Marzaro v. Marzaro

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Marzaro v. Marzaro

SHERI MARZARO v. SEBASTIANO G. MARZARO
(AC 46459)
Elgo, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from, inter alia, the judgment of the trial court
dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff. The defendant claimed, inter alia,
that the court improperly concluded that the marital residence, which was
held in a revocable trust, with the parties as cotrustees, was subject to
equitable distribution pursuant to statute (§ 46b-81). Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the marital property
and assigning the marital debt even though it awarded a larger portion of
the marital assets to the plaintiff and the majority of the debt to the defendant,
as the court reasonably could have considered the parties’ unequal earnings
potential and that the majority of the liabilities listed on the defendant’s
financial affidavit were debts related to his business.

The trial court’s distribution of the marital residence as marital property
pursuant to § 46b-81 was not improper because the defendant and the plain-
tiff had a presently existing interest in the marital residence, as they were
the lifetime beneficiaries of the trust and had the ability to invade the trust
property by revoking the trust, and their children, as remainder beneficiaries,
did not have a present interest in the trust and were not necessary and
indispensable parties to the action.

The plaintiff, whose motion to cite in the cotrustees of the trust had been
granted by the trial court, was not required to plead any additional facts
with respect to counts two and three of her amended complaint because
she did not raise separate causes of action in those counts or allege any
wrongdoing in connection with the trust but, rather, identified the beneficiar-
ies and trustees of the trust and claimed an interest in the marital residence
that was held in the trust.

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court
improperly denied his motion for contempt regarding the plaintiff’s alleged
failure to comply with certain discovery orders because the claim was
inadequately briefed and, although the defendant sought an articulation of
the factual basis of the trial court’s decision to deny the motion, he failed
to file a motion for review of the trial court’s denial of the motion for
articulation pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 66-7).

Argued October 9, 2024—officially released March 4, 2025
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Marzaro v. Marzaro

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Fairfield, where the court, M. Moore, J., granted
the plaintiff’s motion to cite in the cotrustees of the
Marzaro Family Trust as a defendant; thereafter, the
court, M. Moore, J., rendered judgment dissolving the
marriage and granting certain other relief, from which
the named defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
William W. Taylor, for the appellant (named defen-
dant).
Richard W. Callahan, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The defendant Sebastiano G. Marzaro
appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving
his marriage to the plaintiff, Sheri Marzaro.1 On appeal,
the defendant claims that (1) the court abused its discre-
tion in fashioning its financial orders by making a
grossly disproportionate property distribution in the
plaintiff’s favor and by assigning all of the marital debt
to him, (2) the court improperly concluded that the
parties’ marital residence, which was held in the Mar-
zaro Family Trust (trust), was subject to equitable distri-
bution, (3) the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts
to support a cause of action in counts two and three
of her revised complaint and (4) the court improperly
denied his motion for contempt and failed to order the
1
In her original complaint, the plaintiff named only Sebastiano G. Marzaro
as the defendant. Subsequently, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to
cite in the cotrustees of the Marzaro Family Trust as an additional defendant
and to amend the complaint to state facts showing the interest of the Marzaro
Family Trust in this action. We note that, on his appeal form, Sebastiano
G. Marzaro also listed the Marzaro Family Trust and Sebastiano G. Marzaro,
cotrustee of the Marzaro Family Trust, as additional parties initiating the
appeal. In this opinion, we refer to Sebastiano G. Marzaro as the defendant
and to the plaintiff and the defendant, collectively, as the parties.
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plaintiff to disclose certain financial documents. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which were either found by the
court or otherwise are undisputed, and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The
plaintiff and the defendant were married on September
1, 1975, in Bel Air, California. Two children were born of
the marriage, both of whom reached the age of majority
before the dissolution judgment was rendered.
In 1999 or 2000, the parties moved to a house in
Easton, Connecticut (marital residence), where the
defendant continues to reside. The defendant’s primary
occupation during the marriage was selling shoes and
leather goods imported from Italy. His income varied
significantly, as he earned $500,000 in some years and
$0 in others. In 2017, the defendant opened a restaurant,
called Bigoi Venezia, in New York City. The restaurant
is owned by Italmood, Inc., a company created by the
defendant approximately twenty years ago. The plaintiff
has not been employed full-time for decades. During
the marriage, she served as the primary caregiver to
the parties’ children, and, in the past, she worked as a
translator.
During the course of the marriage, the parties
acquired several properties in addition to the marital
residence—pistachio farmland in California, a home in
Greece, and land in Italy. The parties sold the home in
Greece around 2019 for approximately 240,000 euros
and, with the defendant’s knowledge, the plaintiff
invested the proceeds with a property developer in
Greece. The defendant sold a portion of the pistachio
farmland in 2022 and split the proceeds with a friend,
with whom he claimed he had an informal partnership.
The defendant received approximately $247,000 from
that sale and deposited it into his Italmood, Inc., bank
account.
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The plaintiff left the marital residence around 2014
and did not return. She moved to Europe, first living
in Greece, then Italy, and finally France. The plaintiff
did not tell the defendant that she was not returning
and, despite the passage of several years, the defendant
was not aware that the plaintiff had left him. At the
time of the dissolution judgment, the plaintiff lived in
a small apartment in Paris and was financially sup-
ported by her father.
On November 19, 2019, the plaintiff commenced the
present dissolution action against the defendant on the
ground that the parties’ marriage had broken down
irretrievably. Following a trial, on March 13, 2023, the
court, M. Moore, J., issued a memorandum of decision
dissolving the parties’ marriage. The court found that
the breakdown of the marriage was attributable to both
parties.2 In its financial orders, the court ordered the
defendant to pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount
of $1 per week ‘‘until the first to occur of the following
events: the death of either party or the plaintiff’s remar-
riage or cohabitation pursuant to statute and case law.’’
In its property distribution, the court distributed the
marital assets and debts as follows. The court ordered
the parties to sell the marital residence and to divide
the net proceeds of the sale 60 percent to the plaintiff
and 40 percent to the defendant. The court ordered the
defendant to transfer to the plaintiff $75,000 from a
Chase bank account, which represented approximately
60 percent of the balance of that account. The court
further ordered that the plaintiff retain the proceeds
from the sale of the home in Greece; the land in Italy
2
The court, pointing to the plaintiff’s move to Europe and the defendant’s
failure to notice that the plaintiff no longer was living with him, found that
‘‘[t]he parties appeared severely disconnected in this long-term marriage.’’
The court also recounted the plaintiff’s testimony that the defendant was very
controlling and that ‘‘[the plaintiff] believed the defendant had extramarital
affairs and she admitted to falling in love with someone in Greece, but the
relationship never materialized.’’
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remains in both parties’ names and, in the event that
the parties sell it, each party would receive 50 percent
of the equity; and the land in California is to be sold,
with the parties to split the proceeds equally. The court
awarded the defendant sole interest in the restaurant
Bigoi Venezia as well as the company Italmood, Inc.,
which owns Bigoi Venezia. The court ordered each
party to be responsible for the debts and liabilities listed
on their respective financial affidavits, with the excep-
tion of all tax liabilities and the balance on a Nordstrom
credit card, for which the defendant was solely respon-
sible. This appeal followed. Additional facts and proce-
dural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court abused its
discretion in issuing its financial orders by making a
grossly disproportionate property distribution in the
plaintiff’s favor and assigning all of the marital debt to
the defendant.
