26 CO 38, 25SA245 People in Interest of T.J.W.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
June 1, 2026

# 2026 CO 38

No. 25SA245, People in Int. of T.J.W .- Fourth Amendment - School Search -
Anonymous Tips - Reasonable Suspicion.

The supreme court considers the People's interlocutory appeal challenging
a district court's suppression order. An anonymous tip received through
Colorado's Safe2Tell program described a student smoking marijuana in class.
After verifying details alleged in this tip, an assistant principal at the school
searched T.J.W.'s backpack and found a marijuana vape pen which was used to
charge T.J.W. with marijuana possession. T.J.W. filed a motion to suppress
evidence of the marijuana vape pen which the district court granted, finding that
the search was illegal.

Applying the two-part test established in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
341 (1985), the supreme court holds that the search of T.J.W.'s backpack was
"justified at its inception," and thus reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
because the anonymous Safe2Tell tip, combined with the assistant principal's

<!-- PageBreak -->

independent corroboration, supported a finding of reasonable suspicion.
Accordingly, the supreme court reverses the district court's suppression order.

<!-- PageBreak -->

# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 38

Supreme Court Case No. 25SA245
Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court
Douglas County District Court Case No. 25JD96
Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Chief Judge

Plaintiff-Appellant:
The People of the State of Colorado,
In the Interest of

Juvenile-Appellee:
T.J.W.,

and Concerning

Respondents-Appellees:

L.C.W. and D.W.

Order Reversed
en banc
June 1, 2026

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant:
George Brauchler, District Attorney, Twenty-third Judicial District
Megan Rasband, Chief Deputy District Attorney
Castle Rock, Colorado

Attorneys for Juvenile-Appellee:

The Juba Law Office, PLLC

Michael S. Juba

Denver, Colorado

<!-- PageBreak -->

No appearance on behalf of: L.C.W. and D.W.

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 Through Colorado's Safe2Tell program,1 Assistant Principal Craig Bowman
received an anonymous tip that described a student named "T.J." smoking
marijuana in a teacher's sixth period biology class at approximately 12:30 p.m.
Bowman searched T.J.W.'s backpack and found a marijuana vape pen. The People
later charged T.J.W. with marijuana possession. T.J.W. filed a motion to suppress
evidence of the marijuana vape pen, which the district court granted, finding that
Bowman's search was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The People filed an
interlocutory appeal, challenging that order.

12 In evaluating whether the search of T.J.W.'s backpack violated the Fourth
Amendment, we rely principally on the two-part test established in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985), which provides that a school search is only
reasonable if it is (1) "justified at its inception," and (2) "reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." (Quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).) We hold that the search of T.J.W.'s backpack
was "justified at its inception" because the anonymous Safe2Tell tip, combined

1 Safe2Tell is a statewide statutory program that allows students and members of
the community to "provide anonymous information about unsafe, potentially
harmful, dangerous, violent, or criminal activities in schools" to law enforcement,
public safety agencies, and school officials. § 24-31-602(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025).

<!-- PageBreak -->

with Bowman's independent corroboration, supported a finding of reasonable
suspicion.2 Accordingly, we reverse the district court's suppression order.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

T3
At 1:15 p.m. on a typical school day, Bowman, an assistant principal at
Chaparral High School, received a Safe2Tell report stating that a male student
named "T.J." -described as lean, tall, and with dirty blonde hair-had been
smoking marijuana and covering it up with cologne in Ms. Betts's biology class at
approximately 12:30 p.m.3 The tipster did not identify themself.

14 Bowman first verified that Ms. Betts's sixth period biology class was at the
time of the alleged conduct. He then examined that class's roster and found that
T.J.W., the only person at the school Bowman knew went by "T.J.," was on it.
Bowman then had T.J.W. brought to his office. Although T.J.W. matched the
description of the individual from the tip, Bowman did not smell marijuana on
T.J.W. nor did he observe any signs of intoxication. Bowman told T.J.W. about the
tip and searched T.J.W.'s backpack, where he found a marijuana vape pen.

2 Because T.J.W. does not contest the reasonableness of the scope of the search, we
do not address the second prong of the T.L.O. test.

3 As we do not have access to the Safe2Tell report, we base our description on the
district court's findings of fact, as well as Bowman's uncontested testimony at the
suppression hearing.

<!-- PageBreak -->

15
The People later filed a petition in delinquency, charging T.J.W. with
possession of marijuana or marijuana concentrate. T.J.W. filed a motion to
suppress evidence of the marijuana vape pen, arguing that the search was
unlawful because it "was based solely on an anonymous Safe2Tell tip" and "none
of the information in the tip was corroborated."

