Norwich v. GHT Trust

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Norwich v. GHT Trust

CITY OF NORWICH v. THE GHT TRUST ET AL.
CITY OF NORWICH v. THE REBNER LAND TRUST
CITY OF NORWICH v. RLS TRUST
(AC 47240)
Alvord, Seeley and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The defendants in three actions to foreclose municipal tax liens appealed
from the trial court’s judgments denying their motions to open after the
court rendered judgments of foreclosure for the plaintiff city. The defendants
claimed that the court improperly failed to determine whether it lacked
personal jurisdiction over the defendants due to insufficient service of pro-
cess. Held:

The trial court improperly failed to make a factual and legal determination
regarding personal jurisdiction over each of the defendants, as the defen-
dants clearly raised the issue of insufficient service of process as the basis for
opening the judgments in their motions to open, which implicated personal
jurisdiction, and, accordingly, the judgments denying the motions to open
were reversed and the cases were remanded to the trial court to hold a
hearing and to determine whether personal jurisdiction existed.
Argued December 10, 2024—officially released May 27, 2025

Procedural History

Action, in each case, to foreclose a municipal tax lien
on certain real property owned by the named defendant,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New London, where the defendants were defaulted for
failure to appear; thereafter, the court, K. Murphy, J.,
rendered judgment, in the first case, of foreclosure by
sale and rendered judgments, in the second and third
cases, of strict foreclosure; subsequently, the court,
Spallone, J., denied, in each case, the named defen-
dant’s motion to open, from which the named defendant
in each case appealed to this court. Reversed; further
proceedings.
Edward E. Bona, for the appellants (named defen-
dant in each case).
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Norwich v. GHT Trust

Aimee L. Siefert, for the appellee (plaintiff in each
case).
Opinion

FLYNN, J. This consolidated appeal involves three
separate actions brought by the plaintiff in each action,
the city of Norwich (city), seeking to foreclose munici-
pal tax liens on three properties, each of which was held
by a different trust. The defendants in the respective
actions, The GHT Trust,1 The Rebner Land Trust, and
RLS Trust, appeal from the judgments of the trial court,
Spallone, J., denying their motions to open after the
trial court, K. Murphy, J., rendered judgments of fore-
closure in favor of the city and title had vested in others.2
On appeal, the defendants claim, inter alia, that the
court failed to decide whether it lacked personal juris-
diction over the defendants due to insufficient service
of process.3 We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judg-
ments denying the motions to open and remand the
cases to the trial court.
1
Danjon Capital, Inc., a junior lienholder that had redeemed, also was
named as a defendant in the case involving The GHT Trust. Although Danjon
Capital, Inc., was listed as an appellee in the present appeal, it did not file
a brief or otherwise participate in this appeal. Accordingly, all references
in this opinion to the defendants are to The GHT Trust, The Rebner Land
Trust, and RLS Trust only.
2
Although the defendants indicated on their appeal form that they also
sought to appeal from the court’s denials of their motions for reconsidera-
tion, the defendants have not raised or briefed any claim of error as to those
rulings. See Johnson v. Vita Built, LLC, 217 Conn. App. 71, 74 n.1, 287 A.3d
197 (2022) (although plaintiffs indicated on appeal form that they sought
to appeal from court’s denial of application for prejudgment remedy, they
did not raise or brief any claim of error as to that aspect of court’s ruling
and, thus, abandoned any such claim).
3
The defendants also claim that ‘‘[t]he record . . . yields the inescapable
conclusion that no service was made, that service could have been made
and that the [city] decided, intentionally, to make no attempt at it,’’ and,
therefore the court never acquired any personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dants. As explained subsequently in this opinion, the record does not yield
such a conclusion, as service by publication was made and there remains
a disputed issue pertaining to whether personal jurisdiction was established
by it. The defendants’ counsel did not appear at the scheduled hearing on
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The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. The city com-
menced the first action, Norwich v. Rebner Land Trust,
Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (Rebner Land Trust action), in Sep-
tember, 2022, to collect payment of outstanding real
estate taxes levied on property owned by The Rebner
Land Trust on Newton Street (Rebner Land Trust prop-
erty). The city commenced the second action, Norwich
v. GHT Trust, Superior Court, judicial district of New
London, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (GHT Trust
action), in October, 2022, to collect payment of out-
standing real estate taxes levied on property owned by
The GHT Trust on Summit Street (GHT Trust property).
