State v. Browne

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State v. Browne

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRYANT BROWNE
(AC 47770)
Seeley, Wilson and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had previously been convicted of various crimes in con-
nection with his involvement in engaging police in a high speed pursuit, which
resulted in the death of one police officer, appealed from the trial court’s
judgments denying his motions for sentence modification. The defendant
claimed that the court abused its discretion in finding that he had failed to
establish good cause to modify his sentences. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in how it weighed the various fac-
tors it considered in denying the defendant’s motions for sentence modifica-
tion, specifically, evidence of the defendant’s rehabilitation, sobriety, and
familial relationships, and victim impact testimony and statements, as the
court’s weighing of those factors was consistent with the broad discretion
afforded to it in ruling on such a motion, and the court reasonably found that
the defendant did not establish good cause in light of other factors, including
the seriousness of his crimes, his extensive criminal history, his behavior
while incarcerated, and the impact of the defendant’s crimes on the victims,
law enforcement personnel and the deceased officer’s widow and children.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the defendant’s
postconviction efforts to challenge his conviction through appeals and habeas
corpus proceedings in its analysis of the evidence of the defendant’s remorse,
as it was within the court’s discretion to weigh the information before it and
to determine whether it deemed any remorse expressed by the defendant to
be genuine, and the court’s denial of the defendant’s motions was a denial
of leniency, not a punishment.

The trial court did not overlook mitigating evidence consisting of letters of
support from the defendant’s family and friends in favor of undue empha-
sis on static factors, such as the seriousness of the defendant’s underlying
offenses and criminal history, as the court reasonably considered all of the
information before it and determined that the letters were outweighed by the
gravity of the defendant’s conduct and its continuing effect on the victims,
as well as the defendant’s extensive criminal history.

Argued January 6—officially released May 5, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information, in the first case, charging the
defendant with the crimes of burglary in the first degree,
larceny in the third degree, attempt to commit larceny
in the third degree, conspiracy to commit, inter alia,
burglary in the first degree and disregarding an officer’s
State v. Browne

signal and, substitute information, in the second case,
charging the defendant with the crimes of felony murder,
manslaughter in the first degree and misconduct with a
motor vehicle and, substitute information, in the third
case, charging the defendant with the crime of interfer-
ing with an officer and, substitute information, in the
fourth case, charging the defendant with two counts
each of the crimes of attempt to commit assault in the
first degree, attempt to commit assault of a peace officer
and criminal mischief in the first degree, and with one
count of the crime of reckless endangerment in the first
degree and, substitute motor vehicle complaint charg-
ing the defendant with the crimes of reckless driving
and engaging police in pursuit, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, geographical
area number nine, where the cases were consolidated for
trial and tried to the jury before Clifford, J.; verdicts of
guilty of larceny in the third degree, attempt to com-
mit larceny in the third degree, conspiracy to commit
burglary in the third degree and larceny in the third
degree, disregarding an officer’s signal, misconduct with
a motor vehicle, interfering with an officer, criminal
mischief in the first degree, attempt to commit assault of
a peace officer, reckless driving and engaging an officer
in pursuit; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal and rendered judg-
ments in accordance with the verdicts, and the defendant
appealed to this court, Dranginis, Flynn and Hennessy,
Js., which affirmed the judgments; subsequently, the
court, Baldini, J., denied the defendant’s motions for
sentence modification, and the defendant appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
J. Patten Brown III, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (defendant).
Raynald A. Carre, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, was Michael Gailor, state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Bryant Browne, appeals
from the judgments of the trial court denying his motions
State v. Browne

for sentence modification pursuant to General Statutes
§ 53a-39. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
abused its discretion in finding that he had failed to
establish good cause to modify his sentences. We disagree
and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the court.
The following facts related to the defendant’s underly-
ing convictions, as set forth by this court on his direct
appeal, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal.
“On January 28, 2000, the defendant was an unemployed
drug addict with a $40 a day heroin habit. That morning,
he met his accomplice, Victor Santiago,1 in New Haven
and drove to Middletown. At approximately 11:30 a.m.,
the pair forcibly entered the unoccupied home of the
Fraulino family. They ransacked the house, collecting
jewelry, cash and electronic equipment. Shortly there-
after, Rosemary Fraulino returned home and observed
an unfamiliar motor vehicle in the driveway. She did not
stop at her house but instead called the police on her cel-
lular telephone to alert them to the suspicious occurrence.
“John Labbadia, a Middletown police officer, responded
to the scene and partially blocked the defendant’s vehicle
in the driveway. The defendant and Santiago saw Lab-
badia arrive. When the officer walked to the rear of the
house, they abandoned some of the Fraulinos’ possessions
in the living room and foyer. The defendant got into his
vehicle and sped away with his accomplice.
“Labbadia, believing that he had interrupted a bur-
glary, radioed the police dispatcher. He pursued the
defendant and Santiago on back roads and side streets to
Route 9. George Dingwall, a sergeant on the Middletown
police force, heard Labbadia’s broadcast and joined the
pursuit. A Portland police officer also heard Labbadia’s
broadcast. Three police cruisers with lights and sirens
activated followed the defendant’s vehicle south on Route
9 at a high rate of speed.
1
“Santiago was tried separately.” State v. Browne, 84 Conn. App. 351,
356 n.3, 854 A.2d 13, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 931, 859 A.2d 930 (2004).
State v. Browne

The state police had been alerted, and a number of
troopers positioned themselves at exit six on Route 9. One
trooper placed stop sticks2 across a lane of the highway,
but the defendant successfully avoided them. Several
troopers then joined the chase. The defendant operated
his vehicle in an erratic manner back and forth across
the highway.
“Near exit four in Essex, Dingwall drove his cruiser
beside the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant swerved his
vehicle toward Dingwall’s vehicle. Dingwall lost control
of his cruiser, which spun around and off the highway,
crashing in a heavily wooded portion of the median.
“The defendant continued to drive south on Route 9
at a high rate of speed. Scott Wisner, a state trooper,
positioned his cruiser alongside the defendant’s vehicle.
The defendant swerved toward Wisner’s cruiser, striking
it. Wisner dropped back, and Labbadia moved his cruiser
ahead of the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant’s car
struck the rear of Labbadia’s cruiser, which also spun
out of control and off the highway. The defendant then
drove onto Interstate 95 southbound.
“The state police responded in force. One trooper pre-
ceded the pursuit and warned motorists to move off the
highway. State troopers used their cruisers to block the
entrance ramps to the interstate highway. At exit sixty-
seven, the state troopers deployed stop sticks again, but
the defendant veered off the roadway to avoid them. At
exit sixty-three in Clinton, police cruisers were parked in
the gore between the exit and entrance ramps to the high-
way. State troopers were standing in the gore in another
effort to deploy stop sticks. The defendant saw the trap
and drove off the highway through the gore, coming
dangerously close to the troopers standing there. He
drove onto the entrance ramp and back onto the highway.
2
“Stop sticks are hollow spikes attached to a rollout strip that police
officers can throw across a highway to stop fleeing vehicles. When a tire
passes over a stop stick, the stop stick punctures the tire and causes it
to deflate slowly.” State v. Browne, 84 Conn. App. 351, 356–57 n.4, 854
A.2d 13, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 931, 859 A.2d 930 (2004).
State v. Browne

