Castelino v. Whitman, Breed, Abbott & Morgan, LLC

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Castelino v. Whitman, Breed, Abbott & Morgan, LLC

MARITA TAMMY CASTELINO v. WHITMAN,
BREED, ABBOTT & MORGAN, LLC
(AC 47014)
Seeley, Westbrook and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant,
rendered following its grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
on the plaintiff’s complaint alleging, inter alia, employment discrimination
based on disability. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly concluded
that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with respect to her
claims. Held:

The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant, as
the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
plaintiff’s position, at the time of her hiring, required some measure of in
person work in the office, and the same evidence also established, as a
matter of law, that the plaintiff’s proposed accommodation to work entirely
from home was not reasonable because that accommodation would elimi-
nate an essential job function.
Argued November 12, 2024—officially released July 1, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, alleged
employment discrimination, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Hon. Kenneth B.
Povodator, judge trial referee, granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
James V. Sabatini, for the appellant (plaintiff).
James C. Riley, with whom, on the brief, was John
M. Hendele IV, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PALMER, J. The plaintiff, Marita Tammy Castelino,
appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the
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trial court in favor of the defendant, Whitman, Breed,
Abbott & Morgan, LLC, with respect to her claims under
the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act
(CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., for disability
discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation.
On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improp-
erly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment because, contrary to the court’s determination,
there are genuine issues of material fact with respect
to each of the plaintiff’s claims and, consequently, the
plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on her claims. We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The following facts, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our analysis. Commencing
on May 29, 2020, the plaintiff was employed by the
defendant, a law firm, to serve as an administrative
assistant in the defendant’s real estate practice group.
The plaintiff was hired to work for Attorney Cynthia
Smith, who headed the defendant’s real estate practice
group, and, more specifically, to provide support to
Cynthia Smith’s longtime paralegal, Carla Smith.1
Among other matters, Cynthia represents landlords and
tenants in commercial leases, sellers and purchasers
in sale and purchase transactions, and developers in
various transactions.
The plaintiff was told that her position was ‘‘mostly’’
remote and that she would be expected to go into the
office ‘‘once in a while,’’ on an ‘‘as needed’’ basis. At
the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March, 2020,
certain of the defendant’s practice groups had con-
verted to a mostly remote work model. The real estate
1
For ease of reference, we hereinafter refer to Cynthia Smith and Carla
Smith by their first names throughout this opinion. Although they share
the same last name, the record does not indicate that Cynthia and Carla
are related.
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Castelino v. Whitman, Breed, Abbott & Morgan, LLC

practice group, however, continued to work from the
office on a regular basis, subject to social distancing
restrictions and required mask wearing. The exception
was Carla, who was directed by her physician not to
come into the office because she suffers from a chronic
health condition that severely compromises her
immune system.
During the plaintiff’s first two weeks with the defen-
dant, Cynthia was traveling and out of the office, and
the plaintiff remained in the office organizing physical
files. The plaintiff learned that COVID-19 testing was
being performed at a medical facility in the same office
building where the defendant’s office was located, and
she observed that nurses from that medical facility used
the same restrooms as the defendant’s employees. As a
result, the plaintiff, who previously had been diagnosed
with diabetes and asthma, was concerned about being
exposed to COVID-19.
The plaintiff relayed her concerns to Cynthia during
a phone conversation on June 11, 2020, and requested
to work exclusively remotely. Cynthia denied the plain-
tiff’s request. The plaintiff memorialized this conversa-
tion in an email to herself and her husband. Although
the defendant did not permit the plaintiff to work
remotely on an exclusive or continuous basis, Cynthia
granted the plaintiff’s requests to do so on specific days.
According to the plaintiff, when she worked in the
office, she spent approximately one third to one half
of her time performing personal errands for Cynthia,
such as accessing documents from files concerning
Cynthia’s personal properties, picking up lunch for Cyn-
thia, and making ‘‘personal deposits’’ on Cynthia’s
behalf at a bank. With respect to the other work that
required the plaintiff’s presence in the office, she was
expected to maintain physical files, scan client docu-
ments, and meet with clients to obtain ‘‘ink signatures’’
and notarize documents for real estate closings.
