707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

707 BLUE HILLS, LLC v. JOHN M. KELLY ET AL.
(AC 47039)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, a former client of the defendant attorneys K and G, and their law
firm L Co., appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the defendants’
motion to strike certain counts of the complaint, including, inter alia, legal
malpractice and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
(§ 42-110a et seq.), as legally insufficient. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia,
that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to strike without
affording it the opportunity to present oral argument. Held:

This court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the portion of the
appeal that challenged the plaintiff’s stricken CUTPA claims against K and
L Co., even though two counts of the complaint remained pending against
those defendants, as the plaintiff relied on the same factual and legal issues
in the stricken claim against G and the stricken CUTPA claims against K
and L Co., and, therefore, the sufficiency of the stricken CUTPA claims
against K and L Co. and the sufficiency of the stricken claim against G were
inextricably intertwined.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion
to strike without affording the plaintiff an opportunity for oral argument,
as the plaintiff did not timely request oral argument pursuant to the rule of
practice (§ 11-18 (a) (2)) and did not pursue a timely objection to the motion
to strike pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 10-40).
Argued March 26—officially released September 9, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the alleged
legal malpractice of the named defendant et al., and for
other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, where the court, Rosen, J., granted
the defendants’ motion to strike certain counts of the
complaint and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
John A. Sodipo, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jessica L. Topper, with whom, on the brief, was Ash-
ley A. Noel, for the appellees (defendants).
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