“The defendant continued to weave through traffic.
Between exits fifty-nine and fifty-eight in Guilford,
Adam Brown, a state trooper, successfully deployed stop
sticks under the tires of the defendant’s vehicle. Never-
theless, the defendant kept going and at exit fifty-seven
attempted to force Robert Hart, a state trooper, off the
highway. The defendant stopped his vehicle, which was
traveling on the rims of its wheels, against the Jersey
barriers near exit fifty-four in Branford.
“When the defendant got out of his vehicle, he said,
‘I’m on drugs, man—real bad—I’m on drugs.’ Person-
alty belonging to the Fraulino family was found in the
defendant’s vehicle. As a state trooper was transporting
the defendant to the state police barracks in Westbrook,
a police radio dispatch broadcasted information that
Dingwall had been transported to a hospital by Life Star
helicopter. In response, the defendant made several unso-
licited remarks: ‘It’s not my fault; I’m on drugs; you can’t
blame me for any of this because I’m on drugs.’ Dingwall
died as a result of his injuries.” (Footnotes in original.)
State v. Browne, 84 Conn. App. 351, 355–58, 854 A.2d
13, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 931, 859 A.2d 930 (2004).
“The defendant was charged in five informations with
numerous criminal and motor vehicle violations, which
were consolidated for trial. The jury convicted him of
larceny in the third degree in violation of General Stat-
utes §§ 53a-124 (a) (2) and 53a-119, attempt to commit
larceny in the third degree in violation of General Stat-
utes §§ 53a-49 (a), 53a-124 (a) (2) and 53a-119, conspiracy
to commit burglary in the third degree in violation of
General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-103, conspiracy
to commit larceny in the third degree in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-124, disregarding an
officer’s signal by engaging an officer in a pursuit result-
ing in death in violation of General Statutes § 14-223
(b), interfering with an officer in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-167a (a), attempt to commit assault of
a peace officer in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-
49 (a) (2) and 53a-167c (a) (1), criminal mischief in the
State v. Browne

first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-115
(a) (1), misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-57, reckless driving in violation
of General Statutes § 14-222 and engaging an officer in
pursuit in violation of General Statutes § 14-223 (b). The
defendant’s total effective sentence was thirty-two years
in the custody of the [C]ommissioner of [C]orrection.”3
Id., 354 n.1.
On January 16, 2024, the defendant filed multiple
motions4 seeking a modification of his sentence in which
he requested that the court reduce his total effective
sentence by six years. In support of the motions, the
defendant’s attorney submitted a letter in which he
represented that the defendant had “completed his edu-
cation [and] critical drug treatment programming,” and
that the defendant had “done everything in his ability to
rehabilitate and prepare to successfully reintegrate into
society.” The attorney further asserted in the letter that
the defendant’s “complete and successful rehabilitation,
coupled with his education, work ethic, and support sys-
tem constitute good cause to reduce his sentence.” The
defendant submitted materials in support of his motions,
such as certificates from programs he had completed
during his incarceration, work appraisals from periods
of incarceration, a handwritten letter from him,5 and
letters of support from the defendant’s family members.
The court, Baldini, J., held a hearing on the motions
on April 23, 2024. During the hearing, the court heard
3
The jury acquitted the defendant “of burglary in the first degree,
conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree, felony murder, man-
slaughter in the first degree, criminal mischief in the first degree and
two counts of attempt to commit assault in the first degree. The jury was
unable to reach a verdict on the charges of attempt to commit assault
of a peace officer and reckless endangerment in the first degree, and the
court declared a mistrial as to those counts.” State v. Browne, supra, 84
Conn. App. 355 n.2. The defendant was sentenced on March 12, 2002.
4
The motions corresponded to the underlying criminal and motor
vehicle cases under which the defendant was convicted.
5
In his handwritten letter dated February 12, 2023, the defendant
stated: “I . . . accept full responsibility for all of the bad decisions that I
made on [January 28, 2000], including not stopping for the Middletown
State v. Browne

from the defendant, his brother, and his attorney, as
well as the state and Kim Raymond, Dingwall’s widow.
A letter from Wisner in opposition to the defendant’s
motions also was read to the court at the hearing.
On May 7, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision denying the defendant’s motions to modify
his sentence. In its decision, the court explained that,
“[i]n evaluating the defendant’s motion[s], the court
. . . considered a variety of factors, some static, and oth-
ers variable. The static factors the court . . . considered
include: (1) the seriousness of the offenses for which
the defendant was convicted; (2) the defendant’s prior
criminal history; and (3) the defendant’s employment,
treatment, and family history prior to his present incar-
ceration. The variable factors the court . . . considered
[were] factors that center on the timeframe following
his convictions. These factors include: (1) whether the
defendant has expressed remorse; (2) whether the defen-
dant has engaged in efforts to rehabilitate himself while
incarcerated; (3) whether the defendant has contributed
to the welfare of others while incarcerated; (4) whether
family, friends, or community members support the
defendant and the defendant’s sentence modification
request; (5) the length of time the defendant has been
incarcerated and any disciplinary history while incarcer-
ated; and (6) and the victims’ positions with respect to
the sentence modification motion.”
The court identified “the seriousness of the crimes
committed” and “[t]he impact of the defendant’s actions”
as important factors in its decision. The court noted:
“[The defendant’s] actions on January 28, 2000, set into
and state police. I come from a hardworking and honest family back-
ground. My using drugs and my addiction had made it impossible for me
to stay clean or sober for many years prior to and leading up to [January
28, 2000]. [January 28, 2000], was the last day I used drugs. My family
and I have been dev[a]stated by this loss of life. I have remained drug
free for [twenty-three] years, on my own, without any help or assistance
from the [Department of Correction]. This [has] been the longest I have
been clean and sober in many years. I can do better; I will do better. I
have [two] granddaughters that I have never met and a son that needs
my help to raise them.”
State v. Browne

motion a series of events, which significantly impacted
the lives of many, including the owners of the home that
the defendant stole from, the many law enforcement
officials who risked their lives to keep the public safe and
aided in the apprehension of the defendant, members of
the public who witnessed the traumatic events, and the
multiple victims of these crimes, including . . . Labbadia
. . . Wisner . . . Dingwall, and . . . Dingwall’s family. The
defendant committed multiple criminal acts evidencing
a pure disregard for others and the law. He attributes
his criminal conduct to his drug use, but his decision to
ingest drugs was a volitional one and so were the actions
that ensued thereafter.”
With respect to the impact that the defendant’s crimes
had on his victims and their communities, the court
explained that, “[i]n . . . Wisner’s statement, he reflected
upon the events of January 28, 2000, the dangerousness
of the defendant’s conduct, and the effect the defendant’s
actions has had upon him and his fellow law enforcement
officers. . . . Raymond, the victim’s widow, tearfully
discussed how her family continues to suffer the loss
of her late husband. . . . Dingwall was a hard-working
family man who served proudly for nineteen years . . .
as a member of the Middletown Police Department. He
was eleven . . . months away from retirement and aspired
to become a teacher. He had two children, a son and a
daughter, who were nine . . . years old and twelve . . .
years old when he died. Today, his children are thirty-
four . . . and thirty-seven . . . years old and they have
been cheated out of the opportunity to have a relation-
ship with their father. Raymond described the ‘forever
loss’ that she and her family experience, noting that
holidays, celebrations, and even regular days are never
quite the same. Despite the passage of twenty-four . . .
years, the pain of losing . . . Dingwall endures and the
defendant’s actions on January 28, 2000, continue to
impact the lives of many.”
The court next rejected the defendant’s claim that he
has shown true remorse for his actions, in part, because
State v. Browne

he continues to challenge his convictions. Specifically,
the court reasoned that “[t]he defendant’s claim that
he accepts full responsibility for his actions is under-
mined by [his] many efforts to challenge the propriety of
his conviction[s],” including the direct appeal in which
this court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. The
court mentioned subsequent challenges to the defen-
dant’s convictions, including “multiple habeas corpus
petitions, claiming insufficiency of counsel by his trial,
appellate, and habeas attorneys, including one petition
that remains pending. [See] Browne v. Commissioner
of Correction, 158 Conn. App. 1, 125 A.3d 1014, cert.
denied, 318 Conn. 906, 122 A.3d 634 (2015); Browne
v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 10, 2023) (Newson,
J.). In these matters, the defendant has raised claims
that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to employ
an expert witness to challenge the state’s theories of
causation and intent as to the death of . . . Dingwall and
failing to retain an expert to ascertain the value of the
items stolen during the residential burglary. Addition-
ally, the defendant has claimed that the three officers
who testified about the defendant’s conduct [that] led
to . . . Dingwall’s death were ‘untruthful’ in their testi-
mony. In 2022, he applied for a sentence commutation,
and it was determined that he did not meet the criteria
for a commutation. The court acknowledges and appre-
ciates the defendant’s right to pursue postjudgment
relief, however, the claims raised in these proceedings
undermine the defendant’s representations that he fully
accepts responsibility for his actions. In addition, when
presented with the opportunity to apologize to the many
victims of his crimes at the hearing on his motion, the
defendant declined to do so.” As a result, the trial court
concluded that the defendant “ha[d] not demonstrated
sincere regret for the crimes he has committed.”
The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that he is
“ ‘fully rehabilitated’.” Specifically, although the defen-
dant submitted a certificate for his general equivalency
degree (GED), the court found that he had not completed
State v. Browne