16
Following a suppression hearing, the district court granted the motion,
concluding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court
cited T.L.O. to make clear that something less than probable cause was required
here, applied a reasonable suspicion standard to its analysis, and concluded that
Bowman lacked reasonable suspicion because the anonymous Safe2Tell tip was
insufficiently corroborated.

17
The People filed an interlocutory appeal.

## II. Analysis

18
We begin by laying out this court's jurisdiction and the appropriate
standard of review. Then, we describe the relevant Fourth Amendment principles
regarding reasonable grounds for a school search under T.L.O.'s first prong,
including the reliability of anonymous tips within such analysis. We then apply
these principles to the facts of this case.

<!-- PageBreak -->

### A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

19
The People may file an interlocutory appeal to seek this court's review of a
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence per C.A.R. 4.1 and section
16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2025). The People must certify both that the appeal is not
taken for purposes of delay and that the suppressed evidence is a substantial part
of the proof against the defendant. C.A.R. 4.1(a); § 16-12-102(2). The People have
met these conditions here.

110 "A trial court's order suppressing evidence presents a mixed question of fact
and law." People v. Dacus, 2024 CO 51, 1 23, 559 P.3d 198, 203. Therefore, we accept
the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we "assess
the legal significance of the facts de novo." Id. (quoting People v. Thompson,
2021 CO 15, 1 15, 500 P.3d 1075, 1078).

## B. Legal Principles

111 This case requires us to review two, often siloed areas of Fourth Amendment
law. First, we examine T.L.O. and its progeny, which govern whether school
searches are "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 469 U.S. at 337. Second,
we discuss the reliability of anonymous tips in determining whether there were
reasonable grounds for a search.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## 1. Reasonable Grounds for a School Search

112 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches
and seizures by the government, U.S. Const. amend. IV, including searches of
students by public school officials, T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337. Ordinarily, to be legal,
a warrantless search must be based on "probable cause" to believe that a violation
of the law has occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982).

[13 However, in the school context, to balance "the privacy interests of
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators ... to
maintain order," a search's legality hinges not on probable cause, but "simply on
the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
341. Specifically, a school search is only reasonable if it is (1) "justified at its
inception," and (2) "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place." Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
"Under ordinary circumstances," a school search is "'justified at its inception'
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of
the school." Id. at 341-42.

114 We first applied T.L.O.'s two-part test in People in Interest of P.E.A., 754 P.2d
382, 386 (Colo. 1988), which concerned the search of a student's car on school
grounds. There, we unequivocally concluded that reasonable suspicion applied

<!-- PageBreak -->

when analyzing the reasonableness of a school search under T.L.O. P.E.A.,
754 P.2d at 388-89. Although we acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court in
T.L.O. did not expressly indicate "whether particularized suspicion is an essential
element of the T.L.O. standard of reasonableness," we concluded that the
reasonable suspicion standard set forth in People v. Wells, 676 P.2d 698, 701 (Colo.
1984), "applie[d] under the facts" of P.E.A. P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 388-89. Wells
instructs courts to assess whether the "specific and articulable facts" and the
"rational inferences from [those] facts" objectively created reasonable suspicion.
676 P.2d at 701. Applying Wells, we held that the search was "justified at its
inception" because the circumstances "establishe[d] the articulable facts and
concomitant rational inferences necessary to create a reasonable suspicion that
P.E.A. possessed drugs or other contraband." P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 389.

115 We later addressed another school search in People in Interest of J.G., 2024 CO
16, 1 1, 545 P.3d 954, 958, where a student was subjected to daily searches per a
safety plan that went into effect after he was adjudicated delinquent for various
firearms-related crimes. We determined that the search was "justified at its
inception" under T.L.O., even in the absence of "individualized suspicion,"
because the unique circumstances of that case further diminished the student's
expectation of privacy. J.G., 11 24, 27, 545 P.3d at 961. Specifically, we found that
J.G. should not have "expect[ed] privacy in a backpack he brought to school"

<!-- PageBreak -->

because he was subject to daily searches and, in fact, had previously complied with
such searches. Id. at | 26, 545 P.3d at 961.

