26CO66, 26SA142 People v. Vanpelt, Justin

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The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
October 12, 2026

# 2026 CO 66

# No. 26SA142, People v. Vanpelt-Suppression of Evidence- Voluntary Statements.

The supreme court holds that the district court erred when it suppressed
evidence of the gun taken from Vanpelt prior to his arrest. In coming to this
conclusion, the supreme court holds that the officers had reasonable suspicion that
Vanpelt had committed the crime of driving under the influence and did not
violate the Fourth Amendment or the Colorado Constitution when the officers
seized Vanpelt's firearm while he was unconscious out of concern for officer
safety. The supreme court further holds that Vanpelt's statements to the officers
were voluntary because the officers' conduct did not overbear Vanpelt's will. The
supreme court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the issue of the precluded
in-court identification because Vanpelt did not properly raise this issue.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 66

Supreme Court Case No. 26SA142
Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court
Larimer County District Court Case No. 24CR1075
Honorable Sarah B. Cure, Judge

Plaintiff-Appellant:
The People of the State of Colorado,

V.
Defendant-Appellee:
Justin Winter Vanpelt.

Order Reversed in Part and Appeal Dismissed in Part
en banc
October 12, 2026

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant:

Gordon P. Mclaughlin, District Attorney, Eighth Judicial District

Russell B. Connelly, Deputy District Attorney

Fort Collins, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee:

Megan A. Ring, Public Defender

Matthew Morriss, Deputy Public Defender

Fort Collins, Colorado

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JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

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JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[1 The People bring this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's
suppression of certain evidence prior to Justin Winter Vanpelt's trial for two
separate shooting incidents that occurred after he fled from the police. The People
first challenge the court's suppression of evidence of a firearm that police seized
from Vanpelt prior to his arrest. The People also challenge the district court's
order precluding a potential in-court identification by a witness at trial. Finally,
while the People concede that Vanpelt was not properly advised of his Miranda
rights during a custodial interrogation, they challenge the district court's finding
that Vanpelt's statements were involuntary.

12 To begin, we decline to address the People's challenge regarding the
potential identification as it is not reviewable under C.A.R. 4.1(a). As to the issues
properly before us, we hold that the district court erred by suppressing evidence
of the firearm because officers seized the firearm for their safety and thus did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. We further hold that Vanpelt's statements during
the interrogation were voluntary because officers' conduct did not overbear
Vanpelt's will.

T3
Thus, we reverse the district court's suppression of the firearm, reverse the
court's determination that Vanpelt's statements during the interrogation were
involuntary, and dismiss the People's appeal as to the identification issue.

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## I. Facts and Procedural History1

14 On the afternoon of July 21, 2024, officers pulled over a Toyota Sequoia with
no license plates and a mismatched hood and "rear tailgate" near a gas station in
Loveland, Colorado. As one of the officers exited his vehicle, the Sequoia drove
off. A Jeep Wrangler caught up with the Sequoia, and the Jeep's driver took
pictures of the Sequoia's driver. The driver of the Sequoia then fired a handgun at
the Jeep, with the bullet striking the Jeep's front bumper.

15
Less than an hour later, another shooting involving a vehicle occurred in the
area: Someone fired a handgun at a Ford Explorer, striking its rear right tire. The
driver of the Ford Explorer, Lance Black, reported the incident to Dacono police,
describing the vehicle as a silver Toyota Land Cruiser or 4Runner with no license
plates; he also described the driver.

16 Loveland police identified Vanpelt as the suspect in the first incident, and a
warrant was issued for his arrest. Following communications with Dacono police,
Loveland police suspected that Vanpelt was the individual involved in the second
incident with Black.

1 We rely on the district court's order and other parts of the record, as necessary,
such as testimony at the motions hearing. Vanpelt does not contest these facts.

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17
Three days after these incidents, Loveland police asked Black to participate
in a photo array, where he identified Vanpelt. Two days later, Black participated
in a second photo array with Dacono police, where he again identified Vanpelt.

18
That same day, officers conducted a welfare check in response to a report of
a man slumped over his motorcycle in a parking lot. Arriving at the scene, officers
found Vanpelt unconscious on his motorcycle, with his hands on the handlebars
and his head hanging down. They saw a firearm holstered on his leg. Officers
approached and removed the firearm, waking Vanpelt. They then transported
him to the Las Animas County Jail, where officers identified him as Vanpelt and
discovered an active warrant for his arrest.2

19
After Vanpelt's arrest, Loveland detectives interviewed him at the Las
Animas County Jail. The ensuing interview lasted around seventy-five minutes,
during which Vanpelt made several inculpatory statements and wrote a letter of
apology to the victims of the Loveland shooting.