his education while incarcerated for the underlying con-
victions but, rather, obtained his GED in the 1980s while
incarcerated in Massachusetts. The court also found
that “several of the program certificates the defendant
submitted to support his claim that he is rehabilitated
were not for programs completed during his present
incarceration.”
The court noted that, even though the defendant had
“served a substantial portion of his sentence—twenty-
four . . . years—[and] . . . ha[d] maintained various
employment positions while incarcerated and received
‘good’ to ‘excellent’ ratings from his supervisors,” he
“made limited efforts to address the obstacles that have
contributed to his incarceration. The documents pro-
vided by the defendant show that, in the time that the
defendant has been incarcerated, he completed only
three programs: the People Empowering People program
(2014–2015), the Beyond Fear program (2012), and an
anger management program (2023). Several of the pro-
gram certificates the defendant submitted to support
his claim that he is rehabilitated were not for programs
completed during his present incarceration. Instead,
they are for programs that the defendant completed
prior to his present incarceration.” (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) Moreover, the court found that the defendant had
not submitted adequate documentation demonstrating
that he had “completed ‘critical drug treatment pro-
gramming’ during his present incarceration,” as “[t]he
documentation provided show[ed] that the defendant
received substance abuse treatment while incarcerated
in Connecticut and Massachusetts prior to committing
the offenses for which he was convicted.” (Emphasis in
original.) As a result, the court concluded that “[i]t [was]
evident that the defendant ha[d] demonstrated minimal
efforts to avail himself of opportunities for growth,
rehabilitation, and contribution while incarcerated for
these offenses. Moreover, it is apparent that rehabilita-
tive efforts prior to the commission of the crimes for
which he is incarcerated were not significant enough
State v. Browne

to rehabilitate him or to deter him from engaging in
criminal behavior.”
Next, the court acknowledged the letters that it had
received in support of the defendant’s sentence modifica-
tion. Specifically, the court noted that “[i]t is undisputed
that the defendant has a loving and closely connected
family who remain committed to assisting the defendant
and to supporting him upon his release. Many of the
letters suggest that the punishment that the defendant
received for his actions is disproportionate and draco-
nian. See letters from Ina Webb Bryant (the defendant
‘has not been convicted of manslaughter or murder but
for running from the police’); Alexis Soares (‘the prison
system should be one of rehabilitation, rather than per-
petual retribution . . . [and] one horrible action in a dark
moment of someone’s life should not define who they
are forever’); [and] Debra Canzater (‘I am praying that
the court finds it in their heart to grant him an early
release due to a bad decision he made over twenty years
ago’). It is obvious that these advocates are unaware of
the defendant’s robust and abhorrent criminal history.”
Finally, the court found that the defendant was not
able to “remain at liberty without violating the law” and
noted that “[t]he defendant has a multistate criminal
history that dates back to 1986.”6 Moreover, the court
emphasized the fact that the defendant was on parole
when he was arrested for the present offenses and was
involved in a police car chase one month before he engaged
in the conduct giving rise to his present incarceration.
The defendant also was convicted and sentenced for
other crimes, including, “on March 28, 2002, [he] was
6
In addition to the eleven offenses of which the defendant was convicted
with respect to his present incarceration, the court found that he had
“at least thirty-three . . . other convictions, [including] . . . twelve . . .
burglary convictions, five . . . breaking and entering convictions, four
. . . failure to appear convictions, three . . . larceny convictions, two
. . . possession of narcotics convictions, one . . . robbery conviction, one
. . . escape conviction, and one . . . engaging police in pursuit convic-
tion,” which was one of the same charges of which he was convicted of
in relation to the present matter.
State v. Browne

convicted of [attempt to commit] assault on a public
safety officer in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-167c
[for which he was] sentenced to twenty-five . . . months
to be served concurrently to the present sentence,” and,
“[o]n November 21, 2002, [he] was convicted of reckless
endangerment in the first degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-63 [for which he was] sentenced to seven
. . . months to be served consecutively to the present sen-
tence. These convictions relate[d] to additional criminal
conduct by the defendant on January 28, 2000.”
The court also took note of the defendant’s contin-
ued “misconduct notwithstanding his incarceration,”
including his December 7, 2012, conviction of crimi-
nal contempt of court in violation of General Statutes
§ 51-33a, for which he was sentenced to six months of
incarceration, which was to be served consecutively to
the present sentence.7 Further, the court detailed the
five disciplinary tickets that were issued to the defendant
during his present incarceration, with the most recent
one having been issued in 2016.8 The court ultimately
concluded that “[t]he defendant has demonstrated that
he is not amenable to rehabilitation and is not deterred by
punishment,” thus, that he “ha[d] not established good
cause to modify [his] sentence.” This appeal followed.
We begin with our standard of review and the relevant
legal principles that guide our resolution of this appeal.
“[General Statutes §] 53a-39 (a) provides: Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section, at any time
during an executed period of incarceration, the sentenc-
ing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause
shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant dis-
charged, or order the defendant discharged on probation
7
When asked at the hearing to elaborate on the conduct that gave rise
to his conviction of criminal contempt of court, the defendant stated
that he had a “little discussion with the judge and that’s what he did.”
No further explanation was offered.
8
The court indicated that “[t]he offenses for which the tickets were
issued were for interfering with safety and security (2001), disobeying
a direct order (2003), fighting (2008), security tampering (2012), and
public indecency (2016).”
State v. Browne

or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that
to which the defendant could have been originally sen-
tenced. [I]n arriving at its sentencing determination, the
sentencing court may appropriately conduct an inquiry
broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information [it] may consider or the source from which
it may come. . . . [T]his broad discretion applies with
equal force to a sentencing court’s decision regarding a
sentence modification . . . . State v. Dupas, 291 Conn.
778, 783, 970 A.2d 102 (2009). Accordingly, we review
a court’s judgment granting or denying a motion to
modify a sentence for abuse of discretion. See id. An
abuse of discretion exists when a court could have cho-
sen different alternatives but has decided the matter so
arbitrarily as to vitiate logic, or has decided it based on
improper or irrelevant factors. . . . State v. Rivera, 200
Conn. App. 487, 493, 240 A.3d 728 (2020), aff’d, 343
Conn. 745, 275 A.3d 1195 (2022). As such, [i]n determin-
ing whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Generally speak-
ing, under this deferential standard, [w]here the trial
court has properly considered all of the offenses proved
and imposed a sentence within the applicable statutory
limitations, there is no abuse of discretion. . . . State v.
Dupas, supra, 783.” (Footnotes omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Martin G., 222 Conn. App.
395, 403–404, 305 A.3d 324 (2023), cert. denied, 348
Conn. 944, 308 A.3d 34 (2024).
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding that he did not estab-
lish good cause to warrant a sentence modification. The
defendant raises a number of arguments in support of
his claim, which we address in turn.
I
We first address the defendant’s challenge to the
weight the court afforded to evidence of his rehabilita-
tion, sobriety, and familial relationships, and to victim
State v. Browne

