Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.

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Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
STUART HANKE v. ELECTRIC
BOAT CORPORATION
(AC 48297)
Suarez, Clark and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant,
rendered following its grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment on the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged, inter alia, employment
discrimination based on disability. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the
court improperly concluded that he failed to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination as to any of the three counts of his complaint. Held:
The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment on the plaintiff’s claim of disability discrimination, as there was no
genuine issue of material fact that, at the time the plaintiff’s employment
was terminated, he was not qualified to perform the essential functions
of his position as an engineering supervisor with or without a reasonable
accommodation.
The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the defendant failed to
provide him with a reasonable accommodation for his disability, as the trial
court correctly determined that he failed to initiate the required interactive
process with the defendant to request such an accommodation and had failed
to request any such accommodation.
The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on
the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant retaliated against him for requesting
a leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation for his disability, as there
was no evidence that the plaintiff had requested a reasonable accommodation.
Argued December 4, 2025—officially released April 7, 2026
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-
dant’s alleged employment discrimination, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New London, where the court, Chadwick, J.,
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
James V. Sabatini, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
Danielle Jurema Lederman, with whom, on the brief,
were Tracy Thomas Boland and Robert G. Young, pro
hac vice, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
CLARK, J. The plaintiff, Stuart Hanke, appeals from
the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in
favor of the defendant, Electric Boat Corporation, with
respect to his claims brought under the Connecticut Fair
Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes
§ 46a-51 et seq. The plaintiff’s complaint asserted three
separate counts against the defendant for violations of
CFEPA: (1) that the defendant terminated his employ-
ment on the basis of his disability; (2) that the defendant
failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his
disability; and (3) that the defendant retaliated against
him for requesting a reasonable accommodation for his
disability. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
improperly rendered summary judgment for the defen-
dant on all three counts of his complaint. Specifically, the
plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that
he failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination
on any of the three counts of his complaint because there
were no genuine issues of material fact that (1) he was
not qualified to perform the essential functions of his job
at the time his employment was terminated, (2) he failed
to request a reasonable accommodation in the form of a
request for a medical leave of absence, and (3) he failed to
demonstrate that he had engaged in a protected activity.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, gleaned from the record before
the trial court on the summary judgment motion and
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the
nonmoving party, and procedural history are relevant to
our analysis. In 2011, the defendant hired the plaintiff.
He eventually became an engineering supervisor with
the defendant, a position that he held until his employ-
ment was terminated. As an engineering supervisor, the

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
plaintiff managed a team of engineers and reported to
Steven Moffett, the manager of engineering.
In May, 2019, the plaintiff arrived late to a meeting
and was observed dozing off during that meeting by
Moffett and other employees of the defendant. Moffett
reported the incident to human resources representative
Cristine Troiano. On May 24, 2019, Moffett and Troiano
met with the plaintiff to discuss the incident. During
that meeting, the plaintiff admitted that he had been
sleeping during the prior meeting that month. He did not
disclose to Moffett or Troiano any medical condition or
request any accommodation. Instead, he attributed the
incident to ongoing family issues. The plaintiff concedes
that sleeping during work hours is a violation of the
defendant’s policy.
After the meeting with Moffett and Troiano, the defen-
dant issued the plaintiff a letter of reprimand for sleeping
at work in violation of company rules and regulations.
The reprimand included a five day suspension from work.
The plaintiff received no further discipline as a result
of the incident.1
In September, 2019, a significant number of employees
whom the plaintiff supervised announced their inten-
tion to resign, resulting in a much higher attrition rate
than that of the other teams that reported to Moffett.
The plaintiff concedes that the high attrition rate was
a cause for concern and that he discussed the attrition
problem with Moffett. Because of the high attrition
rate, Moffett interviewed members of the plaintiff’s
team and concluded that the plaintiff’s performance as
a supervisor was the cause of the high rate of attrition.
Moffett relayed his conclusions regarding the plaintiff’s
performance to Troiano. Moffett and Troiano scheduled
1 On June 21, 2019, the plaintiff was diagnosed with sleep apnea. The
plaintiff never requested an accommodation due to his sleep apnea diag-
nosis. Nor did the plaintiff request that his suspension for the sleeping
incident be rescinded or withdrawn after he had been diagnosed with
sleep apnea. Moreover, during his deposition, the plaintiff agreed that
he was deemed eligible for short-term disability benefits for stress and
anxiety but not for his sleep apnea.