110 The People charged Vanpelt with attempted first degree murder, vehicular
eluding, two counts of illegal discharge of a firearm, possession of a weapon by a
previous offender, and three crime of violence sentence enhancers. Vanpelt
pleaded not guilty and, as relevant here, moved to suppress the following

2 The record does not indicate why Vanpelt was ultimately apprehended.

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evidence: (1) the seized gun, arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
contact him or probable cause to seize his firearm; (2) Black's out-of-court
identifications of him and any subsequent in-court identification, arguing that this
was or would be the result of impermissibly suggestive photo arrays; and
(3) Vanpelt's statements to law enforcement during his interrogation at the Las
Animas County Jail, arguing that these statements were made in violation of
Miranda and his other constitutional rights.

111 After a suppression hearing, the district court (1) suppressed evidence of the
gun; (2) declined to suppress Black's identification at the first photo array, but
agreed that Black's out-of-court identification at the second photo array should not
be admitted, and otherwise prohibited any in-court identification by Black; and
(3) suppressed Vanpelt's statements made to law enforcement during the
interrogation, finding them to be involuntary.

[12 The People filed this interlocutory appeal.

## II. Analysis

T13
The People now argue that the district court erred in (1) suppressing
evidence of the gun taken from Vanpelt when he was arrested, (2) precluding
Black's in-court identification of Vanpelt, and (3) finding that Vanpelt's statements
to police officers and the letter he wrote were involuntary. We first address our

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jurisdiction, then our standard of review, and then we take up two of the three
issues raised by Vanpelt.

## A. Jurisdiction

114 Under C.A.R. 4.1(a), we may consider an interlocutory appeal by the People
to review three types of rulings adverse to the prosecution: "(1) the suppression of
evidence obtained via an unlawful search and seizure pursuant to Crim. P. 41(e);
(2) the suppression of an involuntary confession or admission pursuant to Crim.
P. 41(g); and (3) the suppression of improperly ordered or insufficiently supported
nontestimonial identification pursuant to Crim. P. 41.1(i)." People v. Smith, 254 P.3d
1158, 1160 (Colo. 2011) (emphasis added). Crim. P. 41.1(i) provides that "[a]
person aggrieved by an order issued under [Rule 41.1] may file a motion to
suppress nontestimonial identification seized pursuant to such order and the said
motion shall be granted if there were insufficient grounds for the issuance or the
order was improperly issued." (Emphasis added.) Here, Vanpelt did not move to
suppress pursuant to Rule 41.1(i) because he was not yet "aggrieved by an order
issued under [Rule 41.1]" to obtain nontestimonial identification. As a result,
C.A.R. 4.1 does not apply. Importantly, "[w]e will not exercise jurisdiction under
C.A.R. 4.1(a) outside of these 'extremely narrow' circumstances." Smith, 254 P.3d
at 1160 (quoting People v. Null, 233 P.3d 670, 674 (Colo. 2010)).

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115 Additionally, the People must certify both that the appeal is not taken for
purposes of delay and that the suppressed evidence is a substantial part of the
proof against the defendant. C.A.R. 4.1(a); § 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2025).3

116 Here, the suppression of the evidence of both the gun and the statements
made to law enforcement officers are reviewable under C.A.R. 4.1(a). But the
out-of-court and in-court identification issue is not covered. Crim. P. 41.1(c)
narrowly authorizes court orders permitting identifications when the police lack
probable cause for an arrest. Such an order was not used in this case, and Vanpelt
did not file his motion under Crim. P. 41.1(i). Therefore, C.A.R. 4.1 does not
encompass this issue. Accordingly, we dismiss the portion of the appeal
challenging the district court's order precluding an in-court identification of
Vanpelt, and we address only the matters of the suppression of the firearm and
Vanpelt's statements to officers during his interrogation.

## B. Standard of Review

117 "A trial court's order suppressing evidence presents a mixed question of fact
and law." People v. Dacus, 2024 CO 51, 1 23, 559 P.3d 198, 203. The trial court's
findings of fact "are entitled to deference," but we "may give different weight to

3 The People have so certified.

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those facts and may reach a different conclusion in light of the legal standard."
Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 190 (Colo. 2002).