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Throughout the month of June, Cynthia and Carla
expressed their concerns to each other about the plain-
tiff’s work performance. On June 8, only one week after
the plaintiff began work at the defendant, Carla sent
an email to Cynthia expressing frustration with the
plaintiff, stating, among other things: ‘‘I don’t think she
is going to work out unless she can grasp a lot of things
quicker than she’s shown [in] the past week. She does
not pay attention to what’s contained in e-mails.’’ On
June 11, the plaintiff emailed Cynthia and Carla con-
cerning signatures the plaintiff had missed in a real
estate contract. On June 15, Carla emailed the plaintiff
regarding incorrect information that the plaintiff had
entered on a wire transfer request form.
On June 16, Cynthia emailed Anthony Riccio, an
employment recruiter who had worked with the defen-
dant to fill the position for which the plaintiff was hired,
and told him that there were some ‘‘growing pains’’
with the plaintiff, explaining that ‘‘[t]here are a few
issues as she seems to get quite flustered and conse-
quently does not pay attention to details, but we will
give her a few more days to settle in. I would expect,
however, with someone of her experience that she will
grasp things quickly.’’ Cynthia also inquired of Riccio
about the length of the plaintiff’s probationary period.
In the beginning of July, Cynthia and Carla continued
to email the plaintiff about certain performance issues,
including the fact that she had provided a client with
the wrong financial statement during a real estate clos-
ing. On July 9, Cynthia decided that the plaintiff’s
employment would be terminated. Carla emailed Ric-
cio, stating that, after careful consideration, it had
become ‘‘increasingly evident that [the plaintiff] is not
going to succeed in [her] role’’ because she did not
demonstrate the real estate experience reflected on her
resume or discussed during the interview process, and
she lacked the necessary attention to detail. Carla asked
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Castelino v. Whitman, Breed, Abbott & Morgan, LLC

Riccio to begin the process of finding a replacement
for the plaintiff. Cynthia, who was copied on the email
chain, thanked Riccio for his assistance and stated: ‘‘It
is very disappointing, and I am very sorry to say that [the
plaintiff] is just not a good fit for this particular role.’’
The plaintiff continued working for the defendant,
unaware of her impending termination. On July 23,
Carla emailed the plaintiff and inquired whether she
had contacted clients to obtain information for certain
sale documents, a task that Carla had asked the plaintiff
to do a few days earlier. When the plaintiff responded
that she had not done so, Cynthia, who again was copied
on the email chain, emailed Attorney Kevin Walsh, one
of the defendant’s managing partners, and asked: ‘‘When
are we terminating her? I cannot trust her to follow-
up or perform even rudimentary tasks.’’ The plaintiff’s
employment was terminated on July 27, not quite two
months after she commenced work with the defendant.
The plaintiff thereafter filed a timely complaint with
the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities
(CHRO), which issued a release of jurisdiction on June
30, 2021. Subsequently, on September 23, 2021, the
plaintiff commenced the present action against the
defendant. In count one of her complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had violated General Statutes
§ 46a-60 (b) (1)2 by discriminating against her and termi-
nating her because of her physical disabilities, namely,
2
General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be
a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . [f]or an employer,
by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide
occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or
to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against
any individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed, age,
sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry,
present or past history of mental disability, intellectual disability, learning
disability, physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness, status
as a veteran or status as a victim of domestic violence . . . .’’
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diabetes and asthma. In count two, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had violated § 46a-60 (b) (1) by fail-
ing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation
for her disabilities. In count three, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had violated § 46a-60 (b) (4)3 by
terminating her employment in retaliation for
requesting a reasonable accommodation.
On March 15, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum of
law maintaining that (1) the plaintiff could not establish
a prima facie case with respect to any of her claims,
(2) her employment was terminated for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, namely, her performance
deficiencies, and (3) she could not demonstrate that
the defendant’s proffered reason for her termination
was pretextual. The defendant submitted several exhib-
its in support of its motion, including affidavits from
Cynthia, Carla, and Walsh.