Opinion

WILSON, J. This appeal arises out of a legal malprac-
tice action brought by the plaintiff, 707 Blue Hills, LLC,
against the defendants, John M. Kelly, David L. Griffith,
and the law firm of Griffith & Kelly, LLC (law firm),1
which represented the plaintiff in a prior civil action
(prior action). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to
strike without affording it an opportunity for oral argu-
ment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court striking
counts five, six, seven and eight of the plaintiff’s com-
plaint.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On
September 7, 2022, the plaintiff commenced the under-
lying legal malpractice action against the defendants in
connection with their representation of the plaintiff in
the prior action. See 707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Remax
Premier Realtors, Superior Court, judicial district of
Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S. The operative
complaint alleged the following twelve counts: legal
malpractice against Kelly (count one); legal malpractice
against the law firm (count two); ‘‘legal malpractice
(recklessness)’’ against Kelly (count three); ‘‘legal mal-
practice (recklessness)’’ against the law firm (count
four); violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.,
against Kelly (count five); violations of CUTPA against
the law firm (counts six and eight); violations of CUTPA
against Griffith (count seven); breach of fiduciary duty
against Kelly (count nine); breach of fiduciary duty
against the law firm (count ten); fraudulent misrepre-
sentation against Kelly (count eleven); and fraudulent
misrepresentation against the law firm (count twelve).2
1
In this opinion, we refer to Kelly, Griffith, and the law firm collectively
as the defendants and individually by name where appropriate.
2
We note that this case was consolidated with Apex Properties, LLC v.
John M. Kelly, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-
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On November 23, 2022, the defendants filed a motion
to strike counts three through twelve of the plaintiff’s
complaint, along with a supporting memorandum of
law, on the ground that the counts were legally insuffi-
cient. The plaintiff did not file a response to the motion
to strike within thirty days of its filing, as required by
Practice Book § 10-40 (a).3 On January 5, 2023, after
the time had expired for filing its objection to the motion
to strike, the plaintiff filed a motion for extension of
time, requesting that it be permitted ‘‘up to and includ-
ing February 8, 2023 . . . to respond to the defendants’
motion to strike . . . .’’ On January 17, 2023, the defen-
dants filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion for
extension of time. It does not appear that the trial court
ever ruled on the plaintiff’s motion for extension of
time. The motion to strike appeared on the March 13,
2023 short calendar, and, on March 9, 2023, the defen-
dants marked the motion to strike as ‘‘take papers.’’ On
March 13, 2023, the trial court, Rosen, J., granted the
motion to strike ‘‘[f]or the reasons set forth in the defen-
dants’ supporting memorandum of law. In its order, the
court noted that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff did not file an opposition
memorandum.’’ On the same day, again, after the time
for filing an objection to the motion to strike had
expired, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion
to strike, accompanied by a supporting memorandum
of law and an exhibit. The plaintiff also filed a motion
for oral argument, requesting that the court ‘‘schedule
[the plaintiff’s] objection to the . . . motion to strike
for oral argument as of right.’’ The trial court, however,
did not act on any of these filings. On March 24, 2023,
XX-XXXXXXX-S. The consolidation of the present case and Apex Properties,
LLC, has no bearing on the disposition of the plaintiff’s claims in the pres-
ent appeal.
3
Practice Book § 10-40 (a) provides: ‘‘Any adverse party shall have thirty
days from the filing of the motion to strike to respond to a motion to strike
filed pursuant to Section 10-39 by filing and serving in accordance with
Sections 10-12 through 10-17 a memorandum of law in opposition.’’
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s
March 13, 2023 decision granting the defendants’ motion
to strike, claiming, inter alia, that the court ‘‘might have
likely overlooked the fact that the plaintiff filed its
objection [to the motion to strike] and requested that
the motion be heard at oral argument as of right.’’ In
its motion to reconsider, the plaintiff also challenged
the court’s finding that the plaintiff had not filed an
objection, representing that, ‘‘[d]espite the fact that [the
plaintiff’s counsel’s] office had service problems, which
delayed the filings, the objection was filed on the morn-
ing prior to the scheduled calendar.’’ On April 6, 2023,
the defendants filed an objection to the motion to recon-
sider. On April 10, 2023, the trial court denied the plain-
tiff’s motion to reconsider. The plaintiff did not file a
substitute complaint.
On August 23, 2023, the defendants filed a motion
for judgment as to the stricken counts (counts three
through twelve) of the complaint pursuant to Practice
Book § 10-44.4 On August 31, 2023, the plaintiff filed an
objection to the motion for judgment, stating, inter alia,
that ‘‘the complaint is being amended in regards to
counts three through twelve.’’ On September 1, 2023,
the defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff’s objection
to the defendants’ motion for judgment.
Thereafter, on September 5, 2023, the plaintiff filed
a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, accom-
panied by the proposed amended complaint. Also on
that date, the court granted the defendants’ motion for
4
Practice Book § 10-44 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Within fifteen days after
the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been
stricken may file a new pleading; provided that in those instances where
an entire complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any count in a
complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint has been stricken, and the party
whose pleading or a count thereof has been so stricken fails to file a new
pleading within that fifteen day period, the judicial authority may, upon
motion, enter judgment against said party on said stricken complaint, coun-
terclaim or cross complaint, or count thereof.’’
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

judgment, stating: ‘‘The plaintiff failed to timely file an
amended complaint in accordance with the court’s prior
orders. The court therefore enters judgment [in favor
of the defendants] on the counts of the plaintiff’s com-
plaint that were previously ordered stricken.’’ On Sep-
tember 13, 2023, the defendants filed an objection to
the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended com-
plaint. Subsequently, on September 30, 2023, the trial
court sustained the defendants’ objection to the plain-
tiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint,
ruling that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s proposed amended com-
plaint is an improper attempt to restate claims that the
court had ordered stricken, and as to which the court
had entered judgment in favor of the defendants.’’
On September 27, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider the trial court’s September 5, 2023 decision
granting the defendants’ motion for judgment. On Octo-
ber 5, 2023, the defendants filed an objection to the
motion to reconsider. On October 10, 2023, the trial
court sustained the defendants’ objection and denied
the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. Thereafter, on Octo-
ber 30, 2023, the plaintiff filed this appeal. During the
pendency of this appeal, this court, sua sponte, ordered
the parties to file supplemental memoranda addressing
‘‘whether this appeal should be dismissed, in part, for
lack of a final judgment as to [Kelly] and [the law firm],
because two counts of the operative complaint filed
September 21, 2022 [counts one and two], remain pend-
ing against those defendants. See Ahern v. Board of
Education, 219 Conn. App. 404, 418–19, [295 A. 3d 496]
(2023); Practice Book §§ 61-3 and 61-4.’’ On October 15,
2024, the plaintiff filed a memorandum opposing the
partial dismissal of the appeal. The plaintiff argued that
the portion of the appeal as to Kelly and the law firm
should not be dismissed because ‘‘the factual and legal
issues being relied upon for a resolution of the claims
against . . . Griffith are intertwined with the factual
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

