Cardona v. Padilla

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Cardona v. Padilla

PRISCILLA I. CARDONA v. RAYMOND J. PADILLA
(AC 46883)
Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff mother appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the
defendant father primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child and
ordering certain visitation for the plaintiff with the child. On appeal, the
plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in making
its custody and visitation orders. Held:

This court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court’s shared physical
custody order constituted an abuse of its discretion because the trial court
failed to credit evidence demonstrating that the defendant was unwilling to
facilitate the child’s relationship with the plaintiff, as it was not the province
of this court to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court.

The trial court abused its discretion by issuing an unbalanced visitation
order that significantly limited the plaintiff’s in-person visitation with the
child because the record did not contain any findings of the court demonstra-
ting why such a limited visitation schedule was warranted, such as a finding
of complete unfitness, and the order was inconsistent with the clear intent
of the statute (§ 46b-56 (b)), which requires that custody and visitation
orders should provide the child with the active and consistent involvement
of both parents, commensurate with their abilities and interests, and, accord-
ingly, this court remanded the case for a new hearing on visitation.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing an order pursuant to
the rule of practice (§ 25-26 (g)) requiring the parties to request leave of
the court before filing a motion for modification of custody or visitation
orders, the court having indicated that it did so in light of the various cases
and filings between the parties, its concerns about the best interest of the
child, and its observations regarding the divisive and acrimonious nature
of the parties’ behaviors.
Argued October 21, 2024—officially released February 4, 2025

Procedural History

Application for custody of the parties’ minor child,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Danbury, where the defendant
filed a cross complaint; thereafter, the matter was tried
to the court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee;
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judgment awarding the parties joint legal custody of
the minor child and primary physical custody to the
defendant and entering certain visitation orders, from
which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in
part; further proceedings.
Olivia M. Eucalitto, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion

SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Priscilla I. Cardona, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court awarding the defen-
dant, Raymond J. Padilla,1 who lives in Florida, primary
physical custody of their minor child (child) and order-
ing visitation for the plaintiff with the child. On appeal,
the plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion
in making its custody and visitation orders and by issu-
ing an order pursuant to Practice Book § 25-26 (g) when
neither party has filed excessive motions or pleadings
in this case. We agree with the plaintiff as to the court’s
visitation order and, accordingly, reverse the judgment
of the court in part and remand the case for a new
hearing on visitation.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The
parties are not married to each other and have one
minor child between them, who was born in 2019. The
plaintiff and the defendant originally lived together in
New York with the child and the parties’ other children.2
In January, 2021, however, the defendant moved to Flor-
ida with his other children while the plaintiff remained
1
The defendant did not file a brief or otherwise participate in this appeal.
As a result, on July 17, 2024, this court ordered ‘‘that the appeal shall be
considered on the basis of the [plaintiff’s] brief and the record, as defined
by Practice Book § 60-4, and oral argument, if not waived by the [plaintiff]
or the court. Pursuant to Practice Book § 70-4, oral argument by the [defen-
dant] will not be permitted.’’
2
In addition to the child, the plaintiff has one son and the defendant has
three sons from other relationships.
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in New York with the child and her son.3 The parties
then took turns visiting each other for a time before
the plaintiff, with the child and her son,4 made an
extended visit to Florida in April, 2021, and the parties
again lived together with all of their children during
that visit. The plaintiff planned on returning to New
York at the end of that summer and believed that the
defendant was going to accompany her back to New
York. On August 11, 2021, however, while the parties
were still in Florida, the defendant alleged that the
plaintiff struck him during an argument, which resulted
in the plaintiff being arrested and charged with assault
and battery in Florida.5 Later in August, 2021, the plain-
tiff left Florida with the child and her son and moved
into her mother’s house in Danbury. The parties have
not been in a romantic relationship since August, 2021.
Thereafter, the defendant commenced a custody action
in Florida regarding the child; that case was closed,
however, in June, 2023, after the court determined that
Florida was not the proper venue for the matter.
In May, 2022, the plaintiff brought the action underly-
ing this appeal and filed a custody application
requesting sole legal custody and primary physical cus-
tody of the child and child support. On September 21,
2022, the defendant filed in Connecticut an application
for an emergency ex parte order of custody. The court,
Figueroa Laskos, J., initially denied the defendant’s
application but set October 4, 2022, as the date for a
3
The plaintiff did not want to move to Florida at the time because her
son’s father did not consent to her relocating to Florida with their son.
4
The father of the plaintiff’s son consented to the plaintiff visiting Florida
with their son until the end of the summer of 2021.
5
The plaintiff denies that she struck the defendant that day. The charges
against the plaintiff ultimately were not prosecuted after she completed a
deferred prosecution agreement. Regarding the 2021 incident, we note that
the trial court in the present action found the plaintiff’s description of the
events underlying the incident to be more credible than the defendant’s
version of what had occurred.
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hearing thereon. On September 21, 2022, the defendant
also filed a cross complaint in this action seeking sole
legal and physical custody of the child. Following the
October 4, 2022 hearing, the court issued an interim
order that, inter alia, permitted the defendant to visit
with the child but did not permit him to leave the state
with the child. The court also ordered the parties to
return to court on November 30, 2022, for a continuation
of the hearing on the defendant’s application. There-
after, following the November 30, 2022 hearing, the
court issued another interim order again allowing for
parenting time between the defendant and the child.
Another hearing took place on December 19, 2022, after
which the court issued an interim order on December
20, 2022, stating: ‘‘The minor child will remain in the
care of the defendant [in Florida] until the next hearing
date. The plaintiff shall return the minor child to the
defendant no later than 5:30 p.m. today . . . .
Caseflow shall assign a hearing date.’’ Subsequently, on
April 6, 2023, the court ultimately granted the defen-
dant’s application and awarded custody of the child to
the defendant in Florida.6

A trial on the plaintiff’s custody application and the
defendant’s cross complaint was held before the court,
Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee, on August
16 and 17, 2023, during which the plaintiff and the defen-
6
In its April 6, 2023 order, the court, Figueroa Laskos, J., found ‘‘that the
defendant . . . met his burden of proof to show that the minor child [was]
in immediate present psychological harm.’’ That finding was mentioned
during the trial in the present matter on the plaintiff’s custody application
and the defendant’s cross complaint before the court, Hon. Heidi G. Wins-
low, judge trial referee. When the defendant was questioned further on
cross-examination about the basis for the April 6, 2023 order, the plaintiff’s
counsel objected, and the court sustained the objection, stating that ‘‘[t]he
findings of Judge Figueroa Laskos are not in any way binding upon this
court.’’ Ultimately, following the hearing on this matter, Judge Winslow
determined that the plaintiff is not ‘‘a physical danger to the child when the
child is in [her] . . . care.’’
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dant both testified. At the conclusion of the trial on
7

7
Prior to trial, the plaintiff and the defendant filed proposed orders regard-
ing custody and visitation. In a notice of trial compliance filed by the plaintiff
on August 11, 2023, the plaintiff set forth proposed orders that included,
inter alia:
‘‘1. The parties shall share joint legal custody of the minor child . . . .
The minor child’s primary caregivers shall be in Connecticut.
