Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

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Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

INTEGRIS INSURANCE COMPANY v.
NARENDRA B. TOHAN
(AC 47222)
Alvord, Elgo and Moll, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant physician, a reproductive endocrinologist, appealed from the
trial court’s summary judgment for the plaintiff insurance company in its
action seeking a declaratory judgment as to its duty to defend and indemnify
the defendant in a separate civil negligence action. In the civil negligence
action, the plaintiffs, K and R, alleged, inter alia, that the defendant was
negligent in the provision of professional services, having discovered through
genetic testing that the defendant used his own sperm when he performed
in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures for their parents, without having
informed the parents of his conduct. The defendant claimed, inter alia,
that the court improperly concluded that all of the allegations in the civil
negligence action fell within exclusions to coverage in the insurance policy
issued to him by the plaintiff. Held:

The trial court properly concluded that the civil negligence action contained
an allegation that potentially fell within the coverage provided by the insur-
ance policy issued by the plaintiff, as the first count of the civil negligence
action contained allegations that concern professional services provided by
the defendant, as that term was used in the policy.

The trial court improperly determined that the intentional conduct exclu-
sion to coverage in the insurance policy clearly and unambiguously applied
to every allegation in the civil negligence action, as the first count in that
action was beyond the scope of the intentional conduct exclusion because the
count specifically alleged, inter alia, that the defendant inadvertently and
“negligently” used his sperm that contained a genetic disease when providing
IVF services to K’s parents, causing the injuries K sustained.

The trial court improperly determined that the sexual conduct exclusion
to coverage in the insurance policy applied clearly and unambiguously to
every claim set forth in the civil negligence action, as the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that the sexual conduct exclusion applied to every negligence
allegation set forth therein, including the allegation that the defendant
negligently utilized sperm that contained a genetic disease when providing
IVF services, a claim that is not sexual in nature.

Argued October 6, 2025—officially released April 7, 2026

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment
determining whether the plaintiff had a duty to defend
and indemnify the defendant in a separate negligence
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

action for alleged medical misconduct, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,
where the court, S. Connors, J., granted the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment on the second count
of the amended complaint and on the counterclaim;
thereafter, the court, Klau, J., granted the plaintiff’s
amended motion for final judgment and rendered judg-
ment thereon, from which the defendant appealed to this
court. Reversed in part; judgment directed.
Neal L. Moskow, for the appellant (defendant).
Eugene A. Cooney, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

ELGO, J. In this declaratory action regarding an insur-
er’s duty to defend, the defendant, Narendra B. Tohan,
appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Integris Insurance
Company. This appeal presents two principal issues for
our resolution. We first consider whether the court prop-
erly concluded that the underlying complaint contained
an allegation that potentially fell within the scope of the
medical professional liability insurance policy at issue.
We then consider whether the court properly concluded
that the plaintiff met its burden of establishing that two
exclusions to coverage clearly and unambiguously applied
to every allegation of that complaint. We conclude that
the latter determination was improper and, accordingly,
reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.1
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
defendant; see Martinelli v. Fusi, 290 Conn. 347, 350,
963 A.2d 640 (2009); reveals the following facts and
procedural history. The plaintiff is a medical professional
liability insurer licensed to transact business in this state.
The defendant is a physician licensed by the state of Con-
necticut. At all relevant times, the defendant maintained a
1
In light of that conclusion, we do not consider the defendant’s ancil-
lary contention that the court improperly rejected his breach of contract
counterclaim and his special defense of estoppel.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

“Physicians & Surgeons Professional Liability Claims
Made” insurance policy with the plaintiff (policy) that
contained a retroactive date of October 1, 1984, and an
extended reporting period endorsement, which permit-
ted the reporting of claims for an indefinite period after
the term of the policy.
In 2019, Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty (civil
action plaintiffs),2 who were strangers for most of their
lives, discovered through a genetic testing company
that they are half siblings. See Suprynowicz v. Tohan,
351 Conn. 75, 76, 328 A.3d 646 (2025). As our Supreme
Court recently recounted, the civil action plaintiffs, “who
are both in their thirties, were conceived through [in
vitro fertilization (IVF)]. The defendant is the reproduc-
tive endocrinologist who performed the IVF procedures
for the [civil action plaintiffs’] respective parents. . . .
Unbeknownst to [the parents], the defendant [allegedly]
used his own sperm in the IVF procedures.” (Footnote
omitted.) Id., 78. After she became pregnant, Kayla’s
mother “was informed that her pregnancy was the result
of ‘mixed sperm.’ ” Id. On April 1, 2021, the civil action
plaintiffs commenced a civil action against the defen-
dant (civil action). Their complaint contained six counts
and alleged negligence, fraudulent concealment, and
violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.3 It is
undisputed that those claims were brought and reported
to the plaintiff while the policy’s extended reporting
period endorsement was in effect.
Weeks later, the plaintiff sent the defendant a certi-
fied letter dated April 20, 2021 (reservation of rights
2
For clarity, we refer to Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty
individually by first name and collectively as the civil action plaintiffs
in this opinion.
3
The plaintiff in the present case appended a copy of the civil action
plaintiffs’ March 31, 2021 complaint as an exhibit to its motion for sum-
mary judgment. See generally Community Action for Greater Middlesex
County, Inc. v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 387, 395, 757 A.2d
1074 (2000) (“[t]he question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend
. . . is to be determined by comparing the allegations of [the underlying]
complaint with the terms of the insurance policy”).
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

letter). In that letter, Maureen Rodgers, a senior claims
account executive with the plaintiff, stated that the
plaintiff had reviewed the allegations of the civil action
plaintiffs and had concluded that “some or all of the
claims brought against you in [the civil action] are NOT
COVERED by the [p]olicy. For this reason, we will be
providing a defense to you in [the civil action] under
a FULL RESERVATION OF OUR RIGHTS to decline
payment under the policy for any damages that might
be awarded.” Rodgers proceeded to recite the pertinent
allegations of the complaint in the civil action and certain
provisions of the policy, and then stated: “Our review of
the allegations in the [civil action] indicates that some or
all of the allegations are NOT COVERED under . . . the
[p]olicy and are additionally or alternatively EXCLUDED
FROM COVERAGE under one or more of the exclusions
in the [p]olicy . . . . In particular, we refer to those claims
that are predicated in whole or in part on the conten-
tion that you substituted your sperm for that of the
intended sperm donor. Any damages arising directly
or indirectly from such actions (1) would NOТ be dam-
ages arising out of a ‘medical incident’ and would thus
be outside the coverage of the [p]olicy, and (2) would be
damages EXCLUDED from coverage under one or all of
the exclusions cited above. For the same reasons, claims
of fraudulent concealment and violations of [CUTPA]
are not ‘medical incidents’ covered under the [p]olicy
and are excluded from the coverage of the [p]olicy under
one or all of the referenced exclusions.”
Rodgers then encouraged the defendant to obtain
separate legal counsel “[b]ecause of the possibility that
damages awarded in [the civil action] may not be covered
under the [p]olicy or may exceed your [l]imits of [l]iability
. . . .” After informing the defendant that the plaintiff
had retained Attorney Sally O. Hagerty to represent
him in the civil action, Rodgers stated: “We remind you
once again that this defense is provided under a FULL
RESERVATION OF OUR RIGHTS under the policy.
Our rights include, but are not limited to the right to
seek judicial determinations of whether any damages
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

that might be awarded in the [civil action] are or are not
covered under the [p]olicy and/or whether we are entitled
to a rescission of the [policy].”4
On April 30, 2021, the plaintiff commenced this declar-
atory action against the defendant, which concerns the
plaintiff’s duty to defend the defendant against alle-
gations that, in the course of providing IVF services,
he improperly mixed his own sperm with that of Gary
Suprynowicz and Brian Flaherty “to create the embryo[s]
which became” the civil action plaintiffs, as alleged in the
civil action. The plaintiff’s operative complaint contains
two counts. In count one, the plaintiff alleged that it
was entitled to a rescission of the policy due to material
misrepresentations made by the defendant in his applica-
tion for insurance coverage. In count two, the plaintiff
sought, inter alia, a declaration that “[t]he actions of the
defendant as described in the [civil action] are not ‘medi-
cal incidents’ as defined in the policy,” that the “injuries
or damages” claimed by the civil action plaintiffs were
excluded from coverage under the policy, that “it is
against the public policy of the state of Connecticut to
insure against damages caused by the conduct with which
the defendant is charged in the [civil action],” and that
the plaintiff “is under no obligation to provide a defense
to the defendant” in the civil action.
On March 30, 2022, the defendant filed an answer,
a special defense, and a two count counterclaim. In his
special defense, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff
was estopped from bringing the declaratory action by
virtue of its written promise to provide a defense to him
in the civil action, as memorialized in the reservation of
rights letter. The defendant’s counterclaim sounded in
contract and alleged that the plaintiff breached both the
policy and the plaintiff’s written agreement to provide a
defense in the civil action. On April 29, 2022, the plain-
tiff filed an answer to that counterclaim and a reply to
the defendant’s special defense, in which it denied the
4
Attorney Hagerty filed an appearance on behalf of the defendant in
the civil action on May 13, 2021.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

allegations contained therein in all material respects. On
that date, the plaintiff also filed a certificate of closed
pleadings and requested a court trial.
On July 29, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on count two of its operative complaint,
the defendant’s special defense, and the defendant’s
counterclaim, claiming that no genuine issues of mate-
rial fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. That motion was accompanied by a
memorandum of law and several exhibits.5 On December
23, 2022, the defendant filed an objection to the motion
for summary judgment and two exhibits.6 The plaintiff
filed a reply memorandum on January 9, 2023. The court
held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on
July 25, 2023.
In its subsequent memorandum of decision, the court
first rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the civil action
plaintiffs had not alleged injuries that resulted from a
medical incident and, thus, were beyond the scope of the
coverage provided by the policy. The court then concluded
that all of the allegations in the civil action fell within
both the sexual conduct exclusion contained in § III. A.
10. of the policy and the intentional conduct exclusion
contained in § III. A. 12. Lastly, the court concluded that
the defendant had failed to raise a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact regarding either his special defense of estoppel
or his breach of contract counterclaim. The court thus
rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on
5
The plaintiff’s exhibits were (1) the March 31, 2021 complaint from
the civil action, (2) the sworn affidavit of Garrett Cronin, Vice President
of Underwriting and Member Services for the plaintiff, to which a true
and accurate copy of the policy was appended, (3) an uncertified copy
of a portion of the insurance policy at issue in St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 222 Conn. 823, 610 A.2d 1281 (1992), culled from
the appellate record of that appeal, and (4) five unreported cases of the
Superior Court.
6
The exhibits submitted by the defendant were (1) a copy of the res-
ervation of rights letter and (2) an article in a medical journal. See
S. Friedman, “Artificial Insemination with Donor Semen Mixed with
Semen of the Infertile Husband,” 33 Fertility and Sterility 125 (1980).
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

count two of the operative complaint, the defendant’s
special defense, and the defendant’s counterclaim.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for entry of
final judgment with the court. In that motion, the plain-
tiff maintained that, in light of the summary judgment
rendered in favor of the plaintiff on count two of the
operative complaint, the defendant’s special defense,
and the defendant’s counterclaim, the rescission claim
set forth in count one of its complaint was “moot and
no longer provides any ground for practical relief.” On
December 3, 2023, the court granted the plaintiff’s
motion and rendered judgment accordingly. From that
judgment, the defendant now appeals.7
We begin by noting the well established standard that
governs our review of a trial court’s decision to grant a
motion for summary judgment. “In seeking summary
judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing
the nonexistence of any issue of fact. . . . [T]he moving
party for summary judgment has the burden of showing
the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material
facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive
law, entitle[s] him to a judgment as a matter of law. The
courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy
his burden the movant must make a showing that it is
quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real
doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material
fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the opponent. . . . When documents submitted in support
of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving
party has no obligation to submit documents establish-
ing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once the moving
party has met its burden, however, the opposing party
must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of
some disputed factual issue.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co. No. 1, Inc., 332
7
In this appeal, neither party challenges the propriety of the court’s
dismissal of count one of the plaintiff’s complaint.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