On April 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed a revised com-
plaint containing the same three claims as the original
complaint. The plaintiff, however, made more specific
factual allegations in connection with her failure to
accommodate claim, alleging that ‘‘the defendant failed
to accommodate the plaintiff’s disability by failing to
permit remote work from home, failing to provide digi-
tal copies of documents, and failing to provide a large
computer screen . . . .’’
On May 30, 2023, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, con-
tending, in her memorandum of law in opposition to
3
General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (4) provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be
a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . [f]or any person,
employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or
otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has opposed
any discriminatory employment practice or because such person has filed
a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding under section 46a-82,
46a-83 or 46a-84 . . . .’’
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the defendant’s motion, that judgment as a matter of
law was inappropriate because there were disputed
issues of fact material to her claims. In support of her
contention, the plaintiff provided the court with several
exhibits, including her deposition testimony and affida-
vit; the email memorializing her June 11, 2020 phone
conversation with Cynthia; the defendant’s answer to
the plaintiff’s CHRO complaint; a copy of an email
between Cynthia and Riccio in May, 2020, concerning
the plaintiff’s start date and whether she was comfort-
able coming into the office; and the defendant’s answers
and objections to the plaintiff’s interrogatories and
requests for production. The defendant filed a reply
memorandum on June 9, 2023.
The court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial
referee, held a hearing on the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on June 12, 2023. On October 10,
2023, the court issued a memorandum of decision con-
cluding that there were no genuine issues of material
fact with respect to the plaintiff’s claims and that the
defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4
With respect to the disability discrimination claim set
forth in count one of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court
first determined that the plaintiff had not provided evi-
dence to establish each of the elements of her prima
facie case. As an initial matter, the court expressed
doubt as to whether the plaintiff had satisfied her bur-
den of demonstrating that her chronic conditions of
4
In resolving the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the trial court
engaged in the well settled analytical framework applicable to employment
discrimination claims, pursuant to which, as we explain more fully herein-
after, ‘‘the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case, then the burden
of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimina-
tion by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employ-
ment decision. . . . Once the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual.’’ (Citation omitted;
footnote omitted.) Lassen v. Hartford, 223 Conn. App. 285, 290–91, 308 A.3d
564 (2024).
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asthma and diabetes qualified her as disabled for pur-
poses of CFEPA,5 particularly in view of the fact that
those conditions did not have any appreciable impact
on her job performance. The court also concluded that
the plaintiff could not establish that she was qualified
for her position because she could not perform the
essential functions of her job with the accommodation
that she had requested. Specifically, the court deter-
mined that working entirely remotely was not a reason-
able accommodation request, as a matter of law,
because that accommodation would have eliminated
an essential function of her job, namely, the work that
she was required to do in the office. Finally, the court
further determined that the plaintiff was unable to
establish a prima facie case under CFEPA because she
had failed to establish that the adverse employment
action, that is, her termination, had occurred under
circumstances that gave rise to an inference of discrimi-
nation.6
The court also concluded that, even if the plaintiff
could establish a prima facie case for her disability
discrimination claim, the evidence offered by the defen-
dant satisfied its burden of providing a legitimate, non-
discriminatory justification for the plaintiff’s termina-
tion, specifically, her performance deficiencies. With
respect to whether the plaintiff could demonstrate that
the reason proffered by the defendant was merely a
5
Pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-51 (15), ‘‘ ‘[p]hysically disabled’ refers
to any individual who has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impair-
ment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes
or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to, epilepsy, deafness
or being hard of hearing or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial
appliance or device . . . .’’
6
‘‘To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, an employee plaintiff
must show that (1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [she] was
qualified for the position; (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that
give rise to an inference of discrimination.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Lassen v. Hartford, 223 Conn. App. 285, 290 n.5, 308 A.3d 564 (2024).
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pretext for discrimination, the court stated: ‘‘[I]t
remains a challenge to treat the plaintiff’s claims as
anything other than an attempt to take the combination
of the defendant’s dissatisfaction with her performance
and her own efforts to change her job requirements
and recharacterize them as improper conduct by the
defendant.’’
