Buggelli v. Buggeli

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Buggelli v. Buggelli

MEGHAN MCCARTAN BUGGELLI
v. ROYCE BUGGELLI
(AC 46331)
Moll, Westbrook and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dissolved
by a judgment rendered by a New Jersey court, appealed from the trial
court’s denial of her motions seeking reimbursement from the defendant
for extracurricular, healthcare and college expenses incurred on behalf of
their minor children. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improp-
erly denied her motion concerning extracurricular and healthcare expenses
because it misinterpreted the parties’ settlement agreement, as incorporated
into the dissolution judgment and as modified by a postjudgment consent
order. Held:

The trial court improperly construed the modified settlement agreement in
determining that the plaintiff waived her right to seek reimbursement for
the claimed extracurricular and healthcare expenses on the ground that she
did not provide the defendant with the purported requisite notice, as the
consent order, in clear and unambiguous terms, removed the notice require-
ments of the original settlement agreement with which the plaintiff originally
had to comply in order to be entitled to reimbursement from the defendant
for extracurricular and healthcare expenses.

The trial court improperly construed the modified settlement agreement to
require the plaintiff to submit reimbursement requests for extracurricular
and healthcare expenses to the defendant by email, as, pursuant to that
agreement, the defendant’s obligation to reimburse the plaintiff for extracur-
ricular and healthcare expenses was not dependent on the plaintiff’s provi-
sion of either notice to the defendant of said expenses or the submission
of reimbursement requests for said expenses to him by any particular method
of delivery.

The trial court’s articulation, issued following the filing of the plaintiff’s
appeal, did not modify its original decision denying the plaintiff’s motion
for contribution toward college expenses, as the articulation provided that,
pursuant to Newburgh v. Arrigo (88 N.J. 529), the court had placed great
emphasis on its findings demonstrating that the plaintiff had engaged in
conduct that was detrimental to the relationship between the defendant and
the children, and, insofar as the articulation stated that the defendant should
not be obligated to pay any college expenses so long as the plaintiff continued
to block any relationship he might have with the children, that statement
aligned with this court’s interpretation of the original decision to require
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Buggelli v. Buggelli
consideration of the Newburgh factors in determining whether the defen-
dant’s obligation to contribute toward college expenses arose.

The trial court improperly relied on the Newburgh factors in denying the
plaintiff’s motion for contribution toward college expenses, as the college
expense provisions of the modified settlement agreement were ambiguous
as to whether the parties agreed to terms concerning the allocation of their
college expense contributions, and the ambiguity created a threshold factual
issue that was required to be resolved in an evidentiary hearing before the
motion for college expenses could be adjudicated.

Argued June 2—officially released September 9, 2025

Procedural History

Motions by the plaintiff seeking, inter alia, reimburse-
ment from the defendant for certain expenses incurred
on behalf of the parties’ children in connection with a
foreign judgment of dissolution, and other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Haven, where the court, Hon. James G. Kenefick,
Jr., judge trial referee, denied the plaintiff’s motions,
and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed; fur-
ther proceedings.
Brandon B. Fontaine, with whom, on the brief, was
Meaghan E. Collins, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Dyan M. Kozaczka, with whom, on the brief, were
Thomas D. Colin and Ross M. Kaufman, for the appel-
lee (defendant).
Opinion

MOLL, J. In this postjudgment dissolution matter, the
plaintiff, Meghan McCartan Buggelli, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court denying her motions seeking
from the defendant, Royce Buggelli, (1) reimbursement
for extracurricular and healthcare expenses incurred by
the plaintiff for the parties’ children and (2) contribution
toward the children’s college expenses. The plaintiff
claims that the court improperly denied her motion
concerning extracurricular and healthcare expenses
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Buggelli v. Buggelli

because it misinterpreted the parties’ settlement agree-
ment, as incorporated into the dissolution judgment
and as modified by a postjudgment consent order.1 We
agree with this claim. The plaintiff further claims that
the court improperly (1) modified, by way of an articula-
tion, its original decision denying the motion regarding
college expenses and (2) denied the motion regarding
college expenses. We conclude that (1) the court’s artic-
ulation did not modify its original decision denying the
motion regarding college expenses, but (2) the parties’
modified settlement agreement contains an ambiguity
that materially affects the merits of the motion regard-
ing college expenses, such that the court’s denial of
the motion cannot stand. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts, as found by the trial
court or as gleaned from the record, and procedural
history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
The parties were married on October 21, 2000. Four
children were born of the marriage: (1) Emma, who
was nineteen years old and a freshman at Colgate Uni-
versity at the time of the court’s decision; (2) Courtenay
and Sydney, who were seventeen years old and seniors
in high school at the time of the court’s decision; and
(3) Juliette, who was twelve years old at the time of
the court’s decision. On February 16, 2016, the parties
were divorced in New Jersey. The dissolution judgment
incorporated a settlement agreement executed by the
parties that same day (original settlement agreement).
The original settlement agreement contains various pro-
visions regarding the children, including terms govern-
ing (1) custody and parenting time, (2) extracurricular
expenses, (3) healthcare expenses, and (4) college
expenses.
1
We address the plaintiff’s claims in a different order than they are pre-
sented in her principal appellate brief.
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Subsequent to the dissolution judgment, issues arose
with respect to the defendant’s parenting time, where-
upon the defendant filed with the Family Part of the
Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
(New Jersey trial court) a motion to reinstate his parent-
ing time, which the New Jersey trial court denied with-
out prejudice on May 12, 2017, pending the completion
of reunification therapy.2 Thereafter, the parties exe-
cuted a consent order, which the New Jersey trial court
entered as a court order on March 16, 2018 (consent
order). The prefatory language of the consent order
provides, inter alia, that the defendant had ‘‘voluntarily
determined that he wishes to relinquish legal and resi-
dential custody to the plaintiff and forgo all future par-
enting time . . . .’’ The consent order further provides,
inter alia, that (1) the plaintiff has ‘‘sole physical and
sole residential custody of the . . . children,’’ (2) the
defendant ‘‘relinquishes all future parenting time and
future communications with the . . . children,’’ and
(3) the plaintiff has ‘‘sole and exclusive authority to
make all decisions concerning the children, without
the need to consult with, advise, notify, or obtain the
consent of, the defendant.’’