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
a meeting with the plaintiff for September 20, 2019, for
the purpose of discussing with him his performance as a
supervisor and the attrition rate of his team. In advance
of the meeting, Moffett informed the plaintiff that he
would be required to attend the meeting with Moffett
and human resources staff and that, at that meeting, he
would be asked to step down from his supervisor posi-
tion into an engineering specialist role while retaining
his supervisor pay.
As a result of learning about the meeting that was to
take place on September 20, 2019, the plaintiff experi-
enced stress and anxiety. The plaintiff ultimately did
not attend the scheduled meeting on September 20,
2019, and did not return to work after that date. He
subsequently applied for short-term disability benefits
due to stress and anxiety.
The defendant uses third-party administrators to man-
age its employees’ short-term and long-term disability
benefits. The defendant uses Sedgwick to administer its
short-term disability benefits. Employees apply directly
to Sedgwick for short-term disability benefits. Sedgwick
determines eligibility and approval of short-term disabil-
ity benefits and notifies the defendant of its determina-
tion. The plaintiff’s short-term disability benefits were
initially approved through October 21, 2019, and were
extended multiple times thereafter.
During the time that the plaintiff was out of work on
short-term disability, the defendant remained in contact
with him and communicated with him about his return
to work. Troiano also contacted the plaintiff via email
to notify him of the process for requesting a leave of
absence. The plaintiff did not utilize that process and
never requested a leave of absence.
Under the defendant’s short-term and long-term
disability policy, an employee who exhausts his or her
short-term disability benefits must apply for long-term
disability benefits “[u]nless return to work is imminent
. . . based on a medically documented [return to work]

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
date . . . .” The maximum short-term disability benefit
is twenty-six weeks. The Hartford is the third-party
benefits administrator for the defendant’s long-term
disability benefits. The defendant’s policy and practice
is to administratively terminate the employment of an
employee who is approved for long-term disability. The
defendant has no power to override a determination made
by Sedgwick or The Hartford regarding an employee’s
eligibility for disability benefits. For the plaintiff to be
eligible for short-term or long-term disability benefits,
the administrator for the respective benefits program
needed to determine that he was unable to work during
the period for which he was approved for benefits.
By March 19, 2020, the plaintiff had exhausted his
twenty-six weeks of short-term disability benefits. The
plaintiff applied for long-term disability benefits and
was notified of his approval on or about April 14, 2020.
In accordance with its policy, also on or about April
14, 2020, the defendant informed the plaintiff that
his employment was to be administratively terminated
effective April 30, 2020, due to his approval for long-
term disability benefits. At no time prior to or after his
approval for long-term disability benefits and the notice
of his administrative termination did the plaintiff com-
municate to the defendant an intent to return to work or
an expected date of return. The plaintiff’s employment
was terminated on April 30, 2020. As of the date of his
termination, the plaintiff remained unable to work. In
June, 2020, the plaintiff was medically cleared to return
to work without restriction.
The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) on or about
June 12, 2020. The CHRO issued a release of jurisdic-
tion on or about May 12, 2021.2 Subsequently, on July 7,
2021, the plaintiff commenced the present action against
2 “A person alleging discriminatory work practices in violation of
CFEPA must exhaust his or her administrative remedies by filing a
complaint with the [CHRO] in accordance with General Statutes §
46a-82. Only after obtaining a release of jurisdiction from the CHRO
may that person pursue a civil action in the Superior Court.” Eldridge

