lawful bounds of the IURC’s jurisdiction because that agency
did not have the authority to rewrite the common law of torts and thereby
immunize a public utility from claims by non-customer third parties. Id. at 404.
¶36 The court agreed with the plaintiffs. Id. at 406–08. The court began by
explaining that the legislature may delegate rulemaking powers to an
administrative agency only if that delegation is accompanied by sufficient
standards to guide the agency in exercising its statutory authority. Id. at 406. In
the case before it, the court perceived no evidence that the legislature had given or
intended to give the IURC the authority to immunize IPL from liability for injuries
caused by IPL’s negligence to non-customers. Id. The court further observed that
any doubt regarding the IURC’s authority was to be resolved against a finding of
such authority, particularly given that “immunity is the exception and not the
rule.” Id. at 406–07. Finally, the court noted that public policy supported its
determination because IPL’s position suggested that it was entitled to greater

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immunities than governmental entities enjoyed for the same undertaking. Id. at
407.
¶37 In our view, the reasoning in Tyus applies with equal force in this case.
Similar to the circumstances before the court in Tyus, here, we perceive nothing
that would allow us to conclude that either article XXV of our constitution or
section 40-3-102 has granted the PUC the authority to abrogate the common law
by limiting PSCo’s liability for injuries caused by its own negligence to
non-customers. As noted above, although both article XXV and section 40-3-102
grant broad authority to the PUC to regulate utilities’ facilities, services, rates, and
charges, nothing in those provisions either expressly or by necessary implication
grants the PUC the authority to limit a utility’s liability to non-customers. And as
in Tyus, absent any indication that the framers of our constitution or our legislature
intended to grant that authority, we deem it appropriate to resolve any doubt
against such authority, particularly when it would allow the PUC to abrogate an
injured non-customer’s common law rights. See Banner Health v. Gresser, 2025 CO
60M, ¶ 17, __ P.3d __ (“To abrogate common law, the legislature must manifest its
intent to do so expressly or by clear implication, and we strictly construe statutes
that derogate from common law.”); Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo. 2004)
(same).

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¶38 Accordingly, we conclude that the PUC had no authority to issue a tariff
limiting PSCo’s liability for its negligent acts to non-customers. We, however,
express no opinion as to whether the PUC could properly issue a tariff limiting a
utility’s liability to the utility’s customers.
¶39 We are not persuaded otherwise by PSCo’s contention that persuasive case
law from other jurisdictions mandates a contrary result. In our view, the
authorities on which PSCo relies are distinguishable because those cases involved
either tort claims by the utility’s customers or claims by non-customers for
economic injuries resulting from the use or interruption of a utility’s services. See,
e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 361 P.3d 942, 944, 947–49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015)
(concluding that a liability limitation in a public utility’s tariff barred a
non-customer’s claim for damages based on an alleged negligent
telecommunication service interruption), aff’d, 385 P.3d 412 (Ariz. 2016); Pac. Bell v.
Colich, 244 Cal. Rptr. 714, 715, 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that a tariff’s
limitation of liability provision barred a non-customer from seeking equitable
indemnification for ordinary negligence from a concurrently negligent telephone
utility because the damages sought by the allegedly injured party from the
non-customer and for which the non-customer sought indemnification were for
economic losses arising exclusively from an interruption to the injured party’s
telephone service); CenterPoint Energy Res. Corp. v. Ramirez, 640 S.W.3d 205, 207,