In August, 2018, unbeknownst to the defendant, the
plaintiff moved with the children to Connecticut and,
sometime later, successfully changed the children’s last
names through Probate Court proceedings. Subse-
quently, the defendant filed with the New Jersey trial
court a motion for reunification and visitation. On
November 22, 2019, the New Jersey trial court dismissed
that motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
relinquished exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over any
child custody issues in the matter.
2
The New Jersey trial court further determined that the plaintiff failed
to comply with a prior order regarding reunification therapy.
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Buggelli v. Buggelli

In February, 2020, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-
71,3 the plaintiff registered the New Jersey dissolution
judgment in the Superior Court in the judicial district
of New Haven. On October 15, 2021, the plaintiff filed
a motion seeking reimbursement from the defendant
for extracurricular and healthcare expenses that she
had incurred for the children (motion for extracurricu-
lar and healthcare expenses), to which the defendant
filed an objection on November 2, 2021. On January 20,
2022, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking contribution
from the defendant toward the children’s college
expenses (motion for college expenses). On October
20, 2022, the trial court, Hon. James G. Kenefick, Jr.,
judge trial referee, held an evidentiary hearing on those
two motions.4 Both parties testified at the hearing and,
prior to the hearing, submitted financial affidavits. Fol-
lowing the hearing, both parties filed posthearing briefs.
On February 24, 2023, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision denying the motion for extracurricular
3
General Statutes § 46b-71 provides: ‘‘(a) Any party to an action in which
a foreign matrimonial judgment has been rendered, shall file, with a certified
copy of the foreign matrimonial judgment, in the court in this state in which
enforcement of such judgment is sought, a certification that such judgment
is final, has not been modified, altered, amended, set aside or vacated and
that the enforcement of such judgment has not been stayed or suspended,
and such certificate shall set forth the full name and last-known address of
the other party to such judgment and the name and address of the court in
the foreign state which rendered such judgment.
‘‘(b) Such foreign matrimonial judgment shall become a judgment of the
court of this state where it is filed and shall be enforced and otherwise
treated in the same manner as a judgment of a court in this state; provided
such foreign matrimonial judgment does not contravene the public policy
of the state of Connecticut. A foreign matrimonial judgment so filed shall
have the same effect and may be enforced or satisfied in the same manner
as any like judgment of a court of this state and is subject to the same
procedures for modifying, altering, amending, vacating, setting aside, staying
or suspending said judgment as a judgment of a court of this state; provided,
in modifying, altering, amending, setting aside, vacating, staying or sus-
pending any such foreign matrimonial judgment in this state the substantive
law of the foreign jurisdiction shall be controlling.’’
4
The court considered other motions during the evidentiary hearing,
which motions are not germane to this appeal.
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and healthcare expenses and the motion for college
expenses. On March 16, 2023, the plaintiff filed this
appeal. On April 19, 2024, in response to an order issued
by this court on March 27, 2024, the trial court issued
an articulation of its decision.5 Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
Before turning to the plaintiff’s claims, we note that
the original settlement agreement contains a choice of
law provision, which was unaffected by the consent
order and which states in relevant part: ‘‘The place or
places of execution of [the original settlement] [a]gree-
ment shall have no bearing on the law governing its
interpretation, because it is understood and agreed by
both parties that the [original settlement] [a]greement
shall be construed and governed in accordance with
the laws of the [s]tate of New Jersey, exclusive of con-
flicts of law principles. . . .’’ Thus, insofar as we must
interpret the original settlement agreement, or the origi-
nal settlement agreement as modified by the consent
order (modified settlement agreement), New Jersey
contract law governs.
Pursuant to New Jersey contract law, ‘‘we apply basic
contract principles because [a]n agreement that
resolves a matrimonial dispute is no less a contract
than an agreement to resolve a business dispute. . . .
According to those principles, we must discern and
implement the common intention of the parties. . . .
Therefore, our role when interpreting marital settle-
ment agreements is to consider what is written in the
context of the circumstances at the time of drafting
5
On December 14, 2023, pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5, the plaintiff
filed a motion for articulation, to which the defendant filed an opposition
on December 22, 2023. On January 2, 2024, the trial court denied the motion
for articulation. On January 22, 2024, pursuant to Practice Book § 66-7, the
plaintiff filed a motion for review. On March 27, 2024, this court granted
the plaintiff’s motion for review and granted, in part, the relief requested,
ordering the trial court to articulate certain aspects of its decision.
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and to apply a rational meaning in keeping with the
expressed general purpose. . . . In doing so, the words
of an agreement are given their ordinary meaning. . . .
Therefore, where the parties’ intent is plain and the
language is clear and unambiguous, a court must
enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would
lead to an absurd result.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Woytas v. Greenwood Tree
Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511–12, 206 A.3d 386 (2019).
‘‘A contract is ambiguous if its terms are susceptible
to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations.
. . . When a contract is ambiguous in a material
respect, the parties must be given the opportunity to
illuminate the contract’s meaning through the submis-
sion of extrinsic evidence. . . . While extrinsic evi-
dence should never be permitted to modify or curtail
the terms of an agreement, a court may consider all of
the relevant evidence that will assist in determining the
intent and meaning of the contract in attempting to
resolve ambiguities in the document.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Capparelli v.
Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 604, 212 A.3d 979 (App.
Div. 2019).

Although we apply New Jersey contract law in inter-
preting the original settlement agreement and the modi-
fied settlement agreement, ‘‘procedural issues such as
the standard of review are governed by Connecticut
law.’’ Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 326 Conn. 438, 447, 165 A.3d
1137 (2017). ‘‘[T]he standard of review in family matters
is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial
court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the
court has abused its discretion or it is found that it
could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the
facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial
court has abused its broad discretion in domestic rela-
tions matters, we allow every reasonable presumption
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in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Our defer-
ential standard of review, however, does not extend to
the court’s interpretation of and application of the law
to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of law is
entitled to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Footnote omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) K. D. v. D. D.,
214 Conn. App. 821, 825–26, 282 A.3d 528 (2022).
I
We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial
court improperly denied the motion for extracurricular
and healthcare expenses. For the reasons that follow,
we agree with the plaintiff.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. Paragraph
3.3 of the original settlement agreement sets forth terms
regarding the children’s extracurricular activities. Para-
graph 3.3 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The parties agree
that the [plaintiff] and/or [the defendant] may enroll
the children in extracurricular activities . . . . The
parties agree that they shall pay a maximum of $100
per month per child jointly for said expense without
the necessity of consultation and/or agreement with
the other party and deemed [preauthorized]. . . . [The
defendant’s] maximum cost per child per month is $45
. . . . Provided that the [defendant’s] prorated monthly
share of the activity does not exceed $45, [the plaintiff]
may sign up the child for that activity without the need
to obtain [the defendant’s] consent, however [the plain-
tiff] shall notify [the defendant] of her intent to sign
up the child or children for such an activity, within a
reasonable time frame prior (under the [circum-
stances]), or waives reimbursement. Any expense
above $100 per month per child, must be decided jointly
by [the defendant] and [the plaintiff] and consented
thereto. Extracurricular activities . . . shall be paid for
55% by [the plaintiff] and 45% [by the defendant] in
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accordance with the [c]hild [s]upport [g]uidelines if the
parties so agree. In addition, although an activity might
be considered ‘[preauthorized]’ by this paragraph, [the
plaintiff] must notify [the defendant] a reasonable time
period prior to enrolling the child although [the defen-
dant] understands that consent is not necessary. Any
reimbursements due to [the plaintiff] shall occur on a
monthly basis . . . .’’
Paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 of the original settlement
agreement contain terms concerning the children’s
healthcare expenses. Paragraph 4.2 provides in relevant
part: ‘‘[T]he [plaintiff] shall pay the first $250 per year
per child towards unreimbursed medical expenses
incurred on behalf of the minor children. Thereafter,
the payment of the non-reimbursable medical, dental,
and prescription drug expenses incurred on behalf of
the unemancipated children shall be allocated between
the parties with 45% to the [defendant] and 55% to the
[plaintiff]. The [plaintiff] shall give the [defendant] thirty
days prior written notice before incurring any bill in
excess of [$200] per treatment, except in an emergency,
or $250 for series of treatment, except in an emer-
gency. . . .’’
Paragraph 4.3 of the original settlement agreement
provides in relevant part: ‘‘The [defendant] shall provide
the [plaintiff] with reimbursement and/or payment of
his share of any unreimbursed medical expenses
incurred on behalf of the children within fourteen (14)
days of the date the [plaintiff] submits the bills to him
by personal delivery, email or regular mail. . . . The
obligation of the [defendant] shall include [various enu-
merated healthcare] expenses, provided the notice of
the provisions of this paragraph have been complied
with, as well as the requirements set forth in paragraph
4.2. . . .’’
The consent order contains the following relevant
provisions. Paragraph 1 provides: ‘‘Paragraph 1.1 of . . .
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the [original settlement agreement] . . . is hereby
modified such that, effective with the entry of [the]
[c]onsent [o]rder, the plaintiff shall have sole physical
and sole residential custody of the . . . children
. . . .’’6