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
the defendant by way of a three count complaint alleging
that the defendant had (1) discriminated against him by
terminating his employment because of his disabilities,
namely, his sleep apnea,3 stress, and anxiety, (2) failed
to provide him a reasonable accommodation in the form
of a leave of absence, and (3) retaliated against him for
requesting a reasonable accommodation in violation of
General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (1).4
On April 12, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum
of law and supporting documentation. The defendant
claimed that it was entitled to summary judgment on
all three counts of the plaintiff’s complaint because
there were no genuine issues of material fact that (1) the
plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of his
position with or without a reasonable accommodation
and that the defendant had terminated his employment
for a legitimate business reason, which was not a pretext
for discrimination; (2) the plaintiff failed to request an
accommodation and had received all of the paid disabil-
ity benefits he requested; and (3) the plaintiff did not
engage in a protected activity, and the defendant had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
v. Hospital of Central Connecticut, 230 Conn. App. 666, 668–69 n.2,
330 A.3d 604 (2025).
3 See footnote 1 of this opinion.
4 General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) provides in relevant part: “It shall be
a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (1) [f]or an
employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case
of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or
employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or
to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race,
color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital
status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental dis-
ability, intellectual disability, learning disability, physical disability,
including, but not limited to, blindness, status as a veteran or status
as a victim of domestic violence . . . .”
Although § 46a-60 (b) (1) has been amended since the time of the
allegedly discriminatory conduct in this case; see Public Acts 2022,
No. 22-82, § 10; Public Acts 2021, No. 21-69, § 1; those amendments
are not relevant to this appeal. We therefore refer in this opinion to
the current revision of § 46a-60 (b) (1).

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
his employment, which the plaintiff could not show was
pretextual. Attached to its memorandum of law were affi-
davits, excerpts from the transcripts of the depositions of
the plaintiff, Moffett, Troiano, and Patricia DeAngelis,
an employee benefits specialist with the defendant, and
other documentary evidence.
On July 29, 2024, the plaintiff filed an objection to the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, contend-
ing, in his memorandum of law in opposition, that the
defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on any
of the plaintiff’s claims because there existed genuine
issues of material fact with respect to all of the issues
raised in the defendant’s motion. The plaintiff’s objec-
tion and memorandum in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment included attached excerpts of the
transcripts from the sworn depositions of the plaintiff,
DeAngelis, Moffett, and Troiano, and additional docu-
mentary evidence.
The court, Chadwick, J., heard argument from the
parties on October 21, 2024. On November 29, 2024,
the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it
granted the defendant’s motion on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to establish that there were genuine
issues of material fact concerning any of his claims and
that the defendant therefore was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
With respect to the disability discrimination claim set
forth in count one of the plaintiff’s complaint, the trial
court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to produce
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to each of the elements of a prima facie
case. Specifically, the court determined that there was no
genuine issue of material fact “as to whether a reasonable
accommodation existed that would qualify the plaintiff
to perform his job” because, although the plaintiff had
suggested that he would have been able to return to work
after receiving an accommodation in the form of a leave
of absence, the plaintiff “left on long-term disability
without providing the defendant company any insight