‘‘2. The minor child shall reside with the plaintiff in Connecticut.
‘‘3. The defendant shall have parenting time with the minor child as
follows, which time may be in Florida, at the defendant’s expense: (a) Martin
Luther King Day weekend from Friday at 4 p.m. until Monday at 4 p.m.; (b)
President’s Day weekend from the last day of school at 4 p.m. until the day
immediately preceding return to school at 4 p.m.; (c) in even numbered
years, April vacation from the last day of school at 4 p.m. until the day
immediately preceding return to school at 4 p.m.; (d) in odd numbered
years, Memorial Day weekend from the last day of school at 4 p.m. until
Monday at 4 p.m.; (e) Father’s Day weekend from the last day of school at
4 p.m. until Sunday at 4 p.m.; (f) summer vacation from July 15th until
August 15th . . . (g) Yom Kippur from the last day of school at 4 p.m. until
the day immediately preceding return to school at 4 p.m.; (h) Columbus
Day weekend from the last day of school at 4 p.m. until Monday at 4 p.m.;
(i) in odd numbered years, Thanksgiving from the last day of school at 4
p.m. until the day immediately preceding return to school at 4 p.m.; (j)
winter break from December 26th at 4 p.m. until December 30th at 4 p.m.;
(k) in even numbered years, New Year’s Eve, and New Year’s Day, from
December 30th at 4 p.m. until the day immediately preceding return to
school at 4 p.m.; [and] (l) seventy-two hours before the commencement of
the defendant’s parenting time, the defendant shall provide the plaintiff with
an itinerary, through AppClose, which shall include: the address at which
he will be staying with the minor child and flight information, including
airline, airport, flight numbers, and times and dates of departures or arrivals.
‘‘4. In addition to the parenting time set forth in paragraph three, the
defendant shall have parenting time in New York or Connecticut, at his
election, on the second weekend of each month, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties, in writing, from Friday at 4 p.m. until Sunday at 4 p.m.
‘‘5. At his election, the defendant may accompany the minor child for
trick-or-treating on Halloween.
‘‘6. The defendant shall also be entitled to parenting time with the minor
child on or around the minor child’s birthday.
‘‘7. The plaintiff shall have parenting time on Mother’s Day weekend in
all years. . . .
‘‘9. Each parent shall be able to Skype with the minor child, while [the
child] is in the care of the other parent. The parents shall endeavor to have
the calls at 4 p.m. each day, or at another agreed upon time, taking into
consideration the minor child’s appointments and activities. The parent who
has parenting time with the minor child shall: (a) provide the minor child
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August 17, 2023, the court orally set forth its decision,8
stating: ‘‘Each party blames the other for poor commu-
nications between them, and each gives, frankly, only
lip service to a desire to facilitate better communica-
tions. But the court finds that both parties are responsi-
ble for the poor communications between them and
that both parties have acted improperly in efforts to
exclude the other parent from access to the child at
different times.9 . . . Neither parent is found . . . to
be unfit in any way, except for [the] fact that they have
this ongoing chest-beating going on with regard to the
communications.
‘‘That isn’t to say that when I say they’re not unfit
that either of them is unflawed. [The plaintiff] does
interrogate the child, asking the child for information
about the child’s father. [The defendant] hovers over
the child, in essence, at every opportunity in order to
give the child the impression that [the child] has to
be guarded against her mother when her mother is
with a quiet indoor space to participate in the Skype call; (b) ensure that
he or she has a mounted working camera; (c) place the minor child in front
of the camera for the call; and (d) leave the room once the other parent
appears on the call.’’
In his proposed orders filed August 14, 2023, the defendant requested,
inter alia, the following:
‘‘1. The parties’ minor child . . . shall reside primarily with the defendant
in [Florida];
‘‘2. The parties shall have joint legal custody, with the defendant having
the final say. The plaintiff shall have video contact with the child Monday,
Wednesday, Friday, and Sunday at 7 p.m.;
‘‘3. The plaintiff shall have supervised visitation with the child in [Florida]
at the defendant’s discretion . . . .’’
8
The court ordered a transcript of its decision to be used in the preparation
of the judgment file in this case.
9
As examples, the court referred to ‘‘when [the plaintiff] left Florida
and did not disclose to [the defendant] where she was for several weeks
thereafter’’ and how, ‘‘[d]espite [the plaintiff’s] frequent communications
asking for information or opportunities to see the child, [the defendant]
ignores those and insists on [using a cell phone application called] AppClose
as the only type of communication, knowing full well that his responses
are not being received.’’
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communicating with her by telephone, and, indeed, he
intervenes when he feels that he needs to, for silly
reasons, when [the plaintiff] is speaking with the child
by Skype.
‘‘So, they’re both acting inappropriately and damag-
ingly toward the child, which is very sad to see. That
having been said, I don’t think that either parent pre-
sents a danger to the child when the child is in his or
her own care. I find, frankly, on the evidence that [the
plaintiff’s] description of the events . . . in [August]
of 2021 [when the plaintiff was arrested is] more credi-
ble than the description of [the defendant]. And so, [the
court does not] see that the parties represent any danger
toward each other either. . . .
‘‘The parties shall have joint legal custody of the
child.10 If there’s no agreement after consultation on
important issues involving the child, then the defendant
. . . will . . . have the final word . . . during the
child’s normal school year. The plaintiff will have the
final decision during the summer months when the child
is not in school. Summer being shortly [after] getting
out of school until shortly [before] returning to school.
‘‘Now, I’m gonna call this shared physical custody
because it’s an interesting arrangement. The defendant
will have the child with him during the school year.
There are certain occasions when the child will see her
mother, but . . . in general, the child will be residing
in Florida. It will be her primary residence, and she will
attend school there as long as at least one parent is
living in Florida.
‘‘The child will arrive in Connecticut and be delivered
in Connecticut two days after the end of the . . .
10
Recognizing that the plaintiff had not had a physical presence with the
child for several months and that ‘‘some action ha[d] to be taken to restore
[the] child to [the plaintiff’s] presence,’’ the court ordered the defendant to
deliver the child to the plaintiff on September 3, 2023, with the child returning
to the defendant on September 24, 2023.
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school year and returned to Florida by the plaintiff two
days before school starts again. I anticipate that this
will mean a delivery to Connecticut sometime in the
latter part of May, or the middle to late part of May,
and a delivery back to Florida in the early mid-part of
August each year.
‘‘The plaintiff will also be entitled to have the child
with her from December 26 until January 1 each year
. . . . In addition, the [plaintiff will have the child on]
the Friday before Easter until the Tuesday after Easter
or, if there’s no school in the week following Easter,
then . . . until the Sunday after Easter. It all depends
on whether there’s school. I don’t want to take the child
out of school.
‘‘During the time when the child is staying with the
other parent, there will be regular video contact by
Skype as it is now, or some other replacement that both
parties may agree upon, and [those] visits will take
place Monday, Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday . . .
between the hours of 7:15 and 7:45 [p.m.]. The call will
commence at any time during that period of time, but
it will always end by 7:45 [p.m.]. Furthermore, the call
will be no more than ten minutes, but it will not be the
prerogative of the parent who is not on the call to cut
off the call. So, even though it’s only supposed to be
ten minutes, it is the parent who is on the call who is
the only one who may cut off the call.