impact testimony and statements.9 The defendant argues
that good cause existed to modify his sentence in part
because, while incarcerated, he had engaged in programs,
received positive work assessments, and maintained
sobriety. He contends that the court, however, “mini-
mized [his] rehabilitation efforts,” especially given that
Connecticut policy restricts the availability of “certain
programs” to inmates nearing a discharge or parole date,
and improperly relied on disciplinary tickets that he had
received while incarcerated as evidence of his inability
to follow the law. He further contends that those dis-
ciplinary tickets did not undermine his claim of good
cause because they were issued for “minor administra-
tive matters” that were nonviolent in nature and not
related to drugs.10
In a similar fashion, the defendant also asserts that
the court “discounted the effort necessary for [him] to
achieve and maintain sobriety and loving relationships
with his family,” especially in light of the uncontro-
verted evidence of his sustained sobriety, the letters of
support from family and community members, and the
testimony from his brother at the hearing regarding a
plan for the defendant’s reentry into society. Finally,
although he recognizes that “victim impact statements
are an essential component of sentence modification pro-
ceedings,” the defendant argues that the court “placed
disproportionate weight on the [written statement] of . . .
Wisner” and that the victim impact statements should
have been “balanced against the broader penological
objectives of sentencing.” As a result, he contends that
the court’s “undue emphasis on these statements led to
an unbalanced evaluation of the ‘good cause’ standard.”
We are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion
in its weighing of this evidence.
9
In part II of this opinion, we address separately the defendant’s
claim that the court improperly discounted the evidence demonstrat-
ing his remorse.
10
The defendant’s assertion in his appellate reply brief that the state
mischaracterized the nature of his institutional conduct, including
his disciplinary history, is unavailing and unsupported by the record.
State v. Browne

As we have indicated, the court set forth in its deci-
sion a variety of factors that it considered in denying the
defendant’s motions for sentence modification. Many of
those factors are similar to factors that are considered by
the Board of Parole and Pardons (parole board) in review-
ing applications for parole. See State v. Brelsford, 227
Conn. App. 53, 62, 319 A.3d 763 (“in reviewing applica-
tions for sentence modifications of definite sentences,
[the sentencing court] performs a function similar to
that of a parole board . . . and [this court] has affirmed
the consideration of [factors set forth in the statute
governing parole eligibility, General Statutes] § 54-125a
(f) (4) . . . when considering sentence modifications”
(citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 912, 324 A.3d 142 (2024); see
also State v. Toste, 231 Conn. App. 866, 873, 334 A.3d
1083 (it is appropriate for trial court, when ruling on
motion for sentence modification, to consider statutory
factors considered by parole board when deciding to grant
parole), cert. granted on other grounds, 352 Conn. 908,
336 A.3d 81 (2025).11
With respect to the court’s consideration of the
evidence of the defendant’s rehabilitation, the court
acknowledged the defendant’s participation in three
11
Those factors include whether “(A) there is a reasonable probability
that such person will live and remain at liberty without violating the
law, (B) the benefits to such person and society that would result from
such person’s release to community supervision substantially outweigh
the benefits to such person and society that would result from such
person’s continued incarceration, and (C) such person has demonstrated
substantial rehabilitation since the date such crime or crimes were
committed considering such person’s character, background and his-
tory, as demonstrated by factors, including, but not limited to, such
person’s correctional record, the age and circumstances of such person
as of the date of the commission of the crime or crimes, whether such
person has demonstrated remorse and increased maturity since the date
of the commission of the crime or crimes, such person’s contributions
to the welfare of other persons through service, such person’s efforts
to overcome substance abuse, addiction, trauma, lack of education or
obstacles that such person may have faced as a child or youth in the
adult correctional system, the opportunities for rehabilitation in the
adult correctional system, whether the person has also applied for or
received a sentence modification and the overall degree of such person’s
State v. Browne

programs and his positive work assessments while incar-
cerated but, nevertheless, found that, during the course
of the twenty-four years of his incarceration that he has
served, he “made limited efforts to address the obstacles
that have contributed to his incarceration.” The court
reached this conclusion, in part, because much of the
evidence submitted by the defendant concerning his
rehabilitative efforts involved programs or education
completed prior to his present incarceration. As a result,
the court found that the efforts made by the defendant
during his present incarceration were “minimal,” and
that any prior rehabilitative efforts were insufficient in
light of his engagement in the criminal conduct underly-
ing his convictions for which he is presently incarcerated.
Although the defendant contends that he had limited
opportunities for rehabilitation during the past twenty-
four years of his incarceration, he does not contest that
he participated in only three programs during his present
incarceration; moreover, this was but one factor in the
court’s analysis of the overall degree of the defendant’s
rehabilitation.
In assessing the rehabilitation evidence, the court also
properly took into consideration the defendant’s cor-
rectional record, which included five disciplinary tickets
that were issued to the defendant during his present
incarceration, as well as his conviction of criminal con-
tempt of court and other crimes related to his criminal
conduct on January 28, 2000. Although the defendant
contends that the tickets were issued for nonviolent con-
duct, they nonetheless were evidence of the defendant’s
conduct while incarcerated, and the defendant has not
cited any authority demonstrating that they should not
have factored into the court’s decision. The court’s deci-
sion regarding the defendant’s rehabilitation also was
made with due consideration for the defendant’s multi-
state criminal history dating back to 1986, which includes
at least thirty-three other convictions in addition to the
convictions underlying his motions, as well as the fact
rehabilitation considering the nature and circumstances of the crime
or crimes.” General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (4).
State v. Browne

that the defendant was on parole when he was arrested
for the present offenses and was involved in a police chase
one month before he engaged in similar conduct giving
rise to his present incarceration. As a result of this evi-
dence, the court concluded that the defendant was not
able to “remain at liberty without violating the law,”
and that he “has demonstrated that he is not amenable
to rehabilitation and is not deterred by punishment.”
These considerations properly factored into the court’s
determination as to whether the defendant demonstrated
good cause for a modification of his sentence.
To the extent that the defendant is arguing that the
court should have given specific weight to his “rehabili-
tation efforts,” he has provided no authority to support
such an argument. Moreover, our Supreme Court rejected
a similar argument in State v. Dupas, supra, 291 Conn.
786. In Dupas, the defendant appealed from the denial
of his application for sentence modification, claiming
that the trial court abused its discretion because “the
court’s decision ‘assigned no value’ to the defendant’s
postsentence cooperation with the state. Put another
way, the defendant . . . argue[d] that because his original
sentence was determined prior to his cooperation with
the state, his subsequent cooperation required that the
sentencing court reduce his sentence, and that the court
had discretion only as to the amount of the reduction.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id. The defendant’s claim in
Dupas was based on the fact that the trial court did not
expressly state in its memorandum of decision why it
had determined that the defendant’s postsentence coop-
eration was not sufficient to warrant a reduction of his
sentence. Id., 786–87. Our Supreme Court rejected the
defendant’s claim, holding that, “although the court
did not explain precisely why it had considered evidence
of the defendant’s cooperation insufficient to justify a
reduction in the defendant’s sentence, it is clear from the
memorandum of decision that the court considered that
cooperation in ruling on the motion. The memorandum
of decision also clearly stated the basis for the court’s
denial of the motion—the heinous nature of the crime
State v. Browne