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
into his projected length of recovery or completing the
defendant’s formal leave of absence procedure, even
after being informed of the need to apply.”
The trial court next concluded that the defendant was
entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s failure
to accommodate claim because the plaintiff presented no
evidence in support of his claim that he had requested a
leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation, and the
defendant therefore could not be liable for having failed
to accommodate a request that the plaintiff never made.
Lastly, with respect to the plaintiff’s retaliation claim,
the trial court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material
fact concerning whether his employment was terminated
because he had engaged in the protected activity of seek-
ing a reasonable accommodation. The court determined
that the plaintiff had produced “no evidence” supporting
his claim that he had “requested a reasonable accom-
modation . . . .” As a result, the court concluded that
the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation. Accordingly, the court rendered summary
judgment for the defendant on all three claims. This
appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as
necessary.
“We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of
review and legal principles that govern our analysis.
The standard of review of a trial court’s decision grant-
ing summary judgment is well established. Practice
Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any
other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party . . . [and] the moving party . . . has the
burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as
to all the material facts . . . . When documents submit-
ted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
to establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit
documents establishing the existence of such an issue. .
. . Once the moving party has met its burden, however,
the [nonmoving] party must present evidence that dem-
onstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.
. . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment is plenary.
. . . On appeal, we must determine whether the legal
conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and
logically correct and whether they find support in the
facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial
court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Castelino
v. Whitman, Breed, Abbott & Morgan, LLC, 233 Conn.
App. 467, 477, 342 A.3d 245, cert. denied, 353 Conn.
914, 344 A.3d 155 (2025).
“Under [CFEPA] . . . employers may not discriminate
against certain protected classes of individuals, includ-
ing those who are physically disabled.” Desrosiers v.
Diageo North America, Inc., 314 Conn. 773, 775, 105
A.3d 103 (2014). Section 46a-60 (b) provides in relevant
part: “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation
of this section . . . (1) [f]or an employer, by the employer
or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide
occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or
employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any
individual or to discriminate against any individual in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment because of the individual’s . . . present or
past . . . physical disability . . . .” “[W]e review federal
precedent concerning employment discrimination for
guidance in enforcing our own antidiscrimination stat-
utes.” Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390,
415, 944 A.2d 925 (2008).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred
in rendering summary judgment on his disability dis-
crimination claim because a genuine issue of material
fact existed with respect to whether the plaintiff was

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
qualified to perform the essential functions of his job at
the time of his termination, with the reasonable accom-
modation of a leave of absence.5 We disagree.
“The standard applicable to the plaintiff’s claim of
disability discrimination . . . is the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine6 model of analysis. . . . Under this framework,
the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case, then
the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut
the presumption of discrimination by articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employ-
ment decision. . . . Once the defendant offers a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the plaintiff has
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the proffered reason is pretextual.” (Footnote in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Castelino
v. Whitman, Breed, Abbott & Morgan, LLC, supra, 233
Conn. App. 478; see also Eldridge v. Hospital of Central
Connecticut, 230 Conn. App. 666, 673, 330 A.3d 604
(2025) (concluding that pretext model of analysis set
forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802–804, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)
(McDonnell Douglas), was appropriate standard for
evaluating disability discrimination claim because “[t]he
5 The plaintiff also claims, inter alia, that his employment was ter-
minated because of his disability and that the defendant’s “policy and
practice of automatically terminating employees as a result of long-term
disability benefits is per se discriminatory . . . .” Because we agree with
the trial court that the plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether he was qualified
to perform the essential functions of his position with or without a
reasonable accommodation at the time of his termination, we need not
address the plaintiff’s additional claims regarding the other elements of
his disability discrimination claim. See, e.g., Lassen v. Hartford, 223
Conn. App. 285, 291 n.6, 308 A.3d 564 (2024) (“[s]ummary judgment
is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists . . . with
respect to any one element that the plaintiff is required to prove in order
to prevail at trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6 See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256–58, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) (clarifying that bur-
den placed on defendant in burden shifting framework as set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–804, 93 S. Ct.
1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), is one of production, not persuasion).

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
defendant articulated . . . nondiscriminatory bases for
its termination of the plaintiff’s employment”).
“In order to establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination based on adverse employment action
under the burden shifting analysis enumerated by the
United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, [supra, 411 U.S. 802], and adopted by
[our Supreme Court] in Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 53–54, 578 A.2d
1054 (1990) . . . the complainant must prove that: (1)
[he] [was] in the protected class; (2) [he] was qualified
for the position; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) that the adverse action occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimina-
tion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v.
Hospital of Central Connecticut, supra, 230 Conn. App.
671–72. “To be a qualified individual with a disability, a
plaintiff must be able to perform the essential functions
of his job, with or without a reasonable accommodation,
at the time of the adverse employment decision.” (Empha-
sis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stubbs
v. ICare Management, LLC, 198 Conn. App. 511, 525,
233 A.3d 1170 (2020).
“Both this court and numerous federal courts have
recognized that attendance at work is a necessary job
function. An employee who is unable to come to work on
a regular basis [is] unable to satisfy any of the functions
of the job in question, much less the essential ones. . . .
[Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals] have also held that
regular and reliable attendance is a necessary element of
most jobs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barba-
bosa v. Board of Education, 189 Conn. App. 427, 438,
207 A.3d 122 (2019).
In the present case, the plaintiff does not claim that
he was able to perform the essential functions of his job
without a reasonable accommodation. Thus, to make
out a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff
was required to prove that he was able to perform the