Conn. 93, 101, 209 A.3d 629 (2019). Whether the trial
court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff is a question of law subject to our plenary
review. See Nash Street, LLC v. Main Street America
Assurance Co., 337 Conn. 1, 8, 251 A.3d 600 (2020).
“Our standard of review for interpreting insurance
policies is [also] well settled. The construction of an insur-
ance policy presents a question of law that we review de
novo. . . . When construing an insurance policy, we look
at the [policy] as a whole, consider all relevant portions
together and, if possible, give operative effect to every
provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result. .
. . Insurance policies are interpreted based on the same
rules that govern the interpretation of contracts. . . . In
accordance with those rules, [t]he determinative ques-
tion is the intent of the parties . . . . If the terms of the
policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language,
from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced,
must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning. . . .
In determining whether the terms of an insurance policy
are clear and unambiguous, [a] court will not torture
words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning
leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any ambigu-
ity in a contract must emanate from the language used
in the contract rather than from one party’s subjective
perception of the terms. . . . As with contracts generally,
a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it
is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading. . . .
Under those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms
of an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the
insured . . . .
“The question of whether an insurer has a duty to
defend its insured is purely a question of law . . . . An
insurer’s duty to defend is determined by reference to
the allegations contained in the [underlying] complaint. .
. . The duty to defend does not depend on whether the
injured party will successfully maintain a cause of action
against the insured but on whether [the complaint] stated
facts which bring the injury within the coverage. . . . If
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

an allegation of the complaint falls even possibly within
the coverage, then the insurance company must defend
the insured. . . . That being said, an insurer has a duty
to defend only if the underlying complaint reasonably
alleges an injury that is covered by the policy. . . . [W]e
will not predicate the duty to defend on a reading of
the complaint that is . . . conceivable but tortured and
unreasonable. . . . There is also no duty to defend if the
complaint alleges a liability which the policy does not
cover . . . .
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment on a
claim for breach of the duty to defend, an insurer must
establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact
either that no allegation of the underlying complaint
falls even possibly within the scope of the insuring agree-
ment or, even if it might, that any claim based on such an
allegation is excluded from coverage under an applicable
policy exclusion. In presenting countervailing proof,
the insurer . . . is necessarily limited to the provisions
of the subject insurance policy and the allegations of
the underlying complaint. Therefore, it is only entitled
to prevail under a policy exclusion if the allegations of
the complaint clearly and unambiguously establish the
applicability of the exclusion to each and every claim
for which there might otherwise be coverage under the
policy.
“An insured, in turn, may rebut an insurer’s claim
that it has no duty to defend him in the light of an appli-
cable policy exclusion by showing that at least one of
his allegations, as pleaded states a claim that falls even
possibly outside the scope of the exclusion or within
an exception to that exclusion. Unless the allegations
of any such underlying claim fall so clearly and unam-
biguously within a policy exclusion as to eliminate any
possible coverage, the insurer must provide a defense to
its insured.”8 (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
8
In its principal appellate brief, the plaintiff asserts, as it did at oral
argument on its motion for summary judgment before the trial court,
that the defendant, as the insured party, “bears the burden of proving
in the first instance that the damages claimed in the underlying action
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Old Repub-
lic National Title Ins. Co., 218 Conn. App. 226, 239–41,
291 A.3d 1051 (2023).
I
We first consider the question of whether the court
properly concluded that the complaint in the civil action
contained an allegation that potentially fell within the
scope of the policy. As our Supreme Court has explained,
“[a]n insurer’s duty to defend is triggered if at least one
allegation of the complaint falls even possibly within
the coverage.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Capstone Building Corp. v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 308 Conn. 760, 805, 67 A.3d 961
(2013). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that none of the
injuries alleged by the civil action plaintiffs arises out
of “professional services,” as that term is used in the
policy.9 We disagree.
“[T]he question of whether an insurer has a duty to
defend its insured is purely a question of law, which is to
be determined by comparing the allegations of [the] com-
plaint with the terms of the insurance policy.” (Internal
are within the insuring agreement of the policy. If the insured carries
that burden, the burden then switches to the insurer to prove that the
damages are within any policy exclusions.” When an insurance cover-
age dispute is litigated at trial, that is an accurate statement of the
respective burdens of the insurer and the insured. See, e.g., Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak, 327 Conn. 225, 239, 173 A.3d 888 (2017).
That burden shifting framework nevertheless has no application in the
summary judgment context when an insurer is the moving party. As this
court has observed, “to prevail on its own motion for summary judg-
ment . . . for a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend in the
underlying action, the insurer must establish that there is no genuine
issue of material fact either that no allegation of the underlying com-
plaint falls even possibly within the scope of the insuring agreement or,
even if it might, that any claim based on such an allegation is excluded
from coverage under an applicable policy exclusion.” (Emphasis added.)
Lancia v. State National Ins. Co., 134 Conn. App. 682, 691, 41 A.3d
308, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904, 44 A.3d 181 (2012).
9
The plaintiff has raised this claim as an alternate ground of affir-
mance. Because it pertains to the applicability of the policy in question,
we address that threshold question before considering whether any
exclusions to the policy apply.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

quotation marks omitted.) Misiti, LLC v. Travelers
Property Casualty Co. of America, 308 Conn. 146, 154,
61 A.3d 485 (2013); see also Stewart v. Old Republic
National Title Ins. Co., supra, 218 Conn. App. 255 n.9
(“when determining an insurer’s duty to defend, we must
look to the allegations within the complaint made by a
third party against the insured” (emphasis in original)).
In the present case, § I. A. of the policy provides in rel-
evant part that the plaintiff “will pay on behalf of the
individual named in the declarations as an insured all
sums that such insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of any claim or suit first made
and first reported by such insured to the [plaintiff] dur-
ing the policy period or, where applicable, the automatic
extended reporting period as a result of an alleged or
actual injury to any person arising out of a medical inci-
dent occurring on or after the insured’s retroactive date
and before the expiration or termination of the policy
period. . . .” (Emphasis altered.) The policy defines the
term “Medical Incident” in relevant part as “any act or
omission in the furnishing of professional services. .
. .” (Emphasis omitted.) The policy defines “Professional
Services” in relevant part as “any professional medical
services within the customary scope of the insured’s prac-
tice specialty or classification . . . .” The policy further
obligates the plaintiff, among other things, to “defend
the insured against any claim or suit which includes . . .
allegations of professional negligence for which cover-
age is provided under this policy.” (Emphasis omitted.)
We now compare those policy provisions to the allega-
tions of the complaint in the civil action. For purposes
of the present analysis, our focus is on the first count of
that complaint, which alleges negligence on the part of
the defendant.10 In that count, the civil action plaintiffs
allege, inter alia, that Kayla’s parents “had been treating
10
In its memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judg-
ment, the plaintiff averred that “[t]he facts and legal claims alleged by
[Riley in the underlying complaint] are identical in substance” to those
alleged by Kayla. In its appellate brief before this court, the plaintiff
likewise notes that “[s]imilar, although more sparse, allegations are made
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

with [the defendant] in his professional capacity, in
their efforts to become pregnant”; that “[p]rior to the
pregnancy, they were not advised that the sperm would
be anything but [Gary] Suprynowicz’s sperm”; that the
defendant “negligently . . . mixed his sperm with [Gary]
Suprynowicz’s sperm to impregnate” her mother; that
the defendant negligently “failed to offer [Kayla’s par-
ents] the choice of sperm donor”; and that, “after she
became pregnant, [Kayla’s] mother was advised that the
pregnancy was the result of ‘mixed sperm.’ ”
Mindful of the procedural posture of this case, which
obligates us to construe the allegations of the complaint
and other summary judgment materials in a light most
favorable to the defendant; see Panaro v. Electrolux
Corp., 208 Conn. 589, 591, 545 A.2d 1086 (1988); Dorf-
man v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 227 Conn. App.
347, 391 n.27, 322 A.3d 331 (2024), cert. denied, 351
Conn. 907, 330 A.3d 881, and cert. denied, 351 Conn.
907, 330 A.3d 882 (2025); we conclude that those allega-
tions implicate the plaintiff’s duty to defend under the
policy. It is undisputed that the defendant is a reproduc-
tive endocrinologist who provided fertility services to
Kayla’s parents using IVF procedures. See Suprynowicz
v. Tohan, supra, 351 Conn. 78. Moreover, as the civil
action plaintiffs expressly allege in their complaint,
Kayla’s parents were treated by the defendant “in his
by [Riley in the underlying complaint]” as those alleged with respect to
Kayla, with the exception of the allegation that she inherited a genetic
disease from the defendant.
Our review of the underlying complaint confirms the accuracy of those
representations. The negligence counts pertaining to Kayla and Riley,
respectively, both allege that the defendant provided fertility services
to their parents and that, in so doing, the defendant negligently utilized
his own sperm. The fraudulent concealment counts pertaining to Kayla
and Riley both allege that the defendant fraudulently concealed the
fact that he had “improperly mixed his own sperm” and “improperly
replaced” the sperm of Gary Suprynowicz and Brian Flaherty, respec-
tively, with his own while providing fertility services to their parents.
Given the similarly of those allegations, and the plaintiff’s averment
that the facts and legal claims of Kayla and Riley in the underlying
complaint are identical in substance, it is unnecessary to discuss the
counts pertaining to Riley separately in this opinion.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

professional capacity, in their efforts to become preg-
nant.” Providing IVF services to Kayla’s parents plainly
is within the customary scope of the defendant’s practice
specialty and thus constitutes “professional services” as
that term is defined in the policy.
The fact that the defendant may have negligently
used his own sperm while providing those professional
services, as the civil action plaintiffs allege in their com-
plaint, does not alter that conclusion. A decision of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia is instructive in this regard. Like the present
case, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826
F. Supp. 155, 158 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff’d, 48 F.3d 778
(4th Cir. 1995), involved a declaratory action brought
by a medical professional liability insurer against an
insured fertility specialist who was named as a defendant
in various civil actions seeking tort damages due to his
“fraudulent and unauthorized use of his own semen in
connection with the artificial insemination of the female
patients . . . .” On cross motions for summary judgment,
the court considered whether the defendant’s alleged
misconduct in inseminating patients with his own sperm
fell within the policy’s coverage, which expressly covered
claims arising from the defendant’s provision of “pro-
fessional services.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 160. The court stated: “To determine whether an
insured doctor has engaged in a professional service, it
is well established that courts must look to the nature of
the insured’s act or conduct, not to the insured’s title.
Equally well established is that an insured’s act, to consti-
tute a professional service, must be such as exacts the use
or application of special learning or attainments of some
kind. Relying on this definition, [the plaintiff insurer]
argues that [the defendant’s] actions in producing sperm,
i.e., masturbation, and acting as a sperm donor for the
plaintiffs in the underlying actions do not constitute
professional services. [B]y focusing on the production
of semen, [the plaintiff insurer] has missed the mark.
The professional service at issue is not [the defendant’s]
production of sperm. It is, instead, the fraudulent use
of his sperm to inseminate his patients. The underlying
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

civil actions make this unmistakably clear. . . . [The
defendant’s] fraudulent artificial insemination of his
patients with his own sperm involved the provision of
professional, medical services requiring special skill and
knowledge. . . . In this case, it is the operation itself, i.e.,
the insemination (and, ironically, its success), that is the
proximate cause of the harms alleged in the underlying
civil actions. As a result, the [plaintiff’s] policy extends
coverage to claims arising from [the defendant’s] mis-
conduct.” (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 160–62. That logic applies
equally in the present case.11
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that, construed
in the light most favorable to the defendant; see Panaro
v. Electrolux Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 591; the first count
of the underlying complaint contains allegations that
concern professional services provided by the defendant,
as that term is used in the policy. For that reason, the
court properly concluded that the civil action contained
an allegation that potentially fell within the coverage
11
In its appellate brief, the plaintiff devotes significant discussion to
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 222 Conn. 823, 610 A.2d
1281 (1992), which, it argues, “should be emphatically overruled.”
(Emphasis omitted.) Shernow is inapposite to the present case, as it
concerned a civil action brought by a patient for injuries sustained
“when a dentist, in the course of treatment, sexually assaulted her . .
. .” Id., 824. Unlike Shernow, the present case involves a civil action
brought not by the defendant’s patients, but rather their children,
stemming from the defendant’s allegedly negligent and fraudulent
acts when performing IVF services. In addition, their complaint does
not allege sexual assault, nor does it contain any reference to “sex” or
“sexual.” Accordingly, the court’s holding in Shernow that, “[w]hen
the medically negligent procedure is so inextricably intertwined and
inseparable from the intentional conduct that serves as the basis for
the separate claim of a sexual assault, we join with those jurisdictions
that conclude that professional liability policies must, in such instances,
extend coverage” (emphasis added); id., 830; has little relevance here.
Moreover, if that precedent were to be revisited or overruled, as the
plaintiff urges, it remains the exclusive prerogative of our Supreme
Court to do so. See, e.g., State v. Corver, 182 Conn. App. 622, 638 n.9,
190 A.3d 941 (“[i]t is well established that this court cannot overrule
or reconsider the decisions of our Supreme Court”), cert. denied, 330
Conn. 916, 193 A.3d 1211 (2018).
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

provided by the policy. See Capstone Building Corp. v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., supra, 308 Conn. 805.
II
We next consider whether the court properly concluded
that the plaintiff met its burden of establishing that two
exclusions to coverage clearly and unambiguously applied
in the present case. In its memorandum of decision, the
court concluded that all of the claims in the civil action
fell under the intentional conduct exclusion contained in
§ III. A. 12. of the policy and the sexual conduct exclusion
contained in § III. A. 10. The defendant claims, and we
agree, that both determinations were improper.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the plaintiff,
as the party seeking summary judgment, bore the bur-
den “to establish that there are no genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the allegations fall entirely
within the policy exclusion.” State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Tully, 322 Conn. 566, 583 n.10, 142 A.3d 1079
(2016). We also are mindful that “Connecticut law favors
a narrow construction” of insurance policy exclusions.
Nash Street, LLC v. Main Street America Assurance
Co., supra, 337 Conn. 26. As our Supreme Court has
explained, “[w]hen construing exclusion clauses, the lan-
guage should be construed in favor of the insured unless
it has a high degree of certainty that the policy language
clearly and unambiguously excludes the claim.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Pasiak, 327 Conn. 225, 239, 173 A.3d 888 (2017).
Accordingly, an insurer “is only entitled to prevail under
a policy exclusion if the allegations of the complaint
clearly and unambiguously establish the applicability
of the exclusion to each and every claim for which there
might otherwise be coverage under the policy.” Lancia
v. State National Ins. Co., 134 Conn. App. 682, 691,
41 A.3d 308, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904, 44 A.3d 181
(2012).
A
The defendant contends that the court improperly
determined that the intentional conduct exclusion
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

contained in § III. A. 12. of the policy clearly and unam-
biguously applied to every claim in the underlying com-
plaint. We agree.
Section III. A. 12. of the policy provides in relevant
part that “[t]he coverage afforded under this policy . . .
does NOT apply to the following . . . any willful, wanton,
intentional, dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, illegal or
malicious act or omission . . . .” In rendering summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court concluded
that, notwithstanding the fact that two of their six
counts sounded in negligence, the civil action plaintiffs
in those counts alleged “that the defendant intention-
ally used his own sperm to impregnate their mothers
without consent and without providing information on
his genetic composition . . . .”
“The interpretation of pleadings is always a question
of law for the court . . . . Our review of the trial court’s
interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Com-
missioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 536, 51
A.3d 367 (2012). In light of the procedural posture of
this case, we are obligated to construe the allegations of
the underlying complaint in the light most favorable to
the defendant, as the nonmoving party to the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. See Panaro v. Elec-
trolux Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 591; Dorfman v. Liberty
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., supra, 227 Conn. App. 391 n.27.
Our analysis focuses on the first two counts of that
complaint. The civil action plaintiffs captioned count
one as a “negligence” claim. In that count, they alleged,
inter alia, that Kayla’s parents “had been treating with
[the defendant] in his professional capacity, in their
efforts to become pregnant”; that “[t]hey never engaged
[the defendant] as a sperm donor”; that “[t]hey were
never given a choice of any sperm donor”; that “[t]hey
had no information of [the defendant’s] . . . genetic dis-
eases or illnesses”; that, “[p]rior to the pregnancy, they
were not advised that the sperm would be anything but
[Gary Suprynowicz’s] sperm”; that Kayla’s “mother was
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