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216 (Tex. 2022) (concluding that a liability limitation in a utility tariff barred the
utility’s liability for damages suffered by a residential customer’s houseguests
when the evidence established that the guests had used the utility’s services,
thereby rendering them consumers of such services).
¶40 Nor are we persuaded that the tariff itself affords a sufficient limiting
principle regarding the PUC’s authority. The liability-limiting provision in Tariff
Sheet R87 applies to “persons,” which could preclude an essentially limitless range
of individuals or entities from seeking redress for PSCo’s negligent acts. Nor do
we view the liability limitation’s exception for circumstances in which a utility’s
lines “are in a defective condition” to provide an adequate limiting principle
because, even with such a limitation, the tariff would abrogate a broad swath of
non-customer’s common law rights.
¶41 Finally, PSCo does not point us to any principle for deciding when a tariff
would be sufficiently tailored to support enforcement of a liability-limitation
provision like that at issue here. To the contrary, for the reasons set forth above,
PSCo’s construction of the tariff, in which virtually any activity would implicate
the PUC’s ratemaking authority, would afford the PUC essentially limitless
regulatory power, including the power to grant utilities full immunity from
liability to any injured persons or entities (because any liability could, of course,

21
impact a utility’s economic health, thereby implicating the rates that the utility
must charge).
¶42 For these reasons, we agree with the division below that the PUC lacked the
authority to approve a tariff limiting PSCo’s liability to a non-customer like
Cuevas in the circumstances presented here.
C. HVSA’s Notification Requirement
¶43 PSCo next contends that the division erred in holding that Cuevas was not
a “person” subject to the HVSA’s notification requirement under section
9-2.5-102(1). We are not persuaded.
¶44 Section 9-2.5-102(1), provides, in pertinent part:
[A] person or business entity shall not, individually or through an
agent or employee, perform or require any other person to perform
any function or activity upon any land, building, highway, or other
premises if at any time during the performance of any function or
activity it could reasonably be expected that the person performing
the function or activity could move or be placed within ten feet of any
high voltage overhead line or that any equipment, part of any tool, or
material used by the person could be brought within ten feet of any
high voltage overhead line during the performance of any function or
activity.
¶45 Notwithstanding the foregoing, section 9-2.5-103(1) allows a “person or
business entity” to perform such work, but only if the person or business entity
promptly notifies the public utility of the work to be performed and if “satisfactory
mutual arrangements . . . have been made between the public utility operating the
lines and the person or business entity responsible for performing the work.”

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¶46 Finally, section 9-2.5-101(4), C.R.S. (2025), defines “[p]erson or business
entity” as “a party contracting to perform any function or activity upon any land,
building, highway, or other premises.”
¶47 Reading these provisions together makes clear that the HVSA places the
burden of notification solely on the party contracting to perform the work that is
reasonably expected to come within ten feet of a utility’s high voltage line. Here,
however, it is undisputed that Cuevas was not the party contracting to perform
the work at issue. Outdoor Design was the contracting party.
¶48 Moreover, we perceive nothing in the HVSA that would allow us to read
“person or business entity” in section 9-2.5-103(1)’s notification requirement to
include employees of the business entity that contracted to do the work. To the
contrary, the HVSA shows that when the legislature intended to include agents or
employees, it did so expressly. See, e.g., § 9-2.5-101(1) (using the term “employee,”
in contrast to the language in section 9-2.5-101(4) concerning a party contracting
to perform work); § 9-2.5-102(1) (referring to a person or business entity’s agents
or employees, in contrast to the language concerning the party contracting to
perform work).
¶49 Accordingly, we conclude that the division correctly determined that
Cuevas was not a “person” subject to the HVSA’s notification requirement. See
Mladjan v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 797 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Colo. App. 1990) (concluding

23
that a person who was injured when he drove the extended bed of a dump truck
into high voltage power lines was not a “person or business entity” within the
meaning of section 9-2.5-102(1) because he was a city employee and not a
contracting party).
D. Causation Requirement
¶50 Finally, Outdoor Design contends that the division erroneously read out of
section 9-2.5-104(2) the words “results in,” “caused by the contact,” and “due to
the contact” when it interpreted that section as not containing a causation element.
¶51 Section 9-2.5-104(2) provides, in pertinent part:
If a violation of this article results in physical or electrical contact with
any high voltage overhead line, the person or business entity
violating this article shall be liable to the owner or operator of the high
voltage overhead line for . . . the liability incurred by the owner or
operator due to the contact.
¶52 Outdoor Design contends that, under section 9-2.5-104(2)’s plain language,
to establish Outdoor Design’s indemnity obligation, PSCo was required to prove
that any violation of the HVSA’s notice provision caused Cuevas’s injuries. We
disagree.
¶53 As noted above, section 9-2.5-102(1) of the HVSA prohibits a business entity
from performing or requiring another person to perform work if it reasonably
could be anticipated that the person or business entity performing such work or
their equipment could be brought within ten feet of any high voltage overhead