and the defendant’s involvement in it. A reasonable
interpretation of the memorandum of decision is that
the court considered the defendant’s cooperation, but
deemed that cooperation insufficient, in light of the
heinous nature of the crime . . . .” Id., 787.
Similarly, in State v. Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn. App.
63, this court held that, “[a]lthough the defendant argues
that the [trial] court should have relied more heavily
on his rehabilitation and certain other factors, he does
not cite any legal authority that governs the degree of
weight a court must afford factors that it considers in
determining whether good cause has been established, nor
are we aware of any. Here, the court expressly considered
the steps the defendant has taken toward rehabilitation
but concluded that those steps did not outweigh other
factors that it considered. The court’s consideration of
all of these factors was consistent with the broad discre-
tion afforded to courts in ruling on motions for sentence
modification.” (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
In the present case, the defendant also has not directed
this court to any authority governing the degree of
weight that a trial court must afford to the factors it
considers in its good cause determination. Likewise, it
is clear from the court’s memorandum of decision that
it did consider the defendant’s rehabilitation but found
that the defendant did not establish good cause in light of
other factors, including the serious nature of his crimes,
which the court found to be “an important factor in its
determination,” and because the defendant’s rehabilita-
tion was minimal and the materials he provided did not
sufficiently demonstrate that he had “avail[ed] himself
of opportunities for growth, rehabilitation, and contri-
bution while incarcerated for these offenses.” See State
v. Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn. App. 63; see also State v.
Martin G., supra, 222 Conn. App. 406 (trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant did not
establish good cause for sentence modification in light
of gravity of defendant’s conduct and its continuing
effect on victim and victim’s family, which outweighed
State v. Browne

defendant’s rehabilitative efforts). Consequently, we
are unpersuaded by the defendant’s argument that the
court improperly weighed the rehabilitation evidence
against the nature and circumstances of his crimes and
the impact of the defendant’s crimes on his victims.
The record also shows that the court specifically
acknowledged the defendant’s remarks to the court at
the hearing that he has remained sober and his “good to
excellent” work ethic during incarceration, as well as
his positive work appraisals. The court also “considered
the numerous letters written in support of the defen-
dant’s” motions for sentence modification and recognized
that it was “undisputed that the defendant has a loving
and closely connected family who remain committed to
assisting the defendant and to supporting him upon his
release.” Nevertheless, the court also found that the
contents of many of the letters suggested that the defen-
dant’s punishment was disproportionate to his actions,
and, in making that finding, it specifically referred to
statements in letters submitted by the defendant, which
led the court to conclude that the persons making the
statements were “unaware of the defendant’s robust and
abhorrent criminal history.”12 The defendant’s sobriety
and his familial support system did factor into the court’s
decision, but as we have indicated, the court considered
a multitude of factors in reaching its decision, and it
necessarily must have determined that other factors
outweighed the progress the defendant has made with
his sobriety and the support system he would have from
family members upon his release from incarceration. In
his appellate briefs, the defendant fails to explain how,
or provide support for why, the court abused its discre-
tion in this respect.
12
At the hearing, the court stated that, when it read the letters, a few
of them stood out because they suggested that the conduct underlying
the defendant’s convictions and sentences was “a one-time event . . . .”
The court noted further that the persons who submitted the letters were
perplexed that someone would receive sentences like the one imposed on
the defendant “for a one-time event . . . .” After making those comments,
the court asked the defendant’s counsel if those people were aware of
the defendant’s history, to which counsel replied: “I don’t believe they
were fully as aware . . . .”
State v. Browne

The defendant’s briefing of his argument that the court
placed disproportionate weight on the victim impact
testimony and statements is equally devoid of authority
or legal analysis demonstrating how the court abused its
discretion in its weighing of this evidence. In his appellate
reply brief, the defendant asserts that Ҥ 53a-39 (a) makes
clear that sentence modification remains available even
for serious crimes, provided good cause is shown,” and
that “[t]o allow victim impact alone to eclipse rehabilita-
tion evidence would render the statutory scheme illusory
for any individual convicted of a violent or high-profile
offense.” (Emphasis added.) This argument lacks merit
for two reasons. First, there is nothing in the record
establishing that the court relied solely on the victim
impact testimony or statements in reaching its deter-
mination that good cause had not been established, as
it is clear from the court’s decision that it considered a
number of factors and all of the evidence and informa-
tion before it. Second, even if the court afforded more
weight to the victim impact testimony and statements,
the defendant has not directed this court to any author-
ity demonstrating why that would constitute an abuse of
the court’s discretion. See State v. Brelsford, supra, 227
Conn. App. 63. In fact, this court previously has found
no abuse of discretion in a trial court’s weighing of the
relevant sentencing factors when the trial court “con-
cluded that the circumstances the defendant presented in
support of his [requested sentence modification] did not
rise to the level of good cause in light of the seriousness
of the offenses [and] the impact on the victim’s family . . .
notwithstanding the fact that [the defendant had] served
in excess of the twenty-five year mandatory minimum
. . . . See . . . State v. Martin G., [supra, 222 Conn. App.
406] (the court conducted an appropriate review of the
information before it and determined that the gravity
of the defendant’s conduct, and its continuing effect on
the victim and her family, outweighed the rehabilitative
efforts he has undertaken since his incarceration) . . . .”
(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Toste, supra, 231 Conn. App.
875–76.
State v. Browne

In the present case, the court viewed the seriousness
of the defendant’s crimes to be an important factor,
stating that the defendant’s actions, which evidenced “a
pure disregard for others and the law,” “set into motion
a series of events [that] significantly impacted the lives
of many,” including the owners of the home he burglar-
ized, law enforcement personnel, “members of the public
who witnessed the traumatic events, and the multiple
victims of [his] crimes . . . .” The statement submitted by
Wisner and the testimony from Raymond impressed on
the court the dangerousness of the defendant’s conduct
and the enduring painful impact it has had on their lives,
as well as the lives of fellow law enforcement officers
and Dingwall’s children, who, as the court found, were
“cheated out of the opportunity to have a relationship
with their father.”
As we have stated in this opinion, the trial court has
wide discretion in determining whether a defendant’s
sentence should be modified. See State v. Martin G.,
supra, 222 Conn. App. 404. The record demonstrates
that the court reasonably considered all of the infor-
mation before it and determined that the defendant
failed to establish good cause to modify his sentence after
weighing the various factors concerning the defendant’s
rehabilitation, sobriety, familial relationships and sup-
port system, his extensive criminal history and behavior
while incarcerated, the serious nature of the crimes of
which he was convicted, and the impact of the defendant’s
crimes on the victims, law enforcement personnel and
Dingwall’s widow and children. In doing so, the court,
which noted that “[t]he defendant’s actions have had, and
continue to have, a profound impact on the victims and
the community,” necessarily determined that any reha-
bilitative efforts by the defendant were outweighed by
the gravity of his conduct and its impact on the victims.
Contrary to the defendant’s claims, the court’s decision
in that respect does not undermine the rehabilitative
efforts that he has achieved or any positive steps he has
taken during his period of incarceration; rather, those
efforts must be considered in light of the other factors,
State v. Browne

which, in this case, weighed heavily against a sentence
modification.
We conclude that the court’s weighing of the factors
was “consistent with the broad discretion afforded to it
in ruling on a motion for sentence modification. See, e.g.,
State v. Martin G., [supra, 222 Conn. App. 406] (court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that defen-
dant failed to establish good cause to warrant sentence
modification where gravity of defendant’s conduct and
its continuing effect on victim and her family outweighed
defendant’s rehabilitative efforts) . . . see also State v.
Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn. App. 63–64 (rejecting defen-
dant’s claim that court should have relied more heavily
on rehabilitative efforts and holding that court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that defendant failed
to establish good cause to warrant sentence modification
where defendant’s rehabilitative efforts did not outweigh
factors weighing against sentence modification).” State
v. Reyes, 229 Conn. App. 121, 128, 326 A.3d 589, cert.
denied, 350 Conn. 934, 327 A.3d 385 (2024); see also
State v. Toste, supra, 231 Conn. App. 875 (“[i]t was
within court’s discretion to weigh all of the information
before it to determine whether the defendant established
good cause to justify a modification of his sentence”).
It appears from the arguments raised in the defen-
dant’s appellate briefs that he is, in effect, asking this
court to reevaluate and weigh the evidence to reach a
different conclusion. That, however, is not our role on an
appeal from a denial of a sentence modification. Rather,
as we already have indicated, “we review a court’s judg-
ment granting or denying [a motion for a] . . . sentence
[modification] for abuse of discretion. An abuse of dis-
cretion exists when a court could have chosen different
alternatives but has decided the matter so arbitrarily as
to vitiate logic, or has decided it based on improper or
irrelevant factors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Toste, supra, 231 Conn. App. 870. “[E]very
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation
State v. Browne