The city commenced the third action, Norwich v. RLS
Trust, Superior Court, judicial district of New London,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (RLS Trust action), in
March, 2023, to collect payment of outstanding real
estate taxes levied on property owned by RLS Trust on
Talman Street (RLS Trust property).
In each action, the city filed a motion for first order
of notice, and the court found that the addresses of the
defendants were ‘‘unknown and that reasonable efforts
to find the defendant(s) have failed . . . .’’ Accord-
ingly, the court ordered the city to publish notice of
each foreclosure action on the Judicial Branch legal
notices website. See General Statutes § 52-68.4 The city
their respective motions. Accordingly, we do not make any determination
as to whether the court’s rulings on the motions to open were proper and
conclude that a remand is necessary because the court did not determine
whether there was personal jurisdiction.
In addition, the defendants claim that the court violated their due process
rights by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to establish personal jurisdic-
tion. Because the court must hold a hearing in accordance with our remand
order, we do not separately address this claim.
4
General Statutes § 52-68 provides: ‘‘(a) The Superior Court, and the
judges, clerks and assistant clerks thereof, may, except where it is otherwise
specially provided by law, make such order as is deemed reasonable, in
regard to the notice which shall be given of the institution or pendency of
all complaints, writs of error and appeals from probate, which may be
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Norwich v. GHT Trust

subsequently filed the Judicial Branch form titled ‘‘Affi-
davit of Online Publication of Legal Notice After Court
Order,’’ form JD-CL-161, and a motion for a finding of
actual notice and/or that further notice was unneces-
sary in each case. The city’s motion in the Rebner Land
Trust action noted that ‘‘[t]he subject property is vacant
land; therefore, service on the property address would
not . . . yield any results.’’ The city’s motions in the
GHT Trust action and the RLS Trust action did not
provide additional information about the properties at
issue in those cases.
The court, K. Murphy, J., granted the city’s motions
for a finding that further notice was unnecessary. In
the Rebner Land Trust action, the court initially ruled
that additional notice was required, as ‘‘[n]otice to the
owner of the property should be provided to [the Rebner
Land Trust property] by causing some proper officer
to serve [the complaint and related documents] on the
defendant in the manner prescribed by law . . . .’’ The
city filed a motion for clarification ‘‘on exactly where
the court would like the [city] to have the defendant
served’’ because, ‘‘as mentioned in the Motion for Find-
ing Further Notice Unnecessary, the [Rebner Land Trust
property] is vacant land.’’ The court subsequently
ordered that, ‘‘[i]n light of the information provided in
the [city’s] motion for clarification, the court’s previous
order requiring additional notice is vacated and the
[city’s] motion for finding further notice unnecessary
is granted.’’ The court also ruled that, ‘‘[i]n light of
brought to or pending in the Superior Court, when the adverse party, or
any persons so interested therein that they ought to be made parties thereto,
reside out of the state, or when the names or residences of any such persons
in interest are unknown to the party instituting the proceeding.
‘‘(b) Such notice, having been given and proved by the affidavit of the
officer who served the notice or by other competent evidence, shall be
deemed sufficient service and notice, and the court may proceed to a hearing,
unless otherwise provided by law, or may order further notice as it deems
reasonable.’’
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the court’s recent ruling in granting the [city’s] motion
finding further notice unnecessary, no further clarifica-
tion is needed.’’ In the GHT Trust action, the court
granted the city’s motion outright. In the RLS Trust
action, similar to the Rebner Land Trust action, the
court initially ruled that additional notice was required,
with ‘‘[s]ervice of trust with unknown address to be
made at the address of the [RLS Trust property].’’ The
city filed a motion for clarification ‘‘on exactly where
the court would like the defendant served,’’ as ‘‘the
[RLS Trust property] is an abandoned building.’’ The
court subsequently granted the city’s motion for a find-
ing that further notice was unnecessary and ordered
that ‘‘no further notice is necessary due to compliance
with publication notice,’’ then ruled that no further clari-
fication was needed.