118 Where, as here, the statements sought to be suppressed are recorded, and
there are no disputed facts outside of that recording, we find ourselves in "'a
similar position as the trial court'" and accordingly conduct an "independent
review of the audio or video recording to determine whether the statements were
properly suppressed." People v. Kutlak, 2016 CO 1, 1 13, 364 P.3d 199, 203 (quoting
People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Colo. 2008)).

## C. Whether the District Court Erred in Suppressing Evidence of the Gun Taken from Vanpelt Prior to His Arrest

### 1. Additional Facts

119 Vanpelt's arrest stemmed from a phone call reporting that a man was
slumped over a motorcycle in a parking lot. When Officer Ellis arrived, he saw
Vanpelt unconscious on his motorcycle, with his hands on the handlebars and his
head hanging between his arms. Officer Ellis suspected that Vanpelt was under
the influence of alcohol or drugs or otherwise experiencing a medical episode
because it did not look like he was intentionally asleep. In particular, Officer Ellis
testified that, in his experience, those who fall asleep intentionally "generally find
a position of comfort" such as "rolling up ... a sweater" or "dismounting the
motorcycle."

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120 As officers approached, they observed that Vanpelt had a firearm holstered
to his leg. Officer Gutierrez removed the firearm because the officers were unsure
what Vanpelt's state of mind would be when he awoke, especially given his
potential intoxication. Vanpelt woke up when the gun was removed. After
speaking with Vanpelt, officers transported him to the Las Animas County Jail.
121 Vanpelt later moved to suppress evidence of the gun, arguing that it was
the fruit of an illegal seizure.4 The district court granted Vanpelt's motion.
Although the court found that the officers had grounds to approach Vanpelt
because they were conducting a welfare check, it further found that the officers
had no grounds to search Vanpelt or seize his firearm because they had no
reasonable suspicion of a crime. The court noted that although Officer Ellis
suspected that Vanpelt might have been intoxicated, Officer Ellis also admitted
that Vanpelt "may just be asleep" and that "there were no signs of use of drugs or
alcohol."5

4 The People represent that Vanpelt's gun was matched to the projectile recovered
from the bumper of the first victim's vehicle, the Jeep, in Loveland.

5 The court also found that the seizure was not justified by a "community
caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement because
officers did not act per a specific policy authorizing "disarming an otherwise
law-abiding individual." However, the People did not raise this argument, and
the Supreme Court rejected a specific community caretaking exception to the
warrant requirement in Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 198 (2021).

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### 2. Analysis

122 Both the United States and Colorado Constitutions protect individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. While "police must, whenever practicable,
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures" with a warrant, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), there are certain exceptions to the warrant requirement,
see People v. Brunsting, 2013 CO 55, 1 19, 307 P.3d 1073, 1078-79. As relevant here,
if officers have reasonable suspicion of a crime, they may conduct an investigatory
stop, during which they can carry out a protective search and remove any
weapons so long as they reasonably suspect that their safety requires it. People v.
Martinez, 801 P.2d 542, 544 (Colo. 1990) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-31). To
determine whether officers had reasonable suspicion, courts assess the "specific
and articulable facts" and the "rational inferences from [those] facts." People v.
Wells, 676 P.2d 698, 701 (Colo. 1984) (quoting People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272, 1274
(Colo. 1983)).

123 Here, the "specific and articulable facts" - Vanpelt's unusual slumped-over
appearance on his motorcycle-and the "rational inferences from [those]
facts" -that Vanpelt was intoxicated on a vehicle-supported reasonable

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suspicion of driving under the influence.6 Additionally, the officers' concern for
their safety was reasonable, justifying their seizure of Vanpelt's firearm. The
officers faced an armed, unconscious, and thus unpredictable individual. It was
reasonable for them to fear that he might wake and use his firearm in a startled
state.

124 Thus, we hold that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the
Colorado Constitution by seizing Vanpelt's firearm for officer safety.7 We
accordingly reverse the district court's suppression of evidence of the firearm.

