26 CO 34, 24SC778 Sandoval, Bernard v. City of Colorado Springs

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The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
May 26, 2026

2026 CO 34

No. 24SC778, Sandoval v. City of Colo. Springs-Colorado Governmental
Immunity Act-Waiver-Conflicting Directions.

The supreme court granted certiorari to review whether the court of appeals
properly interpreted section 24-10-106(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. (2024), which waives
sovereign immunity when a public entity fails to repair a traffic control signal
displaying "conflicting directions," causing a dangerous condition. The
circumstances here involved one driver facing a blank, inoperative traffic light and
the perpendicular driver facing a green light at an intersection in the City of
Colorado Springs.

The supreme court holds that under these circumstances, the traffic control
signals displayed conflicting directions, causing a dangerous condition. As a
result, Colorado Springs waived its sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the
supreme court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 34

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC778
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 24CA198

Petitioner:
Bernard E. Sandoval,

V.

Respondent:
City of Colorado Springs.

Judgment Reversed
en banc
May 26, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Ramos Law

Brian Hugen

Northglenn, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Marc Smith, Acting Colorado Springs City Attorney

W. Erik Lamphere, Division Chief

Colorado Springs, Colorado

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JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

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JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11
As Bernard E. Sandoval was driving in Colorado Springs, he approached an
intersection where his traffic signal was inoperative. After stopping at the
unilluminated light and treating the intersection as a four-way stop, Sandoval
entered the intersection, not realizing that the crossing lane had a green light.
Corey Kinzy, traveling in that lane, drove through the intersection, striking
Sandoval's car.

12 Sandoval sued the City of Colorado Springs for negligence. In response,
Colorado Springs moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying
on the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA"). The CGIA typically
immunizes public entities from tort claims and liabilities. § 24-10-106(1), C.R.S.
(2025). However, a public entity waives this immunity when it "fail[s] to repair a
traffic control signal on which conflicting directions are displayed," and the failure
"cause[s]" a "dangerous condition." § 24-10-106(1)(d)(II). Colorado Springs
argued that the traffic signals were not "conflicting" at the time of the collision,
meaning it had not waived sovereign immunity under the CGIA. The district
court denied the motion, finding that "the traffic signals were not properly
functioning and displayed conflicting signals to drivers approaching the
intersection."

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T3
Colorado Springs appealed, and a division of the court of appeals reversed.
Sandoval v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 24CA198, 1 1 (Oct. 31, 2024). The division held
that the signals were not conflicting because Sandoval could have stopped at the
inoperative light and only proceeded when safe, while Kinzy could have driven
through his operative, green light. Id. at | 15. It rejected Sandoval's argument that
he permissibly treated the intersection as a four-way stop, noting instead that
applicable traffic codes require a driver to treat an inoperative traffic signal "as a
stop sign and yield to vehicles in or approaching the intersection." Id. at [[ 16-17.
We granted Sandoval's petition for certiorari review.1

14 We hold that under the circumstances, the traffic control signals displayed
conflicting directions, causing a dangerous condition. As a result, Colorado
Springs waived its sovereign immunity under the CGIA. Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

15
While driving northbound on South Tejon Street in Colorado Springs,
Sandoval encountered an inoperative traffic signal at the intersection with East

1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:
Whether the division of the court of appeals correctly interpreted
section 24-10-106(1)(d)(II), C.R.S. (2024).

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Costilla Street. The inoperative light was unilluminated, and there was no other
signal to direct his course of action. Sandoval stopped at the intersection.
Unaware that the eastbound light on Costilla Street was still operating and
properly cycling, Sandoval treated the intersection as a four-way stop and
proceeded when he thought it was clear for his turn. Kinzy, driving eastbound on
Costilla Street with a green light at the intersection, then struck Sandoval's car,
injuring him.

16
Sandoval filed negligence claims against, inter alia, the City of Colorado
Springs. Citing section 24-10-106(1)(d)(II), Sandoval asserted that Colorado
Springs had waived its immunity under the CGIA because of its "failure to repair
a traffic control signal on which conflicting directions are displayed."

