Gibson v. Denmo's Original Drive-In, LLC

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Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC

THERESA GIBSON v. DENMO’S
ORIGINAL DRIVE-IN, LLC
(AC 47533)
Suarez, Seeley and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant in
her premises liability action. She claimed that the court abused its discretion
in denying her motion to set aside the verdict because the court provided
the jury with an incorrect version of interrogatories and the jury’s use of
those interrogatories precluded the jury from fully evaluating the essential
elements of her cause of action. Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion
to set aside the verdict, as the version of the interrogatories submitted to
the jury properly followed the evidence adduced at trial and were consistent
with the pleadings, and the first interrogatory as to the plaintiff’s burden
of proof that the jury answered in the negative properly articulated an
essential element of a premises liability claim and was properly dispositive
of that claim, such that the erroneous submission of the interrogatories to
the jury was harmless.
Argued March 20—officially released May 27, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sus-
tained as a result of the defendant’s alleged negligence,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the jury
before Parkinson, J.; verdict for the defendant; there-
after, the court, Parkinson, J., denied the plaintiff’s
motion to set aside the verdict and rendered judgment
in accordance with the verdict, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Andrew J. Pianka, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Christopher S. Acquanita, for the appellee (defen-
dant).
Opinion

WILSON, J. In this premises liability action, the plain-
tiff, Theresa Gibson, appeals from the judgment of the
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Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC

trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the
defendant, Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC. On appeal,
the plaintiff claims that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by denying her motion to set aside the verdict
because the court provided the jury with an incorrect
version of the interrogatories and the jury’s use of those
interrogatories precluded the jury from fully evaluating
the essential elements of the cause of action. We dis-
agree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
consideration of the present appeal. The plaintiff com-
menced this action in August, 2022. Her revised com-
plaint (operative complaint) consisted of one count
sounding in premises liability. In the operative com-
plaint, the plaintiff alleged that, on March 27, 2022, she
was a customer at the defendant business, a drive-in
eatery in Southbury. After she placed her order at the
walk-up window, she walked to her vehicle to wait for
her order and, while doing so, tripped and fell when
she ‘‘stepped on a loose, uneven surface or defect that
was covered with leaves and debris which obstructed
the view of the same.’’ The plaintiff alleged that (1) she
sustained physical injuries while on a path between the
walk-up window and the parking area, (2) the defendant
had actual or constructive notice of the defective condi-
tion and took no steps to remedy the defect or to warn
patrons, and (3) her injuries were caused by the defen-
dant’s negligence. In paragraph 8 of her complaint, the
plaintiff alleged ten different negligent acts by the defen-
dant that caused her injuries and damages.1 Although
the defendant admitted to having possession and con-
trol of the premises, it denied, or denied having suffi-
cient knowledge to respond to, the material allegations
of the operative complaint.
1
Specifically, in paragraph 8 of the operative complaint, the plaintiff
alleged:
‘‘8. The injuries and damages suffered by the plaintiff . . . were caused
by the defendant in one or more of the following ways:
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The case was tried to a jury. Prior to trial, both parties
filed proposed jury interrogatories and verdict forms
with the court, Parkinson, J., pursuant to Practice Book
§ 16-18.2 Evidence commenced and concluded on Feb-
‘‘a. in that the defendant was aware or should have been aware of the
defect, and the defendant allowed the hazardous condition to remain for
an unreasonable period of time;
‘‘b. in that the walkway in which [the plaintiff] was caused to fall was
not reasonably safe for the use and purpose intended;
‘‘c. in that there were no warnings as to the hazardous nature or condition
of the walkway;
‘‘d. in that the defendant failed to inspect or performed inadequate inspec-
tions of the area for hazardous conditions despite having adequate time to
discover the same;
‘‘e. in that the defendant failed to remedy the defect in the walkway,
although it was well aware of the dangerous conditions;
‘‘f. in that the defendant failed to notify those responsible for maintaining
the area of the defective and dangerous condition of the area that its patrons
were utilizing to park and access the [business];
‘‘g. in that the defendant failed to inspect or made an inadequate inspection
of said property to locate and remedy any defect which may pose a hazard
to the health or safety of those utilizing the parking and access way to their
business, and that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of such
hazards, and such inadequate inspection constituted a disregard for the
health and safety under all relevant circumstances;
‘‘h. in that the defendant allowed leaves and debris to litter the area and
to cover and conceal the defects that existed, creating a dangerous and
unsafe condition to those, including the plaintiff, who were utilizing the facil-
ity;
‘‘i. in that the defendant failed to maintain, patch, or repave the walkway
despite the fact that the asphalt had long exceeded its useful life and had
become cracked, uneven, loose, and otherwise created a trip[ping] haz-
ard; and
‘‘j. in that the defendant invited the general public to patronize their
facility, and knew or with the exercise of due care, should have known that
the walkway and parking lot contained loose pavement, defects, cracks,
and uneven areas and that these areas could and would be covered with
leaves and debris concealing the hazards, yet the defendant failed to take
any steps to safeguard their patrons from this risk.’’
2
Practice Book § 16-18 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may submit to
the jury written interrogatories for the purpose of explaining or limiting a
general verdict, which shall be answered and delivered to the clerk as a
part of the verdict. The clerk will take the verdict and then the answers to
the several interrogatories, and thereafter the clerk will take the judicial
authority’s acceptance of the verdict returned and the questions as answered,
and proceed according to the usual practice. The judicial authority will not
accept a verdict until the interrogatories which are essential to the verdict
have been answered.’’
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ruary 15, 2024, after which time the court addressed
the parties’ proposed jury interrogatories. Counsel for
each of the parties and the court agreed that the inter-
rogatories submitted by the parties would be ‘‘com-
bined’’ into a single set of interrogatories. At the instruc-
tion of the court, the defendant’s counsel edited the
defendant’s proposed interrogatories to include a ques-
tion requested by the plaintiff’s counsel and, on Febru-
ary 16, 2024, emailed a new set of proposed interrogato-
ries to the court and the plaintiff’s counsel. In response,
the plaintiff’s counsel emailed the court and the defen-
dant’s counsel his objections to the defendant’s edited
proposed interrogatories. Specifically, the plaintiff’s
counsel stated that ‘‘question 1 should be deleted as it
is repetitive of paragraph 4 (d),’’ that question 2 should
be modified, and that ‘‘[t]he interrogatories unduly limit
the plaintiff’s claim.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel then sub-
mitted a revised draft to the court and to the defendant’s
counsel.