## D. Whether the District Court Erred in Finding that Vanpelt's Statements and the Letter He Wrote Were Involuntary

## 1. Additional Facts

125 Following Vanpelt's arrest, Sergeant Cortina and Detective Mu interviewed
Vanpelt in an interrogation room while he was in custody at the Las Animas
County Jail. The interview lasted approximately seventy-five minutes. At the

6 While it is true, as the district court noted, that Vanpelt could have just been asleep
or otherwise experiencing a medical episode, reasonable suspicion "may exist
even where innocent explanations are offered." People v. Reyes-Valenzuela,
2017 CO 31, 1 14, 392 P.3d 520, 523 (quoting People v. Castaneda, 249 P.3d 1119, 1122
(Colo. 2011)).

7 Below, Vanpelt argued that it was problematic for this initial temporary seizure
of his firearm to convert into a permanent one after his arrest. But because the
district court determined that the initial seizure was improper, it did not reach this
issue. We thus limit our analysis to the initial seizure.

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beginning of the interview, Sergeant Cortina introduced himself and Detective Mu
and gave the following Miranda advisement:

You do have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will
be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to the
presence of an attorney, to have that attorney present prior to any
questioning, if you so desire. If you cannot afford to hire an attorney,
one will be appointed to you, free, by the court, prior to any
questioning.

Vanpelt then confirmed that he understood these rights and was willing to waive
them to speak with officers.

126 About ten minutes into the interview, Sergeant Cortina began to ask about
Vanpelt's involvement in the Loveland shooting:

Cortina:
Are you that person who is randomly shooting at
people ?-

Vanpelt:
No-

....

Cortina:
We weren't there, right? But we know you were
there .... I want to show you a picture . . .. That's
you driving with a cigarette in your
mouth .... That was the picture that the lady in
the car with her husband, after the police officer
tried to stop you, they decided to follow
you ... and evidently, they took a picture of you
and then . . . you popped a round off at them and
that's what we don't understand. Is it because
they took a picture of you? Or because they pissed
you off because they were following you, or
something else that we're not even aware
of? ... Nobody is hurt, I want you to know that,

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nobody got shot, okay, so I think that's important for you to know -

Vanpelt:

Oh absolutely, that changes the whole-

Cortina:

It does. The bullet went into their bumper, just so you know that . ... But we did recover that bullet.

Vanpelt:

And I got attempted murder for that?

Cortina:

Well, and that's what I need to know is, did they -

Vanpelt:

And that can't change now, can it?

Cortina:

Absolutely it can change. That just depends on what your theory and what your story is as to why

this occurred. What provoked you to actually, "I'm going to take a shot at this person?" ...

Vanpelt:

I know you gave me your word to tell the truth and everything ... and I so appreciate that and I will too, but my reluctance is this right now . . . because this could possibly be the rest of my life .... I would love to just ... tell you everything right now, but I don't want to f ***** g incriminate myself -

127 Sergeant Cortina then urged Vanpelt to take accountability, suggesting that
doing so would look good in front of a judge, at which point Vanpelt confessed:

Cortina:

[Y]ou know as well as I do, a judge looks at a person a lot differently who stands up and takes responsibility for their actions, than not .... This is a no-brainer .... In this case, you know, it's not the best scenario for you. But, I'm just trying to figure out, did they threaten you, these people?

Vanpelt:

Uh yeah, actually, that really is what happened .... But I never, I never fired at

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them .... It was supposed to be a "leave me alone" type thing. It scared me . .. .

Cortina:

But you fired at their car?

Vanpelt:

Yeah .... It was dumb as hell .... It was, it was very, very f ***** g irresponsible .... But I just

wanted to be left alone .... It's just 'cause I was having a bad day fighting with my girl .... She gets me so irritated .... I'm the one that needs to control my actions, you know?

28 Later in the interview, the following exchange occurred in which Vanpelt
made incriminating statements:

Cortina:

Was this the first time you've ever done anything like this?

Vanpelt:

Yeah absolutely, absolutely.

Cortina:

Um, are you sorry for it?

Vanpelt:

Oh man, you have no idea.

.... Cortina: ....

So, should they be worried that you do know who they are and that you are going to be going after them?

Vanpelt:

No, not at all ... . I thought about trying to find out who they were and writing a letter, calling or something, just saying, like, I apologize .. . .

.... Cortina:

You know what though, you know what I think I can do for you ?... [Y]ou mentioned it yourself .... If you want to write them a letter apologizing to make them feel better . . . , I'll give you that opportunity, and I will make sure that

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they get that letter .... They're scared to death,
dude-

Vanpelt:

Yeah, .... I'll do that immediately . . . .