Before turning to the defendant’s specific challenges
to the property distribution, we observe that the ‘‘stan-
dard of review in family matters is well settled. An
appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in
domestic relations cases unless the court has abused
its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably
conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . .
It is within the province of the trial court to find facts
and draw proper inferences from the evidence pre-
sented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has
abused its broad discretion in domestic relations mat-
ters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor
of the correctness of its action. . . . [T]o conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that
the court either incorrectly applied the law or could
not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation
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marks omitted.) Tilsen v. Benson, 347 Conn. 758, 796,
299 A.3d 1096 (2023).
‘‘[General Statutes §] 46b-81 governs the distribution
of the assets in a dissolution case. . . . That statute
authorizes the court to assign to either spouse all, or
any part of, the estate of the other spouse. . . . In
fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to
be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence
presented by each party, shall consider the length of
the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution
of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employ-
ability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties
and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of
capital assets and income. The court shall also consider
the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of their respective
estates. . . . Moreover, [w]e have iterated that there
is no set formula the court is obligated to apply when
dividing the parties’ assets and . . . the court is vested
with broad discretion in fashioning financial orders.
. . . As a panel of this court once expressed, the court
has vast discretion in fashioning its orders.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Wethington v. Wethington,
223 Conn. App. 715, 734–35, 309 A.3d 356 (2024).
‘‘Generally, we will not overturn a trial court’s divi-
sion of marital property unless it misapplies, overlooks,
or gives a wrong or improper effect to any test or consid-
eration which it was [its] duty to regard.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Fronsaglia v. Fronsaglia,
202 Conn. App. 769, 776, 246 A.3d 1083 (2021). Neverthe-
less, ‘‘[t]he purpose of dividing marital property is to
preserve, as much as possible, the parties’ existing stan-
dard of living, not to award property to one spouse to
the complete exclusion of the other.’’ Greco v. Greco,
275 Conn. 348, 356, 880 A.2d 872 (2005). An award may
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be improper if it imposes a financial obligation on a
party that he cannot possibly meet or that renders him
destitute. See id., 349–50, 356–57 (concluding that trial
court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff more
than 98 percent of marital property, alimony and attor-
ney’s fees because financial award far exceeded defen-
dant’s income, left defendant destitute, and rendered
distribution impracticable); see also Valentine v. Valen-
tine, 164 Conn. App. 354, 367, 141 A.3d 884, cert. denied,
321 Conn. 917, 136 A.3d 1275 (2016).
On appeal, the defendant contends that the court
awarded him only 27 percent of the marital assets or
$230,000,3 while the plaintiff received 73 percent of the
marital assets or $636,500. The defendant further con-
tends that the court assigned him more than $1 million
of debt, which encompassed all of the debt reflected
on his financial affidavit in addition to the Nordstrom
debt that was listed on the plaintiff’s financial affidavit,
while the plaintiff was assigned only her attorney’s fees.
The defendant claims that the court’s financial orders
are impossible for him to carry out and ‘‘disproportion-
ately favor the plaintiff while simultaneously forcing
[him] into financial poverty.’’
At the outset, we reject the factual premise of the
defendant’s argument. With respect to his assets and
his ability to pay his debts, the defendant does not
account for the value of his restaurant, of which he
was awarded 100 percent, or any income derived there-
from. He also does not consider his share of the values
of the properties in Italy and California.
At trial, the defendant testified that both properties
had a total value of only $10,000, as the land in Italy
was undeveloped agricultural property ‘‘where nothing
3
To arrive at $230,000, the defendant valued his share of the equity in
the marital residence at $180,000 and added the $50,000 that he would retain
from the Chase bank account.
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can be built’’ and the pistachio farm in California had
minimal value because pistachios had not been har-
vested in three years. As to his restaurant, he asserts
that, ‘‘at the time of trial, [his] business had no value,
and in actuality [had] a negative value due to the past
rent due,’’ and that his sole source of income was Social
Security. The court, however, rejected these conten-
tions. Although the court did not assign specific values
to the defendant’s assets or make a specific finding
as to his income,4 it found that, ‘‘[a]ccording to [the
defendant’s] testimony, the assets in his name have no
value and his business makes no income for him. The
court does not find the defendant’s testimony credi-
ble.’’5 (Emphasis added.) We will not disturb this credi-
bility determination made by the court. See Fronsaglia
v. Fronsaglia, supra, 202 Conn. App. 779; see also Greco
v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 359 (on appeal, ‘‘[w]e cannot
retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the wit-
nesses’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The defendant’s argument with respect to the amount
of debt assigned to him similarly rests on a faulty prem-
ise. The defendant states that the court assigned him
more than $1 million of debt, which encompassed all
of the liabilities reflected on his financial affidavit. The
court, however, provided that, from the sale of the mari-
tal residence, ‘‘the current mortgage and equity line on
4
‘‘Our Supreme Court . . . has recognized that [t]he court need not . . .
assign specific values to the parties’ assets.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Walton v. Walton, 227 Conn. App. 251, 266, 321 A.3d 1180 (2024). Here,
the defendant cannot assert that the court improperly failed to assign a
specific value to his assets given the scant evidence of valuation presented
by the parties. See id., 267.
5
The court explained that ‘‘[t]he defendant failed to list accounts, assets,
and partnership interests on his financial affidavit. He failed to produce
important discovery to the plaintiff until shortly before trial.’’ For instance,
the court noted that, even though the defendant characterized the land in
California as worthless, he had sold a portion of land near the pistachio
farmland in January, 2022, from which he testified to receiving approximately
$247,000 and depositing it into a bank account.
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the property shall be paid from the gross proceeds.’’
The mortgage and home equity line of credit make up
$441,630 of the debt listed on the defendant’s financial
affidavit. Thus, the amount of debt assigned to the
defendant is significantly less than what he posits on
appeal.
Considering the evidence in the record and the facts
found by the trial court, we cannot conclude that the
court abused its discretion in issuing its financial
orders. Although the court awarded a larger portion of
the marital assets to the plaintiff, ‘‘[t]here is no set
formula the court is obligated to apply when dividing
the parties’ assets and . . . the court is vested with
broad discretion in fashioning financial orders.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Pencheva-Hasse v.
Hasse, 221 Conn. App. 113, 132, 300 A.3d 1175 (2023).
Section 46b-81 ‘‘authorizes the court to assign to either
spouse all, or any part of, the estate of the other spouse.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wethington v.
Wethington, supra, 223 Conn. App. 734–35. Thus, even if
the court distributed the parties’ property in the manner
described by the defendant, such that the plaintiff
received approximately 70 percent of the assets and
the defendant received approximately 30 percent, that
does not, by itself, render the court’s award inequitable.
See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 122, 161 A.3d
1236 (2017) (concluding that ‘‘a distribution ratio of 78
percent to 22 percent is not, on its face, excessive,’’
and observing that ‘‘we have upheld distributions
awarding as much as 90 percent of the marital estate
to one party’’).
Furthermore, the court’s distribution reasonably
could have reflected the unequal earnings potential of
the parties.6 See id.; see also Wethington v. Wethington,
6
In its decision, the court did not explicitly discuss the factors set forth
in § 46b-81 (c). Nevertheless, we may examine what the court reasonably
could have considered, on the basis of the facts it found, in support of its
conclusion. See K. S. v. R. S., 350 Conn. 692, 730–31, 326 A.3d 187 (2024).