never given the choice of a sperm donor, nor was she ever
advised of the identity of the sperm donor”; and that,
“after she became pregnant, [Kayla’s] mother was advised
that the pregnancy was the result of ‘mixed sperm.’ ”
The civil action plaintiffs then set forth four distinct
allegations of negligence on the part of the defendant,
averring that the defendant negligently (1) “mixed his
sperm with [Gary] Suprynowicz’s sperm to impregnate”
Kayla’s mother; (2) “replaced the sperm of Gary Supryno-
wicz with his own”; (3) “failed to offer [Kayla’s parents]
the choice of sperm donor”; and (4) “utilized sperm that
contained a genetic trait including a genetic disease,
leading to Kayla’s contracting a cerebral condition and
mass cell activation disorder.” Count one concluded by
alleging that Kayla sustained injuries “[a]s a result of
[the defendant’s] negligence . . . .”
The civil action plaintiffs captioned count two as a
“fraudulent concealment” claim. That claim incorporated
by reference all of the allegations set forth in count one.
It then alleged that the defendant had “fraudulently
concealed from Kayla” the fact that (1) “[h]e improp-
erly mixed his own sperm with Gary Suprynowicz’s to
create the embryo which became Kayla . . . ”; (2) “[h]e
improperly replaced Gary Suprynowicz’s sperm with his
own . . . ”; and (3) “[the defendant’s] sperm contained
certain genetic traits that caused her to contract a cere-
bral condition and mass cell activation disorder.” Count
two concluded by alleging that Kayla sustained injuries
“[a]s a result of [the defendant’s] fraudulent acts . . . .”
Unlike negligence, fraudulent concealment requires
intentional conduct on the part of a defendant.12 See,
12
Fraudulent concealment is widely recognized as an intentional tort
in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Nebraska Plastics, Inc. v. Holland
Colors Americas, Inc., 408 F.3d 410, 419 (8th Cir. 2005); Nissan Motor
Acceptance Corp. v. Superior Automotive Group, LLC, 63 Cal. App. 5th
793, 829, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914 (2021); McWhinney Centerra Lifestyle
Center, LLC v. Poag & McEwen Lifestyle Centers-Centerra, LLC, 486
P.3d 439, 455 (Colo. App. 2021); Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Portland, 82 A.3d 101, 102 (Me. 2013); T.C. Power & Bro. v. Turner,
97 P. 950, 955 (Mont. 1908); Houghton v. Malibu Boats, LLC, Docket
No. E2023-00324-SC-R11-CV, 2025 WL 2971436, *2 (Tenn. October
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

e.g., Frost v. ADT, LLC, 947 F.3d 1261, 1272 n.5 (10th
Cir. 2020) (“fraudulent concealment requires affirma-
tive and intentional conduct”); Migliori v. Boeing North
American, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1012 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (“[f]raudulent concealment, by definition, requires
an intent to conceal information”); Green v. West Haven
Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district
of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (April 6,
2023) (noting that plaintiff’s negligence claim “does not
sound in an intentional tort” and “starkly contrasts”
with fraudulent concealment claim); Picher v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Portland, 974 A.2d 286, 290 (Me.
2009) (“we treat the intentional tort claim of fraudulent
concealment differently from the negligence claims”).
In preparing the underlying complaint against the
defendant, which was filed at the outset of litigation, the
civil action plaintiffs were under no compulsion to choose
between a negligence theory or an intentional conduct
22, 2025); Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Co., 8 P.3d 324, 333
(Wyo. 2000); see also 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 550, p. 118 (1977).
In Connecticut, a statutory cause of action for fraudulent conceal-
ment exists, which operates to toll an otherwise applicable statute of
limitations. See General Statutes § 52-595. That statute requires proof
of intentional conduct on the part of a defendant. See Bartone v. Robert
L. Day Co., 232 Conn. 527, 533, 656 A.2d 221 (1995). In the fraudulent
concealment counts of their complaint, the civil action plaintiffs did
not reference § 52-595 in any manner. They also did not allege that the
defendant concealed certain facts “for the purpose of obtaining delay
on the plaintiffs’ part in filing a complaint,” which is a necessary pre-
requisite to such a statutory claim. See id.
The appellate courts of this state have not directly addressed the ques-
tion of whether an independent cause of action for fraudulent conceal-
ment exists under Connecticut law. See Willow Springs Condominium
Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 36–37, 717
A.2d 77 (1998) (declining to address defendant’s claim that fraudulent
concealment “cannot be both a tolling mechanism and an independent
claim for relief”); cf. Avoletta v. Torrington, 133 Conn. App. 215, 224,
34 A.3d 445 (2012) (recognizing fraudulent concealment as intentional
tort for purposes of applying municipal immunity provided by General
Statutes § 52-557n). Moreover, that issue has not been raised by the par-
ties to this appeal. In light of the procedural posture of this case and the
applicable standard of review, we therefore assume, without deciding,
that the civil action plaintiffs properly pleaded an independent cause
of action for fraudulent concealment.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

theory of liability regarding the defendant’s alleged acts.
Rather, they retained the right “[u]nder our pleading
practice . . . to advance alternative and even inconsistent
theories of liability against one or more defendants in a
single complaint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd.
Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 357, 71 A.3d 480 (2013);
see also Practice Book § 10-25 (“[t]he plaintiff may claim
alternative relief, based upon an alternative construc-
tion of the cause of action”). A principal rationale for
permitting such pleading is the reality that, when a
plaintiff files a complaint, it often has not engaged in
meaningful discovery, where additional material facts
may be uncovered.13
Our review of the relevant allegations of the first and
second counts of the underlying complaint convinces us
13
See, e.g., DePaepe v. General Motors Corp., 141 F.3d 715, 719 (7th
Cir. 1998) (“[i]nconsistent pleadings are allowable . . . and the use of
discovery to winnow or refine theories of liability should not be discour-
aged” (citation omitted)); Eason v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego,
414 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1282 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“[n]o controlling authority
prevents a plaintiff from pleading alternative legal remedies” because
“[d]iscovery may reveal that [the plaintiff’s] claims providing legal
remedies are inadequate for any number of reasons” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Danko v. Redway Enterprises, Inc., 254 Conn. 369,
381, 757 A.2d 1064 (2000) (“Although a plaintiff is, of course, under
no obligation to raise [alternative] claims, he or she reasonably may
conclude that it is necessary to do so pending the discovery of additional
facts. Under those circumstances, one or more of the plaintiff’s claims
fairly may be described as contingent on the discovery of such additional
facts.”); Lone Star College System v. Immigration Reform Coalition of
Texas, 418 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. App. 2013) (“alternative pleading
is a very common occurrence” because “early in the litigation process
. . . the true nature of the plaintiff’s claims have [not yet] crystallized
through discovery and motions practice”); West Virginia Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Matulis, 251 W. Va. 196, 180, 910 S.E.2d 777 (2024) (“[g]iven that
complaints are filed before the parties have conducted any discovery, it
will often be desirable to plead claims in both negligence and intentional
tort”); Restatement (Third), Torts, Miscellaneous Provisions § 57, com-
ment (c) (Tentative Draft No. 4) (2025) (“[A] plaintiff may proceed on
both negligence and intentional tort claims unless and until the facts
bearing on whether an intentional tort occurred become established. .
. . Facts may . . . become established during discovery, by, for example,
requests for admission.”).
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

that the civil action plaintiffs pleaded those negligence
and fraudulent concealments counts in the alternative.
In this regard, two aspects of their allegations bear par-
ticular emphasis. First, we note that both counts alleged
that the defendant mixed his sperm with that of Gary
Suprynowicz. For the intentional conduct exclusion to
apply, the plaintiff bore the burden of establishing both
“intentional acts and intentional results” on the part
of the defendant. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Tully, supra, 322 Conn. 574. Although the first count
reasonably may be read as alleging that the defendant
deliberately utilized his own sperm while providing IVF
services to Kayla’s parents, there is no allegation that
he intentionally caused the injuries allegedly sustained
by Kayla decades after those services were provided—
namely, mental anguish, physical injury, and a genetic
condition that impaired her earning capacity.
Moreover, a primary defense raised by the defendant
is his contention that the mixed sperm method was a
common medical practice at the time that he provided
professional services to Kayla’s parents.14 In support
of that contention, the defendant submitted a medical
journal article on that medical practice as an exhibit to
his objection to the motion for summary judgment.15 See
footnote 6 of this opinion. In addition, the civil action
14
In his objection to the motion for summary judgment, the defen-
dant argued that the gravamen of the underlying complaint was the
allegation that he “acted as a fertility specialist for the [civil action
plaintiffs’] parents in the late 1980s/early 1990s and utilized a process
called the mixed sperm method to improve the chances of fertility . .
. .” The defendant further averred that the mixed sperm method was
“an accepted use” that was “well recognized as an appropriate infertility
treatment at the time of the [civil action plaintiffs’] conception.” See
generally Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center, 962 P.2d 67,
68 (Utah 1998) (mixed sperm method utilized by fertility clinic after
artificial insemination using husband’s sperm “yielded no results”).
15
Although the question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend
normally is determined by comparing the allegations of the complaint
with the relevant policy language; see Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Prop-
erty Casualty Co. of America, supra, 308 Conn. 154; extrinsic evidence
may be relied on to establish “facts [that] support the duty to defend.”
Id., 161. In the present case, the defendant submitted documentary
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

plaintiffs alleged, in the first count of their complaint,
that, “after she became pregnant, [Kayla’s] mother was
advised that the pregnancy was the result of ‘mixed
sperm.’ ” Construed in the light most favorable to the
defendant, that admission supports the defendant’s
contention that he utilized the mixed sperm method
in providing fertility services to Kayla’s parents. That
admission also provides a reasonable explanation for the
civil action plaintiffs’ decision to allege, in the alterna-
tive, that the defendant’s conduct in mixing his own
sperm with that of Gary Suprynowicz constituted both
negligence and fraudulent concealment.16
Second, we note that counts one and two both allege
that the defendant’s sperm contained a genetic disease
that caused Kayla to contract a cerebral condition and
mass cell activation disorder. At the same time, the
civil action plaintiffs did not allege in the negligence
count that the defendant was aware that he possessed
that genetic disease. Instead, the civil action plaintiffs
simply alleged that the defendant had “negligently . . .
utilized sperm that contained a genetic trait includ-
ing a genetic disease . . . .” By contrast, the civil action
plaintiffs alleged in the second count that the defen-
dant “fraudulently concealed from Kayla” the fact that
“[his] sperm contained certain genetic traits that caused
evidence regarding the mixed sperm medical practice in an effort to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff had a
duty to defend him in the civil action.
16
In light of (1) the defendant’s averment that he utilized an accepted
fertility practice known as the mixed sperm method in providing IVF
services to Kayla’s parents and the documentary material he submitted
in support of his objection to the motion for summary judgment, (2)
the civil action plaintiffs’ concession that, after she became pregnant,
Kayla’s mother was informed that her pregnancy was the result of mixed
sperm, and (3) the civil action plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendant
“negligently” mixed his sperm with that of Gary Suprynowicz without
offering Kayla’s parents “the choice of sperm donor,” we conclude that
a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant used
the mixed sperm method in providing fertility services to Kayla’s par-
ents. Viewed in in the light most favorable to the defendant, we cannot
conclude that his alleged conduct decades ago was “so inherently harm-
ful” that the injuries sustained by Kayla were “unarguably foreseeable”
at the time he provided those services to her parents. See State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully, supra, 322 Conn. 575.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

her to contract a cerebral condition and mass cell activa-
tion disorder.” Because the civil action plaintiffs may
have been unsure at the time that they commenced this
action of whether the defendant had knowledge that his
sperm contained the genetic disease in question, they may
have purposely pleaded their negligence and fraudulent
concealment counts in the alternative with respect to
that allegation as well. See footnote 13 of this opinion.
Construed in the light most favorable to the defendant,
count one alleges that the defendant inadvertently and
negligently used sperm that contained a genetic dis-
ease when providing IVF services to Kayla’s parents.
Accordingly, it is beyond the scope of the intentional
conduct exclusion. See, e.g., Great American Ins. Co.
v. Houlihan Lawrence, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 354, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (intentional conduct exclusion did not
apply when allegations of complaint “liberally construed
. . . could support . . . a finding [of negligence]”); Lavoie
v. Dorchester Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 560 A.2d 570, 571
(Me. 1989) (intentional conduct exclusion did not apply
where complaint alleged negligence as alternative to
intentional tort claims); Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford
v. Cook, 7 N.Y.3d 131, 137–38, 850 N.E.2d 1152, 818
N.Y.S.2d 176 (2006) (insurer could not avail itself of
intentional conduct exclusion where complaint alleged
both negligence and intentional conduct).
In its memorandum of decision, the court relied in
part on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully, supra,
322 Conn. 574–75, in which our Supreme Court stated:
“[W]here . . . the policy excludes coverage for damages
resulting from intentional acts, the court examines the
factual allegations to decide whether both intentional
acts and intended results are present. . . . [E]ven when
an action is [pleaded] as an unintentional tort [such as
negligence], the court examines the alleged activities in
the complaint to determine whether the insured intended
to commit both the acts and the injuries that resulted. If
so, regardless of the title of the action, the court holds
the action to be outside the coverage of the policy.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