Paragraph 2 of the consent order provides: ‘‘The
defendant hereby relinquishes all future parenting time
and future communications with the . . . children.
Accordingly, [p]aragraphs 1.1 through 1.21 . . . of the
[original settlement agreement], providing for the
defendant’s parenting time are hereby modified such
that the defendant shall not have any future parenting
time or communication with the children. However,
nothing in [the consent] [o]rder is meant to prohibit
the [c]hildren, in the event they wish and when of suffi-
cient age, to contact the [d]efendant.’’

Paragraph 3 of the consent order provides: ‘‘As a
result of having sole legal and residential custody of the
children, the plaintiff shall have the sole and exclusive
authority to make all decisions concerning the children,
without the need to consult with, advise, notify, or
obtain the consent of, the defendant. It is the specific
intention and agreement of the parties that the plaintiff
shall have the unilateral authority to make all decisions,
of every nature, regarding the children, including, with-
out limitation, decisions relating to the children’s medi-
cal treatment, schooling, place of residence within or
outside of New Jersey, choices of activities and vaca-
tions. [The] [c]onsent [o]rder eliminates the rights and
obligations to notify, advise or consult with the defen-
dant, or to obtain his consent and [p]aragraphs 1.2,
6
Paragraph 1.1 of the original settlement agreement provides in relevant
part: ‘‘It is hereby agreed that it is in the best interest of the minor children
that the parties will share joint legal custody with [the plaintiff] being the
[p]arent of [p]rimary [r]esidence and the [defendant] being the [p]arent of
[a]lternate [r]esidence. . . .’’
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through 1.21 . . . of the [original settlement agree-
ment] are hereby modified to comport with this agree-
ment that [the] plaintiff shall be able to make all deci-
sions affecting the children unilaterally.’’

Paragraph 5 of the consent order provides: ‘‘[The]
[d]efendant’s requirement pursuant to . . . article XIV
of the [original settlement agreement is] hereby modi-
fied in that [the] [d]efendant shall not be required to
carry any life insurance for the benefit of the minor
children and may cancel same and remove the children
as beneficiaries.’’7