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
essential functions of his job with a reasonable accom-
modation at the time of his termination.
The only accommodation that the plaintiff argues
is at issue in the present case is a leave of absence. “A
medical leave of absence is a recognized accommodation;
however, [t]he duty to make reasonable accommoda-
tions does not, of course, require an employer to hold
an injured employee’s position open indefinitely . . . .”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Hospital
of Central Connecticut, supra, 230 Conn. App. 676; see
also Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co. 457 F.3d 181, 186 (2d
Cir. 2006) (concluding that request for leave of absence
was not indefinite when plaintiff asked for “ ‘more time’
to get a doctor’s appointment and that it would take a
‘couple of weeks’ ”); Thomson v. Dept. of Social Services,
176 Conn. App. 122, 131, 169 A.3d 256 (concluding
that leave of absence request was not reasonable when
plaintiff stated that “she would be taking leave for over
thirty days depending on [her] lung condition,” admit-
ted in her deposition that she did not know how long she
was going to be out on leave, and submitted forms from
her physician stating that improvement was expected
“within one to two months, and additionally stated in
at least three places, that the plaintiff would be absent
[until] reevaluated” without indicating date for reevalu-
ation or return (emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 962, 172 A.3d
800 (2017).
Our review of the record reveals that the defendant
submitted evidence in support of its summary judgment
motion demonstrating that the plaintiff never requested
a leave of absence at any time prior to or at the time of
his termination, and that, when the plaintiff applied for
and received long-term disability benefits, he did not
provide the defendant with any indication of whether
or when he planned to return to work. In support of its
motion for summary judgment, the defendant submit-
ted an excerpt from the plaintiff’s deposition transcript

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
in which the plaintiff testified that he had applied for
and received short-term disability benefits until those
benefits were exhausted, and then applied for long-term
disability but that he “didn’t request accommodations”
and did not utilize the leave of absence process despite
acknowledging the fact that the defendant had asked him
when he would return to work and provided him with
information about how to apply for a leave of absence.
The plaintiff’s deposition transcript also reflects that,
when the plaintiff was informed of his approval for long-
term disability benefits on April 14, 2020, he also was
informed by the defendant that, due to the approval,
his employment would be terminated effective April
30, 2020. The defendant also submitted an affidavit
from Moffett indicating that, while the plaintiff was
receiving short-term disability benefits, Troiano and
Moffett communicated with the plaintiff regarding his
return to work. The defendant additionally submitted
an email from Troiano to the plaintiff informing him
of the steps to follow if he was interested in pursuing a
leave of absence.
Despite these communications from the defendant,
the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that, prior
to his termination, he never communicated to the defen-
dant his intent to return to work or provided any time
period by which he would return. The plaintiff further
conceded during his deposition that he was not able to
return to work on April 30, 2020, the effective date of
his termination.
In response to the evidence submitted by the defen-
dant, the plaintiff provided no evidence demonstrating
that he had applied for a leave of absence or provided the
defendant with any indication of whether or when he
would be able to return to work. Although the plaintiff
argues that his application for disability benefits was
itself a request for a leave of absence, the uncontra-
dicted evidence submitted by the defendant shows that
the long-term and short-term disability benefit applica-
tions were managed by third-party administrators and