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supra, 223 Conn. App. 734–35 (in determining assign-
ment of marital property under § 46b-81, court shall
consider, among other things, amount and sources of
income, earning capacity, employability, and opportu-
nity of each party for future acquisition of capital assets
and income). As explained previously, the court did
not credit the defendant’s testimony that he earned
no income from his business. The defendant himself
testified that the restaurant would earn him income in
the future, and the court acknowledged that testimony
in its decision. The court found that, throughout the
parties’ marriage, the defendant had been involved in
various business ventures with fluctuating income,
making up to $500,000 in some years, whereas the plain-
tiff was the primary caregiver for the parties’ children
and had not been employed full-time for decades, and
she was currently supported financially by her father.7
The court also reasonably could have considered
that, apart from the mortgage and home equity debt
already discussed, the remaining liabilities listed on
the defendant’s financial affidavit—including $21,878 in
sales tax debt, $40,000 in income tax debt,8 $220,000
owed in back rent, $92,996 owed on an Italmood, Inc.,
credit line, and more than $120,000 in credit card
debt9—were debts related to the defendant’s business.
7
The plaintiff’s financial affidavit reflected that she received $233 per week
from Social Security and $115.38 per week in interest from the investment
of proceeds from the sale of the property in Greece, although the plaintiff
testified that she had not collected the interest in two years.
8
Although the defendant characterized the income tax debt as the personal
debt of both parties, he explained that the debt was incurred because he
withdrew money from a defined benefit pension plan to open his restaurant,
and he deferred the payment of taxes at that time.
9
The defendant testified that the only credit card that was not used for
his business was the Nordstrom credit card, which the plaintiff also listed
on her financial affidavit. With respect to the Nordstrom credit card debt,
the plaintiff testified that the defendant had cut off her access to the credit
card when she told him she wanted a divorce, and, at that time, there was
no balance due.
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Thus, it was not inequitable for the court to assign
the responsibility of those debts to the defendant. See
Fronsaglia v. Fronsaglia, supra, 202 Conn. App. 780
(rejecting claim that property distribution was grossly
disproportionate because defendant, inter alia, failed
to account for fact that ‘‘the debts apportioned to him
included business obligations that he solely and unilat-
erally accumulated throughout the marriage, largely
without the plaintiff’s knowledge and over which the
plaintiff had no control’’); see also Rozsa v. Rozsa, 117
Conn. App. 1, 13, 977 A.2d 722 (2009) (plaintiff’s claim
that court improperly ordered him to pay all of marital
debt was unavailing where record revealed that ‘‘the
majority of the liabilities that were assigned to him
stemmed from his business dealings’’).
We therefore conclude that the court’s order was fair
and equitable. In light of the assets awarded to the
defendant and his ability to earn income, the order did
not constitute the imposition of a financial obligation
on the defendant that he cannot possibly meet or that
rendered him destitute. See Valentine v. Valentine,
supra, 164 Conn. App. 367. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion in distributing
the marital property and assigning the marital debt.
II
The defendant next claims that the court improperly
distributed the marital residence. Specifically, he argues
that the court improperly concluded that (1) the trust
holding title to the marital residence was revocable and,
therefore, that the property was part of the marital
estate and subject to equitable distribution pursuant to
§ 46b-81, and (2) the parties’ children were not neces-
sary parties to the action. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to the resolution of this claim. The parties
had the marital residence built in Easton and moved
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in when construction was completed in 1999 or 2000.
The plaintiff described the home as being very large,
approximately 3900 square feet, with four bedrooms,
four and one-half bathrooms, and many custom fea-
tures. At the urging of the plaintiff’s father, the parties
put the marital residence into the trust.
Throughout the dissolution proceedings, the defen-
dant listed the marital residence as the parties’ joint
asset on his financial affidavits, but, when trial was
scheduled to begin, he removed the property from his
financial affidavit and claimed that it belonged to the
trust. During trial, the trust declaration was admitted
into evidence. Both parties acknowledged that they
signed title to the property as trustees back to them-
selves jointly several times over the years to refinance
and to obtain a second mortgage on the marital resi-
dence. Nevertheless, the defendant testified that the
trust was irrevocable and that the parties’ children were
the beneficiaries of the trust; the plaintiff, on the other
hand, testified that the trust was revocable and that
she and the defendant were the beneficiaries during
their lifetimes.
In its memorandum of decision, the court recognized
that ‘‘[a] major issue of contention between the parties
was . . . whether this court can order the sale of the
marital property’’ given that title to the property was
in the name of the trust. The court determined that,
pursuant to the trust declaration, the parties are the
trustees of the trust, settlors of the trust and the lifetime
beneficiaries of the trust. The court recognized that the
trust declaration includes provisions that benefit the
parties’ children, but only following the death of both
parties. The court additionally noted that the trust dec-
laration provides that the parties, as the settlors, may
revoke the trust during their lifetimes.
The court also determined as a threshold matter that
California law governed the construction of the trust
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pursuant to a choice of law provision contained in the
trust declaration,10 but that the ultimate issue of
whether the court could distribute the marital residence
was governed by Connecticut law.11 The court explained
that, pursuant to California case law, legal title to prop-
erty owned by a trust is held by the trustee rather
than by the trust itself, and, when property is held in
a revocable inter vivos trust, the settlor and lifetime
beneficiary have the equivalent of full ownership of the
property. Applying these legal principles to the present
case, the court concluded: ‘‘In the present case,
according to the trust declaration, the parties are the
trustees of the trust and are both the trust’s settlors
and the beneficiaries of the trust during their lifetimes.
10
Article 6.1 of the trust provides in relevant part: ‘‘The validity of this
trust and the construction of its beneficial provisions shall be governed by
the laws of the State of California in force from time to time. This Section
shall apply regardless of any change of residence of the Trustee or any
beneficiary . . . .’’
11
The court also addressed a forum selection clause contained in article
4.1 of the trust declaration, which provides that ‘‘[t]he appropriate Superior
Court of the State of California shall have jurisdiction for all the purposes
set forth in Section 17,200 of the California Probate Code.’’ The court con-
cluded that the provision is permissive rather than mandatory, as it does
not include language indicating exclusivity, and it therefore did not deprive
the court of jurisdiction. See Animal Film, LLC v. D.E.J. Productions, Inc.,
193 Cal. App. 4th 466, 471–72, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (2011) (explaining that
permissive forum selection clauses ‘‘provide for submission to jurisdiction
in a particular forum without mandating it,’’ whereas mandatory forum
selection clauses contain ‘‘language of exclusivity’’).
The defendant challenges this aspect of the court’s decision in a cursory
manner, arguing that the language of the forum selection clause is ‘‘exclusive
and therefore clearly mandatory’’ because of its use of the term ‘‘shall.’’ We
are not persuaded. Under California law, language providing that a court
‘‘shall have jurisdiction’’ does not indicate exclusivity of jurisdiction. See
Intershop Communications AG v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 4th 191,
196–97, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847 (2002) (in comparing cases, use of phrase
‘‘shall have jurisdiction’’ was permissive, whereas use of phrase ‘‘shall have
exclusive jurisdiction’’ was mandatory (emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted)), review denied, California Supreme Court, Docket No.
S112955 (March 26, 2003); see also Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme
Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the forum selection
clause did not deprive the court of personal jurisdiction over the parties.