and legal issues presented against . . . Kelly and the
law firm . . . .’’ The plaintiff relied, inter alia, on Col-
lins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 266 Conn. 12, 30,
836 A.2d 1124 (2003) (this court concluded that it was
unnecessary to address whether counts that were not
brought pursuant to CUTPA were appealable because
they were ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’ with appealable
CUTPA counts). The defendants filed a memorandum
supporting the partial dismissal of the appeal.
On October 30, 2024, this court dismissed the appeal
to the extent it challenged the judgment rendered in
favor of Kelly and the law firm on the non-CUTPA
counts, namely, counts three, four, nine, ten, eleven
and twelve, for lack of a final judgment. The motion to
dismiss as to the judgment rendered in favor of Kelly
and the law firm on counts five, six and eight was
‘‘denied without prejudice to the defendants addressing
in their appellees’ brief and the plaintiff addressing in
its reply brief, if any, whether the judgment rendered
on those counts is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the
judgment rendered on count seven for the purpose of
appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Collins v. Anthem
Health Plans, Inc., [supra, 266 Conn. 30].’’5 Additional
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
Because the finality of the trial court’s judgment
implicates the jurisdiction of this court to hear the
appeal, we first must consider whether the judgment
rendered on counts five, six and eight is inextricably
intertwined with the judgment rendered in favor of Grif-
fith on count seven (CUTPA claim), which constitutes
an appealable final judgment as to Griffith under Prac-
tice Book § 61-3.6 For the reasons that follow, we con-
clude that the judgment rendered on counts five, six
5
We note that the plaintiff did not file a reply brief with this court or any
other filing further addressing this issue.
6
Practice Book § 61-3 provides: ‘‘A judgment disposing of only a part of
a complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint is a final judgment if that
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and eight is inextricably intertwined with the judgment
rendered on count seven. Accordingly, we conclude
that we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal with
respect to the claims that pertain to those counts.
We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles
relating to final judgments. ‘‘The lack of a final judgment
implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of an appel-
late court to hear an appeal. A determination regarding
. . . subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law
. . . [and, therefore] our review is plenary.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Glastonbury v. Sakon, 172
Conn. App. 646, 651, 161 A.3d 657 (2017).
‘‘Because our jurisdiction over appeals . . . is pre-
scribed by statute, we must always determine the
threshold question of whether the appeal is taken from
a final judgment before considering the merits of the
claim. . . . A judgment that disposes of only a part of
a complaint is not a final judgment. . . . Our rules of
practice, however, set forth certain circumstances
under which a party may appeal from a judgment dis-
posing of less than all of the counts of a complaint. Thus,
a party may appeal if the partial judgment disposes
of all causes of action against a particular party or
parties . . . .
‘‘If a party wishes to appeal from a partial judgment
rendered against it, barring a limited exception . . . it
judgment disposes of all causes of action in that complaint, counterclaim
or cross complaint brought by or against a particular party or parties.
‘‘Such a judgment shall be a final judgment regardless of whether judgment
was rendered on the granting of a motion to strike pursuant to Section 10-
44, by dismissal pursuant to Section 10-30, by summary judgment pursuant
to Section 17-44 or otherwise. The appeal from such judgment may be
deferred (unless an objection is filed pursuant to Section 61-5) until the
final judgment that disposes of the case for all purposes and as to all parties
is rendered. If the appeal from such a judgment is to be deferred, a notice
of intent to appeal must be filed in accordance with the provisions of Section
61-5.
‘‘A party entitled to appeal under this section may appeal regardless of
which party moved for the judgment to be made final.’’
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