24
line during the performance of the work. Section 9-2.5-103(1), in turn, permits a
person or entity to perform the work, but only if they promptly notify the public
utility operating the high voltage overhead line and if the parties make satisfactory
mutual arrangements for the performance of the work.
¶54 As these provisions make clear, if a person or entity subject to the HVSA’s
notification requirement does not provide the required notice, then that person or
entity is precluded from performing the work at issue and no injury could possibly
have occurred.
¶55 As a result, we agree with the division that section 9-2.5-104(2) does not
require a separate causation analysis. The notification violation itself was the
cause of the injury because absent the violation, the work would not have been
performed and the injury would not have occurred.
III. Conclusion
¶56 For these reasons, we conclude that (1) the PUC lacked the authority to
approve a tariff limiting PSCo’s liability for its own negligence to non-customers
of the utility; (2) Cuevas, who was not the contracting party for the work at issue,
was not subject to the HVSA’s notification requirement; and (3) section
9-2.5-104(2) of the HVSA does not require a causation analysis, and therefore
Outdoor Design, which violated the HVSA’s notification requirement, must

25
indemnify PSCo for any liability incurred by it as a result of Cuevas’s claims
against it.
¶57 Accordingly, we need not reach and therefore vacate the portion of the
division’s judgment concluding that Tariff Sheet R87, by its terms, does not extend
to non-PSCo customers like Cuevas, but we otherwise affirm the division’s
judgment.
CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ dissented.

1
CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, dissenting.
¶58 Although the majority does not directly answer whether the liability-
limiting language of Tariff Sheet No. R87 of the PSCo Electric Tariff, Colo. PUC
No. 8 (“Tariff Sheet R87”) covers non-customers, Maj. op. ¶ 27, I agree with the
district court’s conclusion that the provision extends to non-customers like
Francisco Cuevas. As the district court noted, Tariff Sheet R87 uses the terms
“[t]he Customer” and “persons” in distinct ways. For example, the tariff places
responsibility for any injury “to persons” on “[t]he Customer” but limits Public
Service Company of Colorado’s (“PSCo”) liability for injury “to persons.” The
plain language of the liability-limiting provision in Tariff Sheet R87 thus precludes
a utility’s liability—such as PSCo’s—to any person, for injuries “caused by
[PSCo’s] lines or equipment when contacted or interfered with by ladders, . . .
trees, . . . or other objects not the property of [PSCo], which . . . are in close
proximity to [PSCo’s] lines and equipment, unless said lines and equipment are in
a defective condition.” Because we must assume that the language choice was
deliberate and that the Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) intended the tariff to
limit PSCo’s liability to all “persons” and not just customers, I believe that the plain
language of Tariff Sheet R87 precludes PSCo’s liability to non-customers like
Cuevas.