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. . . As such, they have the equivalent of full ownership
of the trust property, which includes the marital [resi-
dence]. . . . Moreover, as trustees, the parties hold
legal title to the trust property, subject to their fiduciary
relationship regarding the property. . . . Because the
terms of the trust include no provision preventing the
parties as trustees from transferring title of the marital
[residence] to themselves or from selling the marital
[residence], and the terms include a provision permit-
ting the parties to revoke the trust, the parties’ fiduciary
obligations would not be implicated by an order from
the court to sell the property and distribute the pro-
ceeds. Thus, the parties hold title to the marital [resi-
dence] and may sell or transfer [it] without violating
their fiduciary obligations.’’12 (Citations omitted.) The
court further concluded: ‘‘[T]his court has the authority
to order the sale of the marital [residence] and distribute
the proceeds because the parties as trustees hold legal
title to the marital [residence] and such an order would
not violate any of the parties’ fiduciary obligations
under the trust.’’
After determining that ‘‘Connecticut courts have
treated trust assets as ‘property’ under § 46b-81 and,
accordingly, distributed the assets between the parties
incident to a dissolution of marriage when the parties
had interests in the trust that were more than mere
expectancies,’’ the court ordered the parties to sell the
marital residence.
Before turning to the defendant’s specific arguments
in support of his claim on appeal, we set forth our
standard of review. ‘‘Because resolution of this issue
turns on construing trust language and applying legal
principles, it is subject to plenary review.’’ Ferri v. Pow-
ell-Ferri, 326 Conn. 438, 455, 165 A.3d 1137 (2017).
12
The court concluded that it would reach the same result if it applied
Connecticut law.
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A
The defendant first argues that the court improperly
concluded that the trust is revocable and, therefore,
that the marital residence is subject to equitable distri-
bution. Specifically, he argues that the trust is irrevoca-
ble as it relates to the marital residence because (1)
the marital residence is not community property, and
(2) an amendment to the trust contains a no contest
clause. The defendant further contends that, because
the trust is irrevocable, he has no control over the trust
property, neither party owns the marital residence, and
it therefore cannot be distributed pursuant to § 46b-81.
We are not persuaded.
As the trial court determined, our construction of the
trust declaration is governed by the laws of the state
of California pursuant to a choice of law provision con-
tained in the trust declaration. Under California law,
‘‘a trustee holds legal title to property held in trust.’’
Boshernitsan v. Bach, 61 Cal. App. 5th 883, 892, 276
Cal. Rptr. 3d 109 (2021); see also JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. v. Ward, 33 Cal. App. 5th 678, 685, 245 Cal. Rptr.
3d 303 (2019). ‘‘Furthermore, when settlors transfer
property to a revocable living trust, there is even more
reason to conclude that the property’s title is held by
the trustees, not the trust. Such property is considered
the property of the settlor for the settlor’s lifetime. . . .
[A] revocable inter vivos trust is recognized as simply
a probate avoidance device, and when property is held
in this type of trust, the settlor and lifetime beneficiary
has the equivalent of full ownership of the property.’’
(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Boshernitsan v. Bach, supra, 891–92.
In the present case, the trust declaration explicitly
provides that the trust is revocable by either party dur-
ing their joint lifetimes. Specifically, article 3.1 of the
trust declaration provides in relevant part: ‘‘During the
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joint lifetimes of the Settlors, this trust may be revoked
in whole or in part with respect to community property
by an instrument in writing signed by either Settlor and
delivered to the Trustee and the other Settlor, and with
respect to separate property by an instrument in writing
signed by the Settlor who contributed that property to
the trust, delivered to the Trustee. On revocation, the
Trustee shall promptly deliver to both Settlors all or
the designated portion of the community property trust
assets, which shall continue to be the community prop-
erty of the Settlors and shall be held and administered
as community property. On revocation with respect to
separate property, the Trustee shall promptly deliver
to the contributing Settlor all or the designated portion
of that property. . . .’’
Notwithstanding this provision, the defendant first
contends that the marital residence is not community
property, and the trust is irrevocable as it relates to
noncommunity property. Specifically, the defendant
argues that the parties entered into a community prop-
erty agreement on August 18, 1997,13 the same date they
created the trust, ‘‘which defined the property to be
placed in the trust.’’ The defendant contends that he
purchased the marital residence in his name alone after
the community property agreement was executed, and,
thus, it is not community property. We are not per-
suaded by the defendant’s argument. Article 3.1 of the
trust declaration provides that the trust is revocable
with respect to both community property and separate
property.14 Accordingly, the revocability of the trust
13
The community property agreement was admitted as a full exhibit at
trial.
14
In one portion of his appellate brief, the defendant states that ‘‘the trust
is not community property, nor separate property,’’ but he does not explain
how the property, if neither, would be characterized. See In re Marriage
of Valli, 58 Cal. 4th 1396, 1399, 324 P.3d 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454 (2014)
(characterizing marital assets as either community property or separate
property).
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does not turn on whether the marital residence is char-
acterized as community property.
The defendant also argues, with sparse analysis, that
a no contest clause contained in an amendment to the
trust, dated September 29, 2010, ‘‘clearly creates an
unbreakable irrevocable trust.’’15 The no contest clause
provides in relevant part: ‘‘If any person, singly or in
conjunction with any other person or persons, contests
in any court the validity of this trust or of a deceased
Settlor’s last Will or seeks to obtain an adjudication in
any proceeding in any court that this trust or any of its
provisions or that such Will or any of its provisions is
void, or seeks otherwise to void, nullify, or set aside
this trust or any of its provisions, then the right of that
person to take any interest in such Settlor’s estate or
in this trust shall be determined as it would have been
determined had the person predeceased the execution
of this instrument without surviving issue. . . .’’
The foregoing language, however, already was
included in article 6.8 of the original trust declaration.16
We must ‘‘construe all parts of the instrument in relation
to one another to form a consistent whole.’’ Autono-
mous Region of Narcotics Anonymous v. Narcotics
Anonymous World Services, Inc., 77 Cal. App. 5th 950,
960–61, 292 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851 (2022); see also Trolan v.
Trolan, 31 Cal. App. 5th 939, 949, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264
(2019) (‘‘the court must consider the whole of the trust
instrument, not just separate parts of it’’). In addition,
‘‘[w]e are required to construe the trust so as to give
effect to each term it contains’’ and to read the trust
declaration in a manner that ‘‘give[s] every expression
some effect, rather than one that will render any of
15
The September 29, 2010 amendment to the trust was admitted as a full
exhibit at trial.
16
The only new language contained in the amendment provides instruction
as to how to proceed if the trust is contested by certain family members.
The defendant does not rely on this new language in support of his argument.
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the expressions inoperative.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Trolan v. Trolan, supra, 950. Considering the
trust declaration as a consistent whole, we are not per-
suaded that the no contest clause renders the trust
irrevocable or that the amendment otherwise affects
the revocability of the trust. Instead, because the origi-
nal trust declaration includes both the no contest clause
in article 6.8 and the revocation clause in article 3.1—
which explicitly authorizes the parties to revoke the
trust during their joint lifetimes—we cannot conclude
that revocation of the trust would violate the no contest
clause, as the defendant argues. The court, therefore,
properly determined that the trust is revocable and, as
a result, that the parties have the equivalent of full
ownership of the property as the settlors and lifetime
beneficiaries of the trust. See Boshernitsan v. Bach,
supra, 61 Cal. App. 5th 891–92.

Because the court properly determined that the trust
is revocable and that the parties have the equivalent of
full ownership of the property, we further conclude that
the court properly included the marital residence in the
marital assets subject to equitable distribution pursuant
to § 46b-81. Although our construction of the trust dec-
laration was governed by California law, the ultimate
question of whether the marital residence was properly
subject to distribution as part of the parties’ marital
estate must be determined under the law of this state.