The defendants were subsequently defaulted for fail-
ure to appear.5 On March 1, 2023, the court rendered
a judgment of foreclosure by sale in the Rebner Land
Trust action, setting a sale date of May 6, 2023. The
city was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and
the court granted the committee’s motion to approve
the sale to the city on June 12, 2023. Title to the Rebner
Land Trust property passed to the city on that same
date, when the committee filed the deed of sale with
the court. See U.S. Bank, National Assn. v. Fitzpatrick,
206 Conn. App. 509, 515, 260 A.3d 1240 (2021) (title to
property passed to plaintiff when committee filed deed
of sale with court).
5
In the Rebner Land Trust action, the judicial notice of order indicating
that The Rebner Land Trust was defaulted for failure to appear was sent
to the Newton Street address and returned to the court with a stamp that
stated ‘‘no such number’’ and ‘‘unable to forward.’’ The returned mail was
filed with the court on February 15, 2023. In the GHT Trust action, the
judicial notice of order indicating that The GHT Trust was defaulted for
failure to appear was sent to the Summit Street address and returned to
the court with a stamp that stated ‘‘vacant’’ and ‘‘unable to forward.’’ The
returned mail was filed with the court on March 3, 2023. No returned mail
was filed in the RLS Trust action.
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On May 31, 2023, the court rendered a judgment of
strict foreclosure in the GHT Trust action and set the
law days to commence on June 27, 2023. Danjon Capital,
Inc., a junior lienholder, exercised its right to redemp-
tion on its law day, June 28, 2023, and became the
owner of the GHT Trust property.6 The city filed a satis-
faction of judgment on June 29, 2023.
On July 12, 2023, the court rendered a judgment of
strict foreclosure in the RLS Trust action and set the
law days to commence on August 8, 2023. RLS Trust
did not attempt to redeem the property prior to the
running of the law days and, on August 9, 2023, title to
the RLS Trust property passed to the city on its assigned
law day.
On August 31, 2023, counsel for the defendants filed
appearances in all three cases. On September 5, 2023,
the defendants filed motions to open and vacate the
6
Attorney Stephanie B. Nickse filed an appearance in the GHT Trust
action on behalf of Danjon Capital, Inc., on February 27, 2023. The court
defaulted Danjon Capital, Inc., on May 15, 2023, for failure to disclose a
defense. Danjon Capital, Inc., subsequently filed an affidavit of debt, dated
May 30, 2023, in which it requested that the court grant the city’s motion
for a judgment of strict foreclosure. As explained previously in this opinion,
the court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, and Danjon Capital,
Inc., exercised its right to redemption on its law day. The motion to open
filed by The GHT Trust, which is described subsequently in this opinion
and is at issue in the present appeal, was filed on September 5, 2023, after
title to the GHT Trust property had vested in Danjon Capital, Inc.
Our review of the trial court file reflects that Attorney Nickse, as counsel
for Danjon Capital, Inc., was listed on the certificates of service attached
to the motion to open and the subsequent motion to reconsider the denial
of that motion, certifying that the defendants’ counsel sent notice of those
motions to Attorney Nickse. In addition, Danjon Capital, Inc., was named
as an appellee in the present appeal, and our review of the notices issued
by the Office of the Appellate Clerk indicates that Attorney Nickse received
notice of, inter alia, the filing of the defendants’ brief, the deadline for its
appellee brief, the marking of the case as ‘‘ready,’’ and the assignment to
the docket for oral argument. As set forth in footnote 1 of this opinion,
however, Danjon Capital, Inc., did not file a brief or otherwise participate
in the present appeal.
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judgments on the basis that there had been no service
of process and, consequently, the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them when it rendered the judgments
against them. In their motions, the defendants argued
that ‘‘[n]o service was made or attempted’’ on them,
and the city did not submit affidavits in support of its
motions for a finding that further notice was unneces-
sary, aside from noting that the Rebner Land Trust
property was vacant land, to explain why it could not
serve the defendants by way of ‘‘normal means.’’