marks omitted.) Id.; see also id. (§ 53a-39 (a) “does not
limit the information a court may consider in determin-
ing whether a defendant has shown good cause for the
requested modification, nor does it suggest that the
court’s discretion is somehow limited” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). In the present case, affording every
reasonable presumption in favor of the court’s ruling,
we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion
in how it weighed the various factors.
II
Next, the defendant argues that the court improp-
erly “discounted” evidence of his remorse. Specifically,
he contends that the court discounted the remorse he
expressed in his letter, and that the court’s analysis of
the remorse evidence was improperly influenced by its
reliance on the defendant’s postconviction efforts to chal-
lenge his convictions through appeals and habeas corpus
proceedings. In a few sentences in his principal appellate
brief, without citation to legal authority or substantive
analysis, the defendant asserts that, although “the court
acknowledged the [defendant’s] right to seek postjudg-
ment relief, it improperly concluded that such actions
undermined [the defendant’s] expression of remorse,”
and that “[t]he pursuit of legal remedies is a constitu-
tionally protected right and does not inherently negate
genuine remorse for one’s actions.” In his appellate reply
brief, he further asserts that he “cannot be penalized”
for having invoked his constitutional rights, and he
cites North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89
S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), overruled on other
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S. Ct.
2201, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1989), for the proposition that
“[d]ue process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully attacked
his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he
receives after a new trial.”
Our analysis of this argument requires little discus-
sion. In its decision, the court stated that “[r]emorse is
not just a feeling or expression; it is a genuine change
State v. Browne

in behavior or attitude. While words can be easily said,
actions require effort and commitment that demonstrate
a true willingness to change and make amends. Consistent
actions that show accountability, empathy, and efforts to
repair harm caused by the wrongdoing provide tangible
evidence of remorse.” Although the defendant contends
that his letter and the letters from his family submit-
ted in support of his motions sufficiently demonstrate
his remorse for his actions, the court also had before it
Wisner’s letter, in which he stated: “I would like to think
in retrospect [the defendant] feels as if the decisions he
made that day were the worst he has made in life. I am
unaware of any show of remorse on his behalf directed
toward any of the law enforcement officers and affected
family members since this occurrence. In this case, his
failure to extend any type of remorseful message has
worked against him, as any apologetic indication would
have substantially tempered my remarks in this venue.”
Moreover, although, at the hearing, the defendant’s
brother offered an apology to the Dingwall family on
behalf of the defendant’s family, the defendant himself,
in his statements to the court at the hearing and in his
written statement, offered no such apology. It was within
the court’s discretion to weigh the information before it
and determine whether it deemed any remorse expressed
by the defendant to be genuine.
The court also stated that “[t]he defendant’s claim
that he accepts responsibility for his actions is under-
mined by the many efforts [he has taken] to challenge
the propriety of his convictions.” As examples, the court
referenced the defendant’s appeal from his convictions
and the multiple habeas petitions that he has pursued.
The court stated further: “The court acknowledges and
appreciates the defendant’s right to pursue postjudgment
relief, however, the claims raised in [those] proceedings
undermine the defendant’s representations that he fully
accepts responsibility for his actions. In addition, when
presented with the opportunity to apologize to the many
victims of his crimes at the hearing on [these] motion[s],
the defendant declined to do so. The court finds that the
State v. Browne

defendant has not demonstrated sincere regret for the
crimes he has committed.”
Our Supreme Court has held that, despite the broad
discretion afforded to a trial court at sentencing, “the
[a]ugmentation of [a] sentence based on a defendant’s
decision to stand on [his or her] right to put the [g]over-
nment to its proof rather than plead guilty is clearly
improper.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 758, 91 A.3d
862 (2014). The court has explained that, “[a]lthough
a court may deny leniency to an accused who . . . elects
to exercise a statutory or constitutional right, a court
may not penalize an accused for exercising such a right
by increasing his or her sentence solely because of that
election.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 762; see also State v. Angel M., 337 Conn.
655, 678, 255 A.3d 801 (2020) (“there is a meaningful
difference between increasing a sentence solely on the
basis of the exercise of a constitutional right and denying
leniency for invoking that right and declining to accept
responsibility”). Notwithstanding the defendant’s claim
to the contrary, the court, in denying the defendant’s
requested sentence modification, neither punished him
nor increased his sentence as a result of his exercising his
constitutional and statutory rights to challenge his con-
victions. At issue in the present case is the court’s denial
of the defendant’s request for a sentence modification,
which, in effect, was a request for leniency. See State v.
Roman, 335 A.3d 782, 785 (R.I. 2025) (“[a] motion to
reduce a sentence . . . is essentially a plea for leniency”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United
States v. Moritz, Docket No. 96-1612, 1997 WL 216211,
*3 (2d Cir. April 29, 1997) (decision without published
opinion, 112 F.3d 506) (same); Shakur v. United States,
44 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); State
v. Wallette, 27 N.W.3d 441 (N.D. 2026) (same); State v.
Carrasco, 566 P.3d 474, 477 (Idaho App. 2025) (same).
Thus, the court’s denial of the requested sentence modi-
fication was a denial of leniency, not a punishment. In
his sparse briefing of this issue, the defendant has failed
State v. Browne

to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
We, therefore, reject this argument.
III
The defendant next argues that the court erred because
it “placed undue emphasis” on static factors such as the
seriousness of the underlying offenses and the defen-
dant’s criminal history and “overlooked mitigating
evidence” supporting his motion, including the letters
of support from family, which showed his “strong sup-
port system and his potential to lead a productive life
upon release.” Our analysis of these arguments requires
little discussion. First, in making these arguments, the
defendant is essentially reformulating his first argu-
ment, which challenged, without supporting authority,
the court’s weighing of the various factors. See State
v. Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn. App. 63. As we stated in
part I of this opinion, the court “reasonably considered
all of the information before it and determined that the
defendant failed to establish good cause to modify his
sentence after weighing the various factors concerning
the defendant’s rehabilitation, sobriety, familial rela-
tionships and support system, his extensive criminal
history and behavior while incarcerated, the serious
nature of the crimes of which he was convicted, and
the impact of the defendant’s crimes on the victims,
law enforcement personnel and Dingwall’s widow and
children.” As we also indicated in part I of this opinion,
the court did not “overlook” the “mitigating evidence”
of the letters that were submitted by the defendant but,
rather, considered that information and determined
that it was outweighed by the gravity of the defendant’s
conduct13 and its continuing effect on the victims, as well
13
We find no merit to the defendant’s contention that, by taking into
consideration the seriousness of his conduct and past criminal history,
the court engaged in a “backward-looking” analysis, which he contends
this court has cautioned against in State v. Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn.
App. 53. This court did not suggest in Brelsford that consideration of
the severity of a defendant’s case is “backward-looking” or inappropri-
ate. Indeed, in Brelsford, this court upheld the trial court’s denial of
the defendant’s motion for a sentence modification in part because of
State v. Browne

as the defendant’s extensive criminal history. See State
v. Dupas, supra, 291 Conn. 785 (trial court “ultimately
considered the ‘heinous nature of [the defendant’s] crime
and the [defendant’s] involvement,’ to be the determining
factor in denying the defendant’s motion for modification
of his sentence,” and “[i]t was not an abuse of discretion
for the court to rely on the horrific nature of [the] crime
in denying the defendant’s motion for modification”).
Accordingly, these arguments fail.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

the severity of the case. State v. Brelsford, supra, 62; see id. (“[T]he
defendant contends that the court improperly relied solely on the severity
of the defendant’s offense when denying his modification. The court’s
decision, which plainly reflects that it weighed several factors, belies
that contention and does not merit further discussion.” (Emphasis
added.)); see also State v. Martin G., supra, 222 Conn. App. 406 (“the
court conducted an appropriate review of the information before it and
determined that the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, and its continu-
ing effect of the victim and her family, outweighed the rehabilitative
efforts he has undertaken since his incarceration”).