2
¶59 Moreover, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this provision is
unlawful because it exceeds the PUC’s legal authority. Maj. op. ¶¶ 27, 31. To the
contrary, the approval of a narrowly tailored liability-limiting provision in a
utility’s tariff falls well within the PUC’s broad authority over utilities regulation,
even when that provision protects the utility against liability to non-customers. I
reach this conclusion for three reasons.
¶60 First, the majority’s stringent limitation on the PUC’s power runs contrary
to the plenary authority over utilities regulation conferred to the PUC by
article XXV of the Colorado Constitution. Article XXV expressly imbues the PUC
with “all power” over utilities regulation, including “the powers now vested in the
General Assembly.” Colo. Const. art. XXV (emphasis added). The PUC’s
exceptionally broad authority under article XXV is subject only to restrictions that
“may be imposed by the legislature.” City of Montrose v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
732 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Colo. 1987). As relevant here, although it has the power to do
so, the legislature has not restricted the PUC’s authority to approve tariff
provisions that limit a utility’s liability to non-customers. Accordingly, the PUC
retains such authority. The majority’s decision to the contrary runs afoul of the
plain language of article XXV.
¶61 Second, we need not explore the outer limits of the PUC’s express
constitutional authority under article XXV to conclude that the narrow provision

3
at issue here falls squarely within the scope of that authority. Liability-limiting
tariff provisions deemed unlawful by other jurisdictions generally feature broad
grants of immunity from liability to any third person for any act of pure
negligence. See, e.g., Tyus v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 134 N.E.3d 389, 397 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2019); Heritage Tractor, Inc. v. Evergy Kan. Cent., Inc., 552 P.3d 1266, 1281
(Kan. Ct. App. 2024). By contrast, PSCo’s tariff provision precludes PSCo’s
liability only to those injured as a result of contact with objects, like ladders in
trees, when they are in close proximity to PSCo’s power lines or equipment. And
it specifically preserves PSCo’s liability when its power lines or equipment are
defective. The narrow scope of this tariff provision places it squarely among the
kinds of liability-limiting provisions that regulatory authorities, like the PUC, have
the power to approve.
¶62 Finally, the majority’s decision fails to appreciate the PUC’s unique role in
utilities regulation. The PUC enjoys broad discretion to regulate utilities in a
manner that properly balances the multiple competing interests involved in
ratemaking. See CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 949 P.2d 577, 584 (Colo.
1997). By constraining the PUC’s authority to impose limits on a utility’s tort
liability, even though such limits are “an inherent part of the rate,” W. Union Tel.
Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 571 (1921), the majority compromises the

4
PUC’s ability to ensure that Coloradans maintain access to affordable and safe
electricity.
¶63 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.1
I. PSCo’s Tariff Provision Falls Within the PUC’s Broad
Constitutional Authority Over Utilities Regulation
¶64 The majority’s holding is premised on its assertion that neither article XXV
nor section 40-3-102, C.R.S. (2025), expressly or impliedly grants the PUC the
power to approve tariffs that limit a utility’s liability to non-customers. Maj. op.
¶¶ 27, 31, 33. But the majority’s approach has it backwards. The question is not
whether article XXV or section 40-3-102 grants the PUC power to limit a utility’s
liability to non-customers, but rather, whether either provision restricts the PUC’s
authority to do so.
¶65 Article XXV delegates plenary authority over utilities regulation directly to
the PUC. Specifically, it confers to the PUC “all power” to regulate utilities:
In addition to the powers now vested in the General Assembly of the State of
Colorado, all power to regulate the facilities, service and rates and charges
therefor, including facilities and service and rates and charges therefor
within home rule cities and home rule towns, of every corporation,
individual, or association of individuals, wheresoever situate or
1 Because I would hold that PSCo’s tariff precludes it from incurring any liability
to Cuevas in the first place, I need not reach any issues concerning the High
Voltage Safety Act. See § 9-2.5-104(2), C.R.S. (2025) (requiring that violators of the
High Voltage Safety Act indemnify the owner or operator of an overhead line “for
the liability incurred by the owner or operator”). Accordingly, I would reverse the
judgment of the division below.