On February 20, 2024, the court again reviewed the
proposed jury interrogatories with the parties’ counsel.
After further discussion, the parties’ counsel agreed to
a revised version of the plaintiff’s proposed jury inter-
rogatories (modified interrogatories), which stated in
relevant part:

‘‘1. Did the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that on March 27, 2022, the defendant’s
premises were in a defective condition: loose, uneven
surface or defect that was covered with leaves and
debris which obstructed the view of same.
‘‘YES NO

‘‘(If you answer ‘YES,’ continue to the next question.
If you answer ‘NO,’ do not complete the rest of these
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interrogatories. Sign below. Fill in and return a defen-
dant’s verdict on the defendant’s verdict form.)’’
After question 1, there were two additional questions
asking the jury to specify whether it had found that the
plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant had notice of the specific defective
condition that caused the plaintiff’s physical injuries
and whether the defective condition was a substantial
factor in causing those injuries. The latter question had
ten subparts asking the jury to specify which of the
defendant’s alleged negligent acts was a substantial fac-
tor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries and damages. These
subparts corresponded to the ten allegations of negli-
gence set forth in paragraph 8 of the operative com-
plaint. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
Before the court submitted the case to the jury, the
court confirmed with the parties that the materials to
be submitted to the jury were ready, including the full
exhibits, the jury interrogatories, and the verdict form.
The clerk asked if ‘‘everyone is satisfied,’’ to which the
plaintiff’s counsel and the defendant’s counsel each
replied ‘‘[y]es.’’ Thereafter, the jury was provided with
the exhibits, jury interrogatories and verdict form and
was asked to begin its deliberations. When the jury
returned with a verdict, the clerk read aloud the com-
pleted jury interrogatories and verdict form, at which
time it became apparent that the jury had not been given
the modified interrogatories but, rather, the defendant’s
proposed interrogatories that were emailed to the court
and to the plaintiff’s counsel on February 16, 2024
(unmodified interrogatories).
The unmodified interrogatories that were provided
to the jury stated in relevant part:
‘‘1. Did the plaintiff . . . prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant . . . failed to use
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reasonable care to inspect and maintain the premises
and to make the premises reasonably safe?
‘‘YES NO
‘‘(If you answer ‘NO,’ do not complete the rest of
these interrogatories. Sign below. Fill in and return a
defendant’s verdict on the defendant’s verdict form. If
you answer ‘YES,’ continue on to the next question.)
‘‘2. Did the plaintiff . . . prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the proximate cause of her fall on
March 27, 2022, was a defect or dangerous condition
that being a loose, uneven surface or defect that was
covered with leaves and debris which obstructed plain-
tiff’s view and made the premises not reasonably safe?
‘‘YES NO
‘‘(If you answer ‘NO,’ do not complete the rest of
these interrogatories. Sign below. Fill in and return a
defendant’s verdict on the defendant’s verdict form. If
you answer ‘YES,’ continue to the next question.)’’
Following the second question, there were two addi-
tional questions, addressing whether the plaintiff had
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant had notice of the specific defective condition
and whether the plaintiff had proved that the defendant
breached its duty to the plaintiff. The latter question
had ten subparts inviting the jury to specify which, if
any, of the defendant’s alleged negligent acts was a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries and
damages. The alleged negligent acts described in this
question corresponded with the ten allegations of negli-
gence set forth in paragraph 8 of the operative com-
plaint. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
The jury responded negatively to the first interroga-
tory and returned a verdict for the defendant. After the
clerk announced the jury’s verdict, the court directed
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the jury to exit the courtroom, and the following
exchange occurred between the court and the parties’
counsel:
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I do not believe those were
the jury interrogatories we agreed upon.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I . . . don’t know how
they got them either, Your Honor, those were my pro-
posed ones.
‘‘The Court: I did ask for you both to check the materi-
als that were being given to the jurors; I thought you
both did.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: We looked at the exhib-
its. And, no, we didn’t look at the interrogatories. I just
had the copy in front of me.
‘‘The Court: What [does] counsel suggest we do now?
***
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I think I move for a mistrial.
‘‘The Court: On what ground?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: On the grounds that [the
jury was] given inaccurate jury interrogatories after we
went through, at length, what they should have been,
and they were given the improper interrogatories. They
were confusing, and it was not what we agreed upon.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I certainly
don’t think there’s a mistrial. If counsel is not accepting
of that, they can be given the other ones.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I think, at this point,
they’ve been poisoned by the . . . other questions.
‘‘The Court: So, what were the questions that were
included that were not supposed to be?
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‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Basically, [we] went over
[the] defendant’s submission in the beginning. We went
through and weeded them out.
‘‘The Court: I remember asking for the exhibits, as
well as the interrogatories, and the verdict forms to be
checked by the parties before they were given to the
jurors. I asked more than once. So, I’m not really sure
what has happened here. It could be that it was one of
the court exhibits that were given in.
‘‘The Clerk: This is . . . what was given to me as a
court exhibit.
‘‘The Court: So, the grounds for a mistrial are what,
that the questions were confusing.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: They were improper, they
were confusing, they were not what we agreed upon.
‘‘The Court: Does that change the verdict form
though? The verdict form was the same either way.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I think that how you get
to the verdict is based on the jury interrogatories, and
there were questions in there that really were confusing
and should not have been submitted. We weeded them
out, and they went to the jury anyway.
‘‘The Court: So, your suggestion . . . is for them to
be given the correct interrogatory.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I certainly
don’t think a mistrial is appropriate. They were—
‘‘The Court: I’m asking you if I—
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I—I would—
‘‘The Court: —do not declare a mistrial, is your sug-
gestion still—
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: To give them . . . the
sheet we agreed on. There’s . . . no harm.
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‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I think there is harm.
They’ve already reviewed and made up their mind based
on the improper interrogatories, the improper instruc-
tions. They’re not [going to] change their mind at this
point.