‘‘In general, with only rare exceptions, the video con-
tact with the child will find the child indoors, unsuper-
vised by a parent. The parent is to enclose [the child]
into a room with the electronic device she needs to
communicate with the other parent, will take away from
[the child] all other electronic devices at the same time
and will leave the room. There will be no limitation on
both parents’ access to service providers for the child.’’
(Footnotes added.) The court also ordered the parties
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to communicate via AppClose, a coparenting software
program designed for mobile devices, and to send to
the other parent a paragraph of information about the
child via AppClose two times per week while the child
is in that parent’s custody; addressed child support and
medical expenses and which travel costs will be borne
by either parent; ordered that neither party is to institute
a wellness checkup by the police for the child while
the child is in the care of the other parent; stated that
it was imposing on the parties the provisions of Practice
Book § 25-26 (g), which requires a party seeking to
modify parenting orders to seek permission from the
court; and reserved jurisdiction for purposes of postma-
jority educational support. After it finished setting forth
its decision, the court asked if it had overlooked any-
thing, to which the plaintiff’s counsel responded by
asking the court for a clarification. The following collo-
quy then took place:
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Are there any—is there
any opportunity for my client to have parenting time—
additional parenting time in Florida?
‘‘The Court: Well, I suppose that’s a two-way street,
isn’t it? The short answer is I am not imposing that,
nor making an order regarding that. If . . . these par-
ties grow up at some point and decide that they’re gonna
act like coparents of [the child], then certainly that
opportunity might arise, and that applies not only to
the plaintiff, but also to the defendant. The time will
come when the child might have some desire to do a
lot of things outside of seeing her parents, so, I’m not
making any special orders, and . . . I don’t make any
special orders regarding holidays, birthdays, and the
like, but I would expect the parties to get over their
war of blaming the other party for poor communications
and . . . be willing to take the first step to improve
communications. I don’t see this as a case where family
therapy is generally going to be of help, and so, I’m not
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ordering something of that sort. Further questions?
. . .
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I understand
your stance on holidays and stuff. I knew that coming
into . . . this case, but given the distance between the
two, is there any possibility for more holiday time for
[the plaintiff]? Because after September, the next time
she’ll see [the child] is not [until] December, and then
there is a gap between—
‘‘The Court: There are major gaps.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: No question about it. The court feels that
it’s costly to be going back and forth, especially for the
child to be going back and forth, and that neither of
these parties has the means to do a lot of traveling, but
that isn’t the major consideration. The major consider-
ation, from my point of view, is that I don’t want the
child to be back and forth and back and forth, frankly.
I mean, the child is going to spend two and a half
to three quality months in the warm weather in New
England, and eight and a half to nine quality months—
nine to nine and a half quality months minus a couple
of weeks in Florida. That’s the way it is.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Is there any opportunity
for you to reconsider additional holiday time if [the
plaintiff] was to pay for the flights?
‘‘The Court: I’m not considering it. Maybe [the defen-
dant] would see that as something useful. That’s it.’’
This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
Before we address the plaintiff’s claims on appeal,
we set forth our well established standard of review
applicable to child custody and family matters. ‘‘An
appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in
domestic relations cases unless the court has abused
its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably
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Cardona v. Padilla

conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . .
In determining whether a trial court has abused its
broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we
allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the
correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) N. R. v. M. P., 227 Conn. App. 698, 713, 323
A.3d 1142 (2024).
‘‘Orders regarding the custody and care of minor chil-
dren . . . are governed by . . . [General Statutes]
§ 46b-56, which grants the court broad discretion in
crafting such orders. . . . [Section] 46b-56 (a) provides
in relevant part: In any controversy before the Superior
Court as to the custody or care of minor children . . .
the court may make . . . any proper order regarding
the custody, care, education, visitation and support of
the children if it has jurisdiction . . . . Subject to the
provisions of section 46b-56a, the court may assign
parental responsibility for raising the child to the par-
ents jointly, or may award custody to either parent or
to a third party, according to its best judgment upon
the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and
limitations as it deems equitable. . . . (b) In making
. . . any order as provided in subsection (a) of this
section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents
shall be considered and the court shall enter orders
accordingly that serve the best interests of the child
and provide the child with the active and consistent
involvement of both parents commensurate with their
abilities and interests. . . . [Section] 46b-56 (c) directs
the court, when making any order regarding the cus-
tody, care, education, visitation and support of children,
to consider the best interests of the child, and in doing
so [the court] may consider, but shall not be limited
to, one or more of [seventeen enumerated] factors11
11
‘‘In determining the best interests of the child, the court looks to the
factors enumerated in § 46b-56 (c): ‘(1) The physical and emotional safety
of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of the child; (3)
the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the
needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material information obtained from
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. . . . The court is not required to assign any weight to
any of the factors that it considers.’’ (Citations omitted;
footnote in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 714–15.
Our Supreme Court consistently has held that, ‘‘[i]n
matters involving child custody, and, by implication,
visitation rights . . . the rights, wishes and desires of
the parents must be considered [but] it is nevertheless
the ultimate welfare of the child [that] must control
the decision of the [trial] court. . . . In making this
determination, the trial court is vested with broad dis-
cretion . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) R.
H. v. M. H., 350 Conn. 432, 451, 324 A.3d 720 (2024);
see also Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 541,
429 A.2d 801 (1980).
Additionally, insofar as we are required to construe
§ 46b-56 (b), ‘‘[i]ssues of statutory interpretation consti-
the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (5) the wishes
of the child’s parents as to custody; (6) the past and current interaction and
relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other
person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (7)
the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such
continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent
as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (8) any manip-
ulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the
child in the parents’ dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to be actively
involved in the life of the child; (10) the child’s adjustment to his or her
home, school and community environments; (11) the length of time that the
child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability
of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may
consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home
pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12) the stability
of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (13) the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a
proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be
determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not
in the best interests of the child; (14) the child’s cultural background; (15)
the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence,
as defined in [General Statutes §] 46b-1, has occurred between the parents
or between a parent and another individual or the child; (16) whether the
child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined
respectively in [General Statutes §] 46b-120; and (17) whether the party
satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program
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Cardona v. Padilla

tute questions of law over which the court’s review is
plenary. The process of statutory interpretation
involves the determination of the meaning of the statu-
tory language as applied to the facts of the case, includ-
ing the question of whether the language does so apply.
. . . When construing a statute, [the court’s] fundamen-
tal objective is to ascertain and give effect to the appar-
ent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we
seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning
of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the]
case, including the question of whether the language
actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that
meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to con-
sider the text of the statute itself and its relationship
to other statutes. If, after examining such text and con-
sidering such relationship, the meaning of such text is
plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or
unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the mean-
ing of the statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) C. D. v. C. D., 218 Conn.