Paragraph 6 of the consent order provides: ‘‘[Para-
graph 37.1 of the original settlement agreement] is
hereby declared null and void in that neither party shall
have to disclose to the other party their home address.8
In addition, neither party shall be required to inform
the other party of their place of business, or its address.
As a result, both parties agree that email shall be an
acceptable means of service of process of any judicial
documents. Each party shall provide the other with a
designated email address to be used for service of pro-
cess or other judicial document.’’ (Footnote added.)
7
Paragraph 14.1 of the original settlement agreement, contained within
article XIV, provides: ‘‘The [defendant] shall name the [c]hildren as irrevoca-
ble beneficiaries of term life insurance in the minimum amount of $250,000
for each child for a total of $1,000,000 until each child is emancipated,
designating the [plaintiff] as the [t]rustee of the proceeds of each individual
$250,000 policy. The [plaintiff] shall name the [c]hildren the irrevocable
beneficiaries of term life insurance in the minimum amount of $250,000 for
each child for a total of $1,000,000 until each child is emancipated, designat-
ing the [defendant] as the [t]rustee of the proceeds of each individual
$250,000 policy. Either party may reduce the coverage by $250,000 when
each child is emancipated.’’
8
Paragraph 37.1 of the original settlement agreement provides: ‘‘For so
long as any provision of [the original settlement] [a]greement remains execu-
tory, each party shall, at all times, keep the other informed of his or her
place of residence, and shall promptly notify the other of any change, giving
the address of the new place of residence.’’
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Paragraph 9 of the consent order provides: ‘‘All provi-
sions of the [original settlement agreement], and the
provisions of all [o]rders entered since the [j]udgment
of [d]ivorce, that are not contrary to the provisions
of [the] [c]onsent [o]rder, shall remain in full force
and effect.’’
In his posthearing brief, the defendant argued that
the plaintiff had waived her right to reimbursement for
extracurricular and healthcare expenses because she
had failed to abide by the applicable notice require-
ments set forth in the original settlement agreement,
which requirements, the defendant maintained, were
not modified by the consent order. In her posthearing
brief, the plaintiff argued that the consent order altered
the original settlement agreement by eliminating all
notice requirements, such that, pursuant to the modified
settlement agreement, she was not obligated to provide
him with notice before seeking reimbursement for the
claimed extracurricular and healthcare expenses.9
In addressing the motion for extracurricular and
healthcare expenses, the court summarized the issue as
‘‘whether the plaintiff is required to give the defendant
proper and timely notice of expenses incurred where
she is seeking reimbursement of medical and extracur-
ricular expenses . . . .’’ Ostensibly agreeing with the
defendant’s argument regarding the scope of the con-
sent order, the court observed that the consent order
‘‘only refers to article I [containing paragraphs 1.1
through 1.21 of the original settlement agreement] . . .
article XIV . . . and article XXXVII [containing] [p]ara-
graph 37.1 . . . . There is no reference to article III
9
As relief, the plaintiff requested (1) $15,940 in extracurricular expenses
and (2) approximately $6073 in healthcare expenses. Additionally, the plain-
tiff requested that the court conduct another evidentiary hearing to receive
evidence regarding (1) communications between the parties concerning the
children’s college education and (2) the defendant’s receipt of bills from
the plaintiff.
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[containing paragraph 3.3] . . . [or] article IV [con-
taining paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3] . . . .’’ The court further
referenced the requirement set forth in paragraph 6 of
the consent order that the parties provide one another
with a ‘‘designated email address to be used for service
of process or other judicial document,’’ as they had
‘‘agree[d] that email shall be an acceptable means of
service of process of any judicial documents.’’
The court proceeded to determine that the plaintiff
‘‘has not given the [defendant] proper notice of [the
claimed extracurricular and healthcare] expenses and
has waived reimbursement. [The plaintiff] clearly had
the right to incur the expense[s] without [the defen-
dant’s] consent but should have sent him a copy of the
bills by email requesting reimbursement. [The plain-
tiff’s] claim that a judge in New Jersey suggested they
use a common [application] called SupportPay is not
credible.10 There is no evidence in the record of proceed-
ings in New Jersey to support that claim. [The plaintiff]
failed to use email as a means of providing that informa-
tion to [the defendant].’’ (Footnote added.) The court
denied the motion for extracurricular and healthcare
expenses and ordered that, ‘‘[g]oing forward, the plain-
tiff needs to follow the existing orders regarding reim-
bursement for healthcare and extracurricular
expenses . . . .’’
In its ensuing articulation, the court stated that it had
‘‘note[d] [in its decision] that the plaintiff was using
a[n] [application] called SupportPay to send invoices
and bills to the defendant, which he never received as
he was not signed up with [SupportPay]. The plaintiff
testified that a [New Jersey judge] told [the parties] to
10
During the evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff testified that (1) beginning in
2017, upon the recommendation of a New Jersey judge, she began uploading
receipts for the children’s extracurricular and healthcare expenses into
the software application SupportPay and (2) both parties had access to
SupportPay.
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use [SupportPay] back in 2017. The defendant disagrees
and there is no evidence of such an order. As the defen-
dant was not signed up with [SupportPay], he never
received any bills or invoices [that the plaintiff had]
sent through [SupportPay]. Finally, the plaintiff never
filed a separate motion to open the hearing for addi-
tional testimony, which would have been a waste of
time as [the plaintiff] was using . . . SupportPay to
send [the defendant] bills and invoices. [The plaintiff]
should have been using [the defendant’s] email address
rather than SupportPay.’’
The plaintiff contends that (1) the consent order mod-
ified the original settlement agreement so as to elimi-
nate all notice requirements, and, therefore, the court
incorrectly interpreted the modified settlement agree-
ment to require her to provide notice to the defendant
vis-à-vis extracurricular and healthcare expenses in
order to trigger the defendant’s obligation to reimburse
her for such expenses, and (2) the court misconstrued
the modified settlement agreement to require her to
submit reimbursement requests for extracurricular and
healthcare expenses to the defendant by email. We con-
sider these contentions in turn.
A
The plaintiff asserts that the consent order modified
the original settlement agreement by removing all
notice requirements, such that the court misinterpreted
the modified settlement agreement to contain notice
requirements attendant to extracurricular and health-
care expenses. In response, the defendant argues that
the court’s analysis was correct because the consent
order modified only those provisions of the original
settlement agreement that the consent order expressly
identified—paragraphs 1.1 through 1.21, article XIV, and
paragraph 37.1—such that the notice requirements
applicable to extracurricular and healthcare expenses
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set forth in paragraphs 3.3, 4.2, and 4.3 remain unaltered.
We conclude that the court improperly construed the
modified settlement agreement to maintain the notice
requirements vis-à-vis extracurricular and healthcare
expenses initially imposed in the original settlement
agreement.
We construe the consent order, in clear and unambig-
uous terms, as having removed the notice requirements
of the original settlement agreement with which the
plaintiff originally had to comply in order to be entitled
to reimbursement from the defendant for extracurricu-
lar and healthcare expenses. The first sentence of para-
graph 3 of the consent order provides that the plaintiff
is authorized ‘‘to make all decisions concerning the
children, without the need to . . . notify . . . the
defendant,’’ and the third sentence provides, unequivo-
cally and without qualification, that the consent order
‘‘eliminates the rights and obligations to notify . . . the
defendant . . . .’’11 Taken together, these terms func-
tion to eliminate the language of (1) paragraph 3.3 of
the original settlement agreement providing that the
plaintiff ‘‘shall notify’’ the defendant of her intent to
enroll any child in an extracurricular activity with an
associated cost not exceeding the defendant’s prorated
monthly share of $45, with such notice to be provided
within ‘‘a reasonable time frame’’ or ‘‘a reasonable time
period’’ prior to enrollment, and with the plaintiff ‘‘waiv-
[ing] reimbursement’’ if she failed to comply,12 (2) para-
graph 4.2 of the original settlement agreement providing
11
The third sentence of paragraph 3 of the consent order provides: ‘‘[The]
[c]onsent [o]rder eliminates the rights and obligations to notify, advise or
consult with the defendant, or to obtain his consent and [p]aragraphs 1.2,
through 1.21 . . . of the [original settlement agreement] are hereby modi-
fied to comport with this agreement that [the] plaintiff shall be able to make
all decisions affecting the children unilaterally.’’ We do not construe the
portion of this sentence regarding the modification of paragraphs 1.2 through
1.21 of the original settlement agreement as limiting the scope of the language
eliminating the plaintiff’s rights and obligations regarding, inter alia, notice.
12
Paragraph 3.3 of the original settlement agreement also provides that
‘‘[a]ny expense above $100 per month per child, must be decided jointly by
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that ‘‘[t]he [plaintiff] shall give the [defendant] thirty
days prior written notice before incurring any bill in
excess of [$200] per treatment, except in an emergency,
or $250 for series of treatment, except in an emergency,’’
and (3) paragraph 4.3 of the original settlement agree-
ment providing that the defendant’s obligation to reim-
burse the plaintiff for healthcare expenses was condi-
tioned on the plaintiff’s compliance with ‘‘the notice of
the provisions of [paragraph 4.3],’’ which required the
plaintiff to submit the relevant bills to the defendant
‘‘by personal delivery, email or regular mail.’’
We are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument
that the consent order modified only those provisions
of the original settlement agreement expressly identi-
fied in the consent order. Paragraph 9 of the consent
order provides that ‘‘[a]ll provisions of the [original
settlement agreement], and the provisions of all [o]rders
entered since the [j]udgment of [d]ivorce, that are not
contrary to the provisions of [the] [c]onsent [o]rder,
shall remain in full force and effect.’’ (Emphasis added.)
We construe this language, stated conversely, to provide
that all provisions of the original settlement agreement
that are contrary to the terms of the consent order,
regardless of their location within the original settle-
ment agreement, are superseded.
Indeed, applying the defendant’s reasoning leads to
unworkable results. By way of example, paragraph 6.4
of the original settlement agreement provides: ‘‘[The
plaintiff] represents that she wants her children to
attend the best school possible irrespective of financial
cost(s) and to consider the wishes of the child, while
[the defendant] represents that he believes the cost of
[the defendant] and [the plaintiff] and consented thereto.’’ In her principal
appellate brief, the plaintiff states that the foregoing language ‘‘is not relevant
to this appeal, because [she] has never claimed money owed subject to this
language, even though she has incurred those expenses.’’ Thus, we need
not discuss the effect of the consent order on this language.
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said school and the parties’ finances at that time should
dictate where each child attends school. The parties
are unable to settle their dispute at this time and agree
that the choice of school shall abide the event. Notwith-
standing, the parties agree that any school choice shall
be based on consultation and agreement, and that nei-
ther party has a sole and exclusive right to decide which
school each child will attend.’’ (Emphasis added.) The
consent order, in clear and unambiguous terms, vests
the plaintiff with ‘‘the sole and exclusive authority to
make all decisions concerning the children, without
the need to consult with, advise, notify, or obtain the
consent of, the defendant,’’ and reflects ‘‘the specific
intention and agreement of the parties that the plaintiff
shall have the unilateral authority to make all decisions,
of every nature, regarding the children, including, with-
out limitation, decisions relating to the children’s . . .
schooling,’’ thereby superseding the consultation and
agreement requirement of paragraph 6.4 of the original
settlement agreement. Pursuant to the defendant’s
rationale, because paragraph 6.4 of the original settle-
ment agreement is not referenced in the consent order,
the terms of paragraph 6.4 remain operational notwith-
standing the irreconcilable language in the consent
order.13 Simply put, the defendant’s interpretation of
the consent order is untenable.