‘‘The Court: Right, but you want them to have the
proper questions.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: They sat down, and they
deliberated based on the improper questions. They’ve
made up their mind. I don’t see how we can correct it
by simply now giving them the correct questions.

‘‘The Court: Okay. All right. So, I’m going to accept
the verdict. I’m denying the motion for a mistrial, given
that they have the option to have the other interrogatory
for the questions to be given to them as you said they
should be, and you don’t want that option.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I believe it’s probably
worthless at this point.

‘‘The Court: Okay. So, your motion for a mistrial is
denied. . . . [L]et’s take a brief recess.’’

After a brief recess, the court resumed its discussion
of the interrogatories with the parties.

‘‘The Court: All right . . . . I want to compare, if you
will, the verdict form [the jurors were] given with the
verdict form that they should have been given and ask
you to articulate how you believe you’ve been harmed,
how the plaintiff has been harmed. All right. So, we
have the verdict form they were given and then the one
that they should have been given . . . .

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: The jury interrogator[ies]
that were provided, number 1 . . . ‘Did the plaintiff
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. . . prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant . . . failed to use reasonable care to inspect
and maintain the premises to make the premises . . .
reasonably safe?’ If we look at the continuation of this
interrogatory, we skip down to interrogatory 4 (d).3
‘‘The Court: But why do we get to [interrogatory] 4
(d) . . . if [the jury doesn’t] have to do anything else?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: . . . [T]his is confusing.
‘‘The Court: . . . [W]hat’s confusing? . . . I’m
acknowledging that [the jury was] given the incorrect
[interrogatories]; I’m acknowledging that. What I want
to know is . . . how would things have been different,
right? So, the one that I’m looking at from the one that
we agreed to, or the one that court ordered that they
should have, still [says], if you say, yes, you go to the
next question. If you say no, you return a defendant’s
verdict.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And the one that they’re
answering . . . if we look at under [interrogatory] 4
. . . there’s [a] series of questions that they could have
answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to. Okay. But by putting it up in
number 1, if you answer ‘no’ to that . . . we’re done
for the day.
‘‘The Court: Either way, they were though. You agreed
to that language.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: No. What we agreed to,
the first one should have been, did the defendant prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that on March 27,
3
Interrogatory 4 (d) provided in relevant part:
‘‘Did the plaintiff . . . prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant breached its duty to the plaintiff in one or more of the following
ways . . .
‘‘(d) in that the defendant failed to inspect or performed inadequate inspec-
tions of the area for hazardous conditions despite having adequate time to
discover the same;
‘‘YES NO ’’
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2022, the defendant[’s] premises was in the defective
condition, loose uneven surface—
‘‘The Court: Yes.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: —and that . . . it was cov-
ered by leaves and debris. . . . [W]as the premises
defective? That’s the initial question.
‘‘The Court: Right. And then below—
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And . . . that’s not what
number 1 in the one that we gave . . .
‘‘The Court: No, I . . . understand that. But under-
neath, the language on both of the number 1s, it [says],
if ‘yes,’ continue. If ‘no,’ it’s a defendant’s verdict.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Correct. But that’s like say-
ing go to number 4, and I could not win this case unless
they answered [interrogatory] 4 (d) ‘yes,’ but the options
there were . . . (a) through (j). And you’ve limited me
to one aspect of the case. When under . . . [interroga-
tory] 4, there’s actually (a) through (j).
‘‘The Court: . . . I just want to make sure I’m follow-
ing. The jury interrogatories that you sent to me also
did that. Because question 1, as you presented it to me
[said], number 1: did the plaintiff prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that on March 27, 2022, the defen-
dant’s premises were in a defective condition? I added,
‘a loose uneven surface or defect that was covered with
leaves and debris which obstructed the view of same,’