The court next concluded that the plaintiff’s claim
that the defendant failed to provide her with a reason-
able accommodation, as set forth in count two,
‘‘require[d] little discussion’’ given the court’s conclu-
sion on the discrimination claim.7 The court explained
in relevant part as follows: ‘‘The plaintiff’s conception
of a reasonable accommodation was the conversion of
a job requiring at least some level of attendance at the
workplace into a job fully performed remotely. In a
sense, even more extreme, she wanted to have input if
not be the arbiter of what work she should be required
to do. She emphatically thought it inappropriate that
she was required to run errands for a principal of the
firm. The plaintiff was the low person on a three person
working group within the firm, headed by [Cynthia]. If
the defendant, as an institution or through [Cynthia],
deemed it in the firm’s best interest that the plaintiff’s
role included running errands for the attorney—thereby
allowing [Cynthia] to dedicate more of her time to her
obligations as a lawyer—it plausibly may have been a
practice reasonably subject to question in some objec-
tive or theoretical sense, but not in terms of whether
a job accommodation should have been granted. That
7
‘‘In order to establish a prima facie case for a reasonable accommodation
claim, the plaintiff must produce enough evidence for a reasonable jury to
find that (1) [s]he is disabled within the meaning of the [statute], (2) [s]he
was able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a
reasonable accommodation, and (3) [the defendant], despite knowing of
[the plaintiff’s] disability, did not reasonably accommodate it.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Barbabosa v. Board of Education, 189 Conn.
App. 427, 437–38, 207 A.3d 122 (2019).
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she may not have seen a need for hand delivery of
documents also might have been a plausible question
as to firm efficiency, but not as a function of her job
that needed to be changed to accommodate her. There
is no explanation as to how, when hired for a job requir-
ing at least some presence in the office, the plaintiff
can claim a reasonable accommodation would have
been excusing all on-site work.’’
The court’s conclusion rejecting the plaintiff’s retalia-
tion claim was predicated on its threshold determina-
tion that the plaintiff’s accommodation request was
unreasonable as a matter of law.8 The court stated: ‘‘The
plaintiff provides no authority for the proposition that
there can be liability associated with a denial of an
improper request for accommodation. The theme,
throughout, is that the employer has no obligation to
change the nature of the job, and especially attendance
at the workplace, simply because an employee makes
the request. . . . [T]he unreasonable request for an
accommodation cannot be a shield with respect to an
unsatisfactory employee, with the situation com-
pounded by the employee’s efforts to change the func-
tions of her job in a manner inconsistent with the terms
on which she initially had been hired.’’ Accordingly, the
court rendered summary judgment for the defendant,
and this appeal followed. Additional facts will be set
forth as necessary.
We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of
review and legal principles that govern our analysis.
8
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show ‘‘(1)
that [s]he participated in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew
of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action against [her];
and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lassen v. Hartford,
223 Conn. App. 285, 290–91 n.5, 308 A.3d 564 (2024). In the present case,
the protected activity alleged by the plaintiff was her request for what she
maintains constituted a reasonable accommodation.
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‘‘The standard of review of a trial court’s decision grant-
ing summary judgment is well established. Practice
Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any
other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party . . . [and] the moving party . . . has
the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
as to all the material facts . . . . When documents sub-
mitted in support of a motion for summary judgment
fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit
documents establishing the existence of such an issue.
. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, how-
ever, the [nonmoving] party must present evidence that
demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual
issue. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to
grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
plenary. . . . On appeal, we must determine whether
the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are
legally and logically correct and whether they find sup-
port in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision
of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Stubbs v. ICare Management, LLC, 198 Conn. App. 511,
520, 233 A.3d 1170 (2020).
‘‘Under [CFEPA] . . . employers may not discrimi-
nate against certain protected classes of individuals,
including those who are physically disabled.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 521. Section 46a-60 (b)
provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be a discriminatory
practice . . . (1) [f]or an employer . . . to discharge
from employment any individual or to discriminate
against any individual in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment because of the
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individual’s . . . present or past history of . . . physi-
cal disability . . . .’’ Moreover, ‘‘[§] 46a-60 (b) (1)
requires employers to reasonably accommodate an
employee’s disability.’’ Bartolotta v. Human Resources
Agency of New Britain, Inc., 224 Conn. App. 248, 272,
312 A.3d 59, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 908, 313 A.3d 513
(2024). In addition, § 46a-60 (b) (4) makes it unlawful
for any person to ‘‘discharge, expel or otherwise dis-
criminate against any person because such person has
opposed any discriminatory employment practice
. . . .’’