Pursuant to our construction of the modified settle-
ment agreement, the plaintiff has no responsibility to
send any notice to the defendant in order for his obliga-
tions to reimburse her for extracurricular and health-
care expenses to arise. Accordingly, we conclude that
the court improperly construed the modified settlement
agreement in determining that the plaintiff waived her
13
In a footnote in his appellate brief, the defendant argues that ‘‘paragraph
6.4 of the [original] settlement agreement was never modified by the . . .
consent order.’’
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right to seek reimbursement for the claimed extracur-
ricular and healthcare expenses on the ground that
she did not provide the defendant with the purported
requisite notice.
B
The plaintiff also contends that the court miscon-
strued the modified settlement agreement to require
her to submit reimbursement requests for extracurricu-
lar and healthcare expenses to the defendant by email.
In response, the defendant argues that the court prop-
erly concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to
reimbursement for extracurricular and healthcare
expenses in light of her failure to comply with the terms
of the modified settlement agreement. We agree with
the plaintiff.
Initially, we observe that, with respect to extracurric-
ular expenses, the original settlement agreement is
silent as to whether the plaintiff must use a particular
delivery method to submit a reimbursement request to
the defendant, and the consent order does not address
that subject.14 Paragraph 3.3 of the original settlement
agreement merely states that any extracurricular expense
reimbursements owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
14
We note that paragraph 3.3 of the original settlement agreement provides
in relevant part: ‘‘The parties agree that the [plaintiff] and/or [the defendant]
may enroll the children in extracurricular activities . . . regardless of
whether any of the events or activities associated with such programs are
scheduled to occur on the other’s parenting time. This provision is to be
cross-referenced with the terms of [paragraph] 1.1 (b). . . .’’ Paragraph 1.1
(b), in turn, sets forth terms concerning the defendant’s parenting time
and details the parties’ responsibilities when the children’s extracurricular
activities are scheduled during the defendant’s parenting time. Paragraph
1.1 (b) further provides: ‘‘All emails between the parties will pertain strictly
to issues regarding the [parties’] children, including issues regarding child
support/reimbursement, and issues regarding [certain] litigation . . . .’’ We
do not discern anything in this language to reflect that the plaintiff must
submit reimbursement requests for extracurricular expenses to the defen-
dant by email.
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‘‘shall occur on a monthly basis . . . .’’ With respect
to healthcare expenses, by comparison, paragraph 4.3
of the original settlement agreement requires the plain-
tiff to send bills, for the purpose of reimbursement, to
the defendant ‘‘by personal delivery, email or regular
mail.’’ By its very terms, however, paragraph 4.3 of
the original settlement agreement incorporated a notice
requirement. Paragraph 4.3 provides in relevant part
that ‘‘[t]he obligation of the [defendant] shall include
[various enumerated healthcare] expenses, provided
the notice of the provisions of this paragraph have
been complied with, as well as the requirements set
forth in paragraph 4.2. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) As we
conclude in part I A of this opinion, the consent order
eliminated the notice requirements of paragraphs 3.3,
4.2, and 4.3 of the original settlement agreement. In
other words, the modified settlement agreement does
not tether the defendant’s obligation to reimburse the
plaintiff for healthcare expenses to the plaintiff’s sub-
mission of reimbursement requests to the defendant ‘‘by
personal delivery, email or regular mail.’’ (Emphasis
added.)