options are ‘yes’ and ‘no.’ Underneath, the language you
provided to the court, ‘if the answer is yes, continue.
If the answer is no, do not complete the rest of these
interrogatories and return a defendant’s verdict.’ [The
jurors] would never have got[ten] to that if they
answered no on that question as well.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: But that wasn’t the first
one they were presented with.
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‘‘The Court: Understood, understood.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And I think after they
answer ‘no’ to the first one, and they didn’t have to go
any further, you lose interest. That’s why we got to—
a verdict in ten minutes.
‘‘The Court: Okay. All right. Is there anything else
you want to state for the record—
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: No, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: —as to what the harm is?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: What harm?
‘‘The Court: Yes.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I . . . believe we went
through—
‘‘The Court: Okay.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: —the jury interrogatories.
We agreed on what was fair and accurate and that was
not presented to the jury.
‘‘The Court: Okay. The court will state for the record
that all of the documents that were presented to the
jury were presented to counsel to review before they
went into the jury room. Okay. Is there anything else?
Is there anything else?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: No, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: Anything else?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: No, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: You can bring the jury out, please.’’ (Foot-
noted added.)
Thereafter, the court accepted the verdict for the
defendant and discharged the jury. On February 22,
2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the jury’s
verdict ‘‘on the grounds that the jury interrogatories
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presented to the jury were not the interrogatories that
were approved by the parties and the court, and that
the interrogatories that were in fact submitted were
confusing and prejudicial to the plaintiff.’’ Specifically,
the plaintiff argued that, in order for her to succeed
on her claim, she ‘‘needed to prove only one of her
allegations contained in paragraph 8 [of her com-
plaint],’’ but the interrogatories provided to the jury
instructed the jury to stop and return a verdict for the
defendant if it answered ‘‘no’’ to the first interrogatory,
which prevented the jury from reviewing the nine other
allegations of negligence that were set forth in para-
graph 8 of the operative complaint.
On March 4, 2024, the defendant filed an objection
to the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the jury verdict
in which it argued, inter alia, that, ‘‘[u]nder premises
liability law, the plaintiff was first required to prove
that her fall was caused by a defective or dangerous
condition and that the defendant had actual or construc-
tive notice of the defective condition prior to answering
any interrogatory question as to whether the defendant
was negligent.’’ (Emphasis in original.) It contended
that ‘‘there was obviously no dangerous or defective
condition and certainly no actual or constructive notice
of a dangerous or defective condition given that the
jury opined that the premises was reasonably safe’’
when the jury answered ‘‘no’’ in response to the first
interrogatory. Moreover, the defendant argued that,
‘‘[e]ven if the jury had answered the [modified] interrog-
atories [that the court proposed submitting to the jury],
which the plaintiff’s attorney refused to allow, the jury
would have responded that the plaintiff failed to prove
that the defendant’s premises was in a defective condi-
tion; that being a loose, uneven surface or defect that
was covered by leaves and debris which obstructed
the plaintiff’s view of same.’’ In the plaintiff’s reply in
support of her motion to set aside the jury verdict, filed
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on March 5, 2024, she further argued that ‘‘[t]he entire
verdict is based on a finding that the defendant properly
inspected the property. The jury was prevented from
addressing whether the defendant’s property contained
a defect or whether the defect caused the plaintiff
harm.’’
On March 7, 2024, the court heard argument on the
plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict. On March
19, 2024, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion. In its
memorandum of decision, the court concluded that,
although it was undisputed that the incorrect set of