App. 818, 846–47, 293 A.3d 86 (2023). When a statute
does not define a term, ‘‘it is appropriate to consult
contemporaneous dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Led-
yard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687, 697, 258 A.3d
1268 (2021) (‘in the absence of statutory definitions,
we look to the contemporaneous dictionary definitions
of words to ascertain their commonly approved usage’);
see also General Statutes § 1-1 (a) (‘[i]n the construction
of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed
according to the commonly approved usage of the lan-
guage’).’’ Cerame v. Lamont, 346 Conn. 422, 428, 291
A.3d 601 (2023).
I
The plaintiff’s first claim is that the court’s ‘‘shared
physical custody’’ order constitutes an abuse of its dis-
cretion. In making this claim, she points to the evidence
established pursuant to [General Statutes §] 46b-69b.’ General Statutes § 46b-
56 (c).’’ N. R. v. M. P., supra, 227 Conn. App. 715 n.15.
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demonstrating that the defendant had been unwilling
to facilitate a relationship between the plaintiff and the
child during the time period of December 20, 2022, until
the time of trial. Specifically, she asserts that, aside
from a six day period in April, 2023, when the court
permitted the plaintiff to have in-person parenting time
with the child, she did not see the child until September
3, 2023, when the court again ordered parenting time
between the plaintiff and the child. As the plaintiff
notes, ‘‘[d]uring that approximately nine month period,
the defendant did not facilitate one visit between the
minor child and the plaintiff.’’ She also points to the
court’s finding that the defendant ignored requests from
the plaintiff asking for a chance to see the child, as
well as the evidence demonstrating that the defendant
often interfered with her Skype calls with the child. In
sum, she argues: ‘‘Whereas the evidence demonstrated
that the defendant was unlikely to facilitate a relation-
ship between the minor child and the plaintiff, the evi-
dence also demonstrated that the plaintiff was willing to
facilitate the minor child’s relationship with her father.’’
We construe the plaintiff’s claim as a claim that the
court abused its discretion when making its custody
determination by failing to credit certain evidence,
namely, evidence demonstrating that the defendant was
unwilling to facilitate a relationship between the plain-
tiff and the child, over other evidence it did credit in
making its custody determination. According to the
plaintiff, ‘‘[g]iven the evidence . . . the court could not
have expected the defendant to facilitate a relationship
between the plaintiff and the . . . child during the
months that the child [is in the defendant’s physical
custody] in Florida.’’ (Emphasis added.)
It is well established that a decision to credit ‘‘certain
evidence over other evidence’’ is ‘‘exclusively within the
province of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Weaver v. Sena, 199 Conn. App. 852, 860, 238
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A.3d 103 (2020); see also Woodbridge Crossing Condo-
minium Assn., Inc. v. Ferguson, 229 Conn. App. 99,
104, 325 A.3d 1205 (2024) (‘‘[i]t is the exclusive province
of the trier of fact to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of witnesses and determine
whether to accept some, all or none of a witness’ testi-
mony’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); M. C. v. A.
W., 226 Conn. App. 444, 466, 319 A.3d 183 (2024) (‘‘Inso-
far as the defendant invites us to reconsider the evi-
dence that was before the court, ‘[w]e note that it is
not the function of this court to review the evidence
to determine whether a conclusion different from the
one reached could have been reached. . . . Thus, [a]
mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify
our intervention.’ ’’). ‘‘Likewise, it is not the province
of this court to reweigh the evidence before the court
or to substitute our judgment in this matter.’’ F. S. v.
J. S., 223 Conn. App. 763, 794, 310 A.3d 961, cert. denied,
350 Conn. 903, 323 A.3d 344 (2024); see also In re Blake
P., 222 Conn. App. 693, 707, 306 A.3d 1130 (2023)
(‘‘[a]lthough there may be evidence in the record that
would support the [plaintiff’s] position, it is not the role
of [an appellate] court to examine that evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court’’).
We, therefore, will not substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court relating to its shared custody order
in this matter. Accordingly, we reject the plaintiff’s first
claim.
II
The plaintiff next challenges the court’s visitation
order.12 She claims that the court abused its discretion
12
Although the plaintiff also noted in her appellate brief and at oral argu-
ment before this court that the trial court did not make a finding that its
custody and visitation orders were in the child’s best interest, her brief
contains little analysis, if any, on the issue, aside from referring to § 46b-
56 and the general principle therein that the court’s orders must be guided
by the child’s best interest. The plaintiff also did not seek an articulation
of the court’s decision in this regard. ‘‘Absent an articulation regarding the
legal basis for the trial court’s decision, a claim of error cannot be predicated
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by issuing an order that does not provide the child with
the active and consistent involvement of both parents
as required by § 46b-56 (b), as the visitation order does
not provide the plaintiff with any visitation time in Flor-
ida, and, pursuant to the order, there are significant
gaps in time in which the plaintiff is permitted to see
her child.13 We agree with the plaintiff and remand the
case for a new hearing on visitation.14
on the assumption that the trial court acted erroneously.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Wald v. Cortland-Wald, 226 Conn. App. 752, 767 n.16, 319
A.3d 769 (2024). In such circumstances, we typically presume that the court
‘‘undertook a proper analysis of the law and made whatever findings of fact
were necessary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Walters v. Servidio,
227 Conn. App. 1, 35, 320 A.3d 1008 (2024). We take this opportunity though
to remind trial judges of the importance that the record reflects a best
interest finding. In a child custody case, ‘‘[t]he touchstone of any custody
determination is what is in the best interest of the child. General Statutes
§ 46b-56 (c); Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 517, 72 A.3d 367 (2013).’’ F.
S. v. J. S., supra, 223 Conn. App. 793. As § 46b-56 (c) illustrates, there are
numerous factors that may be taken into consideration by the court, which
need not assign weight to any particular factor. Although there are no
talismanic words a court must use and courts are not limited to considering
the factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c), it is essential for the record to reflect
a best interest finding, both for the parents involved and so that a proper
review of any order challenged on appeal can occur.
13
The plaintiff also states in her appellate brief that the court’s order
interferes with her constitutional right to parent her child. Other than that
bare assertion and a few citations in support thereof, however, her brief is
devoid of any constitutional analysis relating to the court’s decision. To the
extent that the plaintiff is asserting a constitutional claim regarding the
court’s custody and visitation orders, any such claim is unpreserved and
inadequately briefed, and we thus decline to review it. See State v. Nathaniel
T., 230 Conn. App. 45, 52–53, A.3d (2024) (‘‘The defendant has not
requested review of his unpreserved constitutional claim pursuant to State
v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In
re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), either in name or
substance. See State v. Abramovich, 229 Conn. App. 213, 218, 326 A.3d 593
(2024). The defendant has failed to provide any analysis or citation to author-
ity [in support of his constitutional claim]. His claim, therefore, is inade-
quately briefed. We will not engage in Golding . . . review on the basis
of . . . an inadequate brief.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). More-
over, we construe the plaintiff’s claim as one that the court’s visitation order
is an abuse of its discretion, which is consistent with how the plaintiff’s
counsel characterized this claim during oral argument before this court. See
Votre v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 113 Conn. App. 569,
580, 966 A.2d 813 (‘‘[i]t is not the label that the plaintiff placed on each
count of her complaint that is pivotal but the nature of the legal inquiry’’),
cert. denied, 292 Conn. 911, 973 A.2d 661 (2009).