Insofar as the court’s decision reflects that it interpre-
ted paragraph 6 of the consent order to compel the
plaintiff to email extracurricular and healthcare
expense reimbursement requests to the defendant, that
interpretation is incorrect. In clear and unambiguous
terms, paragraph 6 of the consent order required, inter
alia, the parties to provide each other with ‘‘a designated
email address to be used for service of process or other
judicial document.’’ (Emphasis added.) The use of
email contemplated in paragraph 6 applies to service
of process or other judicial documents only and has no
bearing on the delivery of reimbursement requests for
extracurricular or healthcare expenses, which cannot
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rationally be characterized as ‘‘process’’ or ‘‘judicial
document[s].’’15
In sum, pursuant to the modified settlement agree-
ment, the defendant’s obligation to reimburse the plain-
tiff for extracurricular and healthcare expenses is not
dependent on the plaintiff either (1) providing notice of
said expenses to him or (2) submitting reimbursement
requests for said expenses to him by any particular
method of delivery.16 Accordingly, we conclude that
the court improperly construed the modified settlement
agreement in denying the motion for extracurricular
and healthcare expenses.17 Because the court did not
make factual determinations as to the sums, if any, of
the claimed extracurricular and healthcare expenses to
15
The plaintiff also asserts that she provided the defendant with informa-
tion concerning her claimed extracurricular and healthcare expenses (1)
through the Support Pay application and (2) by email in October, 2021, in
connection with the motion for extracurricular and healthcare expenses,
such that she sufficiently complied with any applicable requirements regard-
ing notice and delivery of reimbursement requests. In light of our conclusion
that the modified settlement agreement did not impose any notice or delivery
requirements on the plaintiff with respect to her claimed extracurricular
and healthcare expenses, we need not discuss these assertions further.
16
In her principal appellate brief, the plaintiff acknowledges that, in order
to receive reimbursement from the defendant for extracurricular and health-
care expenses, she necessarily must provide information regarding her
claimed expenses. As the plaintiff represents, ‘‘[n]aturally, if [she] would
like contribution or reimbursement, she has a ‘burden of proof’ and would
need to provide some information. [She] is not disputing that reality. Rather,
[her] point is that the court orders do not require any notice and advisement,
and therefore there is not any specific timing or method of delivery for the
information. Likewise, there is no waiver or other penalty if the information
is not provided a certain way. [She] could provide it to the defendant to
resolve it or, in theory, it might be obtained through a court proceeding.’’
17
The plaintiff additionally claims that, even if the court correctly con-
strued the modified settlement agreement, the court improperly determined
that she had waived her right to the claimed extracurricular and healthcare
expenses, thereby precluding her from again seeking reimbursement for
those expenses after correcting the defects identified by the court. In light
of our conclusion that the court misinterpreted the modified settlement
agreement, thereby necessitating reversal of the court’s judgment, we need
not resolve this claim.
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which the plaintiff is entitled, and as ‘‘[t]his court cannot
find facts in the first instance’’; Casablanca v. Casa-
blanca, 190 Conn. App. 606, 622, 212 A.3d 1278, cert.
denied, 333 Conn. 913, 215 A.3d 1210 (2019); we deem
the proper remedy to be to reverse the denial of the
motion for extracurricular and healthcare expenses and
to remand the case for a new evidentiary hearing on
the motion.
II
We next address the plaintiff’s claims relating to the
court’s denial of the motion for college expenses. The
plaintiff asserts that the court improperly (1) modified,
by way of its articulation, its original decision denying
the motion for college expenses, and (2) denied the
motion for college expenses. For the reasons that fol-
low, we conclude that (1) the court’s articulation did
not constitute an improper modification of its original
decision denying the motion for college expenses, but
(2) there is an ambiguity in the modified settlement
agreement that is germane to the merits of the motion
for college expenses, and, therefore, the court improp-
erly denied the motion.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of these claims. Paragraph
6.1 of the modified settlement agreement18 provides: ‘‘In
addition to all other payments required to be made by
the parties hereunder, the parties agree to contribute
to the college costs for the four (4) children in propor-
tion to their respective incomes, including income from
assets at the time, and New Jersey case law at that
time. Nothing in . . . [a]rticle [VI] shall prevent the
parties from agreeing otherwise.’’
18
We do not construe the consent order to have modified the terms of
paragraphs 6.1, 6.2, or 6.3 of the original settlement agreement, such that
these provisions are identical in the original settlement agreement and in
the modified settlement agreement. For ease of reference, we refer to the
modified settlement agreement in discussing these provisions.
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Paragraph 6.2 of the modified settlement agreement
provides in relevant part: ‘‘Both parties recognize that
under current New Jersey law they are both responsible
for providing a college or other [postsecondary] educa-
tion for [the] children pursuant to factors listed in [New-
burgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982) (New-
burgh factors)].19 The parties agree that the allocation
of same shall abide the event based on the parties’
proportionate share of income at that time and as fur-
ther modified in this agreement. . . . Prior to either
party having an obligation to contribute to such
expenses, and as a prerequisite to triggering either par-
ty’s responsibility to contribute to said cost, the children
shall first have the obligation to apply for reasonable
federal student loans, scholarships, grants and, further,
to utilize any funds accumulated by them personally and
in the [prejudgment] children’s [accounts established
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 529 (§ 529 accounts)] already
established . . . .’’ (Footnote added.)
Paragraph 6.3 of the modified settlement agreement
provides in relevant part: ‘‘Since the parties are unable
19
See Newburgh v. Arrigo, supra, 88 N.J. 545 (‘‘[i]n evaluating the claim
for contribution toward the cost of higher education, courts should consider
all relevant factors, including (1) whether the parent, if still living with the
child, would have contributed toward the costs of the requested higher
education; (2) the effect of the background, values and goals of the parent
on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher education;
(3) the amount of the contribution sought by the child for the cost of higher
education; (4) the ability of the parent to pay that cost; (5) the relationship
of the requested contribution to the kind of school or course of study sought
by the child; (6) the financial resources of both parents; (7) the commitment
to and aptitude of the child for the requested education; (8) the financial
resources of the child, including assets owned individually or held in custo-
dianship or trust; (9) the ability of the child to earn income during the school
year or on vacation; (10) the availability of financial aid in the form of
college grants and loans; (11) the child’s relationship to the paying parent,
including mutual affection and shared goals as well as responsiveness to
parental advice and guidance; and (12) the relationship of the education
requested to any prior training and to the overall long-range goals of the
child’’).
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to agree at this juncture as to the responsibilities for
the educational expenses of [the] children post [high
school], the [parties] agree to confirm and attempt to
reach a determination with regard to their mutual obli-
gation at the time a child commences post [high school]
education. In the eventuality that the parties cannot
resolve those issues, the issues will be [brought] first
to mediation . . . and then to a court of competent
jurisdiction. The law at the time of the application shall
control the parties’ obligation to pay for the educational
cost of [the] children. . . .’’
In his posthearing brief, the defendant argued that,
under New Jersey law, and, in particular, the Newburgh
factors, he was relieved of any obligation pursuant to
the modified settlement agreement to contribute to the
children’s college expenses. In her posthearing brief,
the plaintiff argued that the Newburgh factors were
inapplicable because the modified settlement agree-
ment set forth the terms governing the parties’ obliga-
tions regarding the children’s college expenses.20
In addressing the motion for college expenses, the
court summarized the issue to be ‘‘whether [the plain-
tiff] and the children need to follow the [Newburgh]
factors . . . [as] referenced in article VI [containing
paragraphs 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3] . . . of [the modified set-
tlement agreement].’’ The court stated that, ‘‘[a]lthough
the parties attempted mediation pursuant to [the modi-
fied settlement agreement], it broke down. One could
argue that the [plaintiff] can then make all the decisions
regarding college without input from the [defendant]
. . . . However, th[e] court finds that the [plaintiff] and
. . . Emma had an obligation to give [the defendant]
access to the school for information regarding the
20
As relief, the plaintiff requested (1) approximately $13,329 in college
expenses for Emma’s freshman year at Colgate University and (2) ‘‘orders
regarding the payment of future college expenses.’’
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finances, student aid, and academics. [The defendant]
also had a right to know what other funds were available
that could be applied to the cost of [Emma’s] education.
None of this was provided to the [defendant].’’ The
court continued: ‘‘[I]t would appear that the [plaintiff]
and . . . Emma want the [defendant] out of their
li[ves] totally except for his financial help. The [plaintiff]
was not cooperating with the reunification therapy in
New Jersey. [The plaintiff] moves to Connecticut with-