‘‘The standard applicable to the plaintiff’s claim of
disability discrimination, which is based on disparate
treatment, [failure to accommodate] and retaliation is
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine9 model of analysis.
. . . Under this framework, the plaintiff first must
establish a prima facie case, then the burden of produc-
tion shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption
of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for its employment decision. . . .
Once the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered
reason is pretextual.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omit-
ted.) Lassen v. Hartford, 223 Conn. App. 285, 290–91,
308 A.3d 564 (2024); see also Stubbs v. ICare Manage-
ment, LLC, supra, 198 Conn. App. 521; Phadnis v. Great
Expression Dental Centers of Connecticut, P.C., 170
Conn. App. 79, 95, 153 A.3d 687 (2017).
As set forth previously in this opinion, the court’s
conclusion on all three of the plaintiff’s claims rested
primarily on its determination that the plaintiff’s
requested accommodation to work entirely remotely
9
‘‘See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56,
101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802–804, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).’’ Lassen v.
Hartford, 223 Conn. App. 285, 290 n.4, 308 A.3d 564 (2024).
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was not reasonable as a matter of law,10 and, therefore,
the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case
with respect to each of her claims. ‘‘To establish a prima
facie case of employment discrimination pursuant to
§ 46a-60 (b) (1) on the basis of either a disparate treat-
ment disability discrimination claim or a reasonable
accommodation claim, a plaintiff must establish a com-
mon essential element, namely, that he or she is quali-
fied for the position. . . . In order for an employee to
be qualified, he or she must be able to perform the
essential functions of the job with or without a reason-
able accommodation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Barbabosa v. Board of Education, 189 Conn.
App. 427, 437–38, 207 A.3d 122 (2019). In addition, to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff
must show, inter alia, that she ‘‘participated in a pro-
tected activity’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)
Lassen v. Hartford, supra, 223 Conn. App. 290 n.5; and
the protected activity alleged in this case was the plain-
tiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dant because, inter alia, a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to whether her request to work entirely
remotely constituted a reasonable accommodation that
did not eliminate an essential function of her position.11
10
The plaintiff contends that ‘‘[t]here are two accommodations in play in
this case: work remotely from home and a second computer monitor.’’ In
opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
had submitted evidence that, at the end of June, 2020, she requested a
second computer monitor after she experienced vision issues related to her
diabetes and temporarily lost vision in one eye. The trial court’s discussion
of this alleged accommodation request is limited. On appeal, the plaintiff
does not provide any substantive argument regarding why the court improp-
erly rendered summary judgment on her failure to accommodate claim in
light of this particular proposed accommodation. Accordingly, we limit our
analysis to the plaintiff’s requested accommodation of remote work.
11
The plaintiff also claims, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded
that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff
was disabled and, therefore, a member of a protected class; whether the
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Specifically, the plaintiff contends that working in the
office was not an essential function of the job because
her position initially was intended to be remote and
‘‘[t]he only job tasks that required her to be in the office
were the personal errand tasks that she was doing for
[Cynthia],’’ which ‘‘[t]he defendant admitted . . . was
not a part of her job duties and responsibilities.’’ We
are not persuaded.

‘‘[A]n accommodation is not reasonable if it, in
essence, requires an employer to eliminate an essential
function of a job.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Frantti v. New York, 850 Fed. Appx. 17, 20 (2d Cir.
2021); see id. (evaluating employment discrimination
claim under provisions of analogous federal law).
Although ‘‘reasonableness is normally a question of fact,
summary judgment may be granted in cases where . . .
the plaintiff’s proposed accommodation would elimi-
nate the essential functions of the job.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Barbabosa v. Board of Education,
supra, 189 Conn. App. 446.

Neither this court nor our Supreme Court appears to
have addressed the circumstances under which work-
ing remotely constitutes a reasonable accommoda-
plaintiff could establish an inference of discriminatory intent; whether the
defendant’s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual; and
whether there was a causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action as required for her retaliation claim.