17
Colorado Springs moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
arguing that the inoperative northbound signal was not in conflict with the
functioning eastbound signal. Colorado Springs contended that since motorists
must treat an inoperative signal as a stop sign entering a through street, Sandoval
was required to stop and yield the right-of-way. See § 42-4-612(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025);
§ 42-4-703(3), C.R.S. (2025); City of Colo. Springs, Colo., City Code, ch. 10, arts. 3,
17, §§ 10.3.101(A), 10.17.109(A). Thus, Colorado Springs argued that Sandoval did
not face conflicting directions because his only instruction was to stop and yield
until it was safe to proceed.

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18
The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The court found that
because the north-south light was inoperative but the east-west light was properly
functioning, the traffic signals displayed conflicting directions, creating a
dangerous condition. As a result, the court concluded that the CGIA waiver
applied.

19
Colorado Springs appealed, and a division of the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the signals did not display conflicting directions. Sandoval, 1 15. The
division reasoned that "the inoperative traffic signal directed Sandoval to stop and
then go when safe, while the green light directed Kinzy to go without stopping." Id.
Therefore, "[b]ecause Sandoval and Kinzy could have followed these directions
simultaneously without issue," the division determined that "the signals were not
incompatible." Id. Additionally, the division stated that Sandoval's
assumption-to treat the intersection as a four-way stop-was unsupported by
any legal authority and contradicted the stop-sign conditions imposed by state and
local traffic laws. Id. at | 17.

[10 We granted Sandoval's petition for certiorari.

## II. Analysis

111 We begin by stating the applicable standard of review. Next, we explain the
CGIA's sovereign immunity waiver and principles of statutory construction. We
then address when "conflicting directions are displayed" on a "traffic control

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signal." § 24-10-106(1)(d)(II). Finally, we assess how the law, including relevant
traffic laws, applies to the circumstances presented here.

112 We hold that under the circumstances, the traffic control signals displayed
conflicting directions, causing a dangerous condition. As a result, Colorado
Springs waived its sovereign immunity under the CGIA. Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

### A. Standard of Review

113 "Whether a claim is barred on grounds of immunity under the CGIA is a
question of subject matter jurisdiction." Douglas v. City & Cnty. of Denv., 203 P.3d
615, 617 (Colo. App. 2008) (citing Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 276 (Colo. 1995));
see also City & Cnty. of Denv. v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, 1 10, 418 P.3d 489, 494 ("Because
the CGIA protects the government from suit, the district court must necessarily
make factual findings to ensure that the court has jurisdiction to hear the case.").
We review a court's jurisdictional finding as a question of law when the
underlying facts are uncontested. Douglas, 203 P.3d at 618 (citing Medina v. State,
35 P.3d 443, 452-53 (Colo. 2001)).

## B. Sovereign Immunity Under the CGIA and Principles of Statutory Construction

114 The CGIA provides public entities immunity from tort claims and liabilities.
§ 24-10-106(1). Such immunity is waived under certain circumstances, including,

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as relevant here, when a public entity "fail[s] to repair a traffic control signal on
which conflicting directions are displayed," and the failure "cause[s]" a
"dangerous condition."2 § 24-10-106(1)(d)(II). Because we construe statutes so
that a singular term includes its plural, the sovereign immunity waiver applies to
signals, not just one traffic signal. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d
1139, 1144 (Colo. App. 1999) (citing § 2-4-102, C.R.S. (2025)).

115 We strictly construe immunity provisions since they are in derogation of the
common law, and we broadly construe waiver provisions. Springer v. City & Cnty.
of Denv., 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000) (citing Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082,
1086 (Colo. 2000)). This broad construction principle is based "in the interest of
compensating victims of governmental negligence." Douglas, 203 P.3d at 617-18
(citing Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 1086). And a "plaintiff is afforded the reasonable
inferences from [their] undisputed evidence" in proving that the government
waived its immunity. Dennis, [ 11, 418 P.3d at 494 (citing Tidwell ex rel. Tidwell v.
City & Cnty. of Denv., 83 P.3d 75, 85-86 (Colo. 2003)).

2 The CGIA defines a dangerous condition as

a physical condition of a facility or the use thereof that constitutes an
unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which is known
to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been
known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the
negligent act or omission of the public entity.

§ 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. (2025).