14
In challenging the visitation order, the plaintiff also claims that the court
abused its discretion by failing to issue an order allowing visitation by the
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We first must examine § 46b-56 (b). Although we
exercise plenary review over issues of statutory con-
struction; see C. D. v. C. D., supra, 218 Conn. App.
846; ultimately, we must determine whether the court’s
visitation order constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
See Thomas v. Cleary, 229 Conn. App. 15, 27, 326 A.3d
1109 (2024) (‘‘[T]he authority to exercise the judicial
discretion [authorized by § 46b-56] . . . is not con-
ferred [on] this court, but [on] the trial court, and . . .
we are not privileged to usurp that authority or to substi-
tute ourselves for the trial court. . . . A mere differ-
ence of opinion or judgment cannot justify our interven-
tion. Nothing short of a conviction that the action of
the trial court is one [that] discloses a clear abuse of
discretion can warrant our interference. . . . We are
limited in our review to determining whether the trial
court abused its broad discretion to award custody [or
visitation] based upon the best interests of the child
as reasonably supported by the evidence.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)); see also N. R. v. M. P.,
supra, 227 Conn. App. 722 (trial court did not abuse
‘‘its wide discretion in making its custody determination
and, in doing so, not applying the statutory test of [Gen-
eral Statutes] § 46b-56d’’). With that standard of review
in mind, we turn to the language of the statute.

The plaintiff asserts that, even though the court did
not find that she was unfit or that she presented a
physical danger to the child, ‘‘the result of the . . .
court’s order is that, from mid-August until late Decem-
ber, a period of approximately four months, the plaintiff
will not see the child at all in-person. A further result
is that, for a period of approximately seven months
plaintiff with the child during holidays, other than Easter, and birthdays
and, instead, leaving it to the defendant’s discretion as to whether any such
visitation will occur. In light of our determination that the case must be
remanded for an entirely new hearing on visitation, we need not address
this claim.
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(August until March), the plaintiff will only have parent-
ing time with the child for a period of seven days, or
approximately 3 percent of the time. Further, there is
no court order that permits the plaintiff to exercise
her parental rights in Florida during that seven month
period, if she were so inclined to travel there. . . .
While . . . § 46b-56 (b) requires the court to enter
orders that provide the child with active and consistent
involvement of both parents, a parent who goes four
months without seeing a child and is unable to have
an equal say in making decisions for the child during
that time cannot be said to have an active and consistent
involvement in that child’s life.’’ We agree with the plain-
tiff.
As § 46b-56 (b) directs, a trial court must consider
‘‘the rights and responsibilities of both parents’’ and
‘‘enter orders . . . that serve the best interests of the
child and provide the child with the active and consis-
tent involvement of both parents commensurate with
their abilities and interests.’’ (Emphasis added.) What
constitutes ‘‘active and consistent involvement’’ is not
defined by the statute, likely because it is dependent
on what the court determines to be ‘‘commensurate’’
with the abilities and interests of the parents. General
Statutes § 46b-56 (b). The word ‘‘active’’ is defined as
‘‘characterized by action rather than by contemplation
or speculation’’; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Diction-
ary (11th Ed. 2003) p. 13; and the word ‘‘consistent’’ is
defined as ‘‘marked by harmony, regularity, or steady
continuity . . . .’’ Id., p. 266. Thus, in its commonly
understood meaning, ‘‘active and consistent’’ involve-
ment means regular participation by the parent in a
child’s life. We recognize that, because a child custody
determination is dependent on the factual circum-
stances of a given case, no absolute standard can apply
to what constitutes ‘‘active and consistent involvement’’
under the statute. General Statutes § 46b-56 (b); see R.
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H. v. M. H., supra, 350 Conn. 451 (our Supreme Court
‘‘reaffirm[ed] that decision-making in family disputes
requires flexible, individualized adjudication of the par-
ticular facts of each case without the constraint of
objective guidelines’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). That is because an order that serves the best
interest of a child in one case and provides that child
with regular involvement of both parents may not be
achievable in another case in which the interests and
abilities of the parents may differ. For that reason, we
are mindful of the discretion afforded to trial courts in
crafting an order that meets the statutory requirements.
Nevertheless, we also must bear in mind that the plain
language of the statute conveys a legislative intent that
orders regarding custody and visitation provide the
child with active and regular or steady involvement
by both parents, when the circumstances permit. See
General Statutes § 46b-56 (b).
In the present case, the court’s visitation order signifi-
cantly limits the plaintiff’s in-person visitation with the
child. Understandably, given the distance between Con-
necticut and Florida, the plaintiff, as the noncustodial
parent, will not be able to play as active a role in her
child’s life as she would if the child lived in Connecticut.
Under the court’s visitation order, however, in a nine
month period from mid-August to approximately mid-
May, the plaintiff will have in-person visitation with the
child for only twelve days: that is, from mid-August to
late December she will have no in-person contact with
the child at all, followed by seven days of visitation
from December 26 to January 1; and, after January 1,
she will go at least another three months with no in-
person visitation until Easter, when she will have five
days of visitation with the child over the Easter holiday
with a potential for an additional five days being added
on if there is no school the week following Easter. The
plaintiff’s visitation with the child resumes at some
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point in the middle or end of May, when the child is to
be delivered to Connecticut for an extended period
of time—until mid-August—after which she must be
returned to Florida.

The court’s decision is devoid of any findings specifi-
cally related to the plaintiff’s fitness that would suggest
that the court determined that it was in the child’s best
interest to limit the child’s visitation with the plaintiff.
In fact, the court specifically found that the plaintiff
was not ‘‘unfit in any way’’ and that neither parent posed
‘‘a physical danger to the child when the child is in his/
her own care.’’ The court also did not make any findings
regarding the plaintiff’s abilities or interests in being
involved with the child to support its narrow visitation
order. Instead, the court specifically found that ‘‘both
parties are responsible for the poor communications
between them and that both parties have acted improp-
erly in efforts to exclude the other party from access
to the child at different times.’’ (Emphasis added.) The
court stated that additional visitation time might be
available if both parties ‘‘grow up at some point and
decide that they’re gonna act like coparents of [the
child] . . . .’’ The court then stated that its ‘‘major con-
sideration’’ was that it was worried about the child going
back and forth between Connecticut and Florida.15 The
court’s concerns, however, do not provide a basis for
its refusal to order any visitation for the plaintiff with
the child in Florida, especially when that was specifi-
cally requested by the plaintiff’s counsel and the court
acknowledged that there were ‘‘major gaps’’ in time in
which the plaintiff could visit with the child in person.
15
In its articulation, the court elaborated further on this by stating: ‘‘An
important concern of the . . . court in this case has been the need for [the
child] to have some stability in her home environments. The . . . court
also wished to minimize the frequency of the child’s long-distance travel.
The best interests of the child trump the desire of each party to gain an
advantage over the other.’’
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In Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 623, 436 A.2d
299 (1980), the defendant mother, who lived in Italy,
was given custody of a child, while the child’s father was
given the right of ‘‘reasonable visitation.’’ On appeal, our
Supreme Court determined that the award of custody
to the defendant was not an abuse of discretion but,
nonetheless, determined that the court’s visitation
order could not stand. Id., 635–37. In reaching that con-
clusion, the court stated: ‘‘There is no question but
that frequent visits between the plaintiff and [the child]
would not be feasible while the child is residing in Italy.