‘‘Because [s]ummary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of
material fact exists, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, with respect to any one element that the plaintiff is required to prove
in order to prevail at trial . . . an appellate court need not address every
basis articulated by a trial court in rendering summary judgment.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lassen v. Hartford, supra, 223 Conn. App. 291
n.6. Accordingly, because we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff has
not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether she could perform the essential functions of her position with
her requested accommodation, we need not address the plaintiff’s claims
regarding the other elements of her claims. See id.
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tion. Accordingly, ‘‘[w]e look to federal law for guid-
12

ance on interpreting state employment discrimination
law, and the analysis is the same under both.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) O’Reggio v. Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities, 350 Conn. 182, 190,
323 A.3d 1048 (2024).
A determination of whether a specific job has essen-
tial functions that require in person work involves a
‘‘case-specific inquiry.’’ Kinney v. St. Mary’s Health,
Inc., 76 F.4th 635, 644 (7th Cir. 2023). ‘‘The term essen-
tial functions, which is not defined in the statutes them-
selves, is generally defined in [the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act] regulations promulgated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission . . . to mean
the fundamental duties to be performed in the position
in question, but not functions that are merely marginal.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tafolla v. Heilig,
80 F.4th 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2023). ‘‘Under this standard,
a court must give considerable deference to an employ-
er’s judgment regarding what functions are essential
for service in a particular position . . . . Ultimately,
however, the question whether a task constitutes an
essential function depends on the totality of the circum-
stances.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. The court must conduct ‘‘a fact-specific
12
We note that, in Barbabosa v. Board of Education, supra, 189 Conn.
App. 427, this court held that the trial court properly determined that the
defendant Board of Education of the town of Manchester (board) was
entitled to summary judgment on the claim of the plaintiff, Dianna Barba-
bosa, a school paraprofessional, that the board was required to accommo-
date her disability, which resulted in her frequent and extended absences
from work, by affording her intermittent leaves of absence. Id., 434–36. In
reaching its conclusion, this court explained that Barbabosa was not able
to perform an essential function of her employment, either with or without
her proposed accommodation, namely, maintaining regular attendance, and,
consequently, the accommodation she sought was not reasonable. Id., 447–
48. Thus, although Barbabosa addresses the issue of attendance at work in
the context of a discrimination claim under CFEPA, the case does not
implicate the issue presented here concerning remote work.
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inquiry into both the employer’s description of a job
and how the job is actually performed in practice,’’ in
which it ‘‘draw[s] all inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The court may consider, among other things, ‘‘written
job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the job
performing the function, and the consequences of not
requiring the plaintiff to perform the function.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Frantti v. New York, supra,
850 Fed. Appx. 20.
In the present case, the defendant submitted evidence
in support of its summary judgment motion demonstra-
ting that working in the office is an essential component
of the plaintiff’s job. Specifically, in her affidavit, Cyn-
thia explained that, ‘‘[a]lthough certain of the [defen-
dant’s] practice groups were then largely practicing
remotely, we ultimately determined that we needed
someone capable of working in the office at least part
of the time due to the number of tasks that required
in-person work, including the creation and maintenance
of physical files, locating documents and information
contained in those files, occasional in-person meetings
with clients, preparing transaction documents for exe-
cution by clients, forwarding original documents once
executed or recorded, and other tasks that necessitated
a physical presence in the office. Thus, while I antici-
pated that the new hire could work remotely as work
flow and scheduling allowed, it was a requirement and
condition of the position that the new hire be willing
to work in the office at least part of the time. I was
open to the idea that over time, as the new hire became
more familiar with the requirements of the position and
my practices, proficient with [the defendant’s] systems,
and gained an understanding of the client files, he or
she could work remotely more often. However, at least
during the first months of employment, I needed the
administrative assistant to be present in the office most
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days.’’ Cynthia further stated that the plaintiff did not
object to working in the office during the first couple
of weeks while Cynthia was traveling and, initially, the
plaintiff did not advise Cynthia that she had a health
condition that prevented her from working in the office.
As Cynthia also explained, ‘‘[h]ad [the plaintiff] done
so, I would not have been able to hire her, as working
from the office was an essential function of the job.’’