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116 When interpreting the CGIA, "our goal is to give effect to the intent of the
General Assembly," primarily by looking to the "plain and ordinary meaning of
the terms used." Lyons v. City of Aurora, 987 P.2d 900, 903 (Colo. App. 1999) (citing
Fogg, 892 P.2d at 274). Determining legislative intent requires that "we construe
the statute as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of
its parts." Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 1 18, 410 P.3d
1236, 1240 (citing St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1] v. Loveland ex rel. Loveland, 2017
CO 54, 1 11, 395 P.3d 751, 754). If the statute's plain language is unambiguous, we
effectuate its ordinary meaning without further analysis. See, e.g., id. However,
"strained or forced interpretation of a statutory term should not be adopted."
Lyons, 987 P.2d at 903 (citing State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo. 1990)).

## C. Understanding "Conflicting Directions" in the CGIA's Sovereign Immunity Waiver

117 The CGIA does not define "conflicting." In Lyons, a division of the court of
appeals explained that the term is generally defined as "being in conflict, collision,
[or] opposition." Id. (quoting Conflicting, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary (1986)). The division further pointed out that the verb "conflict" means
"to show variance, incompatibility, irreconcilability, or opposition." Id. (quoting
Conflict, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986)). In that case, the
plaintiff claimed that the directions were conflicting when the pedestrian signal
failed to give her enough time to cross six lanes of traffic before the traffic light

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turned green, causing her to be struck by a car. Id. at 901-02. The division
disagreed and held that the city had not waived its immunity because nothing
suggested that the traffic signals "were in fact simultaneously showing conflicting
directions." Id. at 903 (emphasis added).

118 That same year, another division examined this concept of simultaneous
incompatibility in DeForrest. There, a driver approached an intersection and
encountered both an operating traffic signal, which was red, and a temporary stop
sign. DeForrest, 990 P.2d at 1141. The driver stopped and then entered the
intersection, colliding with another driver, who had proceeded through a green
light in the cross traffic. Id. The division concluded that these circumstances
created "conflicting signals" under section 24-10-106(1)(d)(II), reasoning that a
motorist in this situation "might reasonably assume that the temporary stop sign
controlled over the direction displayed on the traffic light." DeForrest, 990 P.2d at
1144.

119 Colorado Springs points out that the division in DeForrest focused on
conflicting signals facing one driver, not perpendicular drivers. But the division
in that case also recognized that because the first driver faced both a traffic light
and a temporary stop sign, whereas the perpendicular driver faced only a traffic
light, "motorists in opposing traffic lanes were controlled by different types of
signals ... [which] contributed to the display of 'conflicting directions."" Id.

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(quoting § 24-10-106(1)(d)(II)). Consequently, DeForrest demonstrates that
"conflicting directions" can involve perpendicular drivers facing different signal
types.

## D. Application

120 We now turn to Sandoval's circumstances. The relevant facts are
undisputed.3 Both Sandoval and Colorado Springs submit that the unambiguous
plain meaning of "conflicting directions" supports their respective positions.

## 1. Traffic Laws

121 In analyzing whether traffic signals simultaneously display "conflicting
directions," we must consider traffic laws and how they may apply to the scenario
at hand. When a driver faces an intersection where the traffic control signal is
inoperative, the motorist must comply with right-of-way rules for entering a
through street as if there were a stop sign. § 42-4-612(1)(a). Those rules include
stopping and yielding the right-of-way to any vehicle in or so closely approaching
the intersection that it constitutes an immediate safety hazard. § 42-4-703(3).

T22 Based on these traffic laws, Sandoval maintains that he reasonably treated
the intersection as a four-way stop because motorists must treat an inoperative

3 Colorado Springs takes issue with alleged facts in Sandoval's briefing -that
construction obscured Sandoval's view, and Kinzy drove at a high rate of
speed -which are not within the district court's findings. These allegations are
irrelevant to our analysis.

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light as a stop sign entering a through street, meaning that when all the traffic
lights are out at an intersection, it creates a four-way stop. Colorado Springs
counters that Sandoval's assumption does not alter the dispositive question of
whether the signals conflicted.

123 The division recognized that traffic laws direct motorists to treat an
inoperative light as a stop sign entering a through street, § 42-4-612(1)(a), which
requires stopping and yielding until clear, § 42-4-703(3). Sandoval, 1 17. Thus, the
division reasoned that Sandoval should not have treated his inoperative signal as
a four-way stop. Id. Although the division's reasoning has merit, it relies on the
premise that a proper interpretation of traffic laws allowed for compatible
instructions. We must examine that premise and determine whether the traffic
laws reconciled the instructions and prevented the different signal types from
being in conflict.