See Tremaine v. Tremaine, 235 Conn. 45, 61 n.16, 663
A.2d 387 (1995). Section 46b-81 (a) provides: ‘‘At the
time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a mar-
riage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint
under section 46b-45, the Superior Court may assign to
either spouse all or any part of the estate of the other
spouse. The court may pass title to real property to
either party or to a third person or may order the sale
of such real property, without any act by either spouse,
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when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode
to carry the decree into effect.’’
To determine whether a party’s interest in property
held in a trust is subject to equitable distribution pursu-
ant to § 46b-81, Connecticut courts consider whether
the party has a presently existing interest in the trust
property that is more than a mere ‘‘expectancy . . . .’’
Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 227–28, 527 A.2d 1184
(1987); see also, e.g., Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn.
783, 797, 663 A.2d 365 (1995) (‘‘§ 46b-81 applies only to
presently existing property interests, not mere expec-
tancies’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). If the
party is a residuary beneficiary with an unvested inter-
est in the trust, or if the party created the trust for the
benefit of another, he does not have a presently existing
interest in the trust property. See Powell-Ferri v. Ferri,
326 Conn. 457, 465, 165 A.3d 1124 (2017); Smith v.
Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 274, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999); Rubin
v. Rubin, supra, 227–28; Cooley v. Cooley, 32 Conn. App.
152, 162–63, 628 A.2d 608, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 901,
634 A.2d 295 (1993). In addition, property held in trust
may not be considered an asset of a party if he has
no authority to invade the principal of the trust. See
Tremaine v. Tremaine, supra, 235 Conn. 64.
In the present case, because the parties currently are
the beneficiaries of the trust during their lifetimes, and
they have the ability under the trust declaration to
invade the trust property by revoking the trust, we con-
clude that they have a presently existing interest in the
marital residence held by that trust. Accordingly, the
court properly concluded that the marital residence
was distributable marital property pursuant to § 46b-81.
B
The defendant also contends that the court improp-
erly concluded that the parties’ children were not neces-
sary parties for the purpose of distributing the marital
residence from the trust.
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This court has adopted the view ‘‘that a third person
with a claimed interest in property that is the subject
of a dissolution action may properly be joined as a
party. . . . [A]lthough the spouses are ordinarily the
only proper parties to a dissolution action, joinder or
intervention of third parties is permissible where third
parties claim an interest in property involved in the
proceedings. . . . The policy supporting this view is
the desirability of avoiding multiple suits and of granting
complete relief in a single proceeding.’’ (Citations omit-
ted.) Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 293, 580 A.2d
1212, cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803, 584 A.2d 471 (1990).
‘‘Necessary parties . . . are those [p]ersons having
an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be
made parties, in order that the court may act on that
rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine
the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by
adjusting all the rights involved in it. . . . [B]ut if their
interests are separable from those of the parties before
the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree,
and do complete and final justice, without affecting
other persons not before the court, the latter are not
indispensable parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Garden Homes Profit Sharing Trust, L.P. v. Cyr,
189 Conn. App. 75, 82 n.4, 206 A.3d 230 (2019).
‘‘Parties are considered indispensable when they not
only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest
of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made
without either affecting that interest, or leaving the
controversy in such condition that its final [disposition]
may be . . . inconsistent with equity and good con-
science. . . . Indispensable parties must be joined
because due process principles make it essential that
[such parties] be given notice and an opportunity to
protect [their] interests by making [them] a party to the
[action].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kosiorek
v. Smigelski, 138 Conn. App. 695, 705–706, 54 A.3d 564
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(2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 901, 60 A.3d 287 (2013);
see also Bender v. Bender, 292 Conn. 696, 723 n.23,
975 A.2d 636 (2009) (‘‘the nonjoinder of indispensable
parties may violate due process because such parties
must be given notice and an opportunity to protect their
interests’’).
In the present case, as the trial court determined,
the trust contains provisions that benefit the parties’
children following the death of both parties. Specifi-
cally, article 2.4 of the trust provides that, upon the
death of the surviving spouse, the parties’ children
would each receive an equal share of the trust property.
Prior to trial, the plaintiff filed a motion to cite in
the cotrustees of the trust as an additional defendant,
which the court granted, and she amended her com-
plaint to reflect the parties’ interests in the marital resi-
dence as the trustees and beneficiaries to the trust. The
plaintiff did not seek to join the parties’ children as
additional parties, and the children did not seek to inter-
vene in the action. The defendant’s answer to the
amended complaint contained a special defense in
which he claimed that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff failed to join all
interested and indispensable parties to the action as
jurisdictionally required, and therefore no relief can
be granted without affording all the beneficiaries an
opportunity to be heard.’’
In its memorandum of decision, the court determined
that the parties’ children did not need to be joined as
parties to the action. The court concluded that, ‘‘when
distributing trust assets incident to a dissolution of mar-
riage, children who are beneficiaries to the trust do not
need to be joined as parties if they have no legal interest
in the trust assets yet.’’ In support of its conclusion,
the court cited Salvio v. Salvio, 186 Conn. 311, 441 A.2d
190 (1982), which held that the savings account trusts of
the parties’ children were marital property, and because
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those beneficiaries ‘‘had acquired no legal interest in
the funds on deposit, they were not necessary parties
for the purpose of establishing the trial court’s jurisdic-
tion over those accounts.’’ Id., 323–25.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the parties’ chil-
dren were ‘‘indispensable parties’’ because they were
remainder beneficiaries with a vested interest in the
trust property. The defendant contends that, because
the children were not made parties to the action, the
court lacked jurisdiction to issue any orders related to
the trust. He also argues that the children’s due process
rights were violated by the court’s order related to
the trust.
Initially, we note that ‘‘[i]t is well settled that the
failure to join an indispensable party does not deprive
a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.’’17 (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Day v. Seblatnigg, 186 Conn.
App. 482, 497, 199 A.3d 1103 (2018), aff’d, 341 Conn.
815, 268 A.3d 595 (2022); see also Bender v. Bender,
supra, 292 Conn. 723 n.23. In addition, the defendant
failed to file a motion to strike the plaintiff’s amended
complaint for the nonjoinder of indispensable parties.18
‘‘[A]s set forth in [Practice Book §] 10-39,19 the exclusive
17
‘‘[T]he failure to join an indispensable party results in a jurisdictional
defect only if a statute mandates the naming and serving of [a particular]
party.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Day v.
Seblatnigg, 186 Conn. App. 482, 497, 199 A.3d 1103 (2018), aff’d, 341 Conn.
815, 268 A.3d 595 (2022). In the present case, the defendant does not argue
that joinder of the parties’ children was statutorily mandated.
18
The defendant did file a motion to strike the plaintiff’s amended com-
plaint, but it was based solely on the ground that certain counts failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See part III of this opinion.
19
Practice Book § 10-39 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A motion to strike
shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest . . . (3) the legal suffi-
ciency of any such complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any count
thereof, because of the absence of any necessary party or, pursuant to
Section 17-56 (b), the failure to join or give notice to any interested person
. . . . (d) A motion to strike on the ground of the nonjoinder of a necessary
party or noncompliance with Section 17-56 (b) must give the name and
residence of the missing party or interested person or such information as
the moving party has as to the identity and residence of the missing party
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remedy for nonjoinder of parties is by motion to strike.’’
(Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Kosiorek v. Smigelski, supra, 138 Conn. App. 705. Nev-
ertheless, the defendant raised the indispensable party
issue as a special defense, which the plaintiff did not
move to strike as permitted under § 10-39 (a) (5). See
Bender v. Bender, supra, 722 n.23. Accordingly, we
review the defendant’s claim to determine whether the
parties’ children were necessary and indispensable par-
ties, such that their omission violated due process; see
id., 722 n.23; or created a final disposition inconsistent
with equity or good conscience. See id., 724.
We conclude that the parties’ children did not have
a present interest in the trust sufficient to require their
participation in the dissolution action. The trust is revo-
cable, as we explained in part II A of this opinion, and
the parties’ children would receive a share of the trust
property only upon the death of both parties. Because
the parties’ children had not yet acquired an interest
in the trust, they were not necessary and indispensable
parties to the action.
Our conclusion is supported by Salvio v. Salvio,
supra, 186 Conn. 311, which similarly involved trusts
that were revocable in nature. In that case, our Supreme
Court considered whether the parties’ children, as bene-
ficiaries of the savings account trusts established by
their parents, ‘‘presently have a beneficial interest in
those accounts sufficient to require their participation
in the dissolution action . . . .’’ Id., 321. The court
looked to General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 36-110, the
statute governing deposits in trust; id.; which is now
codified at General Statutes § 36a-296. The court deter-
mined that there was a statutory presumption under
which the beneficiary of an unqualified savings account
or interested person and must state the missing party’s or interested person’s
interest in the cause of action.’’
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trust acquires no legal interest in the funds on deposit
until the death of the depositor. Id., 322. In light of that
statutory presumption, and ‘‘[i]n the absence of any
unequivocal act by the defendant rendering the savings
account trusts irrevocable or otherwise transferring
ownership rights to the beneficiaries,’’ our Supreme
Court determined that the parties’ children ‘‘held no
beneficial interest in the accounts at the time of the
dissolution of their parents’ marriage.’’ Id., 323. The
court concluded that, because the parties’ children had
not acquired a legal interest in the savings account
trusts, they were not necessary parties to the action.
Id., 324.
The defendant argues that the present case is distin-
guishable from Salvio because the trusts at issue in that
case were bank accounts, unaccompanied by written
instruction, that were revocable pursuant to a statutory
presumption. The defendant contends that, in contrast
to Salvio, the trust in the present case has ‘‘an extensive
written estate plan in place,’’ under the terms of which
the interests of the parties’ children have vested. The
defendant is correct that the savings account trusts in
Salvio were not accompanied by a statement describing
the nature of the trusts. See Salvio v. Salvio, supra, 186
Conn. 312–13. The fact that there is a written trust
declaration in the present case, however, does not sup-
port the defendant’s claim. As we already have
explained, the terms of the trust explicitly provide that
the trust is revocable and that the parties’ children
would receive a share of the trust property only upon
the death of both parties. Thus, under those terms, the
parties’ children did not have a vested interest in the
trust. See Bartlett v. Bartlett, 220 Conn. 372, 376 and
n.6, 599 A.2d 14 (1991) (beneficiary of revocable trust
does not have vested property interest, but rather mere
expectancy, until death of settlor renders trust irrevoca-
ble); Rubin v. Rubin, supra, 204 Conn. 230–32 (same);
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see also, e.g., Krafick v. Krafick, supra, 234 Conn. 788
n.12 (‘‘by ‘vested’ we refer to pension interests ‘in which
an employee has an irrevocable . . . right, in the
future, to receive his or her account balance . . . or
his or her accrued benefit . . . regardless of whether
the employment relationship continues’ ’’ (emphasis
added)). Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant
failed to establish that the parties’ children were neces-
sary and indispensable parties to the action.
III
The defendant next claims that the plaintiff failed to
plead sufficient facts to support a cause of action in
counts two and three of her revised complaint. Specifi-
cally, the defendant contends that ‘‘the plaintiff failed
to allege any new facts in count two or in count three
of her [amended] complaint . . . other than those facts
that were originally claimed in the dissolution action,
related to a claim regarding the [trust], that would give
rise to a Connecticut cause of action under our law’’
and failed to allege the violation of any law.20 (Citation
omitted.) In response, the plaintiff argues, inter alia,
that she ‘‘was not pleading, nor did she have to, that
the trustees or beneficiaries engaged in wrongful con-
duct. She was putting them on notice that she was
asking the court to award her an interest in the [marital
residence], in accordance with . . . § 46b-81, [and]
that they themselves may have an interest.’’ We agree
with the plaintiff.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. On February 16,
2022, when the parties’ dissolution trial was scheduled
to begin, the defendant’s counsel brought to the court’s
attention that the marital residence was held in trust.
The following day, the court continued the trial to afford
20
We note that the defendant’s brief is far from a model of clear analysis,
and this claim in particular is difficult to divine.
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the parties an opportunity to address the issue of the
trust.
On February 24, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion to
cite in the trust as an additional defendant, with an
amended complaint attached. The court granted the
motion and ordered that ‘‘the complaint be amended
to state facts showing the interest of [the trust] in this
action and summon [the trust] to appear as a defendant
in this action . . . .’’
The defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
the action as against the trust on the basis that the
proposed amended complaint attached to the motion
to cite in, which had not been filed with the court, also
had not been properly served on the trust. The court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. On August
2, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion to cite in the cotrus-
tees of the trust as an additional defendant, which the
court granted.
On August 31, 2022, the plaintiff filed the operative
amended complaint, which contains three counts.21
Count one, which was directed at the defendant, con-
tained essentially the same allegations as the original
complaint, seeking a dissolution of her marriage to the
defendant along with, inter alia, an equitable property
division. In count two of the amended complaint, which
was directed at both parties as trustees of the trust,
the plaintiff alleged that the parties were cotrustees of
the trust, which they created in August, 1997; that the
trust currently owns the marital residence; that the par-
ties made several transfers of the marital residence
throughout the years; that the parties used that marital
residence as their marital home; and that ‘‘the plaintiff
21
We note that, although the plaintiff labeled the operative complaint as
a ‘‘cross complaint,’’ the parties agree that it is, in effect, an amended
complaint, and the defendant does not take issue with the mislabeling of
this pleading.
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claims an interest in [the marital residence] pursuant
to [§] 46b-81 and such other [relief] as the court may
deem appropriate and proper.’’ Count three repeated
the same allegations set forth in count two except that
it named the parties as beneficiaries of the trust.
On November 18, 2022, the defendant filed a motion
to strike counts two and three of the amended com-
plaint, claiming, inter alia, that those counts failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
court denied the defendant’s motion to strike. The court
explained in relevant part: ‘‘In the present dissolution
of marriage action, title to the parties’ marital residence
is held in trust. The plaintiff and the defendant are
cotrustees pursuant to the trust agreement and are also
beneficiaries of the trust. The plaintiff alleges in count
two of her [amended] complaint . . . that the parties
are trustees of the [marital residence] and that the prop-
erty was the parties’ marital home. The plaintiff claims
an interest in this real property pursuant to . . . § 46b-
81 as trustee of the trust . . . . The plaintiff alleges in
count three of her [amended] complaint, inter alia, that
the parties have an interest in the [marital residence]
as beneficiaries of the trust agreement. The plaintiff
claims an interest in the [marital residence] pursuant
to . . . § 46b-81 as a beneficiary of the trust . . . .
The court finds that the allegations of counts two and
three of the plaintiff’s [amended] complaint, if proven,
support causes of action claiming an interest in the
[marital residence] in this dissolution of marriage
action. The court therefore denies the defendant’s
motion to strike.’’ (Citation omitted.)