out telling [the defendant], she goes to Probate Court
in Connecticut to change the minor children’s [last]
name[s], she does not give him proper notice for reim-
bursement of the expenses for medical and extracurric-
ular expenses, she does not provide him with the finan-
cial information necessary to determine the net cost at
Colgate [University], and Emma will not authorize his
access to her account at Colgate [University] or respond
to his email asking what she was studying.21 . . . The
court has carefully considered the specific facts of this
case and the [Newburgh] factors . . . and finds that
the [plaintiff] is not entitled to reimbursement for . . .
the costs incurred at Colgate University for Emma’s
freshman year.’’ (Footnote added.) The court then
denied the motion for college expenses and ordered
that, ‘‘[g]oing forward, the plaintiff needs to follow the
existing orders regarding reimbursement . . . for the
cost of college. The children also need to allow the
[defendant] access to their financial and academic
records at whatever college they attend.’’
In its ensuing articulation, with respect to its reliance
on Newburgh, the court stated it had ‘‘considered all
of the [Newburgh] factors . . . but gave more weight
to the eleventh factor regarding ‘the child’s relationship
21
During the evidentiary hearing, the defendant testified that (1) he
emailed Emma asking about her studies, which email she ignored, and (2)
Emma declined to sign a release for him to access her financial information
at Colgate University.
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to the paying parent, including mutual affection and
shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental
advice and guidance.’ . . . It is clear from [the] court’s
factual findings in its [decision] that the [plaintiff]
wanted no contact for herself or [the] children with the
[defendant]. When [the defendant] attempted reunifica-
tion with the children in New Jersey, the [New Jersey
trial] court found the [plaintiff] in violation of the [defen-
dant’s] rights because of her failure to comply with
reunification therapy pursuant to a prior court order.
[The plaintiff] then moves to Connecticut without
notice to the [defendant] and goes to Probate Court
to have the last name[s] of the children changed. The
[plaintiff] has blocked any relationship [the defendant]
might have with the children and until that changes, he
should not be obligated to share in the cost of college.’’
(Citation omitted.)
The plaintiff claims that (1) the court’s articulation
improperly functioned to modify its original decision
denying the motion for college expenses and (2) the
court improperly denied the motion for college
expenses because, inter alia, it incorrectly determined
that the Newburgh factors were applicable. We con-
clude that (1) the court’s articulation did not constitute
an improper modification of its original decision deny-
ing the motion for college expenses, but (2) the court
improperly denied the motion for college expenses on
the basis of its application of the Newburgh factors
because the modified settlement agreement contains
an ambiguity, the resolution of which affects the ques-
tion of whether the Newburgh factors apply in this
case.22
22
The plaintiff further claims that (1) if the Newburgh factors are applica-
ble, then the court’s analysis of the Newburgh factors was flawed, (2) the
court misinterpreted the modified settlement agreement to require that the
children’s school records be shared with the defendant, and (3) the court
failed to enter an order regarding the parties’ obligations for future college
expenses. In light of our conclusion that an ambiguity in the modified
settlement agreement requires reversal of the court’s judgment, we need
not resolve these additional claims.
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A
We first consider the plaintiff’s contention that the
court’s articulation constitutes an improper modifica-
tion of its original decision denying the motion for col-
lege expenses. The plaintiff maintains that (1) the origi-
nal decision required her to comply with the ‘‘existing
orders’’ concerning college expenses, in addition to
requiring the children to permit the defendant to access
their school records, in order to receive contribution
from the defendant for college expenses in the future,
whereas (2) the court’s articulation created a ‘‘much
higher standard’’ by relieving the defendant of any
future obligation to contribute toward the children’s
college expenses until the plaintiff had ceased
‘‘block[ing] any relationship he might have with the
children . . . .’’ We disagree.
‘‘As a general rule, [a]n articulation is appropriate
where the trial court’s decision contains some ambigu-
ity or deficiency reasonably susceptible of clarification.
. . . An articulation may be necessary [if] the trial court
fails completely to state any basis for its decision . . .
or where the basis, although stated, is unclear. . . .
The purpose of an articulation is to dispel any . . .
ambiguity by clarifying the factual and legal basis upon
which the trial court rendered its decision, thereby
sharpening the issues on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Sabrina C. v. Fortin, 176 Conn. App.
730, 750, 170 A.3d 100 (2017). ‘‘It is well settled that
[a]n articulation is not an opportunity for a trial court
to substitute a new decision nor to change the reasoning
or basis of a prior decision. . . . Insofar as we must
construe the . . . judgment and the court’s [articula-
tion], our review is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) C. D. v. C. D., 218 Conn.
App. 818, 828, 293 A.3d 86 (2023). ‘‘[J]udgments are
to be construed in the same fashion as other written
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instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the inten-
tion of the court as gathered from all parts of the judg-
ment. . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly
implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The
judgment should admit of a consistent construction as
a whole. . . . [W]e are mindful that an opinion must
be read as a whole, without particular portions read
in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buchenholz v.
Buchenholz, 221 Conn. App. 132, 138, 300 A.3d 1233,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 928, 304 A.3d 860 (2023).
We conclude that the court’s articulation did not fash-
ion a new requirement to be satisfied in order to trigger
the defendant’s obligation to contribute toward the chil-
dren’s future college expenses. In the original decision,
the court framed the issue before it vis-à-vis the motion
for college expenses to be whether the plaintiff and the
children ‘‘need to follow the [Newburgh] factors,’’ as
referenced in the modified settlement agreement. The
court proceeded to make findings regarding the defen-
dant’s postdissolution attempts at reunification with the
children, as well as actions taken by the plaintiff and
Emma that, as the court found, illustrated that they
‘‘want[ed] the [defendant] out of their li[ves] totally
except for his financial help.’’ Then, expressly stating
that it had considered the Newburgh factors, the court
determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to contri-
bution from the defendant for the costs incurred for
Emma’s freshman year at college, whereupon the court
(1) denied the motion for college expenses and (2)
ordered that ‘‘[g]oing forward, the plaintiff needs to
follow the existing orders regarding reimbursement
. . . for the cost of college [and] [t]he children also
need to allow the [defendant] access to their financial
and academic records at whatever college they attend.’’
We do not agree with the plaintiff’s proposition that,
in order for the defendant to be liable to contribute
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to future college expenses, the original decision only
required (1) the plaintiff ‘‘to follow the existing orders
regarding reimbursement for . . . the cost of college’’
and (2) the children to provide the defendant with
access to their school records. Read in its entirety, we
construe the original decision as reflecting a determina-
tion by the court that the Newburgh factors must be
considered when deciding whether the defendant is
obligated to contribute toward college expenses. In
other words, we interpret the original decision to pro-
vide that the plaintiff, when seeking contribution from
the defendant for college expenses in the future, must
establish that (1) there has been compliance with
existing orders regarding college expenses, (2) the
defendant has been granted access by the children to
their school records, and (3) when applied, the New-
burgh factors justify an order mandating that the defen-
dant contribute to the college expenses.
In light of our construction of the original decision,
we reject the plaintiff’s claim that the articulation modi-
fied the original decision. In its articulation, the court
(1) explained that, although it had considered all of the
Newburgh factors in the original decision, it had given
‘‘more weight’’ to the eleventh factor focusing on the
relationship between the paying parent and the child,
(2) recited findings that it had made in the original
decision reflecting ‘‘that the [plaintiff] wanted no con-
tact for herself or [the] children with the defendant,’’
and (3) stated that the plaintiff ‘‘has blocked any rela-
tionship [the defendant] might have with the children
and until that changes, he should not be obligated to
share in the cost of college.’’ We discern no conflict
between the original decision and the articulation. Clari-
fying the court’s reasoning in the original decision, the
articulation provided that, pursuant to Newburgh, the
court had placed great emphasis on its findings demon-
strating that the plaintiff had engaged in conduct that
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was detrimental to the relationship between the defen-
dant and the children. Insofar as the articulation stated
that the defendant should not be obligated to pay any
college expenses so long as the plaintiff continued to
‘‘[block] any relationship he might have with the chil-
dren,’’ that statement aligns with our interpretation of
the original decision to require consideration of the
Newburgh factors in determining whether the defen-
dant’s obligation to contribute toward college expenses
arises. Stated another way, the court’s articulation pro-
vides that, pursuant to Newburgh, the defendant will
have no obligation to contribute toward the children’s
college expenses as long as the plaintiff’s conduct
‘‘block[ing] any relationship he might have with the
children’’ persists.