With respect to the amount of time that the plaintiff
would be permitted to work remotely, Cynthia stated
that, ‘‘[f]rom the outset or near outset of her employ-
ment, we had agreed that depending on scheduling of
transactions, [the plaintiff] would be able to work one
day per week from home. . . . I did not reject the possi-
bility of her working additional days from home as she
became more familiar with our matters and systems,
but told her that I needed her in the office on the
schedule to which we had previously agreed (i.e., four
days per week), and that we could evaluate further
when I returned to the office later in June.’’ In his
affidavit, Walsh similarly averred that ‘‘the administra-
tive assistant position was not a fully remote position;
rather, the person hired was required to work in the
office at least part of the time, with the partner-in-
charge ([Cynthia]) having discretion to allow the admin-
istrative assistant to work remotely depending on work-
flow and scheduling of transactions.’’
In the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, submitted in
opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment, she acknowledged that she was expected to work
in the office at least part of the time and that her position
was not intended to be entirely remote. Specifically,
she testified that the position ‘‘wasn’t fully remote,’’ but
rather ‘‘[m]ostly remote with coming into the office as
needed . . . .’’ When asked about her understanding
as to how often she would be required to be in the office
on a weekly basis, the plaintiff responded: ‘‘Sometimes
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none. Sometimes a few hours. Other weeks it could be
I might need to go a few days that week. It was just
as needed. It was open-ended as needed when it was
absolutely necessary.’’ She also explained that ‘‘ ‘[a]s
needed’ was how it was phrased’’ during the interview
process and that she would be required to go into the
office ‘‘once in a while if you really need to.’’ As to
whether she was told that the position was ‘‘partially’’
remote, the plaintiff testified: ‘‘It was as needed; so
that’s a yes. That’s an as needed. Partially remote? No.
It was mostly remote. . . . No, it’s not partially remote.
It was remote with . . . an as needed to be partially
in the office. The partial is more so for in the office,
but it was remote and go into the office as needed.’’
In addition, in her objection to the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that ‘‘[t]he
legal assistant job with the defendant was supposed to
be mostly remote.’’13 (Emphasis added.) Similarly, at
the hearing on the motion, the plaintiff’s counsel
acknowledged that, although the plaintiff requested an
accommodation to work ‘‘entirely’’ remotely, the plain-
tiff was told during the hiring process that her position
would be ‘‘mostly’’ remote. Accordingly, in its decision,
the court stated: ‘‘[T]here is no claim that [the plaintiff]
had been hired for a position that was intended to be
100 percent remote. . . . There may be a dispute as
to whether the job was intended to be mostly in office
or mostly remote, but the plaintiff does not appear to
contest the fact that at least some duties assigned to
her required some level of physical presence in the
office, at least as originally structured.’’ (Emphasis
added.)
On appeal, the plaintiff suggests that she was told,
from the outset, that her position would be entirely
13
In her revised complaint, the plaintiff alleged that ‘‘[t]he defendant told
the plaintiff that her job would have her working in the office one to two
days per week and the other days from home.’’
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remote. Citing her deposition testimony, the plaintiff
contends that Cynthia and Walsh told the plaintiff that
her job would be remote.14 In that portion of the deposi-
tion, however, the plaintiff was asked: ‘‘Did anyone from
[the defendant] tell you in words or substance that
your position with the firm would be mostly remote?’’
(Emphasis added.) The plaintiff responded, ‘‘[y]es,’’ and
when asked who told her that, the plaintiff responded
that Cynthia and ‘‘the recruiter,’’ Riccio, did so.
Although there are some portions of the plaintiff’s testi-
mony suggesting that her position was intended to be
‘‘remote,’’ without qualification, we do not review that
testimony in isolation. As set forth previously, the plain-
tiff expressly testified that her position ‘‘wasn’t fully
remote.’’