Applying that precedent, the trial court then reasoned
that, “[n]otwithstanding that some of the allegations in
the [underlying] action are framed as negligence claims,
the [civil action plaintiffs] . . . allege that the defendant
intentionally used his own sperm to impregnate their
mothers without consent and without providing infor-
mation on his genetic composition or the genetic diseases
or illnesses in his lineage, and that they suffered harm
as a result.” (Emphasis added.)
We do not agree with that conclusion. Nowhere in the
first count of the complaint did the civil action plaintiffs
allege that the defendant intentionally mixed his sperm
with that of Gary Suprynowicz to cause the injuries sus-
tained by Kayla or that he intentionally used sperm that
he knew contained a genetic disease; rather, they specifi-
cally alleged that the defendant “negligently” did so. As
our Supreme Court observed in Suprynowicz v. Tohan,
supra, 351 Conn. 77, the negligence claims advanced by
the civil action plaintiffs “are ordinary negligence claims
. . . because they arise from the defendant doctor’s alleged
negligence in using his own sperm to impregnate the [civil
action plaintiffs’] mothers during [IVF] procedures.”
Accordingly, this is not a case in which the allegations
in count one “are plainly inconsistent with a negligence
claim” or “plainly describe intentional conduct,” as was
the case in General Ins. Co. of America v. Okeke, 182
Conn. App. 83, 99, 189 A.3d 158 (2018).
In its memorandum of decision, the court also opined
that applying the intentional conduct exclusion to the
negligence counts pleaded by the civil action plaintiffs
was “consistent with the policies underlying liability
insurance.” The court further stated that, “[i]f the
defendant’s alleged conduct of using his own sperm to
impregnate patients without consent was not considered
an intentional act, then similarly situated fertility doc-
tors could buy liability insurance in advance and have a
shield for liability should they choose to engage in the
same conduct.” For multiple reasons, we are troubled by
that assessment. First and foremost, claims that allege
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

negligent conduct on the part of an insured—like count
one here—plainly are beyond the scope of the intentional
conduct exclusion. Second, in broadly construing the
intentional conduct exclusion contained in § III. A. 12. of
the policy, the court overlooks its obligation to narrowly
construe insurance policy exclusions. See Nash Street,
LLC v. Main Street America Assurance Co., supra, 337
Conn. 19. Third, nothing prevents an insurer from craft-
ing medical professional liability insurance policies that
specifically disclaim coverage for the conduct at issue in
this case. Alternatively, insurers can include additional
exclusions specifically tailored to that scenario. See, e.g.,
USA Gymnastics v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 27
F.4th 499, 512 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[i]nsurers are free to
limit the coverage of their policies” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins,
198 F.3d 100, 104–105 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[t]he burden of
precisely drafting the policy rested with the insurance
company and scrivener . . . and it was free to employ
more precise language”); Merchants Ins. Co. of New
Hampshire, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 143 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1998) (“if [the insurer] had
really intended to limit coverage [with respect to specific
conduct] . . . [the insurer] was free to draft a policy with
qualifying language that expressly implemented that
intention”); McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life
Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 449 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (“[t]he
simple answer to [the] defendant’s contentions is that it
should have taken the public policy it urges this court to
adopt into consideration when it drafted its contract”);
Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of Amer-
ica, supra, 308 Conn. 179 (Eveleigh, J., dissenting) (“if
an insurer wished to exclude from its coverage liability
based on the type of injury that occurred in the present
case . . . it would be free to do so”).
Under Connecticut law, an insurer “is only entitled
to prevail under a policy exclusion if the allegations of
the complaint clearly and unambiguously establish the
applicability of the exclusion to each and every claim
for which there might otherwise be coverage under the
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

policy.” Lancia v. State National Ins. Co., supra, 134
Conn. App. 691. That standard has not been met in the
present case. The court, therefore, improperly concluded
that the intentional conduct exclusion applied to every
allegation of negligence in the underlying complaint.
B
The defendant also claims that the court improperly
determined that the sexual conduct exclusion contained
in § III. A. 10. of the policy clearly and unambiguously
applied to every claim in the underlying complaint. We
agree.
Section III. A. 10. of the policy provides in relevant
part that “[t]he coverage afforded under this policy,
both as to defense and payment of damages, does NOT
apply to the following . . . any injury or damage, whether
direct or consequential, arising out of any sexual inti-
macy, sexual molestation, sexual harassment, sexual
exploitation, sexual assault or sexual contact . . . .”17 In
rendering summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
the court concluded that the plaintiff had demonstrated
that every allegation in the underlying complaint fell
within the sexual conduct exclusion.
A closer look at count one of the complaint belies that
determination. In that count, the civil action plaintiffs
alleged, inter alia, that Kayla’s parents “had been treat-
ing with [the defendant], a reproductive endocrinologist,
in his professional capacity, in their efforts to become
pregnant”; that, “[p]rior to the pregnancy, they were
not advised that the sperm would be anything but [Gary]
Suprynowicz’s sperm”; that “after she became preg-
nant, her mother was advised that the pregnancy was
the result of ‘mixed sperm’ ”; that the defendant neg-
ligently “mixed his sperm with [Gary] Suprynowicz’s
sperm to impregnate” her mother; that the defendant
17
The policy does not define the terms “sexual intimacy,” “sexual moles-
tation,” “sexual harassment,” “sexual exploitation,” “sexual assault,”
or “sexual contact.” As commonly used; see New London County Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 753, 36 A.3d 224 (2012); those terms
all pertain to conduct that is sexual in nature.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

negligently “failed to offer [her parents] the choice of
sperm donor,” and that the defendant negligently utilized
sperm that contained a genetic disease. Significantly,
that count does not allege that the defendant committed
a sexual act, nor does it contain any reference to “sex” or
“sexual.” See, e.g., Illinois State Medical Ins. Services,
Inc. v. Cichon, 258 Ill. App. 3d 803, 809, 629 N.E.2d 822
(1994) (noting that “[n]one of the complaints expressly
allege that [the defendant physician] engaged in sexual
conduct” in concluding that sexual conduct exclusion to
medical professional liability insurance policy did not
apply); West Virginia Mutual Ins. Co. v. Matulis, 251
W. Va. 180, 202, 910 S.E.2d 777 (2024) (emphasizing
that “[t]he complaint does not allege sexual acts, activi-
ties or misconduct, or describe the plaintiff as a victim of
sexual assault” in concluding that sexual conduct exclu-
sion did not apply); contra American Commerce Ins. Co.
v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185, 1191 n.3 (R.I. 2002) (sexual
conduct exclusion applied where underlying complaint
contained allegations that insured “sexually assaulted”
victim and engaged in “inappropriate sexual conduct”).
The plaintiff nonetheless claims that the sexual con-
duct exclusion applies because “procreation is quintessen-
tially sexual.”18 That contention overlooks the fact that
procreation was the purpose of the professional services
rendered in this case. As the underlying complaint makes
clear, the civil action concerns the defendant’s provi-
sion of fertility services to the civil action plaintiffs’
parents through IVF procedures, which undoubtedly
are medical procedures. See Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403,
419, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998) (explaining that “[a]rtificial
insemination involving humans dates back at least to
the late 1770s” and now is “an established treatment for
fertility problems in the United States”); North Coast
Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court,
44 Cal. 4th 1145, 1152 n.3, 189 P.3d 959, 81 Cal. Rptr.
3d 708 (2008) (“[IVF] is a medical procedure of assisted
reproduction in which eggs and sperm are combined in
18
In its memorandum of decision, the court similarly stated that
“[i]mpregnating someone is an inherently sexual act.”
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

a laboratory dish”); see also General Statutes § 38a-536
(requiring group health insurance policies to “provide
coverage for the medically necessary expenses for the
diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including, but
not limited to . . . [IVF]”).
At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s
counsel conceded that IVF is not inherently sexual but
argued that the defendant’s alleged use of his own sperm
brings his conduct within the purview of the sexual
conduct exclusion. For two distinct reasons, we cannot
agree. First, as discussed in part II A of this opinion, a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the
defendant properly utilized the mixed sperm method in
providing fertility services to Kayla’s parents. See West
Virginia Mutual Ins. Co. v. Matulis, supra, 251 W. Va.
197 (“conduct by health care professionals may be either
permissible or inappropriate depending on whether the
action is taken for medical purposes or for purposes of
sexual gratification”). Second, it bears emphasis that
count one of the underlying complaint alleged negli-
gence on the part of the defendant in multiple respects.
Although that count alleges that the defendant negli-
gently mixed his own sperm with that of Gary Supryno-
wicz to impregnate Kayla’s mother, it also alleges that
he negligently failed to offer her parents “the choice of
sperm donor” and negligently utilized sperm that con-
tained a genetic disease. We fail to see how either of the
latter two negligence allegations implicate the sexual
conduct exclusion in any way.
We also reiterate that the civil action plaintiffs did
not allege in count one that the defendant was aware
that his sperm contained a genetic disease or that he
knowingly used sperm that contained a genetic disease
when providing IVF services to Kayla’s parents. In our
view, that specific allegation constitutes an ordinary
claim of negligence on the part of the defendant, and one
that is not sexual in nature. See, e.g., Chung v. Physi-
cians Reciprocal Insurers, 221 App. Div. 2d 907, 907,
635 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1995) (sexual conduct exclusion did
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

not apply where “[t]he allegations of the complaint do
not cast the pleading solely within the [sexual conduct]
exclusion” and “can reasonably be read as alleging that
[the physician] was negligent in his professional treat-
ment”); contra State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully,
supra, 322 Conn. 583 (“[n]othing about the allegations
in the underlying civil action involve a negligent act”).
The sexual conduct exclusion, therefore, does not apply
to that claim.
The plaintiff also argues that some allegations of count
one could be construed as implicating the crime of sexual
assault in the fourth degree pursuant to General Statutes
§ 53a-73a, which provides in relevant part that “(a) [a]
person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree
when . . . (5) such person subjects another person to
sexual contact and accomplishes the sexual contact by
means of false representation that the sexual contact is
for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care profes-
sional . . . .”19 In so arguing, the plaintiff misunderstands
the fundamental nature of the inquiry before us. The
question is not whether some allegations set forth in the
underlying compaint, viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff in moving for summary judgment, could
potentially support such an action, but whether, irrespec-
tive of that claim, there remain any allegations that,
construed in the light most favorable to the defendant,
fall outside the scope of the sexual conduct exclusion,
such as the allegation that the defendant negligently
utilized sperm that contained a genetic disease when
providing IVF services to Kayla’s parents.20
In moving for summary judgment, the plaintiff bore
the burden “to establish that there are no genuine issues
19
In the underlying complaint, the civil action plaintiffs acknowledged
that, “after she became pregnant, [Kayla’s] mother was advised that
the pregnancy was the result of ‘mixed sperm.’ ” Kayla’s parents nev-
ertheless did not bring a civil action against the defendant or pursue
criminal charges after being so advised, and neither Kayla’s parents
nor Reilly’s parents are parties to the civil action.
20
Moreover, as this court has noted, “[s]exual assault in the fourth
degree is a specific intent crime.” State v. Vickers, 228 Conn. App. 830,
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

of material fact as to whether the allegations fall entirely
within the policy exclusion.” State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Tully, supra, 322 Conn. 583 n.10. To do so, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that “the allegations of the
complaint clearly and unambiguously establish the appli-
cability of the exclusion to each and every claim for which
there might otherwise be coverage under the policy.” Lan-
cia v. State National Ins. Co., supra, 134 Conn. App. 691;
see also Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 201 A.3d 555,
573 (Del. Super. 2019) (“because it has not been shown
that each allegation of the [u]nderlying [c]omplaint was
. . . an act of sexual misconduct and because at least one
of the allegations potentially supports a claim under the
insurance policy, [the] [d]efendant cannot rely on the
. . . [s]exual [m]isconduct [e]xclusion to avoid its duty to
defend”). In this case, we do not possess a “high degree
of certainty”; Kelly v. Figueiredo, 223 Conn. 31, 37,
610 A.2d 1296 (1992); that the sexual conduct exclusion
contained in § III. A. 10. of the policy clearly and unam-
biguously applies to each and every negligence allegation
set forth in the underlying complaint. See Nationwide
846, 326 A.3d 287 cert. denied, 350 Conn. 930, 326 A.3d 556 (2024). A
necessary element of § 53a-73a (a) (5) is a false representation made by
the health care professional. That element requires proof that the health
care professional made the statement in question with knowledge of its
falsity. See, e.g., Companions & Homemakers, Inc. v. A&B Homecare
Solutions, LLC, 348 Conn. 132, 144, 302 A.3d 283 (2023) (fraudulent
misrepresentation requires proof that representation “was known to be
untrue by the defendant”); Reid v. Landsberger, 123 Conn. App. 260,
281, 1 A.3d 1149 (explaining that “[a] cause of action for intentional
misrepresentation is essentially a claim of fraud” that requires “a false
representation [that] was made as a statement of fact” that was “known
to be so by its maker” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied,
298 Conn. 933, 10 A.3d 517 (2010), and cert. denied, 298 Conn. 933, 10
A.3d 517 (2010). While the allegations in the fraudulent concealment
counts of the underlying complaint may be read to assert fraudulent
misrepresentations on the part of the defendant, that is not the case
with respect to several of the negligence allegations in count one, such as
the allegations that the defendant negligently “failed to offer [Kayla’s
parents] the choice of sperm donor” and that he negligently utilized
sperm that contained a genetic disease. Viewing the allegations in the
light most favorable to the defendant, we cannot construe those claims
as ones alleging that the defendant made representations to Kayla’s
parents with knowledge of their falsity.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak, supra, 327 Conn. 239. We,
therefore, conclude that the court improperly rendered
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on that basis.
The judgment is reversed in part and the case is
remanded with direction to deny the plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment; the judgment is affirmed in all
other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

************************************************
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************************************************
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

INTEGRIS INSURANCE COMPANY v.
NARENDRA B. TOHAN
(AC 47222)
Alvord, Elgo and Moll, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant physician, a reproductive endocrinologist, appealed from the
trial court’s summary judgment for the plaintiff insurance company in its
action seeking a declaratory judgment as to its duty to defend and indemnify
the defendant in a separate civil negligence action. In the civil negligence
action, the plaintiffs, K and R, alleged, inter alia, that the defendant was
negligent in the provision of professional services, having discovered through
genetic testing that the defendant used his own sperm when he performed
in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures for their parents, without having
informed the parents of his conduct. The defendant claimed, inter alia,
that the court improperly concluded that all of the allegations in the civil
negligence action fell within exclusions to coverage in the insurance policy
issued to him by the plaintiff. Held:

The trial court properly concluded that the civil negligence action contained
an allegation that potentially fell within the coverage provided by the insur-
ance policy issued by the plaintiff, as the first count of the civil negligence
action contained allegations that concern professional services provided by
the defendant, as that term was used in the policy.