The defendant subsequently filed an answer and spe-
cial defenses in which he again asserted, inter alia,
that counts two and three of the plaintiff’s amended
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted; that the plaintiff ‘‘fail[ed] to allege any ille-
gal, wrongful and/or tortious action’’ in those counts;
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that the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the trust
and to award the real property owned by the trust
pursuant to § 46b-81; and that, by entering into the trust,
the plaintiff abandoned her equitable rights in the real
property owned by the trust. The plaintiff did not file
a reply to the special defenses.22 In its decision, the
court did not explicitly address the special defenses
raised by the defendant. Nevertheless, in reaching its
conclusion that the marital residence was subject to
equitable distribution pursuant to § 46b-81, the court
necessarily rejected the defendant’s arguments.
On appeal, the defendant argues that, in counts two
and three of the amended complaint, the plaintiff has
failed to allege facts that ‘‘violate Connecticut law in
any way, shape, or form’’ and that ‘‘[n]either the court
nor the defendant can read the plaintiff’s mind in an
attempt to determine what illegality, breach, and/or tor-
tious conduct she is trying to allege, if any.’’
On the basis of our review of the amended complaint,
however, it is clear that the plaintiff was not attempting
to raise separate causes of action against the trust, or
to allege any wrongdoing in connection with the trust,
in counts two and three. Instead, as the court concluded
in its denial of the defendant’s motion to strike,23 counts
22
In his appellate reply brief, the defendant focuses on the plaintiff’s
failure to file a reply to his special defenses. He argues that, pursuant to
Practice Book § 10-19, the plaintiff’s failure to respond to his special defenses
results in her admission of the allegations contained therein. See Practice
Book § 10-19 (‘‘[e]very material allegation in any pleading which is not denied
by the adverse party shall be deemed to be admitted, unless such party
avers that he or she has not any knowledge or information thereof sufficient
to form a belief’’). The defendant, however, did not make this argument
before the trial court, and we will not address a claim raised for the first
time on appeal. See, e.g., Westry v. Litchfield Visitation Center, 216 Conn.
App. 869, 878, 287 A.3d 188 (2022) (‘‘[o]ur appellate courts, as a general
practice, will not review claims made for the first time on appeal’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
23
On appeal, the defendant does not address the court’s decision on the
motion to strike.
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two and three of the amended complaint served to
identify the parties as beneficiaries and trustees of the
trust and to claim an interest in the property held in that
trust pursuant to § 46b-81. This is particularly apparent
when viewed in the context of the procedural history
of this case, as the plaintiff’s amendment to the com-
plaint was consistent with the court’s order, in granting
the plaintiff’s first motion to cite in the trust as an
additional defendant, that ‘‘the complaint be amended
to state facts showing the interest of [the trust] in this
action . . . .’’ Because the plaintiff was not raising a
separate cause of action in count two or in count three
of her amended complaint, we conclude that she was
not required to plead any additional facts.
IV
The defendant’s final claim is that the court improp-
erly denied a motion for contempt that he had filed
prior to trial regarding the plaintiff’s alleged failure to
comply with certain discovery orders. We conclude that
this claim is unreviewable.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. On January 21,
2021, the defendant filed a request for production of
documents, which sought, among other things, state-
ments from bank accounts ‘‘in the name of [the plaintiff]
individually, or in conjunction with any other person(s)
or in the name of others for the use, benefit or trust
for [the plaintiff],’’ and certain documents related to
the sale of the property in Greece.
On January 13, 2022, the defendant filed a motion
to compel the plaintiff to comply with his request for
production of documents. The defendant alleged, in
relevant part, that the plaintiff failed to produce any
personal bank statements and any documents related
to the sale of the property in Greece. On January 14,
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2022, the court granted the defendant’s motion to com-
pel, ordering the plaintiff to ‘‘comply fully with all out-
standing discovery requests on or before January 21,
2022.’’

On November 25, 2022, the defendant filed another
motion to compel. In his motion to compel, the defen-
dant argued that the plaintiff failed to produce any
personal bank statements pursuant to any of his
requests for production, ‘‘even though there is clear
evidence she maintains bank accounts, or has main-
tained bank accounts, outside of the United States and
in California.’’ The defendant, more specifically, alleged
that the plaintiff ‘‘has, or had, a bank account at Pacific
Premier Bank in . . . California’’ and the plaintiff ‘‘has,
or had, a personal bank account in Greece in accord
with her own admissions through three various emails
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) The defendant requested the
court to order the plaintiff to produce those financial
documents immediately. On December 12, 2022, the
court granted the defendant’s motion to compel and
ordered the plaintiff to comply within ten days.

On December 20, 2022, the plaintiff filed a reply to
the defendant’s November 25, 2022 motion to compel.
In her reply, the plaintiff asserted, in relevant part, that
she ‘‘had an account at Piraeus Bank in Greece but
that account was closed and there are no responsive
documents for 2018, 2019, and 2020 for this bank,’’ and
‘‘[t]he Pacific Premier Bank is an account under the
control of [her] father and she has no access to those
statements.’’24
24
The plaintiff responded similarly to a request for production that the
defendant had filed in July, 2022. Specifically, the plaintiff responded that
she had provided the defendant with all of her bank statements and that
‘‘[t]here is no open account at Piraeus Bank in Greece and [she] has no
account at Premier Bank in . . . California.’’ The defendant acknowledged
this response in his November 25, 2022 motion to compel.
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On January 5, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for
contempt in which he claimed that the plaintiff failed
to comply with the court’s January 14 and December
12, 2022 orders granting the defendant’s respective
motions to compel (discovery orders). The defendant
requested as relief, inter alia, that the court order the
plaintiff to provide full discovery compliance immedi-
ately.
On January 9, 2023, the first day of trial, the defendant
filed an amended list of pending motions, which
included his January 5, 2023 motion for contempt.
Before trial started, the defendant’s counsel brought
the motion for contempt to the court’s attention. He
requested that the court address that motion first and
issue an order for the plaintiff to provide the documents
at issue, so that he could have those documents during
the course of the trial. The plaintiff’s counsel responded
that she had already provided the defendant’s counsel
with the financial documents she had and that she
‘‘ha[d] no other documents available to [the plaintiff]
to give to him.’’ The court decided to proceed with
the commencement of trial, explaining that, ‘‘[i]f the
evidence demonstrates that I can make a finding of
contempt, then potentially I’ll make a finding of con-
tempt, but we’re going to proceed at this point.’’
During trial, the defendant’s counsel asked the plain-
tiff about the motion for contempt and the financial
documents that she allegedly had failed to produce,
specifically, ‘‘bank accounts or information about
money held in Greece and a bank account from a Cali-
fornia bank with [the plaintiff’s] name on it.’’ The plain-
tiff responded that she was aware of the defendant’s
motion but that the documents the defendant had
requested ‘‘were unproduceable.’’ She explained that,
although she previously had an account at Piraeus Bank
in Greece, that account had been inactive since 2018,
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it had no money it in, and it had been closed automati-
cally for inactivity after two years. She further explained
that the bank did not send out statements and nothing
was online, so it was impossible for her to get state-
ments from the bank to show that it was closed. As to
the sale of the property in Greece, the plaintiff testified
that she had invested the proceeds, which the defendant
had agreed to do, and the money was not being held
at a bank. The plaintiff also testified that she had not
received any statements, nor had she requested any,
from the person with which she had invested the money,
and she had provided the defendant with everything
she had with respect to the documentation.