5
operating within the State of Colorado, whether within or without a
home rule city or home rule town, as a public utility, as presently or as
may hereafter be defined as a public utility by the laws of the State of
Colorado, is hereby vested in such agency of the State of Colorado as the
General Assembly shall by law designate.
Colo. Const. art. XXV (emphases added). The provision goes on to explain that
“[u]ntil such time as the General Assembly may otherwise designate,” the plenary
authority described in article XXV “shall be vested in” the PUC. Id.
¶66 This court has recognized that article XXV “vests ‘all power to regulate’
public utilities in the PUC unless and until the general assembly designates
another agency to perform that function.” City of Durango v. Durango Transp., Inc.,
807 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Colo. 1991) (quoting Colo. Const. art. XXV). Thus, unlike
typical regulatory bodies, the PUC does not derive its authority over public
utilities from the legislature; instead, its authority stems directly from the
constitution. See Richard B. Collins & Dale A. Oesterle, The Oxford Commentaries
on the State Constitutions of the United States: The Colorado State Constitution 418 (2d
ed. 2020) (describing article XXV’s “delegation to the PUC of full legislative
discretion” as “[a] bit unusual”); compare Colo. Const. art. XXV, with Colo. Const.
art. IX, § 1(1) (“The general supervision of the public schools of the state shall be
vested in a board of education whose powers and duties shall be as now or hereafter
prescribed by law.” (emphasis added)). In fact, under article XXV, the PUC has “as

6
much authority as the legislature possessed prior to 1954”2 with respect to the
regulation of public utilities. Aspen Airways, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc.,
584 P.2d 629, 631 (Colo. 1978). Accordingly, the PUC’s authority in this area is
plenary, subject only to restrictions that “may be imposed by the legislature.” City
of Montrose, 732 P.2d at 1186; see also Collins & Oesterle, supra, at 418 (noting that
the PUC exercises “full legislative discretion until the general assembly provides
otherwise”).3
2 Article XXV was added to the Colorado Constitution in 1954 by referendum.
Ch. 226, sec. 1, 1955 Colo. Sess. Laws 693, 693–94.
3 Article XXV’s direct grant of authority to the PUC was not unique at the time of
its enactment. Prior to 1996, the New Mexico Constitution directly vested in the
Corporation Commission the “power” and “duty of fixing, determining,
supervising, regulating and controlling all charges and rates of . . . transportation
and transmission companies.” N.M. Const. art. XI, § 7 (1995); H. J. Res. 16, 42d
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 1996 N.M. Laws 1080, 1080–81 (repealing this and other
sections of article XI). The New Mexico Supreme Court long recognized that this
provision represented “not a legislative grant,” but “a delegation of power and
duty by the [c]onstitution” that rendered the Corporation Commission’s power
over utilities regulation “an attribute of sovereignty.” San Juan Coal & Coke Co. v.
Santa Fe, San Juan & N. Ry. Co., 2 P.2d 305, 307 (N.M. 1931); see also Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm’n, 563 P.2d 588, 594 (N.M. 1977) (describing
the provision as a “broad grant of constitutional authority to the [Corporation]
Commission”). Consistent with this interpretation, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals held that the Corporation Commission’s constitutional authority
included the power to approve a tariff provision that limited a utility’s liability for
simple negligence. Coachlight Las Cruces, Ltd. v. Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 664 P.2d 994,
999–1000 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). New Mexico’s PUC analog no longer commands
the same constitutional authority; article XI was amended in 1996 to replace the
Corporation Commission’s broad, constitutionally derived authority with an
instruction to the legislature to delegate authority over utilities regulation to a