The trial court improperly determined that the intentional conduct exclu-
sion to coverage in the insurance policy clearly and unambiguously applied
to every allegation in the civil negligence action, as the first count in that
action was beyond the scope of the intentional conduct exclusion because the
count specifically alleged, inter alia, that the defendant inadvertently and
“negligently” used his sperm that contained a genetic disease when providing
IVF services to K’s parents, causing the injuries K sustained.

The trial court improperly determined that the sexual conduct exclusion
to coverage in the insurance policy applied clearly and unambiguously to
every claim set forth in the civil negligence action, as the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that the sexual conduct exclusion applied to every negligence
allegation set forth therein, including the allegation that the defendant
negligently utilized sperm that contained a genetic disease when providing
IVF services, a claim that is not sexual in nature.

Argued October 6, 2025—officially released April 7, 2026

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment
determining whether the plaintiff had a duty to defend
and indemnify the defendant in a separate negligence
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

action for alleged medical misconduct, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,
where the court, S. Connors, J., granted the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment on the second count
of the amended complaint and on the counterclaim;
thereafter, the court, Klau, J., granted the plaintiff’s
amended motion for final judgment and rendered judg-
ment thereon, from which the defendant appealed to this
court. Reversed in part; judgment directed.
Neal L. Moskow, for the appellant (defendant).
Eugene A. Cooney, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

ELGO, J. In this declaratory action regarding an insur-
er’s duty to defend, the defendant, Narendra B. Tohan,
appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Integris Insurance
Company. This appeal presents two principal issues for
our resolution. We first consider whether the court prop-
erly concluded that the underlying complaint contained
an allegation that potentially fell within the scope of the
medical professional liability insurance policy at issue.
We then consider whether the court properly concluded
that the plaintiff met its burden of establishing that two
exclusions to coverage clearly and unambiguously applied
to every allegation of that complaint. We conclude that
the latter determination was improper and, accordingly,
reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.1
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
defendant; see Martinelli v. Fusi, 290 Conn. 347, 350,
963 A.2d 640 (2009); reveals the following facts and
procedural history. The plaintiff is a medical professional
liability insurer licensed to transact business in this state.
The defendant is a physician licensed by the state of Con-
necticut. At all relevant times, the defendant maintained a
1
In light of that conclusion, we do not consider the defendant’s ancil-
lary contention that the court improperly rejected his breach of contract
counterclaim and his special defense of estoppel.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

“Physicians & Surgeons Professional Liability Claims
Made” insurance policy with the plaintiff (policy) that
contained a retroactive date of October 1, 1984, and an
extended reporting period endorsement, which permit-
ted the reporting of claims for an indefinite period after
the term of the policy.
In 2019, Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty (civil
action plaintiffs),2 who were strangers for most of their
lives, discovered through a genetic testing company
that they are half siblings. See Suprynowicz v. Tohan,
351 Conn. 75, 76, 328 A.3d 646 (2025). As our Supreme
Court recently recounted, the civil action plaintiffs, “who
are both in their thirties, were conceived through [in
vitro fertilization (IVF)]. The defendant is the reproduc-
tive endocrinologist who performed the IVF procedures
for the [civil action plaintiffs’] respective parents. . . .
Unbeknownst to [the parents], the defendant [allegedly]
used his own sperm in the IVF procedures.” (Footnote
omitted.) Id., 78. After she became pregnant, Kayla’s
mother “was informed that her pregnancy was the result
of ‘mixed sperm.’ ” Id. On April 1, 2021, the civil action
plaintiffs commenced a civil action against the defen-
dant (civil action). Their complaint contained six counts
and alleged negligence, fraudulent concealment, and
violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.3 It is
undisputed that those claims were brought and reported
to the plaintiff while the policy’s extended reporting
period endorsement was in effect.
Weeks later, the plaintiff sent the defendant a certi-
fied letter dated April 20, 2021 (reservation of rights
2
For clarity, we refer to Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty
individually by first name and collectively as the civil action plaintiffs
in this opinion.
3
The plaintiff in the present case appended a copy of the civil action
plaintiffs’ March 31, 2021 complaint as an exhibit to its motion for sum-
mary judgment. See generally Community Action for Greater Middlesex
County, Inc. v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 387, 395, 757 A.2d
1074 (2000) (“[t]he question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend
. . . is to be determined by comparing the allegations of [the underlying]
complaint with the terms of the insurance policy”).
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

letter). In that letter, Maureen Rodgers, a senior claims
account executive with the plaintiff, stated that the
plaintiff had reviewed the allegations of the civil action
plaintiffs and had concluded that “some or all of the
claims brought against you in [the civil action] are NOT
COVERED by the [p]olicy. For this reason, we will be
providing a defense to you in [the civil action] under
a FULL RESERVATION OF OUR RIGHTS to decline
payment under the policy for any damages that might
be awarded.” Rodgers proceeded to recite the pertinent
allegations of the complaint in the civil action and certain
provisions of the policy, and then stated: “Our review of
the allegations in the [civil action] indicates that some or
all of the allegations are NOT COVERED under . . . the
[p]olicy and are additionally or alternatively EXCLUDED
FROM COVERAGE under one or more of the exclusions
in the [p]olicy . . . . In particular, we refer to those claims
that are predicated in whole or in part on the conten-
tion that you substituted your sperm for that of the
intended sperm donor. Any damages arising directly
or indirectly from such actions (1) would NOТ be dam-
ages arising out of a ‘medical incident’ and would thus
be outside the coverage of the [p]olicy, and (2) would be
damages EXCLUDED from coverage under one or all of
the exclusions cited above. For the same reasons, claims
of fraudulent concealment and violations of [CUTPA]
are not ‘medical incidents’ covered under the [p]olicy
and are excluded from the coverage of the [p]olicy under
one or all of the referenced exclusions.”
Rodgers then encouraged the defendant to obtain
separate legal counsel “[b]ecause of the possibility that
damages awarded in [the civil action] may not be covered
under the [p]olicy or may exceed your [l]imits of [l]iability
. . . .” After informing the defendant that the plaintiff
had retained Attorney Sally O. Hagerty to represent
him in the civil action, Rodgers stated: “We remind you
once again that this defense is provided under a FULL
RESERVATION OF OUR RIGHTS under the policy.
Our rights include, but are not limited to the right to
seek judicial determinations of whether any damages
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

that might be awarded in the [civil action] are or are not
covered under the [p]olicy and/or whether we are entitled
to a rescission of the [policy].”4
On April 30, 2021, the plaintiff commenced this declar-
atory action against the defendant, which concerns the
plaintiff’s duty to defend the defendant against alle-
gations that, in the course of providing IVF services,
he improperly mixed his own sperm with that of Gary
Suprynowicz and Brian Flaherty “to create the embryo[s]
which became” the civil action plaintiffs, as alleged in the
civil action. The plaintiff’s operative complaint contains
two counts. In count one, the plaintiff alleged that it
was entitled to a rescission of the policy due to material
misrepresentations made by the defendant in his applica-
tion for insurance coverage. In count two, the plaintiff
sought, inter alia, a declaration that “[t]he actions of the
defendant as described in the [civil action] are not ‘medi-
cal incidents’ as defined in the policy,” that the “injuries
or damages” claimed by the civil action plaintiffs were
excluded from coverage under the policy, that “it is
against the public policy of the state of Connecticut to
insure against damages caused by the conduct with which
the defendant is charged in the [civil action],” and that
the plaintiff “is under no obligation to provide a defense
to the defendant” in the civil action.
On March 30, 2022, the defendant filed an answer,
a special defense, and a two count counterclaim. In his
special defense, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff
was estopped from bringing the declaratory action by
virtue of its written promise to provide a defense to him
in the civil action, as memorialized in the reservation of
rights letter. The defendant’s counterclaim sounded in
contract and alleged that the plaintiff breached both the
policy and the plaintiff’s written agreement to provide a
defense in the civil action. On April 29, 2022, the plain-
tiff filed an answer to that counterclaim and a reply to
the defendant’s special defense, in which it denied the
4
Attorney Hagerty filed an appearance on behalf of the defendant in
the civil action on May 13, 2021.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

allegations contained therein in all material respects. On
that date, the plaintiff also filed a certificate of closed
pleadings and requested a court trial.
On July 29, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on count two of its operative complaint,
the defendant’s special defense, and the defendant’s
counterclaim, claiming that no genuine issues of mate-
rial fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. That motion was accompanied by a
memorandum of law and several exhibits.5 On December
23, 2022, the defendant filed an objection to the motion
for summary judgment and two exhibits.6 The plaintiff
filed a reply memorandum on January 9, 2023. The court
held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on
July 25, 2023.
In its subsequent memorandum of decision, the court
first rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the civil action
plaintiffs had not alleged injuries that resulted from a
medical incident and, thus, were beyond the scope of the
coverage provided by the policy. The court then concluded
that all of the allegations in the civil action fell within
both the sexual conduct exclusion contained in § III. A.
10. of the policy and the intentional conduct exclusion
contained in § III. A. 12. Lastly, the court concluded that
the defendant had failed to raise a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact regarding either his special defense of estoppel
or his breach of contract counterclaim. The court thus
rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on
5
The plaintiff’s exhibits were (1) the March 31, 2021 complaint from
the civil action, (2) the sworn affidavit of Garrett Cronin, Vice President
of Underwriting and Member Services for the plaintiff, to which a true
and accurate copy of the policy was appended, (3) an uncertified copy
of a portion of the insurance policy at issue in St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 222 Conn. 823, 610 A.2d 1281 (1992), culled from
the appellate record of that appeal, and (4) five unreported cases of the
Superior Court.
6
The exhibits submitted by the defendant were (1) a copy of the res-
ervation of rights letter and (2) an article in a medical journal. See
S. Friedman, “Artificial Insemination with Donor Semen Mixed with
Semen of the Infertile Husband,” 33 Fertility and Sterility 125 (1980).
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

count two of the operative complaint, the defendant’s
special defense, and the defendant’s counterclaim.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for entry of
final judgment with the court. In that motion, the plain-
tiff maintained that, in light of the summary judgment
rendered in favor of the plaintiff on count two of the
operative complaint, the defendant’s special defense,
and the defendant’s counterclaim, the rescission claim
set forth in count one of its complaint was “moot and
no longer provides any ground for practical relief.” On
December 3, 2023, the court granted the plaintiff’s
motion and rendered judgment accordingly. From that
judgment, the defendant now appeals.7
We begin by noting the well established standard that
governs our review of a trial court’s decision to grant a
motion for summary judgment. “In seeking summary
judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing
the nonexistence of any issue of fact. . . . [T]he moving
party for summary judgment has the burden of showing
the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material
facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive
law, entitle[s] him to a judgment as a matter of law. The
courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy
his burden the movant must make a showing that it is
quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real
doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material
fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the opponent. . . . When documents submitted in support
of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving
party has no obligation to submit documents establish-
ing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once the moving
party has met its burden, however, the opposing party
must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of
some disputed factual issue.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co. No. 1, Inc., 332
7
In this appeal, neither party challenges the propriety of the court’s
dismissal of count one of the plaintiff’s complaint.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