can do so only if the remaining causes of action or
claims for relief are withdrawn or unconditionally aban-
doned before the appeal is taken.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Ahern v. Board of
Education, supra, 219 Conn. App. 418.
There is, however, an exception to this finality rule.
‘‘[I]n some circumstances, the factual and legal issues
raised by a legal argument, the appealability of which
is doubtful, may be so ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
another argument, the appealability of which is estab-
lished that we should assume jurisdiction over both.’’
Clukey v. Sweeney, 112 Conn. App. 534, 542, 963 A.2d
711 (2009); see also Collins v. Anthem Health Plans,
Inc., supra, 266 Conn. 29–30.
In its memorandum of law opposing the partial dis-
missal of the appeal, the plaintiff argued that ‘‘the fac-
tual and legal issues being relied upon for a resolution
of the claims against . . . Griffith are intertwined with
the factual and legal issues presented against . . .
Kelly and the law firm . . . .’’ Specifically, the plaintiff
argued that the legal sufficiency of the complaint sound-
ing in CUTPA as against Griffith depends entirely on
whether the plaintiff alleged valid CUTPA claims
against Kelly and the law firm.
The defendants, however, argue in their appellate
brief that, because the issue of whether Griffith’s con-
duct is controlled by, or violated, CUTPA is not depen-
dent on whether Kelly’s conduct gives rise to a violation
of CUTPA, the counts are not inextricably linked. Spe-
cifically, the defendants argue that the conduct that the
plaintiff alleges within count seven—that Griffith acted
in concert with and assisted Kelly—is not solely sup-
ported by the allegations in counts five, six, and eight
but, rather, is also supported by the allegations in counts
one and two. We agree with the plaintiff.7
7
In their appellate brief, the defendants argue that our Supreme Court’s
discussion in Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 716–17 n.4,
183 A.3d 1164 (2018), reflects that the ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’ exception
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In the present case, the trial court struck counts three
through twelve of the plaintiff’s complaint. Thereafter,
the court rendered judgment on those counts in favor
of the defendants pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44.
That judgment, however, did not constitute an appeal-
able final judgment with respect to Kelly and the law
firm under Practice Book § 61-3 because it did not dis-
pose of all causes of action asserted against them in
the complaint. See, e.g., Ahern v. Board of Education,
supra, 219 Conn. App. 421 (dismissing, for lack of final
judgment, plaintiff’s appeal from partial summary judg-
ment rendered in favor of particular defendant because
trial court had not disposed of all counts pertaining to
that defendant). Specifically, count one, which asserts
a legal malpractice claim against Kelly, and count two,
which asserts a legal malpractice claim against the law
firm, remain pending before the trial court. The trial
court struck the only count asserted against Griffith
(count seven) and, thereafter, rendered judgment in
favor of Griffith on that count pursuant to Practice
Book § 10-44. The judgment rendered on count seven
in favor of Griffith constitutes an appealable final judg-
ment under Practice Book § 61-3 because it disposed
of all causes of action asserted against him in the com-
plaint. The portion of the plaintiff’s appeal challenging
the judgment rendered in favor of Griffith on the
stricken count seven is therefore jurisdictionally
proper.
applies only when there is a final judgment as to all of the parties before
the court. The defendants argue that, here, the judgment of the trial court
on the motion to strike was final as to Griffith only. Although the court in
Meribear Productions, Inc., stated that it had relied on this exception ‘‘when
there is a final judgment as to all of the parties before the reviewing court,’’
it does not expressly limit the exception to such circumstances. Id., 716
n.4. Indeed, the court made clear that the exception may be invoked ‘‘when
resolution of the interlocutory ruling would control or bear on the resolution
of the final judgment or the case generally.’’ Id., 717 n.4. Such is the situa-
tion here.
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

Counts five, six, seven and eight of the plaintiff’s
complaint allege CUTPA violations against Kelly, the
law firm, and Griffith.