7
¶67 Before today, we had consistently applied article XXV with this
interpretation. In Aspen Airways, for example, we held that article XXV permitted
the PUC to temporarily authorize an airline to provide service between Aspen and
Denver, reasoning that the General Assembly could have done so prior to 1954
and had not, at the relevant time, acted to limit the PUC’s authority to exercise the
same power. 584 P.2d at 630–31.
¶68 In contrast, in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Public Utilities Commission,
590 P.2d 495, 497 (Colo. 1979), we acknowledged that the PUC lacked the authority
to approve reduced rates for low-income elderly and disabled customers only
because the General Assembly had specifically restricted the PUC’s power “to
order preferential utility rates to effect social policy.” (Citing the legislature’s
enactment of section 40-3-106(1), C.R.S. (1973), and section 40-3-102, C.R.S. (1973)).
¶69 Here, however, the General Assembly has not acted to restrict the PUC’s
authority to limit a utility’s tort liability to non-customers. And because the
legislature has had the power to limit tort liability since well before 1954, see, e.g.,
Collard v. Hohnstein, 174 P. 596, 596–97 (Colo. 1918) (indicating that the legislature
may abrogate common-law remedies in statute provided that the statute is
sufficiently explicit), so, too, has the PUC since the enactment of article XXV. Aspen
public regulation commission. 1996 N.M. Laws at 1081. Notably, Colorado has
not made a similar change to article XXV.

8
Airways, 584 P.2d at 631; see also Shoemaker v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
559 P.2d 721, 723 (Colo. App. 1976) (noting that tariffs created through properly
delegated legislative authority extinguish any inconsistent common-law remedy).
Accordingly, the PUC may—until the General Assembly legislates
otherwise—approve a tariff that limits a regulated utility’s tort liability to
non-customers.4
¶70 In sum, the majority’s insistence on an express grant of authority to the PUC
to limit a utility’s liability to non-customers fails to account for the plain language
of article XXV of the Colorado Constitution. It is not for this court to impose
restrictions on the PUC’s constitutionally derived plenary authority; that
discretion lies with the General Assembly. The majority’s decision today thus
invades the legislature’s exclusive role in this area. See Colo. Const. art. XXV
(vesting authority in the PUC “[u]ntil such time as the General Assembly may
otherwise designate” (emphasis added)).
4 To the extent the majority’s conclusion rests on its assertion that section 40-3-102,
C.R.S. (2025), likewise does not affirmatively grant the PUC authority to limit a
utility’s liability to non-customers, it again misunderstands the plenary authority
over utilities regulation that article XXV confers on the PUC. See, e.g., In re
Interrogatories on Senate Bill 21-247, 2021 CO 37, ¶ 41, 488 P.3d 1008, 1020
(recognizing that the PUC’s power derives exclusively from the constitutional
amendment creating it and not from the legislature’s general authority).
Importantly, the General Assembly has not acted to restrict that plenary authority
by precluding the PUC—in section 40-3-102 or elsewhere—from limiting a utility’s
liability to non-customers.

9
¶71 I am also unpersuaded by the majority’s reliance on case law from other
jurisdictions to inform its interpretation of article XXV. See Maj. op. ¶¶ 34–37. The
Indiana Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Tyus, for example, is unhelpful. Indiana’s
legal framework differs significantly from Colorado’s. Unlike Colorado, Indiana
law expressly provides that the state regulatory commission “shall establish
reasonable rules and regulations to govern the relations between public utilities and
any or all classes of their customers.” Ind. Code § 8-1-2-34.5(a) (West 2025) (emphasis
added); see also Tyus, 134 N.E.3d at 402 (“[A]ll rules and regulations covering the
relationship between the customer and the public utility shall be filed by each
public utility in the office of the [IURC].” (second alteration in original) (quoting
170 Ind. Admin. Code 4-1-29)). This scope of authority prescribed to the Indiana
regulatory commission is quite different from article XXV’s plenary grant of
authority to the PUC, confirmed by the broad grant of “power and authority” to
the PUC to regulate utilities found in section 40-3-102. It is therefore unreasonable
to conclude, given Indiana’s specifically limited grant of authority to its public
utility regulator, that the Indiana Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Tyus “applies
with equal force” to article XXV or section 40-3-102. See Maj. op. ¶ 37.
¶72 In sum, article XXV directly delegates plenary authority over utilities
regulation to the PUC. Absent legislation to the contrary, that authority includes
the power to approve tariffs limiting a utility’s liability, including to