Conn. 93, 101, 209 A.3d 629 (2019). Whether the trial
court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff is a question of law subject to our plenary
review. See Nash Street, LLC v. Main Street America
Assurance Co., 337 Conn. 1, 8, 251 A.3d 600 (2020).
“Our standard of review for interpreting insurance
policies is [also] well settled. The construction of an insur-
ance policy presents a question of law that we review de
novo. . . . When construing an insurance policy, we look
at the [policy] as a whole, consider all relevant portions
together and, if possible, give operative effect to every
provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result. .
. . Insurance policies are interpreted based on the same
rules that govern the interpretation of contracts. . . . In
accordance with those rules, [t]he determinative ques-
tion is the intent of the parties . . . . If the terms of the
policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language,
from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced,
must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning. . . .
In determining whether the terms of an insurance policy
are clear and unambiguous, [a] court will not torture
words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning
leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any ambigu-
ity in a contract must emanate from the language used
in the contract rather than from one party’s subjective
perception of the terms. . . . As with contracts generally,
a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it
is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading. . . .
Under those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms
of an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the
insured . . . .
“The question of whether an insurer has a duty to
defend its insured is purely a question of law . . . . An
insurer’s duty to defend is determined by reference to
the allegations contained in the [underlying] complaint. .
. . The duty to defend does not depend on whether the
injured party will successfully maintain a cause of action
against the insured but on whether [the complaint] stated
facts which bring the injury within the coverage. . . . If
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

an allegation of the complaint falls even possibly within
the coverage, then the insurance company must defend
the insured. . . . That being said, an insurer has a duty
to defend only if the underlying complaint reasonably
alleges an injury that is covered by the policy. . . . [W]e
will not predicate the duty to defend on a reading of
the complaint that is . . . conceivable but tortured and
unreasonable. . . . There is also no duty to defend if the
complaint alleges a liability which the policy does not
cover . . . .
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment on a
claim for breach of the duty to defend, an insurer must
establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact
either that no allegation of the underlying complaint
falls even possibly within the scope of the insuring agree-
ment or, even if it might, that any claim based on such an
allegation is excluded from coverage under an applicable
policy exclusion. In presenting countervailing proof,
the insurer . . . is necessarily limited to the provisions
of the subject insurance policy and the allegations of
the underlying complaint. Therefore, it is only entitled
to prevail under a policy exclusion if the allegations of
the complaint clearly and unambiguously establish the
applicability of the exclusion to each and every claim
for which there might otherwise be coverage under the
policy.
“An insured, in turn, may rebut an insurer’s claim
that it has no duty to defend him in the light of an appli-
cable policy exclusion by showing that at least one of
his allegations, as pleaded states a claim that falls even
possibly outside the scope of the exclusion or within
an exception to that exclusion. Unless the allegations
of any such underlying claim fall so clearly and unam-
biguously within a policy exclusion as to eliminate any
possible coverage, the insurer must provide a defense to
its insured.”8 (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
8
In its principal appellate brief, the plaintiff asserts, as it did at oral
argument on its motion for summary judgment before the trial court,
that the defendant, as the insured party, “bears the burden of proving
in the first instance that the damages claimed in the underlying action
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Old Repub-
lic National Title Ins. Co., 218 Conn. App. 226, 239–41,
291 A.3d 1051 (2023).
I
We first consider the question of whether the court
properly concluded that the complaint in the civil action
contained an allegation that potentially fell within the
scope of the policy. As our Supreme Court has explained,
“[a]n insurer’s duty to defend is triggered if at least one
allegation of the complaint falls even possibly within
the coverage.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Capstone Building Corp. v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 308 Conn. 760, 805, 67 A.3d 961
(2013). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that none of the
injuries alleged by the civil action plaintiffs arises out
of “professional services,” as that term is used in the
policy.9 We disagree.
“[T]he question of whether an insurer has a duty to
defend its insured is purely a question of law, which is to
be determined by comparing the allegations of [the] com-
plaint with the terms of the insurance policy.” (Internal
are within the insuring agreement of the policy. If the insured carries
that burden, the burden then switches to the insurer to prove that the
damages are within any policy exclusions.” When an insurance cover-
age dispute is litigated at trial, that is an accurate statement of the
respective burdens of the insurer and the insured. See, e.g., Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak, 327 Conn. 225, 239, 173 A.3d 888 (2017).
That burden shifting framework nevertheless has no application in the
summary judgment context when an insurer is the moving party. As this
court has observed, “to prevail on its own motion for summary judg-
ment . . . for a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend in the
underlying action, the insurer must establish that there is no genuine
issue of material fact either that no allegation of the underlying com-
plaint falls even possibly within the scope of the insuring agreement or,
even if it might, that any claim based on such an allegation is excluded
from coverage under an applicable policy exclusion.” (Emphasis added.)
Lancia v. State National Ins. Co., 134 Conn. App. 682, 691, 41 A.3d
308, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904, 44 A.3d 181 (2012).
9
The plaintiff has raised this claim as an alternate ground of affir-
mance. Because it pertains to the applicability of the policy in question,
we address that threshold question before considering whether any
exclusions to the policy apply.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

quotation marks omitted.) Misiti, LLC v. Travelers
Property Casualty Co. of America, 308 Conn. 146, 154,
61 A.3d 485 (2013); see also Stewart v. Old Republic
National Title Ins. Co., supra, 218 Conn. App. 255 n.9
(“when determining an insurer’s duty to defend, we must
look to the allegations within the complaint made by a
third party against the insured” (emphasis in original)).
In the present case, § I. A. of the policy provides in rel-
evant part that the plaintiff “will pay on behalf of the
individual named in the declarations as an insured all
sums that such insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of any claim or suit first made
and first reported by such insured to the [plaintiff] dur-
ing the policy period or, where applicable, the automatic
extended reporting period as a result of an alleged or
actual injury to any person arising out of a medical inci-
dent occurring on or after the insured’s retroactive date
and before the expiration or termination of the policy
period. . . .” (Emphasis altered.) The policy defines the
term “Medical Incident” in relevant part as “any act or
omission in the furnishing of professional services. .
. .” (Emphasis omitted.) The policy defines “Professional
Services” in relevant part as “any professional medical
services within the customary scope of the insured’s prac-
tice specialty or classification . . . .” The policy further
obligates the plaintiff, among other things, to “defend
the insured against any claim or suit which includes . . .
allegations of professional negligence for which cover-
age is provided under this policy.” (Emphasis omitted.)
We now compare those policy provisions to the allega-
tions of the complaint in the civil action. For purposes
of the present analysis, our focus is on the first count of
that complaint, which alleges negligence on the part of
the defendant.10 In that count, the civil action plaintiffs
allege, inter alia, that Kayla’s parents “had been treating
10
In its memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judg-
ment, the plaintiff averred that “[t]he facts and legal claims alleged by
[Riley in the underlying complaint] are identical in substance” to those
alleged by Kayla. In its appellate brief before this court, the plaintiff
likewise notes that “[s]imilar, although more sparse, allegations are made
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

with [the defendant] in his professional capacity, in
their efforts to become pregnant”; that “[p]rior to the
pregnancy, they were not advised that the sperm would
be anything but [Gary] Suprynowicz’s sperm”; that the
defendant “negligently . . . mixed his sperm with [Gary]
Suprynowicz’s sperm to impregnate” her mother; that
the defendant negligently “failed to offer [Kayla’s par-
ents] the choice of sperm donor”; and that, “after she
became pregnant, [Kayla’s] mother was advised that the
pregnancy was the result of ‘mixed sperm.’ ”
Mindful of the procedural posture of this case, which
obligates us to construe the allegations of the complaint
and other summary judgment materials in a light most
favorable to the defendant; see Panaro v. Electrolux
Corp., 208 Conn. 589, 591, 545 A.2d 1086 (1988); Dorf-
man v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 227 Conn. App.
347, 391 n.27, 322 A.3d 331 (2024), cert. denied, 351
Conn. 907, 330 A.3d 881, and cert. denied, 351 Conn.
907, 330 A.3d 882 (2025); we conclude that those allega-
tions implicate the plaintiff’s duty to defend under the
policy. It is undisputed that the defendant is a reproduc-
tive endocrinologist who provided fertility services to
Kayla’s parents using IVF procedures. See Suprynowicz
v. Tohan, supra, 351 Conn. 78. Moreover, as the civil
action plaintiffs expressly allege in their complaint,
Kayla’s parents were treated by the defendant “in his
by [Riley in the underlying complaint]” as those alleged with respect to
Kayla, with the exception of the allegation that she inherited a genetic
disease from the defendant.
Our review of the underlying complaint confirms the accuracy of those
representations. The negligence counts pertaining to Kayla and Riley,
respectively, both allege that the defendant provided fertility services
to their parents and that, in so doing, the defendant negligently utilized
his own sperm. The fraudulent concealment counts pertaining to Kayla
and Riley both allege that the defendant fraudulently concealed the
fact that he had “improperly mixed his own sperm” and “improperly
replaced” the sperm of Gary Suprynowicz and Brian Flaherty, respec-
tively, with his own while providing fertility services to their parents.
Given the similarly of those allegations, and the plaintiff’s averment
that the facts and legal claims of Kayla and Riley in the underlying
complaint are identical in substance, it is unnecessary to discuss the
counts pertaining to Riley separately in this opinion.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

professional capacity, in their efforts to become preg-
nant.” Providing IVF services to Kayla’s parents plainly
is within the customary scope of the defendant’s practice
specialty and thus constitutes “professional services” as
that term is defined in the policy.
The fact that the defendant may have negligently
used his own sperm while providing those professional
services, as the civil action plaintiffs allege in their com-
plaint, does not alter that conclusion. A decision of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia is instructive in this regard. Like the present
case, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826
F. Supp. 155, 158 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff’d, 48 F.3d 778
(4th Cir. 1995), involved a declaratory action brought
by a medical professional liability insurer against an
insured fertility specialist who was named as a defendant
in various civil actions seeking tort damages due to his
“fraudulent and unauthorized use of his own semen in
connection with the artificial insemination of the female
patients . . . .” On cross motions for summary judgment,
the court considered whether the defendant’s alleged
misconduct in inseminating patients with his own sperm
fell within the policy’s coverage, which expressly covered
claims arising from the defendant’s provision of “pro-
fessional services.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 160. The court stated: “To determine whether an
insured doctor has engaged in a professional service, it
is well established that courts must look to the nature of
the insured’s act or conduct, not to the insured’s title.
Equally well established is that an insured’s act, to consti-
tute a professional service, must be such as exacts the use
or application of special learning or attainments of some
kind. Relying on this definition, [the plaintiff insurer]
argues that [the defendant’s] actions in producing sperm,
i.e., masturbation, and acting as a sperm donor for the
plaintiffs in the underlying actions do not constitute
professional services. [B]y focusing on the production
of semen, [the plaintiff insurer] has missed the mark.
The professional service at issue is not [the defendant’s]
production of sperm. It is, instead, the fraudulent use
of his sperm to inseminate his patients. The underlying
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

civil actions make this unmistakably clear. . . . [The
defendant’s] fraudulent artificial insemination of his
patients with his own sperm involved the provision of
professional, medical services requiring special skill and
knowledge. . . . In this case, it is the operation itself, i.e.,
the insemination (and, ironically, its success), that is the
proximate cause of the harms alleged in the underlying
civil actions. As a result, the [plaintiff’s] policy extends
coverage to claims arising from [the defendant’s] mis-
conduct.” (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 160–62. That logic applies
equally in the present case.11
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that, construed
in the light most favorable to the defendant; see Panaro
v. Electrolux Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 591; the first count
of the underlying complaint contains allegations that
concern professional services provided by the defendant,
as that term is used in the policy. For that reason, the
court properly concluded that the civil action contained
an allegation that potentially fell within the coverage
11
In its appellate brief, the plaintiff devotes significant discussion to
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 222 Conn. 823, 610 A.2d
1281 (1992), which, it argues, “should be emphatically overruled.”
(Emphasis omitted.) Shernow is inapposite to the present case, as it
concerned a civil action brought by a patient for injuries sustained
“when a dentist, in the course of treatment, sexually assaulted her . .
. .” Id., 824. Unlike Shernow, the present case involves a civil action
brought not by the defendant’s patients, but rather their children,
stemming from the defendant’s allegedly negligent and fraudulent
acts when performing IVF services. In addition, their complaint does
not allege sexual assault, nor does it contain any reference to “sex” or
“sexual.” Accordingly, the court’s holding in Shernow that, “[w]hen
the medically negligent procedure is so inextricably intertwined and
inseparable from the intentional conduct that serves as the basis for
the separate claim of a sexual assault, we join with those jurisdictions
that conclude that professional liability policies must, in such instances,
extend coverage” (emphasis added); id., 830; has little relevance here.
Moreover, if that precedent were to be revisited or overruled, as the
plaintiff urges, it remains the exclusive prerogative of our Supreme
Court to do so. See, e.g., State v. Corver, 182 Conn. App. 622, 638 n.9,
190 A.3d 941 (“[i]t is well established that this court cannot overrule
or reconsider the decisions of our Supreme Court”), cert. denied, 330
Conn. 916, 193 A.3d 1211 (2018).
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

provided by the policy. See Capstone Building Corp. v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., supra, 308 Conn. 805.
II
We next consider whether the court properly concluded
that the plaintiff met its burden of establishing that two
exclusions to coverage clearly and unambiguously applied
in the present case. In its memorandum of decision, the
court concluded that all of the claims in the civil action
fell under the intentional conduct exclusion contained in
§ III. A. 12. of the policy and the sexual conduct exclusion
contained in § III. A. 10. The defendant claims, and we
agree, that both determinations were improper.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the plaintiff,
as the party seeking summary judgment, bore the bur-
den “to establish that there are no genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the allegations fall entirely
within the policy exclusion.” State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Tully, 322 Conn. 566, 583 n.10, 142 A.3d 1079
(2016). We also are mindful that “Connecticut law favors
a narrow construction” of insurance policy exclusions.
Nash Street, LLC v. Main Street America Assurance
Co., supra, 337 Conn. 26. As our Supreme Court has
explained, “[w]hen construing exclusion clauses, the lan-
guage should be construed in favor of the insured unless
it has a high degree of certainty that the policy language
clearly and unambiguously excludes the claim.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Pasiak, 327 Conn. 225, 239, 173 A.3d 888 (2017).
Accordingly, an insurer “is only entitled to prevail under
a policy exclusion if the allegations of the complaint
clearly and unambiguously establish the applicability
of the exclusion to each and every claim for which there
might otherwise be coverage under the policy.” Lancia
v. State National Ins. Co., 134 Conn. App. 682, 691,
41 A.3d 308, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904, 44 A.3d 181
(2012).
A
The defendant contends that the court improperly
determined that the intentional conduct exclusion
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

contained in § III. A. 12. of the policy clearly and unam-
biguously applied to every claim in the underlying com-
plaint. We agree.
Section III. A. 12. of the policy provides in relevant
part that “[t]he coverage afforded under this policy . . .
does NOT apply to the following . . . any willful, wanton,
intentional, dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, illegal or
malicious act or omission . . . .” In rendering summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court concluded
that, notwithstanding the fact that two of their six
counts sounded in negligence, the civil action plaintiffs
in those counts alleged “that the defendant intention-
ally used his own sperm to impregnate their mothers
without consent and without providing information on
his genetic composition . . . .”
“The interpretation of pleadings is always a question
of law for the court . . . . Our review of the trial court’s
interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Com-
missioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 536, 51
A.3d 367 (2012). In light of the procedural posture of
this case, we are obligated to construe the allegations of
the underlying complaint in the light most favorable to
the defendant, as the nonmoving party to the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. See Panaro v. Elec-
trolux Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 591; Dorfman v. Liberty
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., supra, 227 Conn. App. 391 n.27.
Our analysis focuses on the first two counts of that
complaint. The civil action plaintiffs captioned count
one as a “negligence” claim. In that count, they alleged,
inter alia, that Kayla’s parents “had been treating with
[the defendant] in his professional capacity, in their
efforts to become pregnant”; that “[t]hey never engaged
[the defendant] as a sperm donor”; that “[t]hey were
never given a choice of any sperm donor”; that “[t]hey
had no information of [the defendant’s] . . . genetic dis-
eases or illnesses”; that, “[p]rior to the pregnancy, they
were not advised that the sperm would be anything but
[Gary Suprynowicz’s] sperm”; that Kayla’s “mother was
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