But that fact alone is not enough to render the plaintiff’s
opportunity of visitation illusory. A parent’s privilege
of visitation of children whose custody is awarded to
the other parent is not absolute, but is subordinate to
the best interests of the child. . . . Generally, for the
good of the child, unless a parent is completely unfit,
and that is not the case here, a decree should allow the
noncustodial parent to visit or communicate with the
child. . . . Where the noncustodial parent’s visitation
with his child will be infrequent as a result of the dis-
tance that separates them, the court should, when at
all possible, set specific and usually substantial periods
of visitation time if to do so is consistent with the child’s
best interests. The court did not do so here and the
case must be remanded for that purpose.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote omitted.) Id.
Although the primary issue with the visitation order
in Presutti was its lack of specificity; id., 636–37; which
differs from the present case in which the court refused
to issue any order concerning parenting time for the
plaintiff in Florida, we nonetheless find guidance in the
court’s statements about the need for a noncustodial
parent, who has not been found to be unfit, to have
visitation with a child who resides some distance from
the noncustodial parent and its holding that, when at
all possible, the court should set specific and substantial
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periods of visitation consistent with the child’s best
interest in such cases. In the present case, the court’s
visitation order sets one lengthy period of visitation for
the plaintiff with the child in Connecticut, but, aside
from that, there are only two additional short periods
of time during which the plaintiff can see the child over
the course of one year.
We conclude that the court abused its discretion by
crafting a visitation order that does not provide the
child with the active and consistent involvement of the
plaintiff. Significantly, the record does not contain any
findings of the trial court as to why the plaintiff should
not play an active role in the child’s life. See, e.g., F.
S. v. J. S., supra, 223 Conn. App. 782 (court found that
defendant father ‘‘lack[ed] the ability to play an active
and positive role in [his child’s] life’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In any custody situation in which a
child resides with a custodial parent out of state, visita-
tion with the noncustodial parent will naturally involve
some type of travel, either by the child or the noncusto-
dial parent. The court’s concerns about the child’s travel
can be alleviated through various arrangements, includ-
ing, for example, having the noncustodial parent primar-
ily bear the expense and burden of the travel. The dis-
tance and attendant burdens of traveling by the
noncustodial parent, however, do not by themselves
provide a basis for denying a child the active involve-
ment in the child’s life of a parent who lives out of
state. Here, the court stated that it would be costly to
go back and forth and that neither party has the means
to do a lot of traveling, but when the plaintiff’s counsel
indicated that the plaintiff would be willing to have
additional in-person visitation in Florida and would bear
the costs of travel, the court refused to issue such an
order.
Similarly, the court’s expressed concerns regarding
the parties’ ability to effectively communicate with each
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other did not justify the significant restrictions on the
plaintiff’s opportunities to visit with the child. The court
attributed those difficulties equally to both parties. Fur-
thermore, those challenges exist regardless of the visita-
tion schedule given that the court’s order requires ongo-
ing coordination between the parents regarding regular
communications between the noncustodial parent and
the child and regular activity reports from the custodial
parent to the noncustodial parent.
‘‘[R]easonable visitation for the noncustodial parent
is generally in the best interests of the child and putting
distance between the child and that parent obviously
will impact on those best interests.’’ Ireland v. Ireland,
246 Conn. 413, 442, 717 A.2d 676 (1998) (Berdon, J.,
concurring); see also Twersky v. Twersky, 103 App.
Div. 2d 775, 775–76, 477 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1984) (‘‘Visitation
is a joint right of the noncustodial parent and the child
. . . . The best interests of the child lie in his being
nurtured and guided by both . . . parents . . . . In
order for the noncustodial parent to develop a meaning-
ful, nurturing relationship with her child, visitation must
be frequent and regular . . . . Absent extraordinary
circumstances, where visitation would be detrimental
to the child’s well-being, a noncustodial parent has a
right to reasonable visitation privileges . . . .’’ (Cita-
tions omitted.)); Negaard v. Negaard, 642 N.W.2d 916,
921 (N.D. 2002) (‘‘[v]isitation with a noncustodial parent
promotes the child’s best interests’’).
Further support for our determination can be found
in the fact that, in addition to the visitation order not
providing the opportunity for in-person visitation by
the plaintiff over substantial periods of time, the order
also contains no provisions for the plaintiff’s visitation
with the child on birthdays and holidays, other than
Easter, during which time family gatherings typically
take place. In that regard, the order overlooks the
importance of the child’s relationship with the plaintiff
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and her family, including the plaintiff’s son, who has a
close relationship with the child, and is inimical to the
development and maintenance of a healthy relationship
and bond between the plaintiff and the child, who is
of tender years. See, e.g., Nikolic v. Ingrassia, 47 App.
Div. 3d 819, 821–22, 850 N.Y.S.2d 539 (2008) (visitation
order, which awarded every weekend, holiday and sum-
mer vacation to mother, improperly failed to take into
account child’s relationship with father); see also Ire-
land v. Ireland, supra, 246 Conn. 443 (Berdon, J., con-
curring) (‘‘[v]isitation with the noncustodial parent is
important for the development of the child’’); In re
James O., 160 Conn. App. 506, 516, 127 A.3d 375 (2015)
(‘‘[a] child, no less than a parent, has a powerful interest
in the preservation of the parent-child relationship’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 322 Conn.
636, 142 A.3d 1147 (2016).16
16
We also note that in Felty v. Felty, 108 App. Div. 3d 705, 706, 708–709,
969 N.Y.S.2d 557 (2013), the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York addressed a custody and visitation order awarding sole physical
and legal custody of twins to their mother, who lives in New York, and
granting the father, who lives in Kentucky, liberal visitation rights. Specifi-
cally, the family court had ‘‘awarded the father visitation in Kentucky with
the parties’ children every summer and every school break for ‘Thanksgiving,
Christmas, winter, mid-winter, spring, and Easter’ . . . [and] a ‘right of first
refusal’ for visitation in Kentucky during four of the subject children’s three-
day weekend breaks from school . . . .’’ Id., 705. On appeal in Felty, the
court held that the ‘‘provision of the visitation schedule which, in addition
to the summer visitation, award[ed] the father visits in Kentucky during
school breaks for ‘every Thanksgiving, Christmas, winter, mid-winter, spring,
and Easter,’ effectively deprive[d] the mother ‘of any significant quality time’
with the children, and [was] therefore ‘excessive’ . . . . While that provi-
sion [took] into account the children’s need to spend time with the father
and his family, it [did] not take into account the importance of their relation-
ship with the mother and her extended family, in that it deprives the children
of contact ‘during times usually reserved for family gatherings and recre-
ation’ . . . . [T]he court-appointed forensic evaluator recommended that
the parties share parenting time during major holidays such as Thanksgiving,
Christmas, and Easter. There was no contrary evidence that awarding all
parenting time during these holidays to the father furthers the children’s
best interests.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 708–709. Consequently, the Appellate
Division determined that certain provisions of the visitation order were not
appropriate, and it remanded the case to the family court to set forth a new
visitation schedule. Id. Like in Felty, the visitation order in the present case
fails to adequately take into account the plaintiff’s role in the child’s life.