10
non-customers. Because the General Assembly has not acted to restrict the PUC’s
authority to do so, I would hold that the PUC’s ability to approve a tariff provision
limiting a utility’s liability to non-customers fits comfortably within its plenary
authority directly conferred by article XXV of the Colorado Constitution.
II. PSCo’s Tariff Provision Narrowly Limits PSCo’s
Liability to Non-Customers
¶73 As discussed, the plain language of article XXV makes clear that the PUC’s
plenary authority over utilities regulation includes the power to approve a tariff
provision that limits a utility’s liability to a non-customer, unless and until the
General Assembly limits that power. The majority expresses concern that
construing article XXV to confer such power to the PUC would allow the PUC to
approve tariffs exempting utilities from liability to any non-customer for any
reason. Maj. op. ¶ 31. But the conclusion that the specific tariff provision at issue
here falls comfortably within the PUC’s authority does not require this court to
explore the outer bounds of that authority.
¶74 The tariff provision here is narrow in scope: It limits PSCo’s liability to
non-customers when the non-customer suffers injuries “caused by [PSCo’s] lines
or equipment when contacted or interfered with by ladders, . . . trees, . . . or other
objects not the property of [PSCo], which . . . are in close proximity to [PSCo’s]
lines and equipment, unless said lines and equipment are in a defective condition.”
In short, it precludes PSCo’s liability to non-customers whose injuries result from

11
contact or interference with a power line—an especially unlikely scenario given
the requirements of the High Voltage Safety Act that the majority explains in
detail. Maj. op. ¶¶ 43–49; see, e.g., § 9-2.5-103(1), C.R.S. (2025) (requiring
contracting parties that reasonably expect to work within ten feet of a high voltage
line to contact the operating utility to arrange for safety measures). Moreover,
Tariff Sheet R87 specifically confirms that PSCo is liable for such injuries when its
power lines or equipment are “in a defective condition.” Eliminating liability for
specific, relatively unlikely injuries—while simultaneously preserving liability for
certain negligent actions—does not evoke the concerns that have led some courts
to deem the approval of tariff provisions unlawful exercises of a utility regulator’s
authority.
¶75 To the extent the majority contends that PSCo’s tariff provision is
impermissible specifically because it applies to non-customers, Maj. op. ¶ 31, I note
that courts in other jurisdictions have upheld tariffs limiting liability to
non-customers. In US Airways, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 361 P.3d 942, 944 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2015), for example, a contractor for a utility negligently performed work that
interrupted services US Airways received from a different utility. The court
rejected US Airways’ assertion that the negligent utility’s tariff provision limiting
that utility’s liability did not apply to non-customers, like the airline, because it
concluded that the liability limitation was consistent with the need for “strictly

12
regulated” public utilities to “define[] and limit[]” their liability to ensure that they
can “provide service at reasonable rates.” Id. at 946–47. Similarly, in Trammell v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 361, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), the court
held that a tariff provision limiting a telegraph company’s liability applied not
only to customer senders of a telegram, but also to non-customer recipients. The
court reasoned that tariffs, and any limitations of liability they contain, “have the
force and effect of law” and are “binding on the public generally.” Id. at 368; see
also Colich & Sons v. Pac. Bell, 244 Cal. Rptr. 714, 715, 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that a tariff applied to limit a utility’s liability to a non-customer that
sought indemnification from the utility for damages it owed the utility’s customers
based on the utility’s alleged negligence).
¶76 US Airways, Trammell, and Colich support the proposition that tariffs may
limit a utility’s liability to non-customers in order to preserve the utility’s ability
to provide reliable service and to enforce its tariffs’ legally binding effects.
¶77 In sum, the PUC’s approval of PSCo’s tariff provision limiting PSCo’s
liability to non-customers—in a narrow and unlikely set of circumstances—is a
reasonable exercise of the PUC’s authority.