116 The People seem to analogize the safety plan of J.G. to the "unique
circumstances of the Safe2Tell program" - particularly the fact that the program is
"premised on anonymity." Accordingly, the People suggest that when a school
search stems from a Safe2Tell tip, courts should require something less than the
reasonable suspicion standard required for a Terry stop. But J.G. does not dilute
our general requirement of reasonable suspicion for school searches. In J.G., the
student had a particular reason to have a diminished expectation of privacy. Id.
The same is not true here. The mere existence of the Safe2Tell program did not
further diminish T.J.W.'s expectation of privacy. Nor are we persuaded by the
People's arguments that this situation otherwise requires us to amend this
standard to account for the "danger" posed by marijuana use in schools.4

4 The People imagine a scenario involving guns rather than marijuana. See In re
K.J., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380, 388-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (deeming a tip reliable but
nonetheless remarking that the search would have been reasonable regardless
given "the 'extraordinary dangers' presented by the possibility that a student was
brandishing a handgun at school" (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000))).
This analogy is inapt - the possession or use of marijuana in schools has not been
treated as an "extraordinary danger" that would justify further erosion of
students' legitimate expectations of privacy. We thus express no opinion on
whether a tip involving guns or other drugs would implicate a different standard.

<!-- PageBreak -->

Accordingly, courts should apply a reasonable suspicion standard for determining
whether a school search is reasonable under T.L.O.

## 2. Reliability of Anonymous Tips

117 When the grounds for a search are based in whole or in part on an
informant's tip, courts must assess the tip's reliability. See, e.g., Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990). This totality of the circumstances analysis looks to the
tip's "indicia of reliability" to ascertain whether it adequately establishes the
informant's "veracity" and "basis of knowledge." Id. at 328-29 (first quoting
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972); and then quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).

118 Generally, an anonymous tip is less reliable than a tip from an identified
informant, in part because anonymous tips "seldom demonstrate[] the informant's
basis of knowledge or veracity." Id. at 329 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 237). However,
under certain circumstances even anonymous tips can demonstrate "sufficient
indicia of reliability" to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 327. For
instance, an anonymous tip can be "sufficiently corroborated" by officer
observations so as to "impart[] some degree of reliability." Id. at 331-32; see also
Dacus, 1 32, 559 P.3d at 204 (observing that a "truly anonymous" tip can support
a finding of reasonable suspicion "'if it contains specific details corroborated by
police observation"" (quoting People v. Martinez, 200 P.3d 1053, 1058 (Colo. 2009))).

<!-- PageBreak -->

Such corroboration allows investigating officers to assess the tipster's veracity and
basis of knowledge in part because an "informant who is proved to tell the truth
about some things is more likely to tell the truth about other things." Navarette v.
California, 572 U.S. 393, 398 (2014); see also White, 496 U.S. at 332 ("When significant
aspects of the caller's predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not
only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well
enough to justify the stop.").

119 In Dacus, we identified three forms of anonymous tips, each with varying
levels of reliability: (1) a tip from an unidentified "citizen informant"; (2) a tip from
an informant who makes "first-hand, contemporaneous observations and likely is
not affiliated with the alleged criminal activity"; and (3) a "truly anonymous" tip.
TT 30-31, 559 P.3d at 203-04.

120 We explained that tips from identified citizen informants can alone create
reasonable suspicion because such informants, having "no motive but public
service" and no "expectation of payment," nonetheless identify themselves and
"volunteer[] information to the police," meaning they have "inherent credibility."
Id. at [ 27, 559 P.3d at 203 (quoting People v. Saars, 584 P.2d 622, 626 (Colo. 1978)).
We recognized that this logic extends to unidentified citizen informants, as they are
similarly less likely to "fabricate information in return for immunity or other
compensation." Id. at [ 30, 559 P.3d at 204 (quoting Martinez, 200 P.3d at 1057).

<!-- PageBreak -->

121 Even if an anonymous tip does not indicate that it came from a citizen
informant, it can still create reasonable suspicion, on its own, if it demonstrates
that the tipster (1) "made first-hand, contemporaneous observations," and
(2) "likely is not affiliated with the alleged criminal activity." Id.

122 If the tip does not provide even this information, it may be "truly
anonymous." Id. at [ 31, 559 P.3d at 204. "[T]ruly anonymous" tips are those
where "(1) the caller does not provide their name and has no known prior record
of providing information, (2) the circumstances do not suggest that the caller was
a citizen informant, and (3) the information provided is insufficient to show that
the caller was an unaffiliated bystander contemporaneously witnessing criminal
activity." Id. Such a tip "does not provide the police with a way to assess the
caller's veracity or basis of knowledge." Id. Consequently, "without more" -such
as "specific details corroborated by police observation" - a truly anonymous tip
is "insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion." Id. at [1] 31-32, 559 P.3d at 204
(quoting Martinez, 200 P.3d at 1058).