************************************************
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************************************************
State v. Browne

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRYANT BROWNE
(AC 47770)
Seeley, Wilson and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had previously been convicted of various crimes in con-
nection with his involvement in engaging police in a high speed pursuit, which
resulted in the death of one police officer, appealed from the trial court’s
judgments denying his motions for sentence modification. The defendant
claimed that the court abused its discretion in finding that he had failed to
establish good cause to modify his sentences. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in how it weighed the various fac-
tors it considered in denying the defendant’s motions for sentence modifica-
tion, specifically, evidence of the defendant’s rehabilitation, sobriety, and
familial relationships, and victim impact testimony and statements, as the
court’s weighing of those factors was consistent with the broad discretion
afforded to it in ruling on such a motion, and the court reasonably found that
the defendant did not establish good cause in light of other factors, including
the seriousness of his crimes, his extensive criminal history, his behavior
while incarcerated, and the impact of the defendant’s crimes on the victims,
law enforcement personnel and the deceased officer’s widow and children.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the defendant’s
postconviction efforts to challenge his conviction through appeals and habeas
corpus proceedings in its analysis of the evidence of the defendant’s remorse,
as it was within the court’s discretion to weigh the information before it and
to determine whether it deemed any remorse expressed by the defendant to
be genuine, and the court’s denial of the defendant’s motions was a denial
of leniency, not a punishment.

The trial court did not overlook mitigating evidence consisting of letters of
support from the defendant’s family and friends in favor of undue empha-
sis on static factors, such as the seriousness of the defendant’s underlying
offenses and criminal history, as the court reasonably considered all of the
information before it and determined that the letters were outweighed by the
gravity of the defendant’s conduct and its continuing effect on the victims,
as well as the defendant’s extensive criminal history.

Argued January 6—officially released May 5, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information, in the first case, charging the
defendant with the crimes of burglary in the first degree,
larceny in the third degree, attempt to commit larceny
in the third degree, conspiracy to commit, inter alia,
burglary in the first degree and disregarding an officer’s
State v. Browne

signal and, substitute information, in the second case,
charging the defendant with the crimes of felony murder,
manslaughter in the first degree and misconduct with a
motor vehicle and, substitute information, in the third
case, charging the defendant with the crime of interfer-
ing with an officer and, substitute information, in the
fourth case, charging the defendant with two counts
each of the crimes of attempt to commit assault in the
first degree, attempt to commit assault of a peace officer
and criminal mischief in the first degree, and with one
count of the crime of reckless endangerment in the first
degree and, substitute motor vehicle complaint charg-
ing the defendant with the crimes of reckless driving
and engaging police in pursuit, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, geographical
area number nine, where the cases were consolidated for
trial and tried to the jury before Clifford, J.; verdicts of
guilty of larceny in the third degree, attempt to com-
mit larceny in the third degree, conspiracy to commit
burglary in the third degree and larceny in the third
degree, disregarding an officer’s signal, misconduct with
a motor vehicle, interfering with an officer, criminal
mischief in the first degree, attempt to commit assault of
a peace officer, reckless driving and engaging an officer
in pursuit; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal and rendered judg-
ments in accordance with the verdicts, and the defendant
appealed to this court, Dranginis, Flynn and Hennessy,
Js., which affirmed the judgments; subsequently, the
court, Baldini, J., denied the defendant’s motions for
sentence modification, and the defendant appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
J. Patten Brown III, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (defendant).
Raynald A. Carre, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, was Michael Gailor, state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Bryant Browne, appeals
from the judgments of the trial court denying his motions
State v. Browne

for sentence modification pursuant to General Statutes
§ 53a-39. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
abused its discretion in finding that he had failed to
establish good cause to modify his sentences. We disagree
and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the court.
The following facts related to the defendant’s underly-
ing convictions, as set forth by this court on his direct
appeal, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal.
“On January 28, 2000, the defendant was an unemployed
drug addict with a $40 a day heroin habit. That morning,
he met his accomplice, Victor Santiago,1 in New Haven
and drove to Middletown. At approximately 11:30 a.m.,
the pair forcibly entered the unoccupied home of the
Fraulino family. They ransacked the house, collecting
jewelry, cash and electronic equipment. Shortly there-
after, Rosemary Fraulino returned home and observed
an unfamiliar motor vehicle in the driveway. She did not
stop at her house but instead called the police on her cel-
lular telephone to alert them to the suspicious occurrence.
“John Labbadia, a Middletown police officer, responded
to the scene and partially blocked the defendant’s vehicle
in the driveway. The defendant and Santiago saw Lab-
badia arrive. When the officer walked to the rear of the
house, they abandoned some of the Fraulinos’ possessions
in the living room and foyer. The defendant got into his
vehicle and sped away with his accomplice.
“Labbadia, believing that he had interrupted a bur-
glary, radioed the police dispatcher. He pursued the
defendant and Santiago on back roads and side streets to
Route 9. George Dingwall, a sergeant on the Middletown
police force, heard Labbadia’s broadcast and joined the
pursuit. A Portland police officer also heard Labbadia’s
broadcast. Three police cruisers with lights and sirens
activated followed the defendant’s vehicle south on Route
9 at a high rate of speed.
1
“Santiago was tried separately.” State v. Browne, 84 Conn. App. 351,
356 n.3, 854 A.2d 13, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 931, 859 A.2d 930 (2004).
State v. Browne

The state police had been alerted, and a number of
troopers positioned themselves at exit six on Route 9. One
trooper placed stop sticks2 across a lane of the highway,
but the defendant successfully avoided them. Several
troopers then joined the chase. The defendant operated
his vehicle in an erratic manner back and forth across
the highway.
“Near exit four in Essex, Dingwall drove his cruiser
beside the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant swerved his
vehicle toward Dingwall’s vehicle. Dingwall lost control
of his cruiser, which spun around and off the highway,
crashing in a heavily wooded portion of the median.
“The defendant continued to drive south on Route 9
at a high rate of speed. Scott Wisner, a state trooper,
positioned his cruiser alongside the defendant’s vehicle.
The defendant swerved toward Wisner’s cruiser, striking
it. Wisner dropped back, and Labbadia moved his cruiser
ahead of the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant’s car
struck the rear of Labbadia’s cruiser, which also spun
out of control and off the highway. The defendant then
drove onto Interstate 95 southbound.
“The state police responded in force. One trooper pre-
ceded the pursuit and warned motorists to move off the
highway. State troopers used their cruisers to block the
entrance ramps to the interstate highway. At exit sixty-
seven, the state troopers deployed stop sticks again, but
the defendant veered off the roadway to avoid them. At
exit sixty-three in Clinton, police cruisers were parked in
the gore between the exit and entrance ramps to the high-
way. State troopers were standing in the gore in another
effort to deploy stop sticks. The defendant saw the trap
and drove off the highway through the gore, coming
dangerously close to the troopers standing there. He
drove onto the entrance ramp and back onto the highway.
2
“Stop sticks are hollow spikes attached to a rollout strip that police
officers can throw across a highway to stop fleeing vehicles. When a tire
passes over a stop stick, the stop stick punctures the tire and causes it
to deflate slowly.” State v. Browne, 84 Conn. App. 351, 356–57 n.4, 854
A.2d 13, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 931, 859 A.2d 930 (2004).
State v. Browne