129
After some back and forth, where Vanpelt hesitated to respond to Sergeant
Cortina's questions, Sergeant Cortina renewed his suggestion that Vanpelt write
an apology letter to the Loveland victims.

Cortina:

Why don't we do this, okay? ... We'll give you a piece of paper ... and then we'll see if we can get those handcuffs off you. If you want to write an apology or something to them to let them know that they don't have to sleep with one eye open, that their children are safe, that you're not going to be coming to their house or anything of that nature, I think that will go a long way. I would appreciate that -

Vanpelt:

Yeah, me too.

Cortina:

And I think that would be very suggestive [sic] for you.

Vanpelt:

It's a confession too.

Cortina:

Well, we've already spoken, we're past that kind of thing. This is about being remorseful, bro.

.... Vanpelt:

Will you come to court with me or talk to that judge personally?

Cortina:

I will be there, absolutely.

Vanpelt:

And, I mean, if you guys agree to that, that you would come and, you know, you know, speak on my behalf -if you feel like I deserve it . .. . If you

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feel like I'm just a piece of s ** t running around shooting at people-

Cortina:

I don't feel that, and I don't know you bro, and I don't have anything against you. And I can tell

you this. There's no secrets here. This is a jail.

Look, there's a camera. Everything's recorded in here .... But yeah, absolutely we'll be in court, absolutely .... And what you say and how you're presenting yourself, it is all going to be very documented .... I mean, it's there, you can't edit that, you know.

(Emphases added.)

130 After a bit of further questioning, the officers presented Vanpelt with a piece
of paper to allow him to write a letter:

Cortina:

Whatever you write to them, write it from your heart, man.

Vanpelt:

So, will you be 100% honest with me now too?

Cortina:

About what?

Vanpelt:

.. . Do you think I would have been convicted if I didn't confess, if I didn't give you guys more?

Cortina:

Bro, I can tell you that I am not a judge, and I'm not a jury, right? ... What I do is I investigate, collect the facts, I give my recommendation, if you want to call it that, or my observations, to the district attorney, and I'm going to tell him, "I came in here and spoke to him and he was remorseful, he wanted to make sure the family did not fear for their safety anymore ... . " 11

(Emphases added.)

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131 Vanpelt then wrote the letter, which Sergeant Cortina read aloud for the
record. While Vanpelt did not explicitly confess in the letter, he stated that he was
"apologetic and remorseful."

132 As Vanpelt was asked to date the letter, he returned to the topic of Sergeant
Cortina's support:

Vanpelt:

Hey, you made me a promise.

Cortina:

What promise, what promise are you thinking of? -

.... Vanpelt:

If that, if that you felt like I was that person that you would go to bat for me and help me.

Cortina:

Oh dude ... all of your honesty and your candor and your ... manning up and taking responsibility for your actions, dude, that is going to be so duly noted, I'm telling you.

(Emphases added.)

133 Prior to trial, Vanpelt moved to suppress "any statements he made to law
enforcement in this case," including (as relevant here) statements he made and the
apology letter he wrote during the interrogation.

134 The district court found that the sergeant's Miranda advisement was
incomplete because it failed to inform Vanpelt that (1) he could invoke his right to
remain silent at any time; (2) he could ask for an attorney at any time; (3) his
attorney could be present during questioning; and (4) Vanpelt could stop the
interview at any time. As a result, the court determined that Vanpelt's statements

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to the Loveland police officers during the interrogation, including the apology
letter, must be suppressed.

135 Furthermore, the court ruled that Vanpelt's statements during the
interrogation were involuntary. Specifically, the court found that Sergeant Cortina
made "coercive misrepresentation[s]" -namely, "promises" that he would "talk
to the judge," give his "recommendation" to the district attorney, and "get"
Vanpelt's letter to the judge-which "materially affected [Vanpelt's] ability to
choose whether to remain silent." This, the court concluded, combined with
Vanpelt's "cognitive delay or comprehension difficulties," rendered Vanpelt's
statements involuntary.8

## 2. Analysis

136 The People concede that the statements at issue were made in violation of
Miranda and thus are inadmissible as a part of their case-in-chief. However, the

8 In its order, the district court conflated the voluntariness of Vanpelt's statements
with the voluntariness of his Miranda waiver, even though these issues are
"analytically distinct." People v. Smiley, 2023 CO 36, 1 18, 530 P.3d 639, 645
(quoting People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 n.3 (Colo. 1993)). Specifically, after
deeming the officers' Miranda warnings insufficient, the court alternatively
assumed the warnings to be adequate and addressed whether Vanpelt nonetheless
validly waived his rights. But the court then quoted the factors in Effland v. People,
240 P.3d 868, 877-78 (Colo. 2010), discussing the voluntariness of statements.
Although the basis of the court's ultimate ruling is unclear, it explicitly stated that
it found "the statement to be involuntary," so we proceed from the premise that it
deemed Vanpelt's statements involuntary.