interrogatories was submitted to the jury, the error did
not cause any harm to the plaintiff. The court reasoned
that ‘‘[t]he questions the plaintiff requested on the inter-
rogatories were also of the same format in that, if the
jurors answered ‘no’ to the first question, they would
have returned a verdict for the defendant. In fact, the
first question on the ‘correct’ interrogatories also
referred to whether the plaintiff proved that the defen-
dant’s premises was defective. If the jurors answered
‘no,’ the same result would have been reached: a defense
verdict.’’ Moreover, the court noted that ‘‘the evidence
presented in the case was more than adequate for the
jury to have reached the conclusion it reached.’’4 This
appeal followed.
4
The trial court further concluded that ‘‘any objection to the interrogato-
ries has now been waived,’’ because, before it accepted the verdict, it offered
the parties’ counsel the opportunity to have the jury complete the modified
interrogatories and also, before the case went to the jury, it had instructed
the parties to check all the materials that were being submitted to the jury.
We view this conclusion as a second, independent ground in support of the
court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict. On
appeal, although the plaintiff does not challenge this independent ground
as a separate claim in her appellate briefs, the plaintiff’s analysis of the
claim that she did raise before this court nonetheless sufficiently challenges
the court’s conclusion that she waived any objection to the alleged improper
submission of the interrogatories. Because we conclude herein that the
unmodified interrogatories were consistent with the pleadings and the evi-
dence adduced at trial and that the court’s conclusion that their submission
was harmless was correct, we need not consider this ground as a basis for
affirmance. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 354, 369 n.7, 102 A.3d
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On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused
its discretion by denying her motion to set aside the
verdict because the interrogatories submitted to the
jury did not follow the pleadings and precluded the jury
from fully evaluating the allegations in the operative
complaint and the evidence presented at trial. Counsel
for the plaintiff conceded during oral argument before
this court that each element of a premises liability claim
was incorporated into the unmodified interrogatories
that had been submitted to the jury but contended that
the jury did not review and answer all of the interrogato-
ries that corresponded with each element of the cause
of action. The plaintiff argues that the verdict was based
on a single interrogatory that did not address whether
there was a specific defect that caused her injuries and,
because the jury was directed to disregard the other
interrogatories and enter a verdict for the defendant if
the jury answered ‘‘no’’ to that first interrogatory, that
directive ‘‘cause[d] the jury to ignore the core elements
of the premises liability claim as alleged and the allega-
tions of how the defendant’s negligence caused the
plaintiff’s injuries.’’ In response, the defendant argues
that the court acted within its discretion in denying the
plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict. We agree with
the defendant.5
1 (2014) (declining to reach alternative ground for affirmance in light of
conclusion that alleged prosecutorial improprieties were harmless).
5
The plaintiff additionally claims that the first interrogatory in the unmodi-
fied interrogatories was improper because it constituted a compound ques-
tion. As such, the plaintiff contends that this interrogatory did not require
the jury to make a distinct finding of fact and, thus, could not assist in
testing the correctness of the verdict entered. The defendant argues this
claim is unpreserved as the plaintiff did not raise it before the trial court.
We agree with the defendant that, although this claim is related to the
propriety of the interrogatories provided to the jury, it raises an entirely
new legal issue and cannot be considered as part of the claim raised before
the trial court, namely, that the interrogatories precluded the jury from
considering all of the essential elements of the cause of action. ‘‘[A]n appel-
late court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is not distinctly
raised at the trial level. . . . [B]ecause our review is limited to matters in
the record, we [also] will not address issues not decided by the trial court.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.,
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Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC

Before turning to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, we
briefly set forth our standard of review and applicable
principles of law. ‘‘The proper appellate standard of
review when considering the action of a trial court in
granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict is
the abuse of discretion standard. . . . In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is
required only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest
or [when] injustice appears to have been done. . . .
[T]he role of the trial court on a motion to set aside
the jury’s verdict is not to sit as [an added] juror . . .
but, rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury
could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ulbrich v. Groth,
310 Conn. 375, 414, 78 A.3d 76 (2013).
‘‘The power of the trial court to submit proper inter-
rogatories to the jury, to be answered when returning
313 Conn. 610, 619–20, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014). Accordingly, we decline to
review this claim.
The plaintiff also argues that the first interrogatory in the unmodified
interrogatories was improper because it called for a finding of fact not
relevant in this matter in that it asked whether the premises was reasonably
safe, as opposed to whether there was a specific defect, and because it was
not clear whether the jury’s answer addressed the condition of the property
in general or the specific area at issue. The defendant contends that these
arguments also amount to unpreserved claims of error that we should not
consider. We disagree with the defendant. ‘‘[O]rdinarily, [a reviewing court]
will decline to address only a claim that is raised for the first time on appeal.
. . . [A] claim is an entirely new legal issue, whereas, [g]enerally speaking,
an argument is a point or line of reasoning made in support of or in opposition
to a particular claim. . . . Because [o]ur rules of preservation apply to
claims . . . [and not] to legal arguments . . . [w]e may . . . review legal
arguments that differ from those raised below if they are subsumed within
or intertwined with arguments related to the legal claim before the court.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Curley v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., 220 Conn. App. 732, 744–45, 299 A.3d 1133, cert. denied, 348 Conn.
914, 303 A.3d 260 (2023). We conclude that these arguments are intertwined
with the plaintiff’s claim that the interrogatories submitted to the jury did
not follow the pleadings and precluded the jury from evaluating all of the
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Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC