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
that the request for a leave of absence was a different
process that the plaintiff was notified about but failed
to pursue.7 The defendant also submitted its written
policy for short-term and long-term disability, which
indicates that the application for disability was a form
of compensation for salaried employees “who want to
be paid during their absence . . . .” The plaintiff himself
acknowledged in his deposition “that a medical leave of
absence is a separate process from short-term disability”
and that he “[did not] recall going down the medical leave
of absence process.”
In support of its conclusion that the plaintiff failed to
establish that he was able to perform the essential func-
tions of his job with a reasonable accommodation at the
time his employment was terminated, the court relied on
Thomson v. Dept. of Social Services, supra, 176 Conn.
App. 122. In Thomson, the plaintiff brought an action
against her employer, alleging that the employer had
failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation
in the form of a leave of absence. Id., 127. “The plaintiff
informed the defendant that she would be taking a leave
of absence, did not provide the defendant with any time
frame for her return, and did not respond to the defen-
dant’s subsequent attempts to contact her regarding
her request for leave . . . effectively ask[ing] the defen-
dant to hold [her] position open indefinitely while [she]
attempt[ed] to recover . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 132. The trial court rendered summary
judgment for the defendant. This court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, concluding that the plaintiff
had “failed to demonstrate that she requested a reason-
able accommodation that enabled her to perform the
essential functions of her job, and, therefore the [trial]
court properly determined that as a matter of law the
plaintiff could not meet her burden of proving a prima
facie case of disability discrimination.” Id., 132–33.
7 See Judge v. Landscape Forms, Inc., 592 Fed. Appx. 403, 408 (6th Cir.
2014) (where employer used third-party company to process short-term
and long-term disability claims, employee’s “request for long-term dis-
ability benefits cannot be construed as a request for an accommodation”).

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
In the present case, the trial court concluded that the
plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Thomson, did not “establish
the second element of the prima facie case because he
could not perform the essential elements of his job with
or without a reasonable accommodation.” The plaintiff
argues that the court misapplied Thomson and main-
tains that this court’s decision in Thomson actually
supports his claim that the trial court improperly ren-
dered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
In particular, he observes that, in Thomson, this court
stated in a footnote that it agreed with the plaintiff’s
contention in that case that, for an employer to rely on
the indefinite nature of a leave request as justification
for not granting such an accommodation, an employer
should be required to demonstrate that it engaged in an
interactive process with the employee during which it
explained to the employee the difficulties caused by the
indefinite nature of the request and invited the employee
to provide an approximate return date from a health
care provider. See Thomson v. Dept. of Social Services,
supra, 176 Conn. App. 132 n.1.
The plaintiff’s reliance on Thomson is misplaced.
Although this court agreed with the plaintiff’s conten-
tion in that case that an employer must at least attempt
to engage in an interactive process with employees prior
to terminating their employment on the basis of a request
for leave for an indefinite period, the court ultimately
concluded that the employer was entitled to summary
judgment because the employer actually “did attempt
to engage in the necessary interactive process, and the
plaintiff did not respond for more than two weeks.” Id.
Here, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the
plaintiff never requested a leave of absence or gave the
defendant any indication of whether or when he would
return to work. The undisputed evidence further dem-
onstrates that the defendant in the present case, like
the employer in Thomson, attempted to engage in an
interactive process with the plaintiff, but the plaintiff
failed to communicate to the defendant whether or when
he would return to work. Thus—and contrary to the