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People argue that the statements were voluntary under the Fourteenth
Amendment, meaning they could potentially be used for impeachment. Under
Colorado law, "[n]othing in [section 16-3-406] precludes the admission of a
voluntary statement to impeach the credibility of the defendant as a witness."
§ 16-3-406(5), C.R.S. (2025).

137 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, a defendant's inculpatory
statements are inadmissible for any purpose if they were involuntary. See, e.g.,
People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230, 234 (Colo. 1982) ("A defendant's confession is
admissible in evidence only if it is voluntary. This rule has its source in the due
process clause of the United States Constitution. Our state constitution requires
no less." (citations omitted)). At a suppression hearing, if the defendant makes a
prima facie showing that their statements were involuntary, the People then bear
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements
were voluntary. People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39, 1 15, 325 P.3d 583, 587; see also
Raffaelli, 647 P.2d at 235-36.

138 Central to the voluntariness question is whether the officer's behavior
served to "overbear the defendant's will to resist," which itself involves a two-step
inquiry: (1) whether the police conduct was coercive, and (2) whether this coercive
conduct "played a significant role in inducing the statements." People v. Ramadon,
2013 CO 68, 1 20, 314 P.3d 836, 842. In answering these questions, courts evaluate

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the totality of the circumstances "surrounding and inhering in the interrogation,"
looking not only at the "nature of the police conduct" but also at the "defendant's
ability to resist coercive pressures." Id. This analysis is aided by a nonexhaustive
list of factors:

(1) "whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and
was aware of his situation";

(2) "whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation
and whether the defendant understood and waived his Miranda
rights";

(3) "whether the defendant had the opportunity to confer with
counsel or anyone else prior to the interrogation";

(4) "whether the challenged statement was made during the course of
an interrogation or instead was volunteered";

(5) "whether any overt or implied threat or promise was directed to
the defendant";

(6) "the method and style employed by the interrogator in
questioning the defendant and the length and place of the
interrogation"; and

(7) "the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately prior
to and during the interrogation, as well as his educational
background, employment status, and prior experience with law
enforcement and the criminal justice system."

People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo. 1991); see also Ramadon, 1 20, 314 P.3d
at 842 (quoting People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216, 1222-23 (Colo. 2001) (dividing the
seven Gennings factors into thirteen)).

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139 It is undisputed that (1) Vanpelt was in custody; (2) the officers' Miranda
warnings were inadequate, meaning any waiver was invalid; (3) Vanpelt did not
have the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else before the
interrogation; and (4) the statements at issue were made during the course of the
interrogation. Thus, the first four Gennings factors weigh toward involuntariness.
140 However, the fifth Gennings factor-whether police made "any overt or
implied threat or promise," 808 P.2d at 844-weighs strongly in favor of
voluntariness. The district court characterized Sergeant Cortina's responses to
Vanpelt's plea for the officers to speak with the judge to constitute not only
promises but "a coercive misrepresentation." We disagree. Contrary to the
district court's findings, Sergeant Cortina did not promise to speak to the judge; he
simply confirmed that he would be in court. Similarly, although Sergeant Cortina
indicated that he would deliver Vanpelt's apology letter to the victims, he said
nothing about giving it to the judge. And while Sergeant Cortina stated that he
would give his "recommendation" (which he quickly qualified as his
"observations") to the district attorney, his remarks did not "impliedly promise
leniency," People v. Torres, 2026 CO 15, 1 46, 584 P.3d 578, 589, nor immunity, see
McIntyre, 1 34, 325 P.3d at 591.9

9 Even if we concluded that this were coercive, it cannot be applied retroactively;
a promise has to actually induce the statements made, and most of the inculpatory