[its] verdict, does not depend upon the consent of the
parties or the authority of statute law. In the absence
of any mandatory enactment, it is within the reasonable
discretion of the presiding judge to require or to refuse
to require the jury to answer pertinent interrogatories,
as the proper administration of justice may require.
. . . The trial court has broad discretion to regulate
the manner in which interrogatories are presented to
the jury, as well as their form and content. . . . More-
over, [i]n order to establish reversible error, the defen-
dant must prove both an abuse of discretion and a harm
that resulted from such abuse. . . .
‘‘We further note that jury interrogatories must be
consistent with the pleadings and the evidence adduced
at trial, so as not to mislead the jury. . . . The function
of jury interrogatories is to provide a guide for the jury’s
reasoning, and a written chronicle of that reasoning.
. . . The purpose of jury interrogatories is to elicit a
determination of material facts, to furnish the means
of testing the correctness of the verdict rendered, and
of ascertaining its extent.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilkins v.
Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center, 176 Conn.
App. 420, 430–31, 171 A.3d 88 (2017).
‘‘[A] premises liability claim is a negligence cause of
action. . . . The essential elements of a cause of action
in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that
duty; causation; and actual injury. . . . A business
owner owes its invitees a duty to keep its premises in
a reasonably safe condition.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Walencewicz v. Jealous
Monk, LLC, 228 Conn. App. 349, 363, 325 A.3d 271, cert.
denied, 350 Conn. 927, 326 A.3d 249 (2024). ‘‘To hold
the defendant liable for her personal injuries, the plain-
tiff must prove (1) the existence of a defect, (2) that
allegations in the operative complaint and the evidence presented at trial.
Accordingly, we address both arguments within our analysis in this opinion.
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Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC

the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known about the defect and (3) that
such defect had existed for such a length of time that
the [defendant] should, in the exercise of reasonable
care, have discovered it in time to remedy it.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Stop & Shop Super-
market Cos., 70 Conn. App. 250, 251, 796 A.2d 1277
(2002).
In the present case, although it is undisputed that
the unmodified interrogatories submitted to the jury
were not those agreed upon by counsel, we conclude
that their erroneous submission was nonetheless harm-
less because the unmodified interrogatories were proper.
See, e.g., Earlington v. Anastasi, 293 Conn. 194, 201–
202, 976 A.2d 689 (2009) (concluding that, although
court erred in submitting set of interrogatories to jury,
which included interrogatories that parties had pre-
viously agreed to omit and another they agreed to mod-
ify, submission did not affect outcome and was harm-
less). After reviewing the unmodified interrogatories,
it is clear that they were consistent with the pleadings
and the evidence adduced at trial. The unmodified inter-
rogatories submitted to the jury properly directed the
jury’s attention to each element of the plaintiff’s prem-
ises liability claim and each of the ten specific allega-
tions of negligence set forth in the operative complaint,
and required the jury to make such findings, as neces-
sary. Rather, the plaintiff’s claim rests entirely upon the
alleged impropriety of the first interrogatory.
The first question in the unmodified interrogatories
asked whether the defendant ‘‘failed to use reasonable
care to inspect and maintain the premises and to make
the premises reasonably safe.’’ The plaintiff asserts that
this interrogatory called for an irrelevant factual finding
because, ‘‘[i]n a premises liability case, the issue is not
whether the property in general was well maintained
and kept reasonably safe, but rather whether there was
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20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 733
Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC

a specific defect that caused the plaintiff to be injured.’’
We disagree. The law is clear that a business owner
has a duty to invitees to keep its premises in a reason-
ably safe condition. See Walencewicz v. Jealous Monk,
LLC, supra, 228 Conn. App. 363. Thus, the first interrog-
atory properly articulated an essential element of a
premises liability claim: breach of duty. See id. (‘‘[t]he
essential elements of a cause of action in negligence
are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causa-
tion; and actual injury’’ (emphasis added; internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). It was also consistent with the
pleadings as paragraph 8 of the operative complaint
sets forth several allegations concerning the condition
of the premises and the failure of the defendant to
maintain that premises. As this was an essential element
of a premises liability action, it was properly dispositive
of the plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Klein v. Norwalk Hos-
pital, 299 Conn. 241, 256, 9 A.3d 364 (2010) (determining
that ‘‘the issue of breach was essential to the case, as
it was wholly dispositive of the outcome,’’ when jury
answered first interrogatory addressing breach of duty
in negative, disregarded other interrogatories, and
immediately entered verdict for defendant); see also
Practice Book § 16-18 (‘‘[t]he judicial authority will not
accept a verdict until the interrogatories which are
essential to the verdict have been answered’’ (emphasis
added)).
The plaintiff argues that this first interrogatory,
unlike the first interrogatory in the modified interroga-
tories, failed to address whether there was a specific
defect and precluded the jury from reaching the other
elements of her claim. We first note, again, that the
unmodified interrogatories were consistent with the
pleadings and the evidence adduced at trial. In fact,
the second question in the unmodified interrogatories
submitted to the jury asked whether there was a specific
defect on the premises in a very similar fashion to the
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Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC

first interrogatory in the modified interrogatories.
These subsequent interrogatories were not reached by
the jury, as its answer to the first was dispositive of
the plaintiff’s claim. Moreover, the plaintiff overlooks
that a finding by the jury that the premises was reason-
ably safe necessarily precludes a finding that the prem-
ises was in a defective condition. See Palmieri v. Stop &
Shop Cos., 103 Conn. App. 121, 123–24, 927 A.2d 371
(2007). Thus, an interrogatory that asks whether the
premises was not reasonably safe and an interrogatory
that asks whether the premises was in a defective condi-
tion each address the same issue of breach of duty; the
former stated in the negative, the latter stated in the
affirmative.
To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the first
interrogatory was improper because of the directive
following it, we observe that both sets of interrogatories
contained a directive following each interrogatory,
instructing the jury that if it answered ‘‘no,’’ to not
complete the rest of the interrogatories and enter a
verdict for the defendant. A similar directive was also
included in each rendition of the proposed interrogato-
ries before the court, including those submitted by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff, who agreed to the modified inter-
rogatories, thus cannot be heard to complain that she
was harmed by the directive in the unmodified interrog-
atories that were submitted to the jury. ‘‘It is well estab-
lished that a party who induces an error cannot be
heard to later complain about that error.’’ State v. Cruz,
269 Conn. 97, 105, 848 A.2d 445 (2004); see, e.g., id.,
105–107 (declining to review defendant’s claim chal-
lenging jury instruction that he requested from trial
court).6 We also note that, even if the jury had been
6
‘‘An induced error, or invited error, is [a]n error that a party cannot
complain of on appeal because the party, through conduct, encouraged or
prompted the trial court to make the erroneous ruling.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Cruz, supra, 269 Conn. 105 n.8.
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Gibson v. Denmo’s Original Drive-In, LLC

asked to complete the modified interrogatories, those
interrogatories similarly would not have required the
jury to reach the subsequent questions addressing the
other elements of a premises liability action and the
allegations set forth in the complaint, had the jury
answered no to the first interrogatory. In sum, given our
conclusion that the unmodified interrogatories properly
followed the evidence adduced at trial and were consis-
tent with the pleadings, we agree with the court’s con-
clusion that the erroneous submission of the unmodi-
fied interrogatories to the jury was harmless.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying her motion to set aside
the jury’s verdict must fail.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.