The allegations of count five which are directed
against Kelly provide in relevant part:

‘‘17. As it relates to the underlying civil matter involv-
ing an alleged violation of the appellate stay . . . Kelly
communicated to [Gary] Thompson [the managing
member of the plaintiff] that he was an expert in the
field and continued to reassure and made guarantees
to Thompson of the expected outcome of the case; and
as a consequence, Thompson on behalf of the [plaintiff],
believed that . . . Kelly had superior knowledge, skill
and expertise with respect to prosecuting these types of
proceedings involving a violation of the appellate stay.

‘‘18. [Kelly] further assured Thompson that his firm
could handle the volume when considering he was rep-
resenting the plaintiff in another matter involving a
violation of the appellate stay . . . as well as defending
Thompson’s interest in another entity . . . .

‘‘19. [Kelly] informed the plaintiff through Thompson
that his legal team including his partner . . . Griffith
and others, had a competitive advantage in that they
were able to provide expanded legal services to the
plaintiff.

‘‘20. These misrepresentations by . . . Kelly as to his
skill sets relative to the expected outcome of the case,
the amount of litigants in his firm and the statement
relating to having a competitive advantage, were not
the basis of an honest ‘chest puffing’ but instead were
knowingly false representations made to induce
Thompson, and the same did induce Thompson, to
agree to have . . . Kelly represent the plaintiff.
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

‘‘21. . . . Kelly’s ulterior motive or sole purpose for
the representation was entirely based on the entrepre-
neurial aspect of the practice of law and said representa-
tion was not pursued in the best interest of the plaintiff.
‘‘22. The conduct of . . . Kelly as aforesaid, has
been, and continues to be, unfair, deceptive, immoral,
unscrupulous, offensive to public policy, harmful to
consumers, and otherwise is within the scope of mis-
conduct that CUTPA was enacted to prevent.’’
Count six alleges a CUTPA violation against the law
firm and incorporates the allegations of count five.
Count eight also alleges a violation of CUTPA against
the law firm based on a theory of vicarious liability
resulting from Griffith’s employment with the firm and
incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 17
through 22 of count five.
Count seven, which alleges that Griffith violated
CUTPA, alleges the following relevant factual allega-
tions:
‘‘23. . . . Griffith . . . practices law as a member,
partner, owner, agent, and/or employee of [the law
firm] . . . .
‘‘24. At all times relevant herein . . . Griffith as a
licensed attorney was in the business of providing legal
services to the general public in Connecticut.
‘‘25. [Griffith] . . . knew about the fraudulent
scheme perpetrated by . . . Kelly affecting the manner
in which they obtain new clients and also assisted . . .
Kelly in achieving the same.
‘‘26. [Griffith] assisted . . . Kelly by providing legal
advice as well as coverage for . . . Kelly’s conflicting
legal matters which encouraged and allowed . . .
Kelly to dedicate the time needed to carry out and
perfect the fraudulent scheme as aforesaid.
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