13
III. The Majority’s Limitation on the PUC’s Authority
Compromises the PUC’s Ability to Fulfill Its
Constitutional Role in Utility Regulation
¶78 Ratemaking is an “extraordinarily complex process.” Brief for Edison
Electric Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12. It aims to balance
a variety of often competing considerations, ranging from utilities’ economic
needs, to maintaining service reliability and affordability, to furthering a variety
of disparate policy goals. Id. at 12–13.
¶79 The framers of article XXV “recognized that the factfinding and policy
choices involved in utility ratemaking require highly concentrated analysis of
complex, detailed factual and statistical information.” Mountain States Legal
Found., 590 P.2d at 500 (Carrigan, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the PUC enjoys
considerable discretion when exercising its “essential function . . . to ensure that
all rate charges are fair and reasonable to ratepayers and the utility.” Holcim U.S.
Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2025 CO 1, ¶ 25, 562 P.3d 55, 59 (quoting Pub. Serv.
Co. of Colo. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 26 P.3d 1198, 1204 (Colo. 2001)). This discretion
is necessary for the PUC to achieve its goal of protecting the public interest in
affordable electricity rates without compromising utilities’ operational viability.
See CF&I Steel, L.P., 949 P.2d at 584.
¶80 The majority’s holding fails to appreciate that decisions regarding liability
limitations, “an inherent part of the rate,” fall within the PUC’s constitutionally

14
derived discretion to balance the competing interests that utilities regulation
involves. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. at 571; see also Romany M. Webb et al., Climate Risk
in the Electricity Sector: Legal Obligations to Advance Climate Resilience Planning by
Electric Utilities, 51 Env’t L. 577, 660 (2021) (“Limitations on liability have generally
been justified as in the public interest on the basis that, when their liability is
defined and limited, electric utilities are better able to provide service at reasonable
rates.”). As a result, the majority’s decision today compromises the PUC’s ability
to consider liability limitations as one of many tools available to help balance
utilities’ costs against their mandate to keep electricity prices affordable.
Furthermore, today’s decision invites future litigants to attempt to further
constrain the PUC’s authority in its area of special expertise by turning to the
courts rather than the legislature to impose restrictions on that authority. The
broad implications of the majority’s decision today are disproportionate to the
limited effects of the narrowly circumscribed tariff provision at issue here.
IV. Conclusion
¶81 The plain language of Tariff Sheet R87 clearly precludes PSCo’s liability to
any person, including non-customers, under the circumstances of this case.
However, the majority’s narrow view of the PUC’s authority over utilities
regulation—particularly as applied to the carefully circumscribed tariff provision
at issue here—disregards the breadth of the PUC’s constitutionally delegated

15
power, fails to appreciate the scope of the tariff provision, and threatens to
undermine the PUC’s discretion over ratemaking. I cannot support this result.
¶82 Article XXV of the Colorado Constitution directly delegates plenary
authority over utilities regulation to the PUC. Any restriction on the PUC’s
plenary authority must come from the General Assembly—not this court. Thus
far, the legislature has not restricted the PUC’s ability to approve tariff provisions
limiting a utility’s liability to non-customers—and the majority points to no statute
imposing such a restriction. Accordingly, the PUC has the authority to do so.
¶83 Notably, PSCo’s tariff provision does not grant PSCo broad immunity for
any third person’s injuries caused by any negligent act PSCo may perform. Rather,
it limits PSCo’s liability to non-customers under highly specific (and relatively
unlikely) circumstances. The narrow scope of PSCo’s tariff provision
distinguishes it from those that other courts have deemed to exceed a regulatory
body’s authority. Thus, I see no reason to apply those courts’ concerns to the
provision before us.
¶84 Finally, limiting the PUC’s authority as the majority does today imposes an
unwarranted restriction on the PUC’s discretion to make the complex decisions
that utilities regulation requires. And it invites future litigation over tariff
provisions that the PUC has approved after careful analysis of a variety of

16
competing factors. Article XXV of the Colorado Constitution makes clear that such
analyses are best left in the PUC’s expert hands.
¶85 I respectfully dissent.