In sum, we conclude that the articulation did not
modify the original decision. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s
contention fails.

B

The plaintiff next asserts that the court improperly
denied the motion for college expenses because it incor-
rectly determined that the Newburgh factors were appli-
cable. The plaintiff maintains that the modified settle-
ment agreement is clear and unambiguous in requiring
the parties to pay for college expenses in proportion
to their respective incomes, such that the court should
have enforced the terms of the modified settlement
agreement rather than engaging in an analysis of the
Newburgh factors. In response, the defendant argues
that the modified settlement agreement mandates that
the court apply the Newburgh factors in determining
the parties’ obligations to pay for college expenses.
We conclude that the modified settlement agreement
is ambiguous as to whether the parties agreed to terms
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concerning the allocation of their college expense con-
tributions. In light of this ambiguity, we further con-
clude that the court improperly relied on the Newburgh
factors to deny the motion for college expenses.23
The following legal principles are relevant to our
analysis. ‘‘The [New Jersey] [l]egislature and [New Jer-
sey] courts have long recognized a child’s need for
higher education and that this need is a proper consider-
ation in determining a parent’s child support obligation.
. . . [Newburgh] set[s] forth a non-exhaustive list of
twelve factors a court should consider in evaluating a
claim for contribution toward the cost of higher educa-
tion. . . . Six years [after Newburgh was decided], the
[l]egislature essentially approved those criteria when
amending the support statute, N.J. [Stat. Ann. §] 2A:34-
23 (a).24 . . . Thus, a trial court should balance the
23
We note that the court did not determine expressly that the modified
settlement agreement was clear and unambiguous in requiring the applica-
tion of the Newburgh factors in relation to the motion for college expenses;
however, the court (1) noted that the modified settlement agreement referred
to the Newburgh factors, (2) stated that one of the issues before it was
whether the plaintiff and the children needed to follow the Newburgh factors,
and (3) applied the Newburgh factors. Accordingly, we conclude that the
court necessarily determined that the modified settlement agreement, in
clear and unambiguous terms, required it to apply the Newburgh factors in
adjudicating the motion for college expenses.
24
Section 2A:34-23 (a) of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated provides in
relevant part: ‘‘In determining the amount to be paid by a parent for support
of the child and the period during which the duty of support is owed, the
court in those cases not governed by court rule shall consider, but not be
limited to, the following factors:
‘‘(1) Needs of the child;
‘‘(2) Standard of living and economic circumstances of each parent;
‘‘(3) All sources of income and assets of each parent;
‘‘(4) Earning ability of each parent, including educational background,
training, employment skills, work experience, custodial responsibility for
children including the cost of providing child care and the length of time
and cost of each parent to obtain training or experience for appropriate
employment;
‘‘(5) Need and capacity of the child for education, including higher educa-
tion;
‘‘(6) Age and health of the child and each parent;
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statutory criteria of N.J. [Stat. Ann. §] 2A:34-23 (a) and
the Newburgh factors, as well as any other relevant
circumstances, to reach a fair and just decision whether
and, if so, in what amount, a parent or parents must
contribute to a child’s educational expenses.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 542–43, 897 A.2d 1018
(2006). ‘‘[W]here [however] parties to a divorce have
reached an agreement regarding children attending col-
lege and how those college expenses should be divided,
and no showing has been made that the agreement
should be vacated or modified, the [trial court] need not
apply all twelve factors pertinent to college expenses
as identified in [Newburgh]. Rather, the court should
enforce the agreement as written.25’’ (Footnote in origi-
nal.) Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super.
574, 591, 139 A.3d 1202 (App. Div. 2016).
In light of these legal precepts, the question before
us is whether the modified settlement agreement
reflects an agreement by the parties regarding the divi-
sion of their college expense obligations. On the basis
of paragraphs 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of the modified settlement
agreement (college expense provisions), we conclude
that the modified settlement agreement is ambiguous
in this regard. Paragraph 6.1 reasonably can be read as
‘‘(7) Income, assets and earning ability of the child;
‘‘(8) Responsibility of the parents for the court-ordered support of others;
‘‘(9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of each child and parent; and
‘‘(10) Any other factors the court may deem relevant. . . .’’
We note that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 was amended effective January 8,
2024; see 2023 N.J. Laws, c. 238, § 6; however, said amendment has no
bearing on this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to the current revision of N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23.
25
‘‘In the absence of an agreement by the parties regarding the specific
division of college costs, courts should balance the factors set forth in
Newburgh and the statutory criteria of N.J. [Stat. Ann. §] 2A:34-23 (a), along
with any other factors the court deems relevant to a fair allocation of
expenses.’’ Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 591 n.8, 139
A.3d 1202 (App. Div. 2016).
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providing that the parties’ incomes and the Newburgh
factors,26 as implicated by the phrase ‘‘New Jersey case
law,’’ must be considered in determining the allocation
of the parties’ college expense obligations. Paragraph
6.2, in contrast, states that ‘‘[t]he parties agree that the
allocation of [their college expense obligations] shall
abide the event based on the parties’ proportionate
share of income at that time and as further modified
in this agreement,’’ which reasonably can be interpreted
to mean that the parties’ incomes, alone, govern the
issue.27 Paragraph 6.3, then, provides that ‘‘the parties
are unable to agree at this juncture as to the responsibili-
ties for the educational expenses of [the] children post
[high school]’’ and that, should they require judicial
intervention to resolve a dispute in this respect, ‘‘[t]he
law at the time of the application shall control the
parties’ obligation to pay for the educational cost of
[the] children,’’ which reasonably can be construed as
stating that (1) the parties had not reached an agree-
ment as to the division of their college expense obliga-
tions at the time of the original settlement agreement
and (2) New Jersey law, including the Newburgh fac-
tors, shall govern that determination if the parties can-
not resolve the issue without judicial intervention. It is
reasonable to construe the college expense provisions
to hinge the parties’ college expense obligations on
either (1) their incomes alone, or (2) New Jersey law,
including the Newburgh factors, which encompass an
examination of the parties’ finances. In light of the com-
peting, reasonable constructions of the college expense
provisions, it necessarily follows that they are ambigu-
ous.
26
We note that the Newburgh factors contemplate an analysis of the
parents’ finances. See Newburgh v. Arrigo, supra, 88 N.J. 545 (listing fourth
Newburgh factor as ‘‘the ability of the parent to pay [the] cost [of higher
education]’’ and sixth Newburgh factor as ‘‘the financial resources of
both parents’’).
27
The meaning of the phrase ‘‘as further modified by this agreement’’ in
paragraph 6.2 of the modified settlement agreement is unclear.
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Having concluded that the college expense provisions
are ambiguous, we further conclude that the court
improperly relied on the Newburgh factors to deny the
motion for college expenses. The aforementioned ambi-
guity creates a threshold factual issue to be resolved
before the motion for college expenses may be adjudi-
cated. If the intent of the parties was to allocate their
college expense obligations solely on the basis of their
incomes, then the correct course would be for the court
to enforce the modified settlement agreement as written
without resorting to the Newburgh factors, provided
‘‘no showing has been made that the agreement should
be vacated or modified’’;28 Avelino-Catabran v. Cata-
bran, supra, 445 N.J. Super. 591; however, if the parties
did not intend for their incomes, alone, to determine
their college expense obligations, then the court
‘‘should balance the factors set forth in Newburgh and
the statutory criteria of N.J. [Stat. Ann. §] 2A:34-23 (a),
along with any other factors the court deems relevant
to a fair allocation of expenses.’’ Id., 591 n.8; see also
Gac v. Gac, supra, 186 N.J. 543. Under these circum-
stances, we deem the proper remedy to be to reverse
the denial of the motion for college expenses and to
remand the case for a new evidentiary hearing to resolve
the ambiguity in the college expense provisions.29 See
Capparelli v. Lopatin, supra, 459 N.J. Super. 604
(‘‘[w]hen a contract is ambiguous in a material respect,
28
Nothing in the record indicates that either party has sought to vacate
or to modify the college expense provisions.
29
If, on remand, the court determines that the parties did not intend to
predicate their college expense obligations solely on their incomes, then
the parties should be afforded an opportunity to present evidence to guide
the court’s analysis of the relevant factors under New Jersey law, including
the Newburgh factors. We leave it to the discretion of the court on remand
to determine whether to hold separate evidentiary hearings addressing (1)
the ambiguity of the college expense provisions, (2) the relevant factors
pursuant to New Jersey law, if necessary, and (3) the motion for extracurricu-
lar and healthcare expenses; see part I of this opinion; or to address these
issues in a single proceeding.
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the parties must be given the opportunity to illuminate
the contract’s meaning through the submission of
extrinsic evidence’’).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.