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
plaintiff’s contention on appeal—the trial court’s deci-
sion in this case is entirely consistent with this court’s
decision in Thomson.
In sum, on the basis of our review of the record, we
conclude that the trial court correctly determined that
there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plain-
tiff was not qualified for the position with or without a
reasonable accommodation at the time his employment
was terminated. As a result, the plaintiff failed to estab-
lish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. See,
e.g., Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 Conn.
App. 589, 611 n.15, 43 A.3d 722 (“[t]o be a qualified
individual with a disability, a plaintiff must be able to
perform the essential functions of his job, with or without
a reasonable accommodation, at the time of the adverse
employment decision”), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 920, 47
A.3d 389 (2012), and cert. denied, 305 Conn. 920, 47
A.3d 389 (2012); Thomson v. Dept. of Social Services,
supra, 176 Conn. App. 132–33 (request for medical leave
of absence was not reasonable accommodation when time
period for return was not specified, and, thus, plaintiff
could not show she was qualified for position in that
she could perform essential functions of position with
or without reasonable accommodation). Accordingly,
we conclude that the court properly rendered summary
judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s
disability discrimination claim.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the trial court erred
in rendering summary judgment for the defendant on
his failure to accommodate claim because it incorrectly
concluded that there was no genuine issue of material
fact with respect to his failure to request a reasonable
accommodation in the form of a medical leave of absence.
We disagree.
“In order to survive a motion for summary judgment
on a reasonable accommodation claim, the plaintiff must
produce enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the [stat-
ute], (2) he was able to perform the essential functions
of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation,
and (3) [the defendant], despite knowing of [the plain-
tiff’s] disability, did not reasonably accommodate it.
. . . If the employee has made such a prima facie showing,
the burden shifts to the employer to show that such an
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on its
business.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., supra, 286
Conn. 415–16.
“Once a disabled individual has suggested to his
employer a reasonable accommodation, federal law
requires, and we agree, that the employer and the
employee engage in an informal, interactive process with
the qualified individual with a disability in need of the
accommodation . . . [to] identify the precise limitations
resulting from the disability and potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.
. . . In this effort, the employee must come forward with
some suggestion of accommodation, and the employer
must make a good faith effort to participate in that dis-
cussion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 416.
The trial court in the present case concluded that there
was no genuine issue of material fact “as to whether the
plaintiff initiated the interactive process to request a
reasonable accommodation” because “the plaintiff did
not request to take a leave of absence . . . .” The same
evidence that we reviewed in part I of this opinion in
concluding that there was no genuine issue of material
fact that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie
case of disability discrimination also supports the trial
court’s determination that the plaintiff did not establish
a prima facie case as to his failure to accommodate claim.
Such a claim requires a plaintiff to request a reasonable
accommodation. Having failed to demonstrate that he
requested any such accommodation, the plaintiff failed to
make out a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
of his claim that the defendant did not accommodate his
disability. Therefore, we conclude that the court properly
rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant
on the failure to accommodate claim.
III
The plaintiff’s final claim is that the trial court improp-
erly rendered summary judgment on his retaliation claim
because there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the defendant retaliated against him for request-
ing a leave of absence. We disagree.
“[R]etaliation claims are reviewed under the burden-
shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas [Corp.] [under
which] [t]he plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case of retaliation. To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, an employee must show (1) the employee was
engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware
of that activity; (3) the employee suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse employ-
ment action. . . . Once a prima facie case of retaliation
is established, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to demonstrate that a legitimate, [nondiscrimi-
natory] reason existed for its action. . . . If the employer
demonstrates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,
then [t]he burden shifts . . . back to the plaintiff to estab-
lish, through either direct or circumstantial evidence,
that the employer’s action was, in fact, motivated by
discriminatory retaliation.” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Luth v. OEM Controls, Inc.,
203 Conn. App. 673, 690, 252 A.3d 406 (2021).
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court first
concluded that the protected activity claimed by the
plaintiff was his request for a reasonable accommoda-
tion. The court then concluded that the plaintiff could
not establish a prima facie case of retaliation because
there was “no evidence to establish that the plaintiff . . .
requested a reasonable accommodation . . . .”

Hanke v. Electric Boat Corp.
The only protected activity alleged by the plaintiff on
appeal is his purported request for a reasonable accom-
modation in the form of a leave of absence. We already
have concluded in part II of this opinion, however, that
the plaintiff failed to establish that there was a genu-
ine issue of material fact concerning whether he had
requested a leave of absence as a reasonable accommoda-
tion. Having failed to do so, the plaintiff also has failed
to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether he had engaged in a protected activ-
ity. Thus—and consistent with our analysis in parts I
and II of this opinion—we conclude that the trial court
properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim because
he failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliatory
discrimination.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.