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Furthermore, as we have stated, in any custody situa-
tion in which the parents live in different states, the
noncustodial parent’s parenting time with the out-of-
state child inevitably will be unbalanced to some extent.
Virtual visitation can be a helpful tool in filling the gaps
between in-person visitation. Indeed, in the present
case, the court’s order provides for regular video con-
tact by Skype four times a week, for ten minutes each
time, between the child and the plaintiff during the time
period when the child is residing in Florida. Virtual
visitation, however, is not a substitute for in-person
visitation and cannot replace the nurturing and loving
physical contact that takes place when a parent and a
child interact in person.17
In summary, as we have stated, there is no specific
formula as to what constitutes ‘‘active and consistent’’
involvement by a parent in a child’s life. General Stat-
utes § 46b-56 (b). Nevertheless, in the present case, the
very unbalanced visitation order is not supported by any
underlying factual findings18 demonstrating why such
17
See Goldsmith v. Reid, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 6, 2021) (‘‘there is no substitute for
physical contact [between a parent and a child]’’); Good v. Good, Superior
Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 4,
2017) (virtual visitation can be used as supplement to provide most opportu-
nity for noncustodial parent to continue parent-child relationship); A. LeVas-
seur, note, ‘‘Virtual Visitation: How Will Courts Respond to a New and
Emerging Issue?,’’ 17 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 362, 380–81 (2004) (‘‘Parents
and courts must realize that virtual visitation is not a substitute for actual
visitation time spent face-to-face between parents and children. . . . Par-
ents and children need to be in physical contact to maintain a healthy parent-
child relationship.’’); see also Gilbert v. Gilbert, 730 N.W.2d 833, 840 (N.D.
2007) (‘‘Virtual visitation includes using the telephone, Internet, web-cam,
and other wireless or wired technologies to ensure the child has frequent
and meaningful contact with the noncustodial parent. It is most useful in
cases such as this where the child and noncustodial parent are accustomed
to seeing each other on a regular basis but no longer will be able to because
of the relocation. Virtual visitation is not a substitute for personal contact,
but it can be a useful tool to supplement in-person visitation.’’); A. Schepard,
‘‘Virtual Visitation: Computer Technology Meets Child Custody Law,’’
N.Y.L.J., Vol. 228, September 18, 2002, p. 23 (‘‘[p]arenting plans should not
be structured on the assumption that virtual visitation can substitute for
personal interaction between parent and child’’).
18
Even though trial courts are afforded broad discretion in crafting custody
and visitation orders, there still must be a basis in the record for the court’s
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a limited visitation schedule is warranted, such as a
finding of complete unfitness. See Presutti v. Presutti,
supra, 181 Conn. 636. As the plaintiff has pointed out,
between late August and Easter weekend, she is
allowed visitation with the child, in person, for only
seven days, or 3 percent of the time. The fact that the
parties live in different states is not a sufficient basis
for a noncustodial parent to be provided with such
limited in-person contact with a child, especially under
the circumstances here, in which the plaintiff’s counsel
specifically asked for more visitation time for the plain-
tiff in Florida, which would have obviated any need
for the child to travel repeatedly back and forth between
Connecticut and Florida. We conclude that the court’s
visitation order is not consistent with the clear intent
of § 46b-56 (b) that child custody and visitation orders
should provide the child with the regular and consistent
involvement of both parents, commensurate with their
abilities and interests. In light of this conclusion, we
must remand the case for a new hearing on visitation.
III
The plaintiff next claims that the court abused its
discretion by including, in its final orders, an order
pursuant to Practice Book § 25-26 (g) requiring the par-
ties to request leave of the court before filing a motion
for modification of custody or visitation orders.19 She
decision. See J. Y. v. M. R., 215 Conn. App. 648, 659, 283 A.3d 520 (2022)
(‘‘[w]e are limited in our review to determining whether the trial court
abused its broad discretion to award custody based upon the best interests
of the child as reasonably supported by the evidence’’ (emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hall v. Hall, 186 Conn. 118,
123–24, 439 A.2d 447 (1982).
19
Practice Book § 25-26 (g) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon or after entry
of judgment of a dissolution of marriage, dissolution of civil union, legal
separation or annulment, or upon or after entry of a judgment or final order
of custody and/or visitation . . . the judicial authority may order that any
further motion for modification of a final custody or visitation order shall
be appended with a request for leave to file such motion and shall conform
to the requirements of subsection (e) of this section. The specific factual
and legal basis for the claimed modification shall be sworn to by the moving
party or other person having personal knowledge of the facts recited therein.
If no objection to the request has been filed by any party within ten days
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argues that, because neither party in this case ‘‘filed
excessive motions or pleadings’’ or requested the issu-
ance of such an order, the issuance of the order consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion by the court. We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In its deci-
sion, the court stated that it was ‘‘imposing upon the
parties the provisions of Practice Book [§] 25-26 (g).
This is a [provision] that requires a party seeking to
modify parenting orders [to obtain] permission from
the court to do so via a separate motion asking for
such permission.’’ It is undisputed that neither party
requested that the court do so. On February 16, 2024,
the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation, requesting
an articulation as to the factual and legal basis for the
order and whether the order was intended to be issued.
The court granted the motion for articulation and issued
a written articulation on February 28, 2024, stating in
relevant part: ‘‘There is no provision of [§] 25-26 (g)
that limits the . . . court’s exercise of resource man-
agement to requests by the parties for such manage-
ment. The . . . court is expected to act responsibly
and economically in allocating judicial time and
energy. . . .
‘‘Since 2021, the parties have treated their child as
the rope in a tug-of-war, such that the child has been
back and forth among numerous residences in New
York, Connecticut and Florida. The [child] . . . was
born [in] March [of] 2019. At the time of this trial in
August, 2023, [she] was four years of age. Her parents
of the date of service of such request on the other party, the request for
leave may be determined by the judicial authority with or without hearing.
If an objection is filed, the request shall be placed on the next short calendar,
unless the judicial authority otherwise directs. At such hearing, the moving
party must demonstrate probable cause that grounds exist for the motion
to be granted. If the judicial authority grants the request for leave, at any
time during the pendency of such a motion to modify, the judicial authority
may determine whether discovery or a study or evaluation pursuant to
Section 25-60 shall be permitted.’’
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had spent an unusual amount of time in court. They
had a previous custody case with temporary orders in
Florida and a restraining order case in Florida. These
were separate from the domestic disturbance criminal
case prosecuted by [the state of] Florida against the
plaintiff. All those cases ended in dismissal. The custody
action in Connecticut commenced [in] May [of] 2022.
While it has been pending, each party has filed an ex
parte application for emergency custody orders. The
plaintiff has also filed a separate custody modification
motion in December, 2022, and another such motion
in April, 2023, less than three weeks after the entry of
a pendente lite parenting order. The parties filed a total
of four motions for contempt pendente lite. In addition
to resolution plan dates, discovery issues, and status
conferences, Judge Figueroa Laskos presided over a
multiday hearing on . . . dates from December 19,
2022, to April 6, 2023.