## C. The Safe2Tell Report Here Supports a Finding of Reasonable Suspicion

123 The question here is whether Bowman, in light of the Safe2Tell tip and his
own investigation, had reasonable suspicion to search T.J.W.'s backpack-i.e.,
whether he had sufficient "articulable facts and concomitant rational inferences"
to suspect criminal activity or a violation of school policy. P.E.A., 754 P.2d at

<!-- PageBreak -->

388-89. As we explained above, an informant's tip may support a finding of
reasonable suspicion so long as its "indicia of reliability" supports the tipster's
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge." White, 496 U.S. 328-29 (first quoting Adams,
407 U.S. at 147; and then quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). And even a "truly
anonymous" tip may provide reasonable suspicion so long as it is supported by
something more, like independent corroboration. Dacus, T1 31-32, 559 P.3d at
204.

T24 First, it is well established that the currentness, or freshness, of the
information in a tip is highly relevant to its reliability. See, e.g., People v. Miller,
75 P.3d 1108, 1113 (Colo. 2003). A fresh, rather than stale, tip is one that is reported
in close proximity to the time of the alleged events and is more reliable in part
because it "negate[s] the likelihood of deliberate .. . misrepresentation." Navarette,
572 U.S. at 399-400 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 803(1) advisory committee's note to 1972
proposed rules). In People in Interest of C.C-S., 2021 COA 127, 11 4-5, 28, 503 P.3d
152, 155, 159, a division of the court of appeals found that information in a tip that
described a month-old Snapchat video "was deficient, in large part, because it was
stale." In contrast, the information in the tip here was fresh, as Bowman received
it only forty-five minutes after the alleged events occurred.

<!-- PageBreak -->

125 Second, even if this tip were "truly anonymous" under Dacus, Bowman's
additional corroboration sufficiently bolstered its reliability.5 Here, the tipster
provided numerous details: the student's name ("T.J."); where the student was
when the alleged conduct occurred (in Ms. Betts's biology class at approximately
12:30 p.m.); and a description of what "T.J." looked like (male, lean, and tall with
dirty blonde hair). Bowman's corroboration of these details before the search
established that the tipster had some basis of knowledge and partially confirmed
the tipster's veracity. See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 398 ("[A]n informant who is proved
to tell the truth about some things is more likely to tell the truth about other
things . .. . ").

126 T.J.W. maintains that the actions Bowman took to verify the tip's details
were insufficient to serve as corroboration because he only verified noncriminal
activity. We are not persuaded.

[27 It is true that corroboration of criminal activity is one way to enhance the
reliability of a tip. See Martinez, 200 P.3d at 1058 ("Even if insufficiently detailed,

5 The People ask us to overrule C.C-S., where a division of the court of appeals
observed that "the anonymity of tips received by the Safe2Tell program does not
ensure, without more, that such tips will provide reasonable suspicion as required
by the Fourth Amendment." [ 26, 503 P.3d at 158. Because we determine that the
details of this tip, combined with Bowman's subsequent corroboration, satisfied
reasonable suspicion, we need not address whether it is necessary to overrule
C.C-S.

<!-- PageBreak -->

a tip may be adequately corroborated if police directly observe the criminal
activity alleged."). However, no authority cited by T.J.W. establishes that such
corroboration must be of criminal activity. Instead, any kind of corroboration of
the information in the tip, whether of criminal conduct or otherwise, can bolster
the reliability of an anonymous tip because it allows officers to confirm a tipster's
basis of knowledge and veracity. See, e.g., Navarette, 572 U.S. at 398.

[28 Bowman's corroboration did just that. First, Bowman only knew one "T.J."
at Chaparral High School, T.J.W. Second, Bowman corroborated the tip's
description of T.J.W.'s precise location-Ms. Betts's biology class-and that he
likely was at that location at the time alleged in the tip, 12:30 p.m. Third, T.J.W.
matched the detailed description of "T.J." in the tip-male, lean, and tall, with
dirty blonde hair. All told, we conclude that the corroborated details of the
Safe2Tell report were sufficient to demonstrate the tipster's veracity and basis of
knowledge of T.J.W.'s activities. See White, 496 U.S. at 328-29.

129 To reiterate, the Safe2Tell report at issue here was fresh, received only
forty-five minutes after the alleged events, and provided detailed information into
the suspect's identity and whereabouts during the time of the alleged criminal
activity, much of which Bowman corroborated before he conducted the search.
Thus, we hold that the search of T.J.W.'s backpack was "justified at its inception"

<!-- PageBreak -->

because the anonymous Safe2Tell tip, combined with Bowman's independent
corroboration, supported a finding of reasonable suspicion.

## III. Conclusion

130 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's suppression order
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.