With respect to the duties that the plaintiff was
expected to perform in the office, she submitted evi-
dence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to
her claim, could demonstrate that there were some in
office tasks that were not essential or otherwise could
be done remotely. Specifically, in her deposition testi-
mony, the plaintiff stated that she spent one third to
one half of her time completing personal errands for
Cynthia, which the defendant admitted, in its answer
to the plaintiff’s CHRO complaint, were not part of the
plaintiff’s job duties and responsibilities.15 The plaintiff
14
The plaintiff also refers to an email from Cynthia to Riccio, which was
attached to the plaintiff’s objection to the motion for summary judgment
and states in relevant part: ‘‘We will be extending an offer to [the plaintiff],
however, we have to figure out the appropriate start date, if she is comfort-
able coming into the office, or prefers to work from home.’’ To the extent
that the plaintiff contends that this email gives rise to an issue of fact as
to whether the plaintiff was given the option to work from home exclusively,
we are not persuaded. There is nothing in the record to indicate that this
message was conveyed to the plaintiff at any time prior to her termination.
Moreover, the plaintiff’s own deposition testimony acknowledges that the
position for which she was hired was not fully remote and, therefore, contra-
dicts her suggested interpretation of the email.
15
The defendant also denied that Cynthia had the plaintiff run personal
errands for her.
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also testified that she could answer phone calls
remotely if given access to download the defendant’s
phone system onto her cell phone and she ‘‘couldn’t
see that [she] had to be deleting pages and manipulating
documents from an office desk.’’
In her deposition testimony, however, the plaintiff
also recognized that there were certain tasks, aside
from the alleged personal errands for Cynthia, that
needed to be done in the office. Specifically, the plaintiff
testified that, aside from accessing Cynthia’s personal
files, ‘‘there might be an occasional reason to go in.
That’s why it wasn’t fully remote.’’ She explained: ‘‘No
one can give me any good reason as to why I have to
be in that office except for [Cynthia’s] personal files
that [were] there. That’s the only thing I can come up
with. Because everything else, unless I need to go into
that office to get an ink signature or to actually pick
up a file that may not be available on the database
. . . or to actually pick up a physical file and compare
it to what’s on there to make sure everything is right,
there really isn’t a whole lot of reason for me to keep
going into the office day in and day out and to be there
all day long.’’ (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff further
stated: ‘‘It’s what needs to be done that determines if
I am needed to be in the office. A physical ink signature
that needs to be notarized requires me to go in and
physically obtain that signature and notarize it. Ink doc-
uments that are being delivered by a client that didn’t
email them for whatever reason and they need to be
scanned, I could go in and pick up those documents, get
them scanned then do what I have to do, and go home.’’
In light of the plaintiff’s own testimony, the trial court
aptly observed that ‘‘the plaintiff seems to acknowledge
that her employment, from the start, required at least
some level of performance of work at the office loca-
tion. . . . Although she claims that some of her assign-
ments were unnecessary or could have been assigned
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to someone else in the office . . . she seems to
acknowledge that some of the work-related functions
she was asked to perform required physical presence
in the office.’’
On the basis of our review of the evidence, we agree
with the trial court that no genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether working in the office was
an essential function of the plaintiff’s position. Although
the parties’ evidence conflicted as to how often the
plaintiff was expected, at the time of her hiring, to work
in the office—according to the plaintiff, the position
was mostly remote, whereas Cynthia averred that the
plaintiff was expected to work in the office most of
the time—it is undisputed that the job required some
measure of in person work. The plaintiff’s claim that
her in office tasks were ‘‘marginal’’ and, therefore, not
essential; see Tafolla v. Heilig, supra, 80 F.4th 119;
hinges on her assertion that ‘‘[t]he only job tasks that
required her to be in the office were the personal errand
tasks that she was doing for [Cynthia].’’ The plaintiff’s
contention, however, is belied by her own deposition
testimony in which she acknowledges that there were
other tasks that necessitated a physical presence in the
office, in particular, maintaining physical files, scanning
client documents, and meeting with clients to obtain
‘‘ink signatures’’ and notarize documents for real estate
closings. We therefore conclude that the evidence, even
when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to this issue.
Moreover, the same evidence definitively establishing
that in office work is an essential part of the plaintiff’s
job also establishes, as a matter of law, that the plain-
tiff’s proposed accommodation to work entirely from
home was not reasonable because that accommodation
would eliminate an essential job function. See Barba-
bosa v. Board of Education, supra, 189 Conn. App.
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448. Consequently, we conclude that the court properly
rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.