The motions to open stated that motions to dismiss
were simultaneously being filed, ‘‘setting forth the basis
and the means by which the defendant[s] could have
been found and [were] easily locatable such that service
could be effectuated.’’ In their memoranda of law
accompanying the motions to dismiss, the defendants
argued, inter alia, that the defendants’ addresses were
not ‘‘unknown’’ to the city, as required for the court’s
order pursuant to § 52-68 for notice by publication,
because the deeds to their respective properties, which
had been filed with the city, listed certain post office
boxes as the defendants’ addresses. The defendants
noted that the city did not submit affidavits in support
of its motions for a finding that further notice was
unnecessary and argued that ‘‘it cannot be said that the
address of the defendant[s] [were] in fact unknown to
the [city], who itself is in charge of the care of the very
land records it relied upon to issue and transmit to the
defendant[s] both assessments and tax bills.’’ Copies of
the deeds were attached as exhibits to the defendants’
motions to dismiss.
On September 14, 2023, the city filed objections to
the defendants’ motions to open. In all three actions,
the city argued that service was proper because the
names and residences of the defendants were unknown
to the city and, thus, it instituted the actions by provid-
ing notice by publication pursuant to the court’s orders
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of notice, which were obtained in accordance with § 52-
68. The city claimed that the properties were owned
by trusts and, ‘‘[a]t the time the property was transferred
into the trust[s], there was no indication on the deed
of a trustee or a physical mailing address.’’ The city
also argued that in all of the foreclosure actions, the
land was either vacant or, in the case of the RLS Trust
property, improved with an abandoned house,7 which
‘‘limit[ed] the [city’s] ability to serve the complaint’’ on
any person at the subject properties.
In addition, with respect to the judgments of strict
foreclosure against The GHT Trust and RLS Trust, the
city argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the defendants’ motions to open pursuant to General
Statutes § 49-15 (a) (1) because they were filed after
the passage of the law days,8 and the motions did not
allege ‘‘rare and exceptional’’ circumstances such as
‘‘fraud, accident, mistake, and surprise’’ that would
invoke the court’s continuing equitable jurisdiction pur-
suant to U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel, 339
Conn. 366, 379, 260 A.3d 1187 (2021). The city made a
similar argument in its objection to the motion to open
the judgment of foreclosure by sale of the Rebner Land
Trust property. The city referenced § 49-15 (a) (1) but
7
The city stated that ‘‘the subject property has an abandoned house on
it per the appraisal that is on file with the court.’’ The appraisal report states
that ‘‘the subject property gives the appearance of being abandoned.’’
8
General Statutes § 49-15 (a) (1) provides: ‘‘Any judgment foreclosing the
title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court
rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person having an
interest in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and modified,
notwithstanding the limitation imposed by section 52-212a, upon such terms
as to costs as the court deems reasonable, provided no such judgment shall
be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer except
as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection.’’
‘‘In Connecticut, the passage of the law days in an action for strict foreclo-
sure extinguishes a mortgagor’s equitable right of redemption and vests
absolute title in the encumbrancer.’’ U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel,
339 Conn. 366, 375, 260 A.3d 1187 (2021).
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acknowledged that it applied only to judgments of strict
foreclosure. Nevertheless, relying on First Connecticut
Capital, LLC v. Homes of Westport, LLC, 112 Conn.
App. 750, 752 n.3, 966 A.2d 239 (2009), the city argued
that The Rebner Land Trust failed to file the motion to
open (1) within the four month limitation set forth in
General Statutes § 52-212a,9 and (2) before the court’s
approval of the committee sale.
Also on September 14, 2023, the court issued orders
notifying the parties that the matter would be scheduled
for a remote hearing at a later date. On September 22,
2023, the court issued notices to the parties that it
would hold the remote hearing on October 11, 2023.
The defendants’ counsel did not attend the hearing.10
On October 12, 2023, the court, Spallone, J., issued
orders denying the defendants’ motions to open and
vacate the judgments. It did so on the ground that title
had vested. The court made no determination on the
manner of service made on any defendant or whether
there was personal jurisdiction. We therefore have no
factual or legal determination on that jurisdictional
issue.