‘‘27. . . . Griffith knew that . . . Kelly was using
. . . Griffith’s name to falsely advertise the size and
capabilities of the [law] firm as a way to obtain business
through deception.
‘‘28. Despite having knowledge of this deceptive prac-
tice . . . Griffith took no affirmative action against
such conduct but instead acquiesced and ratified the
same.
‘‘29. The conduct of . . . Griffith as aforesaid, has
been, and continues to be, unfair deceptive, immoral,
unscrupulous, offensive to public policy, harmful to
consumers, and otherwise is within the scope of mis-
conduct that CUTPA was enacted to prevent.’’
A review of the allegations in counts five, six, seven
and eight demonstrates that the sufficiency of the
CUTPA claims alleged against Kelly and the law firm,
and the court’s striking of those counts, are inextricably
intertwined with the sufficiency of the claims alleged
against Griffith in count seven and the court’s striking
of that count. The plaintiff relies on the same factual
and legal basis for both the CUTPA claims against Grif-
fith and the CUTPA claims against Kelly and the law
firm. Because the plaintiff argues that the allegations
contained in count seven against Griffith are sufficient
to meet the requirements under CUTPA, the extent to
which Griffith’s conduct falls under CUTPA is depen-
dent on whether Kelly’s conduct gives rise to a violation
of CUTPA. Specifically, in count seven, it is alleged that
Griffith acted in concert with and assisted Kelly in a
fraudulent scheme of misrepresentation for an imper-
missible entrepreneurial purpose in connection with
the underlying civil matter. Count five sets forth specific
factual allegations as to Kelly’s role in the alleged fraud-
ulent scheme of misrepresentation itself. Thus, if the
trial court finds that the conduct of Kelly does not rise
to the level of a CUTPA violation, then no liability could
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

attach to Griffith for acting in concert with and assisting
Kelly. Similarly, count six alleges a CUTPA violation
against the law firm and incorporates the allegations
set forth in count five. Count eight of the complaint,
which is based on a theory of vicarious liability, alleges
a CUTPA violation against the law firm and incorporates
the allegations set forth in count seven. As the issue of
whether CUTPA liability attaches to the law firm and
Griffith depends on whether the allegations against
Kelly are sufficient to trigger liability under CUTPA, we
conclude that the counts are inextricably intertwined.
See Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., supra, 266
Conn. 30 (concluding that CUTPA and non-CUTPA
counts were ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’ where factual
and legal bases of claims did not differ).
With respect to the defendants’ argument that,
because the allegations within count seven are repre-
sented in counts one and two, the extent to which
Griffith’s conduct violated CUPTA is not dependent on
whether Kelly’s conduct gives rise to a CUTPA violation,
we are not persuaded. Count one alleges legal malprac-
tice against Kelly and provides specific factual allega-
tions as to Kelly’s negligence and his breach of his duty
of care during his representation of the plaintiff. Count
one also alleges that Kelly concealed the negligent acts,
misdeeds, malpractice, and omissions alleged therein.
Count two, alleging legal malpractice against the law
firm, incorporates the factual allegations of count one
and alleges that Kelly’s conduct is imputed to the law
firm on a theory of vicarious liability. That there are
overlapping factual allegations in counts one and two
and counts five, six and eight does not affect our conclu-
sion herein that count seven and counts five, six, and
eight are inextricably intertwined.
In sum, we conclude that the judgment rendered by
the court as to counts five, six, and eight are inextricably
intertwined with the judgment rendered as to count
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707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly

seven, constituting an appealable final judgment for
which this court has jurisdiction.
II
Having determined that this court has jurisdiction to
hear this appeal, we next turn to the merits of the
plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff claims that the court
abused its discretion when it granted the defendants’
motion to strike without affording the plaintiff an oppor-
tunity for oral argument. We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
relevant legal principles. This claim challenges a trial
court’s decision to rule on a motion to strike without
hearing oral argument. Unless a party is entitled to
oral argument as a matter of right, such determination
invokes the discretion of the trial court. See Practice
Book § 11-18. Thus, it is reversible only for abuse of
discretion. ‘‘In reviewing a claim of abuse of discretion,
we have stated that [d]iscretion means a legal discre-
tion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of
the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede
or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . . In gen-
eral, abuse of discretion exists when a court could have
chosen different alternatives but has decided the matter
so arbitrarily as to vitiate logic, or has decided it based
on improper or irrelevant factors. . . . [Reversal is
required only] [i]n those cases in which an abuse of
discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to
have been done . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 202 Conn.
App. 21, 38, 244 A.3d 171 (2020), aff’d, 343 Conn. 424,
274 A.3d 85 (2022).
As stated previously in this opinion, on November
23, 2022, the defendants filed a motion to strike counts
three through twelve of the plaintiff’s complaint on
the grounds that the allegations were insufficient as a
matter of law. On January 5, 2023, after the thirty days
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prescribed by Practice Book § 10-40 had expired, the
plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to respond
to the defendants’ motion to strike, ‘‘up to and including
February 8, 2023.’’ On January 17, 2023, the defendants
filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion for extension
of time. The trial court took no action on these two
motions.
On March 9, 2023, the defendants marked the motion
as ‘‘take papers,’’ given that the plaintiff had not filed
an objection. The motion was listed on the March 13,
2023 short calendar as ‘‘take papers.’’ On March 13,
2023, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to
strike and, in its order, stated that the motion was
granted ‘‘[f]or the reasons set forth in the defendants’
supporting memorandum of law.’’ The trial court further
noted that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff did not file an opposition
memorandum.’’ On that same day, for the first time,
and beyond the thirty days prescribed by Practice Book
§ 10-40, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants’
motion to strike along with a request for oral argument.8
Practice Book § 11-18 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
Oral argument is at the discretion of the judicial author-
ity except as to . . . motions to strike . . . and/or
hearing on any objections thereto. For those motions,
oral argument shall be a matter of right, provided: (1)
the motion has been marked ready in accordance with
the procedure that appears on the short calendar on
which the motion appears, or (2) a nonmoving party
files and serves on all other parties . . . a written
notice stating the party’s intention to argue the motion
or present testimony. Such a notice shall be filed on
or before the third day before the date of the short
calendar date . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘Thus, even
8
This court notes that the plaintiff’s filing of its objection and request for
oral argument on March 13, 2023, is beyond the February 8, 2023 date
requested in its motion for extension of time.
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though . . . § 11-18 ‘grants . . . oral argument as of
right, it is not automatic but must be claimed for argu-
ment as provided in [§ 11-18].’ ’’ Curry v. Allan S. Good-
man, Inc., 95 Conn. App. 147, 152, 895 A.2d 266 (2006).
In the present case, the record reflects that the defen-
dants marked their motion to strike as ‘‘take papers,’’
and it was not marked ‘‘ready.’’ The defendants did not
request oral argument on the motion to strike. Thus,
for the plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, to be afforded
argument as a matter of right, it was required to file
‘‘notice [stating its intent to argue the motion] . . . on
or before the third day before the date of the short
calendar date . . . .’’ See Practice Book § 11-18.
Despite the clear language of § 11-18, the plaintiff failed
to request oral argument three days before March 13,
2023, as required. Rather, the plaintiff filed its request
for oral argument on the short calendar date of March
13, 2023. Indeed, the plaintiff concedes that the notice
for oral argument ‘‘was not filed in accordance with
the time frame set by [§] 11-18 (a) (2).’’ Thus, we con-
clude that the plaintiff was not entitled to oral argument
as of right pursuant to § 11-18. Rather, whether to pro-
vide oral argument was within the discretion of the trial
court. See Practice Book § 11-18.
Notwithstanding its concession that its filing was
untimely, the plaintiff argues that strict adherence to
the requirements under Practice Book § 11-18 (a) (2)
‘‘would serve a complete surprise and an injustice under
the circumstances,’’ and that ‘‘[s]etting the matter down
for argument would not prejudice the defendants in
any way given the fact that the case was set down for