Regarding the California bank account, the plaintiff
testified that it was her father’s bank account, and, even
though she was a signer on it, it was not her account,
she did not have access to it, and she had never seen
a statement for it. The defendant’s counsel showed the
plaintiff exhibit S, which was marked as a full exhibit.
Exhibit S is a letter, dated March 5, 2020, that had been
sent from Pacific Premier Bank in California and was
addressed to the plaintiff at the marital residence. The
letter sought to confirm a request from the plaintiff
to change the address information reflected on bank
records, from the address of the marital residence to an
address located in Northridge, California. The plaintiff
testified that she presumed her father had requested
the change of address, as it had her father’s address
on it. The plaintiff further testified that she was not
familiar with the account, she had not previously
received any other statements, and she was not aware
if additional statements had been sent to her at the
marital address because she had not lived there in
nine years.
In its March 13, 2023 memorandum of decision, the
court addressed the pending pendente lite motions:
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‘‘The court has considered all pending motions in mak-
ing this decision. This decision resolves all pending
motions. In the event this decision does not address a
pending motion, the motion is denied.’’
The defendant subsequently filed a motion for articu-
lation in which he requested, among other things, that
the court explain the factual basis for its decision to
deny the pendente lite motions, including the January
5, 2023 motion for contempt. The court summarily
denied the motion for articulation. The defendant did
not file a motion for review of the court’s denial of
the motion for articulation pursuant to Practice Book
§ 66-7.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly denied his motion for contempt. The defen-
dant contends that, in denying his motion for contempt,
the court improperly failed to order the plaintiff to
disclose certain financial documents related to the sale
of the property in Greece and the bank account in
California, and, therefore, the court’s financial orders
were based on false information. We decline to review
this claim because it is inadequately briefed, and the
record is inadequate for review.
We first conclude that the defendant’s claim is inade-
quately briefed. ‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e
are not required to review issues that have been improp-
erly presented to this court through an inadequate brief.
. . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is
asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter
receives only cursory attention in the brief without sub-
stantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is
deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court
to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of
error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and
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Marzaro v. Marzaro

fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Rossi, 346 Conn.
642, 689, 295 A.3d 75 (2023).
In the present case, the defendant’s claim is devoid
of any citations to applicable legal authority. See, e.g.,
C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271
(2022) (brief containing ‘‘almost no citation to applica-
ble legal authorities’’ was inadequate). Although the
defendant’s briefing on this issue contains some cita-
tions to the record and to legal principles about the
importance of discovery in dissolution cases, it does not
contain a discussion of the legal principles pertaining
to motions for contempt. Consequently, the defendant’s
brief also does not provide an analysis applying those
legal principles to the facts of the present case. ‘‘Where
the parties cite no law and provide no analysis of their
claims, we do not review such claims.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) McNamara v. McNamara, 207
Conn. App. 849, 869, 263 A.3d 899 (2021); see also Gra-
ham v. Graham, 222 Conn. App. 560, 580–81, 306 A.3d
499 (2023) (claim was inadequately briefed where appel-
lant failed to provide legal analysis pertaining to applica-
bility of legal doctrines at issue). Accordingly, we con-
clude that the defendant’s claim is inadequately briefed.
Moreover, the record is inadequate to review this
claim. ‘‘It is well established that the appellant bears the
burden of providing an appellate court with an adequate
record for review. . . . It is, therefore, the responsibil-
ity of the appellant to move for an articulation or rectifi-
cation of the record where the trial court has failed to
state the basis of a decision . . . . Without an adequate
record, [w]e . . . are left to surmise or speculate as to
the existence of a factual predicate for the trial court’s
rulings. Our role is not to guess at possibilities, but
to review claims based on a complete factual record
developed by the trial court. . . . Without the neces-
sary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial
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court, either on its own or in response to a proper
motion for articulation, any decision made by us . . .
would be entirely speculative.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Park
City Sports, LLC, 180 Conn. App. 765, 781, 184 A.3d
1277, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 901, 192 A.3d 426 (2018).
The defendant’s claim that the plaintiff failed to com-
ply with the court’s discovery orders is premised on
his contention that ‘‘the evidence at trial demonstrated
that the information/documents existed.’’ As set forth
previously in this opinion, however, the plaintiff testi-
fied at trial that the documents did not exist, or, alterna-
tively, that she did not have access to them. The plain-
tiff’s testimony was subject to a credibility
determination by the court and, to the extent that it
conflicted with the evidence presented by the defen-
dant, that was a matter for the court to resolve. See
Delena v. Grachitorena, 216 Conn. App. 225, 231, 283
A.3d 1090 (2022) (‘‘[i]t is the exclusive province of the
trier of fact to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether to
accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). It is unclear from the
court’s memorandum of decision to what extent the
court relied on or credited the plaintiff’s testimony and
whether the court found that the documents requested
by the defendant in fact existed.25 Thus, the record is
inadequate for review. See In re Vada V., 343 Conn.
25
If the court found the plaintiff’s testimony credible, it reasonably could
have concluded that the plaintiff had complied with the court’s discovery
orders and, thus, that the defendant had failed to prove the plaintiff’s wilful
noncompliance with those orders; see Puff v. Puff, 334 Conn. 341, 365,
222 A.3d 493 (2020) (party seeking order of contempt must prove alleged
contemnor’s wilful noncompliance with order); or that the plaintiff was
unable to comply with the court’s orders because she did not have access
to any additional documents. See id. (‘‘[t]he inability of a party to obey an
order of the court, without fault on his part, is a good defense to the charge
of contempt’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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730, 742, 275 A.3d 1172 (2022) (record was inadequate
to review respondents’ claims because it was silent on,
and in some cases undermined, factual predicates to
claims).
Although the defendant sought an articulation of the
factual basis of the court’s decision to deny his motion
for contempt, he failed to file a motion for review of
the court’s denial of the motion for articulation pursuant
to Practice Book § 66-7. ‘‘[W]here a party is dissatisfied
with the trial court’s response to a motion for articula-
tion, he may, and indeed under appropriate circum-
stances he must, seek immediate appeal . . . to this
court via the motion for review.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hallock v. Hallock, 228 Conn. App. 81,
92 n.7, 324 A.3d 193 (2024). We recognize that, pursuant
to Practice Book § 61-10 (b), ‘‘[t]he failure of any party
on appeal to seek articulation pursuant to [Practice
Book §] 66-5 shall not be the sole ground upon which
the court declines to review any issue or claim on
appeal.’’ In the present case, however, Practice Book
§ 61-10 (b) does not bar forfeiture of the defendant’s
claim because his failure to file a motion for review is
not the sole ground upon which we decline to review
his claim; instead, as we already have discussed, the
claim also is inadequately briefed. See Pryor v. Pryor,
162 Conn. App. 451, 459 n.7, 133 A.3d 463 (2016) (Prac-
tice Book § 61-10 (b) did not shield defendant from
forfeiture of appellate review because, ‘‘besides failing
to seek an articulation to provide an adequate record,
the defendant has failed to adequately brief his claims’’);
see also Gallagher v. Fairfield, 339 Conn. 801, 817,
262 A.3d 742 (2021) (declining to consider claim where
claim was inadequately briefed and record was inade-
quate, as plaintiff had not requested articulation); State
v. Waters, 214 Conn. App. 294, 330–31, 280 A.3d 601
(declining to remand matter to trial court for articula-
tion because defendant’s failure to seek articulation
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was not ‘‘sole ground’’ on which this court declined to
review claim), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 914, 284 A.3d 25
(2022). Accordingly, we decline to consider this claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.