The court’s order in the Rebner Land Trust action
stated: ‘‘This motion to open and vacate judgment was
on the remote foreclosure calendar on October 11, 2023.
Counsel for the [city] appeared and presented oral argu-
ment. Counsel for the defendant did not appear. The
court finds that the [city’s] argument in its objection is
persuasive. The [city] argues that the defendant’s
9
General Statutes § 52-212a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Unless otherwise
provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing
jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may
not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed
within four months following the date on which the notice of judgment or
decree was sent. . . .’’
10
The parties have not provided this court with a transcript of the hearing
on October 11, 2023.
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motion is precluded because it was not filed before title
vested in the [city] on July 17, 2023. The [city] made
an analogy to . . . § 49-15 (a) (1) but conceded that it
applies to strict foreclosures. However, the [city] noted
that case law has developed in this field regarding fore-
closure by sale, citing First Connecticut Capital, LLC
v. Homes of Westport, LLC, [supra, 112 Conn. App.
752 n.3]. The court finds the case (and authority cited
therein) cited by the [city] to be persuasive, and the
motion to open and vacate is denied.’’
With respect to the motion to open the foreclosure
judgment in the GHT Trust action, the court ruled: ‘‘This
motion to open and vacate judgment was on the remote
foreclosure calendar on October 11, 2023. Counsel for
the [city] appeared and presented oral argument. Coun-
sel for the defendant did not appear. The court finds
that the [city’s] argument in its objection is persuasive.
The [city] argues that the defendant’s motion is pre-
cluded because it was not filed before title vested in
[Danjon Capital, Inc.] on [June] 28, 2023, as required
by . . . § 49-15 (a) (1) absent any rare or exceptional
circumstances. No such circumstances are raised here,
and the motion is denied.’’ The court issued a nearly
identical order concerning the motion to open in the
RLS Trust action, noting that title had vested in the city
in that case on August 9, 2023.
On October 16, 2023, the defendants filed motions for
reconsideration. The motions did not address counsel’s
failure to attend the hearing on October 11, 2023. The
defendants claimed that, in denying their motions to
open, the court overlooked Highgate Condominium
Assn., Inc. v. Miller, 129 Conn. App. 429, 21 A.3d 853
(2011), which they were citing for the first time, and
failed to make a finding of personal jurisdiction. The
defendants argued that, pursuant to Highgate Condo-
minium Assn., Inc., ‘‘where a jurisdictional determina-
tion is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual
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Norwich v. GHT Trust

dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss
in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish
jurisdictional facts. . . . An evidentiary hearing is nec-
essary because a court cannot make a critical factual
[jurisdictional] finding based on memoranda and docu-
ments submitted by the parties.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 436. In addition, the defendants
argued that Highgate Condominium Assn., Inc., ‘‘also
requires that the court ‘make a definitive factual and
legal finding regarding the issue of its personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant[s]’; [id.]; which it did not in its
ruling.’’ The defendants, accordingly, requested that the
court reconsider its decisions denying their motions to
open (1) to take into account Highgate Condominium
Assn., Inc., and (2) to make a finding as to personal
jurisdiction over the defendants.
The city filed objections to the motions for reconsid-
eration that included motions for sanctions. The city
argued that the defendants’ motions should be denied
because the defendants failed to appear at the hearing
on the motions to open and, in their motions for recon-
sideration, they did not provide an explanation for their
failure to attend. The city argued that their ‘‘failure to
prosecute [their] own motion[s] should not be [their]
chance to have another bite at the apple.’’ As to its
requests for sanctions, the city argued that ‘‘[t]he [defen-
dants’] counsel’s procedural tactics are simply done to
delay and cause the [city] to spend additional money
on attorney’s fees. . . . The individual behind the
defendant trust[s] and the [defendants’] counsel have
a long history of filing dilatory motions and objections
which are a waste of judicial resources.’’
The court summarily denied the defendants’ motions
for reconsideration on December 14, 2023, and sus-
tained the city’s objections thereto.11 This consolidated
appeal followed.