never given the choice of a sperm donor, nor was she ever
advised of the identity of the sperm donor”; and that,
“after she became pregnant, [Kayla’s] mother was advised
that the pregnancy was the result of ‘mixed sperm.’ ”
The civil action plaintiffs then set forth four distinct
allegations of negligence on the part of the defendant,
averring that the defendant negligently (1) “mixed his
sperm with [Gary] Suprynowicz’s sperm to impregnate”
Kayla’s mother; (2) “replaced the sperm of Gary Supryno-
wicz with his own”; (3) “failed to offer [Kayla’s parents]
the choice of sperm donor”; and (4) “utilized sperm that
contained a genetic trait including a genetic disease,
leading to Kayla’s contracting a cerebral condition and
mass cell activation disorder.” Count one concluded by
alleging that Kayla sustained injuries “[a]s a result of
[the defendant’s] negligence . . . .”
The civil action plaintiffs captioned count two as a
“fraudulent concealment” claim. That claim incorporated
by reference all of the allegations set forth in count one.
It then alleged that the defendant had “fraudulently
concealed from Kayla” the fact that (1) “[h]e improperly
mixed his own sperm with Gary Suprynowicz’s to create
the embryo which became Kayla”; (2) “[h]e improperly
replaced Gary Suprynowicz’s sperm with his own”; and
(3) “[the defendant’s] sperm contained certain genetic
traits that caused her to contract a cerebral condition
and mass cell activation disorder.” Count two concluded
by alleging that Kayla sustained injuries “[a]s a result
of [the defendant’s] fraudulent acts . . . .”
Unlike negligence, fraudulent concealment requires
intentional conduct on the part of a defendant.12 See,
12
Fraudulent concealment is widely recognized as an intentional tort
in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Nebraska Plastics, Inc. v. Holland
Colors Americas, Inc., 408 F.3d 410, 419 (8th Cir. 2005); Nissan Motor
Acceptance Corp. v. Superior Automotive Group, LLC, 63 Cal. App. 5th
793, 829, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914 (2021); McWhinney Centerra Lifestyle
Center, LLC v. Poag & McEwen Lifestyle Centers-Centerra, LLC, 486
P.3d 439, 455 (Colo. App. 2021); Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Portland, 82 A.3d 101, 102 (Me. 2013); T.C. Power & Bro. v. Turner,
97 P. 950, 955 (Mont. 1908); Houghton v. Malibu Boats, LLC, Docket
No. E2023-00324-SC-R11-CV, 2025 WL 2971436, *2 (Tenn. October
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

e.g., Frost v. ADT, LLC, 947 F.3d 1261, 1272 n.5 (10th
Cir. 2020) (“fraudulent concealment requires affirma-
tive and intentional conduct”); Migliori v. Boeing North
American, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1012 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (“[f]raudulent concealment, by definition, requires
an intent to conceal information”); Green v. West Haven
Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district
of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (April 6,
2023) (noting that plaintiff’s negligence claim “does not
sound in an intentional tort” and “starkly contrasts”
with fraudulent concealment claim); Picher v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Portland, 974 A.2d 286, 290 (Me.
2009) (“we treat the intentional tort claim of fraudulent
concealment differently from the negligence claims”).
In preparing the underlying complaint against the
defendant, which was filed at the outset of litigation, the
civil action plaintiffs were under no compulsion to choose
between a negligence theory or an intentional conduct
22, 2025); Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Co., 8 P.3d 324, 333
(Wyo. 2000); see also 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 550, p. 118 (1977).
In Connecticut, a statutory cause of action for fraudulent conceal-
ment exists, which operates to toll an otherwise applicable statute of
limitations. See General Statutes § 52-595. That statute requires proof
of intentional conduct on the part of a defendant. See Bartone v. Robert
L. Day Co., 232 Conn. 527, 533, 656 A.2d 221 (1995). In the fraudulent
concealment counts of their complaint, the civil action plaintiffs did
not reference § 52-595 in any manner. They also did not allege that the
defendant concealed certain facts “for the purpose of obtaining delay
on the plaintiffs’ part in filing a complaint,” which is a necessary pre-
requisite to such a statutory claim. See id.
The appellate courts of this state have not directly addressed the ques-
tion of whether an independent cause of action for fraudulent conceal-
ment exists under Connecticut law. See Willow Springs Condominium
Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 36–37, 717
A.2d 77 (1998) (declining to address defendant’s claim that fraudulent
concealment “cannot be both a tolling mechanism and an independent
claim for relief”); cf. Avoletta v. Torrington, 133 Conn. App. 215, 224,
34 A.3d 445 (2012) (recognizing fraudulent concealment as intentional
tort for purposes of applying municipal immunity provided by General
Statutes § 52-557n). Moreover, that issue has not been raised by the par-
ties to this appeal. In light of the procedural posture of this case and the
applicable standard of review, we therefore assume, without deciding,
that the civil action plaintiffs properly pleaded an independent cause
of action for fraudulent concealment.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

theory of liability regarding the defendant’s alleged acts.
Rather, they retained the right “[u]nder our pleading
practice . . . to advance alternative and even inconsistent
theories of liability against one or more defendants in a
single complaint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd.
Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 357, 71 A.3d 480 (2013);
see also Practice Book § 10-25 (“[t]he plaintiff may claim
alternative relief, based upon an alternative construc-
tion of the cause of action”). A principal rationale for
permitting such pleading is the reality that, when a
plaintiff files a complaint, it often has not engaged in
meaningful discovery, where additional material facts
may be uncovered.13
Our review of the relevant allegations of the first and
second counts of the underlying complaint convinces us
13
See, e.g., DePaepe v. General Motors Corp., 141 F.3d 715, 719 (7th
Cir. 1998) (“[i]nconsistent pleadings are allowable . . . and the use of
discovery to winnow or refine theories of liability should not be discour-
aged” (citation omitted)); Eason v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego,
414 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1282 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“[n]o controlling authority
prevents a plaintiff from pleading alternative legal remedies” because
“[d]iscovery may reveal that [the plaintiff’s] claims providing legal
remedies are inadequate for any number of reasons” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Danko v. Redway Enterprises, Inc., 254 Conn. 369,
381, 757 A.2d 1064 (2000) (“Although a plaintiff is, of course, under
no obligation to raise [alternative] claims, he or she reasonably may
conclude that it is necessary to do so pending the discovery of additional
facts. Under those circumstances, one or more of the plaintiff’s claims
fairly may be described as contingent on the discovery of such additional
facts.”); Lone Star College System v. Immigration Reform Coalition of
Texas, 418 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. App. 2013) (“alternative pleading
is a very common occurrence” because “early in the litigation process
. . . the true nature of the plaintiff’s claims have [not yet] crystallized
through discovery and motions practice”); West Virginia Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Matulis, 251 W. Va. 196, 180, 910 S.E.2d 777 (2024) (“[g]iven that
complaints are filed before the parties have conducted any discovery, it
will often be desirable to plead claims in both negligence and intentional
tort”); Restatement (Third), Torts, Miscellaneous Provisions § 57, com-
ment (c) (Tentative Draft No. 4) (2025) (“[A] plaintiff may proceed on
both negligence and intentional tort claims unless and until the facts
bearing on whether an intentional tort occurred become established. .
. . Facts may . . . become established during discovery, by, for example,
requests for admission.”).
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

that the civil action plaintiffs pleaded those negligence
and fraudulent concealments counts in the alternative.
In this regard, two aspects of their allegations bear par-
ticular emphasis. First, we note that both counts alleged
that the defendant mixed his sperm with that of Gary
Suprynowicz. For the intentional conduct exclusion to
apply, the plaintiff bore the burden of establishing both
“intentional acts and intentional results” on the part
of the defendant. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Tully, supra, 322 Conn. 574. Although the first count
reasonably may be read as alleging that the defendant
deliberately utilized his own sperm while providing IVF
services to Kayla’s parents, there is no allegation that
he intentionally caused the injuries allegedly sustained
by Kayla decades after those services were provided—
namely, mental anguish, physical injury, and a genetic
condition that impaired her earning capacity.
Moreover, a primary defense raised by the defendant
is his contention that the mixed sperm method was a
common medical practice at the time that he provided
professional services to Kayla’s parents.14 In support
of that contention, the defendant submitted a medical
journal article on that medical practice as an exhibit to
his objection to the motion for summary judgment.15 See
footnote 6 of this opinion. In addition, the civil action
14
In his objection to the motion for summary judgment, the defen-
dant argued that the gravamen of the underlying complaint was the
allegation that he “acted as a fertility specialist for the [civil action
plaintiffs’] parents in the late 1980s/early 1990s and utilized a process
called the mixed sperm method to improve the chances of fertility . .
. .” The defendant further averred that the mixed sperm method was
“an accepted use” that was “well recognized as an appropriate infertility
treatment at the time of the [civil action plaintiffs’] conception.” See
generally Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center, 962 P.2d 67,
68 (Utah 1998) (mixed sperm method utilized by fertility clinic after
artificial insemination using husband’s sperm “yielded no results”).
15
Although the question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend
normally is determined by comparing the allegations of the complaint
with the relevant policy language; see Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Prop-
erty Casualty Co. of America, supra, 308 Conn. 154; extrinsic evidence
may be relied on to establish “facts [that] support the duty to defend.”
Id., 161. In the present case, the defendant submitted documentary
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

plaintiffs alleged, in the first count of their complaint,
that, “after she became pregnant, [Kayla’s] mother was
advised that the pregnancy was the result of ‘mixed
sperm.’ ” Construed in the light most favorable to the
defendant, that admission supports the defendant’s
contention that he utilized the mixed sperm method
in providing fertility services to Kayla’s parents. That
admission also provides a reasonable explanation for the
civil action plaintiffs’ decision to allege, in the alterna-
tive, that the defendant’s conduct in mixing his own
sperm with that of Gary Suprynowicz constituted both
negligence and fraudulent concealment.16
Second, we note that counts one and two both allege
that the defendant’s sperm contained a genetic disease
that caused Kayla to contract a cerebral condition and
mass cell activation disorder. At the same time, the
civil action plaintiffs did not allege in the negligence
count that the defendant was aware that he possessed
that genetic disease. Instead, the civil action plaintiffs
simply alleged that the defendant had “negligently . . .
utilized sperm that contained a genetic trait includ-
ing a genetic disease . . . .” By contrast, the civil action
plaintiffs alleged in the second count that the defen-
dant “fraudulently concealed from Kayla” the fact that
“[his] sperm contained certain genetic traits that caused
evidence regarding the mixed sperm medical practice in an effort to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff had a
duty to defend him in the civil action.
16
In light of (1) the defendant’s averment that he utilized an accepted
fertility practice known as the mixed sperm method in providing IVF
services to Kayla’s parents and the documentary material he submitted
in support of his objection to the motion for summary judgment, (2)
the civil action plaintiffs’ concession that, after she became pregnant,
Kayla’s mother was informed that her pregnancy was the result of mixed
sperm, and (3) the civil action plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendant
“negligently” mixed his sperm with that of Gary Suprynowicz without
offering Kayla’s parents “the choice of sperm donor,” we conclude that
a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant used
the mixed sperm method in providing fertility services to Kayla’s par-
ents. Viewed in in the light most favorable to the defendant, we cannot
conclude that his alleged conduct decades ago was “so inherently harm-
ful” that the injuries sustained by Kayla were “unarguably foreseeable”
at the time he provided those services to her parents. See State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully, supra, 322 Conn. 575.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

her to contract a cerebral condition and mass cell activa-
tion disorder.” Because the civil action plaintiffs may
have been unsure at the time that they commenced this
action of whether the defendant had knowledge that his
sperm contained the genetic disease in question, they may
have purposely pleaded their negligence and fraudulent
concealment counts in the alternative with respect to
that allegation as well. See footnote 13 of this opinion.
Construed in the light most favorable to the defendant,
count one alleges that the defendant inadvertently and
negligently used sperm that contained a genetic dis-
ease when providing IVF services to Kayla’s parents.
Accordingly, it is beyond the scope of the intentional
conduct exclusion. See, e.g., Great American Ins. Co.
v. Houlihan Lawrence, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 354, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (intentional conduct exclusion did not
apply when allegations of complaint “liberally construed
. . . could support . . . a finding [of negligence]”); Lavoie
v. Dorchester Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 560 A.2d 570, 571
(Me. 1989) (intentional conduct exclusion did not apply
where complaint alleged negligence as alternative to
intentional tort claims); Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford
v. Cook, 7 N.Y.3d 131, 137–38, 850 N.E.2d 1152, 818
N.Y.S.2d 176 (2006) (insurer could not avail itself of
intentional conduct exclusion where complaint alleged
both negligence and intentional conduct).
In its memorandum of decision, the court relied in
part on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully, supra,
322 Conn. 574–75, in which our Supreme Court stated:
“[W]here . . . the policy excludes coverage for damages
resulting from intentional acts, the court examines the
factual allegations to decide whether both intentional
acts and intended results are present. . . . [E]ven when
an action is [pleaded] as an unintentional tort [such as
negligence], the court examines the alleged activities in
the complaint to determine whether the insured intended
to commit both the acts and the injuries that resulted. If
so, regardless of the title of the action, the court holds
the action to be outside the coverage of the policy.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