## 2. The Traffic Control Signals Displayed "Conflicting Directions"

124 The question here is whether the traffic control signals displayed
"conflicting directions" when Sandoval faced a blank, inoperative traffic light and
the perpendicular driver faced a green light.

125 The inoperative northbound traffic light and the properly functioning
eastbound light caused drivers in perpendicular lanes to face different types of
signals when approaching the intersection. Sandoval faced an inoperative signal,

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which should generally be treated as a stop sign entering a through street, but
Kinzy faced a traffic light. Although it is not binding authority, DeForrest
recognized that such differing signals contribute to the display of "conflicting
directions." 990 P.2d at 1144 (quoting § 24-10-106(1)(d)(II)).

126 Further, this scenario presents a different situation than entering a through
street from a stop sign as contemplated by the traffic laws because it instead
created a stop sign perpendicular to an operating traffic light. See § 42-4-612(1)(a).
A through street retains preferential right-of-way whereas a traffic light operates
to control the right-of-way. Realistically, no municipality would design an
intersection with a traffic light only operating one way while the cross traffic
adhered to a stop sign because of the practical ramifications. This would create
confusion for drivers. With these conditions presented at an intersection, a driver
who had stopped at the stop sign and saw another driver stopped at the cross light
could then begin to proceed through the intersection, unaware that the
perpendicular driver could also begin to proceed as the light turned green. Both
motorists would be entitled to proceed into the intersection simultaneously,
causing a dangerous condition.

127 Each day, motorists depend on predictability to remain safe on the road. For
example, we expect that other cars will stop at red lights. And we plan
accordingly. Predicting the actions of other drivers stems from our social contract

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that we all subscribe to on the road to keep ourselves and others safe. Our traffic
code enshrines collective rules, like stopping at a red light, to ensure predictability
of the "rules of the road." § 42-4-102, C.R.S. (2025). The traffic code also provides
solutions when, for example, a traffic light is out. This maintains predictability,
our centerpiece of safety, even in those atypical circumstances.

128 However, the scenario presented here removed predictability at the
intersection. With the light malfunctioning in one direction, it must have become
very difficult for drivers, like Sandoval, to predict the conduct of other drivers in
the cross-traffic. Will they stop and then proceed as if they had approached a four-
way stop because their light is also out? Will they stop until the intersection is
clear? Or do they somehow still face an operating traffic signal and will
immediately proceed through a green light or come to a stop if it is red? Drivers
in this scenario cannot reasonably predict which answer is correct. And our traffic
laws could not maintain the predictability that was lost because an operating light
is a different traffic pattern than a through street. That is, Sandoval could not
comply with traffic laws because no such law envisions this vexing situation.
Hence, we disagree with the premise that a proper interpretation of traffic laws
enabled Sandoval and Kinzy to follow the instructions simultaneously without
issue.

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129 To the contrary, the partial malfunction brought about simultaneously
opposed instructions because it created inconsistent suggestions for how to
proceed, removing predictability for drivers at the intersection, and no traffic law
applied to harmonize the directions. These "conflicting directions" thus initiated
a confounding scenario for motorists and confused the right-of-way at the
intersection, creating a dangerous condition.

130 Even though our analysis does not hinge on a driver's assumption of the
right-of-way at the intersection, we broadly construe waiver provisions and afford
plaintiffs all reasonable inferences from their undisputed evidence. Dennis, T1 11,
14, 418 P.3d at 494-95. We must thus consider the practical ramifications creating
confusion and unpredictability. The presented scenario confuses the right-of-way
and risks causing a collision, as in fact what happened here, and our broad
construction is premised on "compensating victims of governmental negligence."
Springer, 13 P.3d at 798 (citing Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 1086). In applying our broad
standard, we see it that the directions were inherently incompatible, and this
incompatibility is exactly the kind of simultaneously opposed "conflicting
directions" that the CGIA waiver contemplates.

## III. Conclusion

131 We hold that under the circumstances, the traffic control signals displayed
conflicting directions, causing a dangerous condition. As a result, Colorado

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Springs waived its sovereign immunity under the CGIA. Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.