11
The defendants filed motions for articulation of the court’s denial of
their motions for reconsideration, which the court denied. The defendants
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Once raised, the issue of the court’s jurisdiction must
be addressed. See Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas,
288 Conn. 568, 576, 953 A.2d 868 (2008); see also Bateson
v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 7, 48 A.3d 652 (2012). The court
in the present case did not do so.
‘‘Motions to open judgments of strict foreclosure are
governed by . . . § 49-15 (a) (1). Under § 49-15 (a) (1),
courts generally cannot open a judgment of strict fore-
closure after the passage of the law days because such
an event vests absolute title in the encumbrancer.’’
(Emphasis in original.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v.
Booker, 220 Conn. App. 783, 793, 299 A.3d 1215, cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 927, 304 A.3d 860 (2023); see footnote
8 of this opinion.
Both this court and our Supreme Court have identi-
fied limited circumstances under which a court may
open a judgment of strict foreclosure. In U.S. Bank
National Assn. v. Rothermel, supra, 339 Conn. 366, our
Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘there is a limited exer-
cise of jurisdiction over a narrow class of equitable
claims raised in postvesting motions to open, despite
the general prohibition of such jurisdiction by . . .
§ 49-15 (a) (1). . . . The category of claims that fall
within this class of cases sound in [f]raud, accident,
mistake, and surprise . . . . These are rare exceptions,
applicable only in unusual circumstances.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) DXR Finance Parent, LLC v. Theraplant,
LLC, 223 Conn. App. 362, 374–75, 309 A.3d 347, cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 957, 310 A.3d 380 (2024).
In addition to the circumstances set forth in Rother-
mel, a court may also open a judgment of strict foreclo-
sure on the basis that the court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion at the time the judgment was rendered. ‘‘Once the
subsequently filed a motion for review with this court, which granted review
but denied the relief requested therein.
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Norwich v. GHT Trust

question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised . . .
[t]he court must fully resolve it before proceeding fur-
ther with the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Bateson v. Weddle, supra, 306 Conn. 7. ‘‘It is axiomatic
that a court cannot render a judgment without first
obtaining personal jurisdiction over the parties. No prin-
ciple is more universal than that the judgment of a court
without jurisdiction is a nullity. . . . Such a judgment,
whenever and wherever declared upon as a source of
a right, may always be challenged. . . . Furthermore,
[a] defect in process . . . implicates personal jurisdic-
tion . . . . [W]hen a particular method of serving pro-
cess is set forth by statute, that method must be fol-
lowed. . . . Unless service of process is made as the
statute prescribes, the court to which it is returnable
does not acquire jurisdiction. . . . The jurisdiction that
is found lacking . . . is jurisdiction over the person
. . . . [A]lthough . . . a judgment of strict foreclosure
ordinarily cannot be opened after the law day has
passed, the judgment can be attacked on the ground
that the court lacked jurisdiction over the party chal-
lenging it.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, supra,
288 Conn. 576; see also Highgate Condominium Assn.,
Inc. v. Miller, supra, 129 Conn. App. 435 (‘‘Once title
has vested, no practical relief is available [p]rovided
that this vesting has occurred pursuant to an author-
ized exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court . . . .
A natural corollary of this principle is that a judgment
of strict foreclosure may be opened . . . upon a finding
that the court lacked jurisdiction over either the person
or the case at the time the judgment of strict foreclosure
was entered.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.)).
A trial court’s authority to open a judgment of foreclo-
sure by sale similarly is limited. ‘‘A motion to open a
judgment of foreclosure by sale is typically subject to
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Norwich v. GHT Trust

two restrictions. . . . First, a motion to open a judg-
ment of foreclosure by sale must be filed within the four
month restriction of . . . § 52-212a. . . . [T]he second
restriction on a motion to open a judgment of foreclo-
sure by sale is that it must be filed before absolute title
left the property owner, which [in the case in which the
motion is filed by the holder of the equity of redemption]
means before the committee sale was approved.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Quicken Loans, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 227 Conn. App. 806, 825, 324 A.3d 167 (2024),
cert. denied, 351 Conn. 905, 330 A.3d 133 (2025); see also
First Connecticut Capital, LLC v. Homes of Westport,
LLC, supra, 112 Conn. App. 752 n.3. As with a judgment
of strict foreclosure, however, a claim that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction may serve as the basis for
a motion to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale.