Applying that precedent, the trial court then reasoned
that, “[n]otwithstanding that some of the allegations in
the [underlying] action are framed as negligence claims,
the [civil action plaintiffs] . . . allege that the defendant
intentionally used his own sperm to impregnate their
mothers without consent and without providing infor-
mation on his genetic composition or the genetic diseases
or illnesses in his lineage, and that they suffered harm
as a result.” (Emphasis added.)
We do not agree with that conclusion. Nowhere in the
first count of the complaint did the civil action plaintiffs
allege that the defendant intentionally mixed his sperm
with that of Gary Suprynowicz to cause the injuries sus-
tained by Kayla or that he intentionally used sperm that
he knew contained a genetic disease; rather, they specifi-
cally alleged that the defendant “negligently” did so. As
our Supreme Court observed in Suprynowicz v. Tohan,
supra, 351 Conn. 77, the negligence claims advanced by
the civil action plaintiffs “are ordinary negligence claims
. . . because they arise from the defendant doctor’s alleged
negligence in using his own sperm to impregnate the [civil
action plaintiffs’] mothers during [IVF] procedures.”
Accordingly, this is not a case in which the allegations
in count one “are plainly inconsistent with a negligence
claim” or “plainly describe intentional conduct,” as was
the case in General Ins. Co. of America v. Okeke, 182
Conn. App. 83, 99, 189 A.3d 158 (2018).
In its memorandum of decision, the court also opined
that applying the intentional conduct exclusion to the
negligence counts pleaded by the civil action plaintiffs
was “consistent with the policies underlying liability
insurance.” The court further stated that, “[i]f the
defendant’s alleged conduct of using his own sperm to
impregnate patients without consent was not considered
an intentional act, then similarly situated fertility doc-
tors could buy liability insurance in advance and have a
shield for liability should they choose to engage in the
same conduct.” For multiple reasons, we are troubled by
that assessment. First and foremost, claims that allege
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

negligent conduct on the part of an insured—like count
one here—plainly are beyond the scope of the intentional
conduct exclusion. Second, in broadly construing the
intentional conduct exclusion contained in § III. A. 12. of
the policy, the court overlooks its obligation to narrowly
construe insurance policy exclusions. See Nash Street,
LLC v. Main Street America Assurance Co., supra, 337
Conn. 19. Third, nothing prevents an insurer from craft-
ing medical professional liability insurance policies that
specifically disclaim coverage for the conduct at issue in
this case. Alternatively, insurers can include additional
exclusions specifically tailored to that scenario. See, e.g.,
USA Gymnastics v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 27
F.4th 499, 512 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[i]nsurers are free to
limit the coverage of their policies” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins,
198 F.3d 100, 104–105 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[t]he burden of
precisely drafting the policy rested with the insurance
company and scrivener . . . and it was free to employ
more precise language”); Merchants Ins. Co. of New
Hampshire, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 143 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1998) (“if [the insurer] had
really intended to limit coverage [with respect to specific
conduct] . . . [the insurer] was free to draft a policy with
qualifying language that expressly implemented that
intention”); McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life
Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 449 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (“[t]he
simple answer to [the] defendant’s contentions is that it
should have taken the public policy it urges this court to
adopt into consideration when it drafted its contract”);
Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of Amer-
ica, supra, 308 Conn. 179 (Eveleigh, J., dissenting) (“if
an insurer wished to exclude from its coverage liability
based on the type of injury that occurred in the present
case . . . it would be free to do so”).
Under Connecticut law, an insurer “is only entitled
to prevail under a policy exclusion if the allegations of
the complaint clearly and unambiguously establish the
applicability of the exclusion to each and every claim
for which there might otherwise be coverage under the
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

policy.” Lancia v. State National Ins. Co., supra, 134
Conn. App. 691. That standard has not been met in the
present case. The court, therefore, improperly concluded
that the intentional conduct exclusion applied to every
allegation of negligence in the underlying complaint.
B
The defendant also claims that the court improperly
determined that the sexual conduct exclusion contained
in § III. A. 10. of the policy clearly and unambiguously
applied to every claim in the underlying complaint. We
agree.
Section III. A. 10. of the policy provides in relevant
part that “[t]he coverage afforded under this policy,
both as to defense and payment of damages, does NOT
apply to the following . . . any injury or damage, whether
direct or consequential, arising out of any sexual inti-
macy, sexual molestation, sexual harassment, sexual
exploitation, sexual assault or sexual contact . . . .”17 In
rendering summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
the court concluded that the plaintiff had demonstrated
that every allegation in the underlying complaint fell
within the sexual conduct exclusion.
A closer look at count one of the complaint belies that
determination. In that count, the civil action plaintiffs
alleged, inter alia, that Kayla’s parents “had been treat-
ing with [the defendant], a reproductive endocrinologist,
in his professional capacity, in their efforts to become
pregnant”; that, “[p]rior to the pregnancy, they were
not advised that the sperm would be anything but [Gary]
Suprynowicz’s sperm”; that “after she became preg-
nant, her mother was advised that the pregnancy was
the result of ‘mixed sperm’ ”; that the defendant neg-
ligently “mixed his sperm with [Gary] Suprynowicz’s
sperm to impregnate” her mother; that the defendant
17
The policy does not define the terms “sexual intimacy,” “sexual moles-
tation,” “sexual harassment,” “sexual exploitation,” “sexual assault,”
or “sexual contact.” As commonly used; see New London County Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 753, 36 A.3d 224 (2012); those terms
all pertain to conduct that is sexual in nature.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

negligently “failed to offer [her parents] the choice of
sperm donor,” and that the defendant negligently utilized
sperm that contained a genetic disease. Significantly,
that count does not allege that the defendant committed
a sexual act, nor does it contain any reference to “sex” or
“sexual.” See, e.g., Illinois State Medical Ins. Services,
Inc. v. Cichon, 258 Ill. App. 3d 803, 809, 629 N.E.2d 822
(1994) (noting that “[n]one of the complaints expressly
allege that [the defendant physician] engaged in sexual
conduct” in concluding that sexual conduct exclusion to
medical professional liability insurance policy did not
apply); West Virginia Mutual Ins. Co. v. Matulis, 251
W. Va. 180, 202, 910 S.E.2d 777 (2024) (emphasizing
that “[t]he complaint does not allege sexual acts, activi-
ties or misconduct, or describe the plaintiff as a victim of
sexual assault” in concluding that sexual conduct exclu-
sion did not apply); contra American Commerce Ins. Co.
v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185, 1191 n.3 (R.I. 2002) (sexual
conduct exclusion applied where underlying complaint
contained allegations that insured “sexually assaulted”
victim and engaged in “inappropriate sexual conduct”).
The plaintiff nonetheless claims that the sexual con-
duct exclusion applies because “procreation is quintessen-
tially sexual.”18 That contention overlooks the fact that
procreation was the purpose of the professional services
rendered in this case. As the underlying complaint makes
clear, the civil action concerns the defendant’s provi-
sion of fertility services to the civil action plaintiffs’
parents through IVF procedures, which undoubtedly
are medical procedures. See Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403,
419, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998) (explaining that “[a]rtificial
insemination involving humans dates back at least to
the late 1770s” and now is “an established treatment for
fertility problems in the United States”); North Coast
Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court,
44 Cal. 4th 1145, 1152 n.3, 189 P.3d 959, 81 Cal. Rptr.
3d 708 (2008) (“[IVF] is a medical procedure of assisted
reproduction in which eggs and sperm are combined in
18
In its memorandum of decision, the court similarly stated that
“[i]mpregnating someone is an inherently sexual act.”
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

a laboratory dish”); see also General Statutes § 38a-536
(requiring group health insurance policies to “provide
coverage for the medically necessary expenses for the
diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including, but
not limited to . . . [IVF]”).
At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s
counsel conceded that IVF is not inherently sexual but
argued that the defendant’s alleged use of his own sperm
brings his conduct within the purview of the sexual
conduct exclusion. For two distinct reasons, we cannot
agree. First, as discussed in part II A of this opinion, a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the
defendant properly utilized the mixed sperm method in
providing fertility services to Kayla’s parents. See West
Virginia Mutual Ins. Co. v. Matulis, supra, 251 W. Va.
197 (“conduct by health care professionals may be either
permissible or inappropriate depending on whether the
action is taken for medical purposes or for purposes of
sexual gratification”). Second, it bears emphasis that
count one of the underlying complaint alleged negli-
gence on the part of the defendant in multiple respects.
Although that count alleges that the defendant negli-
gently mixed his own sperm with that of Gary Supryno-
wicz to impregnate Kayla’s mother, it also alleges that
he negligently failed to offer her parents “the choice of
sperm donor” and negligently utilized sperm that con-
tained a genetic disease. We fail to see how either of the
latter two negligence allegations implicate the sexual
conduct exclusion in any way.
We also reiterate that the civil action plaintiffs did
not allege in count one that the defendant was aware
that his sperm contained a genetic disease or that he
knowingly used sperm that contained a genetic disease
when providing IVF services to Kayla’s parents. In our
view, that specific allegation constitutes an ordinary
claim of negligence on the part of the defendant, and one
that is not sexual in nature. See, e.g., Chung v. Physi-
cians Reciprocal Insurers, 221 App. Div. 2d 907, 907,
635 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1995) (sexual conduct exclusion did
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

not apply where “[t]he allegations of the complaint do
not cast the pleading solely within the [sexual conduct]
exclusion” and “can reasonably be read as alleging that
[the physician] was negligent in his professional treat-
ment”); contra State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully,
supra, 322 Conn. 583 (“[n]othing about the allegations
in the underlying civil action involve a negligent act”).
The sexual conduct exclusion, therefore, does not apply
to that claim.
The plaintiff also argues that some allegations of count
one could be construed as implicating the crime of sexual
assault in the fourth degree pursuant to General Statutes
§ 53a-73a, which provides in relevant part that “(a) [a]
person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree
when . . . (5) such person subjects another person to
sexual contact and accomplishes the sexual contact by
means of false representation that the sexual contact is
for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care profes-
sional . . . .”19 In so arguing, the plaintiff misunderstands
the fundamental nature of the inquiry before us. The
question is not whether some allegations set forth in the
underlying compaint, viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff in moving for summary judgment, could
potentially support such an action, but whether, irrespec-
tive of that claim, there remain any allegations that,
construed in the light most favorable to the defendant,
fall outside the scope of the sexual conduct exclusion,
such as the allegation that the defendant negligently
utilized sperm that contained a genetic disease when
providing IVF services to Kayla’s parents.20
In moving for summary judgment, the plaintiff bore
the burden “to establish that there are no genuine issues
19
In the underlying complaint, the civil action plaintiffs acknowledged
that, “after she became pregnant, [Kayla’s] mother was advised that
the pregnancy was the result of ‘mixed sperm.’ ” Kayla’s parents nev-
ertheless did not bring a civil action against the defendant or pursue
criminal charges after being so advised, and neither Kayla’s parents
nor Reilly’s parents are parties to the civil action.
20
Moreover, as this court has noted, “[s]exual assault in the fourth
degree is a specific intent crime.” State v. Vickers, 228 Conn. App. 830,
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

of material fact as to whether the allegations fall entirely
within the policy exclusion.” State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Tully, supra, 322 Conn. 583 n.10. To do so, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that “the allegations of the
complaint clearly and unambiguously establish the appli-
cability of the exclusion to each and every claim for which
there might otherwise be coverage under the policy.” Lan-
cia v. State National Ins. Co., supra, 134 Conn. App. 691;
see also Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 201 A.3d 555,
573 (Del. Super. 2019) (“because it has not been shown
that each allegation of the [u]nderlying [c]omplaint was
. . . an act of sexual misconduct and because at least one
of the allegations potentially supports a claim under the
insurance policy, [the] [d]efendant cannot rely on the
. . . [s]exual [m]isconduct [e]xclusion to avoid its duty to
defend”). In this case, we do not possess a “high degree
of certainty”; Kelly v. Figueiredo, 223 Conn. 31, 37,
610 A.2d 1296 (1992); that the sexual conduct exclusion
contained in § III. A. 10. of the policy clearly and unam-
biguously applies to each and every negligence allegation
set forth in the underlying complaint. See Nationwide
846, 326 A.3d 287 cert. denied, 350 Conn. 930, 326 A.3d 556 (2024). A
necessary element of § 53a-73a (a) (5) is a false representation made by
the health care professional. That element requires proof that the health
care professional made the statement in question with knowledge of its
falsity. See, e.g., Companions & Homemakers, Inc. v. A&B Homecare
Solutions, LLC, 348 Conn. 132, 144, 302 A.3d 283 (2023) (fraudulent
misrepresentation requires proof that representation “was known to be
untrue by the defendant”); Reid v. Landsberger, 123 Conn. App. 260,
281, 1 A.3d 1149 (explaining that “[a] cause of action for intentional
misrepresentation is essentially a claim of fraud” that requires “a false
representation [that] was made as a statement of fact” that was “known
to be so by its maker” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied,
298 Conn. 933, 10 A.3d 517 (2010), and cert. denied, 298 Conn. 933, 10
A.3d 517 (2010). While the allegations in the fraudulent concealment
counts of the underlying complaint may be read to assert fraudulent
misrepresentations on the part of the defendant, that is not the case
with respect to several of the negligence allegations in count one, such as
the allegations that the defendant negligently “failed to offer [Kayla’s
parents] the choice of sperm donor” and that he negligently utilized
sperm that contained a genetic disease. Viewing the allegations in the
light most favorable to the defendant, we cannot construe those claims
as ones alleging that the defendant made representations to Kayla’s
parents with knowledge of their falsity.
Integris Ins. Co. v. Tohan

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak, supra, 327 Conn. 239. We,
therefore, conclude that the court improperly rendered
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on that basis.
The judgment is reversed in part and the case is
remanded with direction to deny the plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment; the judgment is affirmed in all
other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.