‘‘The clerk’s office in Danbury treated as a pleading
the plaintiff’s letter of August 22, 2022, addressed to
Judge Winslow. The letter . . . seems to be an objec-
tion to a continuance request by the defendant.
Although the plaintiff’s letter accuses the defendant of
not being satisfied until he gets sole custody of the
minor child, the message received by the . . . court
from both parties’ behaviors throughout the case has
been that neither party will be satisfied with anything
less than total victory.
‘‘With any postjudgment motion to modify final cus-
tody orders, the . . . court must first consider what
circumstances have changed to warrant a parenting
plan modification. A request for leave to file a motion
to modify allows the . . . court to undertake that first
consideration early in the context of a probable cause
analysis. . . .
‘‘An important concern of the . . . court in this case
has been the need for [the child] to have some stability
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in her home environments. The . . . court also wished
to minimize the frequency of the child’s long-distance
travel. The best interests of the child trump the desire
of each party to gain an advantage over the other.
Determining probable cause before allowing a hearing
on a motion to modify the parenting plan is a feasible
way to protect the child from unnecessary turmoil. The
discretion of the . . . court to impose filing restric-
tions is not limited to cases with circumstances deemed
to be extreme and compelling. . . . The . . . court did
intend to enter the order imposing the provisions of
Practice Book § 25-26 (g).’’ (Citations omitted.)
We now turn to the legal principles that govern our
resolution of this claim. Whether the court acted
improperly by including the Practice Book § 25-26 (g)
order in its final orders is governed by an abuse of
discretion standard. See J. Y. v. M. R., 215 Conn. App.
648, 671, 283 A.3d 520 (2022). Moreover, ‘‘matters
involving judicial economy, docket management [and
control of] courtroom proceedings . . . are particu-
larly within the province of a trial court.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) F. S. v. J. S., supra, 223 Conn.
App. 791. ‘‘An appellant who seeks to reverse the trial
court’s exercise of judicial discretion assumes a heavy
burden.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J. Y. v. M.
R., supra, 672.
Recently, in J. Y. v. M. R., supra, 215 Conn. App. 670,
this court rejected a similar claim—that the trial court
abused its discretion by including a Practice Book § 25-
26 (g) order in its final orders because such orders
‘‘may be issued in extreme, compelling situation[s] only
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 670–71.
In that case, we concluded that our case law could not
be construed ‘‘as curbing a court’s decision to impose
filing restrictions by limiting such orders to cases with
circumstances deemed to be extreme and compelling,’’
or as holding ‘‘that orders imposing filing restrictions
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are reserved for such cases.’’ Id., 671; see also F. S. v.
J. S., supra, 223 Conn. App. 797 (‘‘[t]here is nothing . . .
curtailing a trial court’s exercise of its considerable
discretion over its docket or expressly barring’’ order
prohibiting parties from filing motions or pleadings
without court approval). Notwithstanding this court’s
conclusion that such orders are not limited to ‘‘circum-
stances deemed to be extreme and compelling’’; J. Y.
v. M. R., supra, 671; in explaining why the trial court’s
issuance of the order did not constitute a clear abuse
of its discretion, this court noted that the parties began
filing ‘‘ ‘[a] slew of . . . motions’ ’’ concerning their
child less than one year following the judgment and
that the minor child’s guardian ad litem had testified
in favor of the court issuing such an order ‘‘in light of
the length of the litigation, the financial and emotional
toll of the litigation on the parties, and the guardian ad
litem’s belief that the child was ‘not unscathed by the
distress that [the parties] ha[d] gone through.’ ’’ Id., 672;
see also F. S. v. J. S., supra, 797–98 (after referring to
issuance of such order in Strobel v. Strobel, 92 Conn.
App. 662, 665, 886 A.2d 865 (2005), as constituting ‘‘a
praiseworthy attempt by the trial judge to limit the
parties’ barrages of repetitive and abusive motions,’’
this court noted that ‘‘[t]he record in the present case
reflects no less of a compelling reason for an order
attempting to curtail the flood of repetitive and often-
times frivolous motions filed in this matter’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, even though a
court’s decision to impose filing restrictions is not lim-
ited to circumstances deemed to be extreme and com-
pelling, our case law suggests that such orders are
appropriate in circumstances in which the parties have
filed repetitive or even frivolous motions or pleadings
that have unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings.
In the present case, given the basis for the court’s
issuance of the Practice Book § 25-26 (g) order, as
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explained in its articulation, we find no clear abuse of
discretion by the court in its inclusion of the § 25-26
(g) order in its final orders. See N. R. v. M. P., supra,
227 Conn. App. 716 (‘‘[n]othing short of a conviction
that the action of the trial court is one [that] discloses a
clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)). In its articulation,
the court first properly noted that ‘‘[t]here is no provi-
sion [in §] 25-26 (g) that limits the trial court’s exercise
of resource management to requests by the parties for
such management.’’ It also stated that the parties ‘‘have
treated their child as the rope in a tug-of-war’’ and that
they have ‘‘spent an unusual amount of time in court.’’
The court then proceeded to set out the various cases
and filings of the parties, which included a prior custody
case in Florida, a domestic disturbance criminal case
in Florida, ex parte applications for emergency custody
orders in the present case, motions for modifications,
one of which was filed just three weeks following the
issuance of a pendente lite parenting order, as well as
motions for contempt, and a separate multiday hearing
that was held on divers dates between October, 2022,
and April, 2023.
Additionally, in its articulation, the court examined
the docket and explained that it viewed the inclusion
of the Practice Book § 25-26 (g) order as an effective
screening tool that would allow it to assess whether
the parties’ circumstances have changed in the event
a motion to modify is filed, for purposes of deciding
whether the moving party should be heard. The court
elucidated further that the § 25-26 (g) order was also
intended to protect the child ‘‘from unnecessary tur-
moil’’ by allowing the court to make a probable cause
determination ‘‘before allowing a hearing on a motion
to modify . . . .’’ Such considerations are well within
the court’s discretion, especially given the court’s con-
cerns about the best interest of the child, as well as its
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observation of the divisive and acrimonious nature of
the parties’ behaviors, which led the court to believe
that ‘‘neither party will be satisfied with anything less
than total victory.’’ Accordingly, the plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the court abused its discretion by
including a § 25-26 (g) order in its final orders.20
The judgment is reversed with respect to the visita-
tion order and the case is remanded for a new hearing on
visitation; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

20
Although the court’s articulation established a sufficiently particularized
basis for issuing the Practice Book § 25-26 (g) order in this case, we caution
that our holding should not be interpreted as endorsing the issuance of such
orders in every contested dissolution proceeding. Rather, our holding in
this case stands only for the proposition that the court’s issuance of a § 25-
26 (g) order here did not constitute an abuse of discretion because it provided
sufficient case specific reasoning for doing so. In other words, a court’s
issuance of a § 25-26 (g) order based on only generalized reasoning that is
not case specific, or on no reasoning at all, may well constitute an abuse
of its discretion. Consequently, the plaintiff’s argument that applying the
logic of the trial court would mean that a Practice Book § 25-26 (g) order
‘‘should be implemented in every contested custody matter’’ is unfounded.