See People’s United Bank, National Assn. v. Purcell,
187 Conn. App. 523, 525–27, 202 A.3d 1112 (2019) (con-
sidering, in context of motion to open judgment of fore-
closure by sale, whether court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over defendant).
In the present case, the defendants contend that, in
denying their motions to open the judgments, the trial
court failed to make a definitive factual and legal finding
regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction, as required
by Highgate Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Miller, supra,
129 Conn. App. 436, and, accordingly, this court must
remand the matter to the trial court to make such a
finding. In response, the city argues that the defendants
did not cite any ‘‘rare or exceptional circumstances’’
that would have permitted the trial court to invoke its
continuing equitable authority to open the judgments
under Rothermel. In addition, the city argues that the
defendants failed to cite Highgate Condominium
Assn., Inc., in their motions to open and did not attend
the hearing scheduled on those motions, and, therefore,
‘‘the defendants’ failure to prosecute [their] motions
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should not be rewarded by overturning a decision that
was not erroneous.’’12
We conclude that, because the court never decided
whether it had personal jurisdiction—although possibly
because the defendants’ counsel never appeared at the
time of the hearing to cite any authorities or offer any
necessary evidence—we must remand the present case
to the court to make a factual and legal determination
regarding personal jurisdiction, hearing argument from
the parties and taking such evidence and making such
findings as may be necessary to that determination.13
See Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, supra, 288
Conn. 576.
In the present case, the defendants filed their motions
to open the judgments of foreclosure on the basis that
the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them at the
time that it rendered the judgments. The court, how-
ever, denied the defendants’ motions to open on another
basis, namely, that title to the subject properties had
already passed and the defendants failed to raise any
‘‘rare or exceptional circumstances.’’ The court, how-
ever, did not address the defendants’ claim that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction.
As set forth previously in this opinion, lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction provides a separate basis for opening
the judgments of foreclosure, independent from the
12
The city does not claim that notice by publication provided sufficient
service of process to the defendants or otherwise address the issue of
personal jurisdiction.
13
On April 1, 2025, this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties ‘‘to file
supplemental memoranda on or before April 21, 2025, of no more than 1500
words addressing whether the defendants have waived any objection to the
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, including, but not limited to, by
the defendants’ counsel not appearing at the hearing on the motions to
dismiss and to open. See Commissioner of Environmental Protection v.
Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., 227 Conn. 175, 195–96, 629 A.2d 1116
(1993).’’ We have reviewed the parties’ memoranda but conclude that the
record is inadequate for this court to address the issue of waiver.
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rare exceptions set forth in Rothermel. See, e.g., Argent
Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, supra, 288 Conn. 576;
Highgate Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Miller, supra,
129 Conn. App. 435; see also Deutsche Bank National
Trust Co. v. McKeith, 156 Conn. App. 36, 42, 111 A.3d
545 (2015). Even if the court’s failure to address the
defendants’ claim that it lacked personal jurisdiction
could have been avoided if the defendants had refer-
enced Highgate Condominium Assn., Inc., in their
motions to open rather than for the first time in their
motions for reconsideration, or if the defendants’ coun-
sel had attended the hearing scheduled on those
motions and offered evidence,14 the defendants clearly
raised the issue of insufficient service of process as the
basis for opening the judgments in their motions to
open, which implicated personal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the judgments denying the motions to
open cannot stand, and we remand the cases to the
trial court to hold a hearing and to address whether
personal jurisdiction exists. See Highgate Condomin-
ium Assn., Inc. v. Miller, supra, 129 Conn. App. 437
(remanding matter to trial court to hold hearing and to
make findings as to personal jurisdiction).
The judgments are reversed and the cases are
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

14
The court did not determine that the failure of the defendants’ counsel
to attend the hearing constituted a ‘‘failure to prosecute’’ their motions to
open, as the city argues. Instead, although the court acknowledged counsel’s
failure to attend the hearing, it still considered the motions on the papers.