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141 Additionally, the sixth Gennings factor - addressing "the method and style"
of the interrogator and "the length and place of the interrogation," 808 P.2d at
844- militates against finding Vanpelt's statements to be involuntary. Sergeant
Cortina did not badger Vanpelt; instead, as the district court observed, he used a
"conversational tone" and exhibited a "friendly demeanor." And while Sergeant
Cortina's cordial posture, along with his implication that Vanpelt taking
accountability would look favorable, may have been designed to keep Vanpelt
talking, these tactics are well within the bounds of appropriate police conduct. See
Torres, TT 54-55, 584 P.3d at 590 (noting that statements encouraging the suspect
to be truthful are "well-established ... as noncoercive conduct" (omission in
original) (quoting People v. Nkongolo, 2025 CO 20, 1 30, 579 P.3d 83, 90)); People v.
Smiley, 2023 CO 36, 1 26, 530 P.3d 639, 646 (observing that "courts have typically
held that officers don't offend the Constitution ... by attempting to create a false
camaraderie with the suspect"); see also People v. Zadran, 2013 CO 69M, T1 15-17,
314 P.3d 830, 834-35 (concluding that stating "I think it would be in your best
interest to talk to me" was a "generic statement about the benefits of cooperating
with the police" that did not "amount to coercion constituting a due process
violation"). Furthermore, while the interrogation lasted seventy-five minutes, this

statements that Vanpelt made during the interrogation were offered before any of
Sergeant Cortina's "promises" here.

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length (coupled with the investigators' approach) is insufficient to render
Vanpelt's statements involuntary. Compare People v. Liggett, 2014 CO 72, 1 30, 334
P.3d 231, 239 (holding that the defendant's statements were voluntary despite a
five and a half hours long interrogation because the investigators did not insult
the defendant, use a derogatory tone, nor engage in coercive conduct), with
Ramadon, TT 25-26, 28, 314 P.3d at 844 (concluding that the defendant's statements
made after fifty-four minutes of interrogation were involuntary because the
interrogator's "invocation of violence" and "invocation of deportation [were]
coercive").

142 Moreover, the bulk of Vanpelt's inculpatory statements took place during
the first half of the interview, mitigating any concern that the length of the
interview coerced Vanpelt's statements.

143 Finally, the last Gennings factor-which considers Vanpelt's "mental and
physical condition" and his "prior experience with law enforcement and the
criminal justice system," 808 P.2d at 84410- also weighs toward finding Vanpelt's
statements to be voluntary. The district court expressed concern over Vanpelt's
mental status-it noted that he "mutters, changes topics, and has trouble

10 This factor also contemplates educational background and employment status,
see Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844, but the district court found that it lacked this
information.

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focusing" -and inferred from this "some cognitive delay" or "comprehension
difficulties." While exploitation of a defendant's "confused mental state," People v.
Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 212 (Colo. 1998), or otherwise "fragile mental and emotional
condition," People v. McIntyre, 789 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Colo. 1990), can suggest
involuntariness, the record does not support such a finding here. In fact, much of
the interview points toward Vanpelt's mental clarity: He was responsive to officer
questions and wary of Sergeant Cortina's attempts to extract a confession from
him.

144 Additionally, the district court found that Vanpelt has "an extensive
criminal history, spanning over [twenty] years." The district court deemed this
troubling because Vanpelt nonetheless "displayed almost no understanding of
how the legal system operates." However, such history weighs in favor of
voluntariness, as it speaks to a defendant's experience in exercising his rights and
resisting coercive pressures. In other words, Vanpelt's extensive background with
law enforcement is evidence of his knowledge of the criminal justice system. In
fact, Vanpelt demonstrated this experience in the interview itself, repeatedly
expressing a reluctance to "incriminate myself" and even stating, "what I've seen
in the past is that when they're really wanting to question you. .. it's
because ... they don't have much of a case."

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145 All told, although Vanpelt was in custody, did not receive proper Miranda
warnings, and lacked the opportunity to confer with counsel, the police did not
threaten him, Sergeant Cortina's method of interrogation was proper, Vanpelt was
mentally alert, and he had extensive experience with the criminal justice system.
"[T]he fulcrum of the voluntariness question is whether the law enforcement
officer overbore the defendant's will." McIntyre, 1 32, 325 P.3d at 590. Here, the
totality of the circumstances does not suggest this to be the case.

146 We thus hold that Vanpelt's statements during the interrogation, including
the written apology letter, were voluntary. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court's determination that those statements were involuntary.

## III. Conclusion

147 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's order suppressing
evidence of the firearm, reverse the court's finding that Vanpelt's statements
during the interrogation were involuntary, and dismiss the People's appeal as to
the identification issue.