trial in April of 2025 and would not in any way disturb
the scheduled trial. The plaintiff, however, did suffer
prejudice in one or more . . . ways.’’ In support of this
argument, the plaintiff relies on Practice Book § 1-8,
which provides: ‘‘The design of these rules being to
facilitate business and advance justice, they will be
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interpreted liberally in any case where it shall be mani-
fest that a strict adherence to them will work surprise or
injustice.’’9 The plaintiff fails, however, to demonstrate
how the court’s appropriate exercise of its discretion
under Practice Book § 11-18, in not affording the plain-
tiff oral argument, resulted in ‘‘surprise or injustice.’’
In its brief, the plaintiff contends that oral argument
would have provided the opportunity for it to expand
on arguments presented in its memorandum of law in
support of its objection to the defendants’ motion to
strike. We point out again, that, in the court’s March
13, 2023 order granting the motion to strike, it noted that
‘‘[t]he plaintiff did not file an opposition memorandum’’
and that the plaintiff’s objection and supporting memo-
randum were filed on the same day, after the time for
filing an objection to the motion to strike had expired.
The plaintiff had every opportunity to timely file its
objection to the motion to strike and to timely request
oral argument on the motion; however, it failed to do
so. Thus, the plaintiff’s argument that the court’s failure
to afford the plaintiff oral argument denied it ‘‘the
opportunity to be meaningfully heard on the record and
to address any ambiguities flowing from the dispute
between the parties to its detriment’’ is unavailing.
(Emphasis omitted.) Moreover, this assertion does not
identify any actual prejudice or injustice that flowed
from the denial. Rather, the plaintiff appears to repre-
sent that oral argument would have been used to discuss
9
The plaintiff additionally contends that ‘‘at no time did it waive its right
for oral argument and, due to circumstances outside of counsel’s control,
the notice was not filed three days before the March 13, 2023 short calendar
date.’’ Specifically, the plaintiff relies on its representation in its motion to
reconsider before the trial court that the plaintiff’s counsel ‘‘had service
problems, which delayed the filings.’’ This argument warrants little discus-
sion. We note that the trial court did not make any factual findings or legal
conclusion concerning the plaintiff’s ‘‘service problems.’’ Thus, to the extent
that the plaintiff relies on this bare assertion presently in its claim that the
trial court abused its discretion by granting the defendants’ motion to strike
without affording the plaintiff an opportunity for oral argument, there simply
is no basis in the record for this court to conclude as such.
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arguments the plaintiff raised as part of its untimely
objection to the motion to strike, which was not prop-
erly before the trial court. Thus, we are not persuaded
that the trial court abused its discretion by adhering to
our rules of practice.10
In sum, we agree with the defendants that the plain-
tiff’s untimely motions practice before the trial court
evidenced a clear disregard for Practice Book §§ 11-18
and 10-40. The plaintiff had the opportunity to pursue
a timely objection to the defendants’ motion to strike
and to appropriately request oral argument under Prac-
tice Book § 11-18 (a) (2). Because no party appropri-
ately requested oral argument on the motion to strike,
the trial court properly ruled on the motion without
oral argument, subsequent to the submission of the
defendants’ short calendar marking the motion as ‘‘take
papers.’’ Thus, we conclude that the plaintiff was not
entitled to oral argument as a matter of right and, there-
fore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by grant-
ing the defendants’ motion to strike without affording
the plaintiff an opportunity for oral argument.11
10
Thus, even if we were to conclude that the court abused its discretion
by granting the defendants’ motion to strike without affording the plaintiff
an opportunity for oral argument, which we do not, the plaintiff fails to
establish that such denial was harmful. See Bradley v. Yovino, 218 Conn.
App. 1, 15–16, 291 A.3d 133 (2023) (‘‘[I]n order to establish reversible error
in nonconstitutional claims, the [appellant] must prove both an abuse of
discretion and harm . . . . The harmless error standard in a civil case is
whether [an] improper ruling would likely affect the result. . . . In the
absence of a showing that the [claimed error] would have affected the final
result, its [error] is harmless.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)).
11
The plaintiff also claims that the court abused its discretion in denying
the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider. In light of our conclusion herein that
the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to
strike without affording the plaintiff an opportunity for oral argument, we
also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration. See LendingHome Marketplace, LLC
v. Traditions Oil Group, LLC, 209 Conn. App. 862, 873, 269 A.3d 195
(‘‘[b]ecause there was no error in the court’s ruling, we also conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to
reargue/reconsider’’), cert. denied, 343 Conn. 927, 281 A.3d 1187 (2022).
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The judgment is affirmed with respect to the granting
of the motion to strike counts five, six, seven and eight
of the plaintiff’s complaint.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.