“The defendant continued to weave through traffic.
Between exits fifty-nine and fifty-eight in Guilford,
Adam Brown, a state trooper, successfully deployed stop
sticks under the tires of the defendant’s vehicle. Never-
theless, the defendant kept going and at exit fifty-seven
attempted to force Robert Hart, a state trooper, off the
highway. The defendant stopped his vehicle, which was
traveling on the rims of its wheels, against the Jersey
barriers near exit fifty-four in Branford.
“When the defendant got out of his vehicle, he said,
‘I’m on drugs, man—real bad—I’m on drugs.’ Person-
alty belonging to the Fraulino family was found in the
defendant’s vehicle. As a state trooper was transporting
the defendant to the state police barracks in Westbrook,
a police radio dispatch broadcasted information that
Dingwall had been transported to a hospital by Life Star
helicopter. In response, the defendant made several unso-
licited remarks: ‘It’s not my fault; I’m on drugs; you can’t
blame me for any of this because I’m on drugs.’ Dingwall
died as a result of his injuries.” (Footnotes in original.)
State v. Browne, 84 Conn. App. 351, 355–58, 854 A.2d
13, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 931, 859 A.2d 930 (2004).
“The defendant was charged in five informations with
numerous criminal and motor vehicle violations, which
were consolidated for trial. The jury convicted him of
larceny in the third degree in violation of General Stat-
utes §§ 53a-124 (a) (2) and 53a-119, attempt to commit
larceny in the third degree in violation of General Stat-
utes §§ 53a-49 (a), 53a-124 (a) (2) and 53a-119, conspiracy
to commit burglary in the third degree in violation of
General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-103, conspiracy
to commit larceny in the third degree in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-124, disregarding an
officer’s signal by engaging an officer in a pursuit result-
ing in death in violation of General Statutes § 14-223
(b), interfering with an officer in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-167a (a), attempt to commit assault of
a peace officer in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-
49 (a) (2) and 53a-167c (a) (1), criminal mischief in the
State v. Browne

first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-115
(a) (1), misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-57, reckless driving in violation
of General Statutes § 14-222 and engaging an officer in
pursuit in violation of General Statutes § 14-223 (b). The
defendant’s total effective sentence was thirty-two years
in the custody of the [C]ommissioner of [C]orrection.”3
Id., 354 n.1.
On January 16, 2024, the defendant filed multiple
motions4 seeking a modification of his sentence in which
he requested that the court reduce his total effective
sentence by six years. In support of the motions, the
defendant’s attorney submitted a letter in which he
represented that the defendant had “completed his edu-
cation [and] critical drug treatment programming,” and
that the defendant had “done everything in his ability to
rehabilitate and prepare to successfully reintegrate into
society.” The attorney further asserted in the letter that
the defendant’s “complete and successful rehabilitation,
coupled with his education, work ethic, and support sys-
tem constitute good cause to reduce his sentence.” The
defendant submitted materials in support of his motions,
such as certificates from programs he had completed
during his incarceration, work appraisals from periods
of incarceration, a handwritten letter from him,5 and
letters of support from the defendant’s family members.
The court, Baldini, J., held a hearing on the motions
on April 23, 2024. During the hearing, the court heard
3
The jury acquitted the defendant “of burglary in the first degree,
conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree, felony murder, man-
slaughter in the first degree, criminal mischief in the first degree and
two counts of attempt to commit assault in the first degree. The jury was
unable to reach a verdict on the charges of attempt to commit assault
of a peace officer and reckless endangerment in the first degree, and the
court declared a mistrial as to those counts.” State v. Browne, supra, 84
Conn. App. 355 n.2. The defendant was sentenced on March 12, 2002.
4
The motions corresponded to the underlying criminal and motor
vehicle cases under which the defendant was convicted.
5
In his handwritten letter dated February 12, 2023, the defendant
stated: “I . . . accept full responsibility for all of the bad decisions that I
made on [January 28, 2000], including not stopping for the Middletown
State v. Browne

from the defendant, his brother, and his attorney, as
well as the state and Kim Raymond, Dingwall’s widow.
A letter from Wisner in opposition to the defendant’s
motions also was read to the court at the hearing.
On May 7, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision denying the defendant’s motions to modify
his sentence. In its decision, the court explained that,
“[i]n evaluating the defendant’s motion[s], the court
. . . considered a variety of factors, some static, and oth-
ers variable. The static factors the court . . . considered
include: (1) the seriousness of the offenses for which
the defendant was convicted; (2) the defendant’s prior
criminal history; and (3) the defendant’s employment,
treatment, and family history prior to his present incar-
ceration. The variable factors the court . . . considered
[were] factors that center on the timeframe following
his convictions. These factors include: (1) whether the
defendant has expressed remorse; (2) whether the defen-
dant has engaged in efforts to rehabilitate himself while
incarcerated; (3) whether the defendant has contributed
to the welfare of others while incarcerated; (4) whether
family, friends, or community members support the
defendant and the defendant’s sentence modification
request; (5) the length of time the defendant has been
incarcerated and any disciplinary history while incarcer-
ated; and (6) and the victims’ positions with respect to
the sentence modification motion.”
The court identified “the seriousness of the crimes
committed” and “[t]he impact of the defendant’s actions”
as important factors in its decision. The court noted:
“[The defendant’s] actions on January 28, 2000, set into
and state police. I come from a hardworking and honest family back-
ground. My using drugs and my addiction had made it impossible for me
to stay clean or sober for many years prior to and leading up to [January
28, 2000]. [January 28, 2000], was the last day I used drugs. My family
and I have been dev[a]stated by this loss of life. I have remained drug
free for [twenty-three] years, on my own, without any help or assistance
from the [Department of Correction]. This [has] been the longest I have
been clean and sober in many years. I can do better; I will do better. I
have [two] granddaughters that I have never met and a son that needs
my help to raise them.”
State v. Browne

motion a series of events, which significantly impacted
the lives of many, including the owners of the home that
the defendant stole from, the many law enforcement
officials who risked their lives to keep the public safe and
aided in the apprehension of the defendant, members of
the public who witnessed the traumatic events, and the
multiple victims of these crimes, including . . . Labbadia
. . . Wisner . . . Dingwall, and . . . Dingwall’s family. The
defendant committed multiple criminal acts evidencing
a pure disregard for others and the law. He attributes
his criminal conduct to his drug use, but his decision to
ingest drugs was a volitional one and so were the actions
that ensued thereafter.”
With respect to the impact that the defendant’s crimes
had on his victims and their communities, the court
explained that, “[i]n . . . Wisner’s statement, he reflected
upon the events of January 28, 2000, the dangerousness
of the defendant’s conduct, and the effect the defendant’s
actions has had upon him and his fellow law enforcement
officers. . . . Raymond, the victim’s widow, tearfully
discussed how her family continues to suffer the loss
of her late husband. . . . Dingwall was a hard-working
family man who served proudly for nineteen years . . .
as a member of the Middletown Police Department. He
was eleven . . . months away from retirement and aspired
to become a teacher. He had two children, a son and a
daughter, who were nine . . . years old and twelve . . .
years old when he died. Today, his children are thirty-
four . . . and thirty-seven . . . years old and they have
been cheated out of the opportunity to have a relation-
ship with their father. Raymond described the ‘forever
loss’ that she and her family experience, noting that
holidays, celebrations, and even regular days are never
quite the same. Despite the passage of twenty-four . . .
years, the pain of losing . . . Dingwall endures and the
defendant’s actions on January 28, 2000, continue to
impact the lives of many.”
The court next rejected the defendant’s claim that he
has shown true remorse for his actions, in part, because
State v. Browne

he continues to challenge his convictions. Specifically,
the court reasoned that “[t]he defendant’s claim that
he accepts full responsibility for his actions is under-
mined by [his] many efforts to challenge the propriety of
his conviction[s],” including the direct appeal in which
this court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. The
court mentioned subsequent challenges to the defen-
dant’s convictions, including “multiple habeas corpus
petitions, claiming insufficiency of counsel by his trial,
appellate, and habeas attorneys, including one petition
that remains pending. [See] Browne v. Commissioner
of Correction, 158 Conn. App. 1, 125 A.3d 1014, cert.
denied, 318 Conn. 906, 122 A.3d 634 (2015); Browne
v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 10, 2023) (Newson,
J.). In these matters, the defendant has raised claims
that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to employ
an expert witness to challenge the state’s theories of
causation and intent as to the death of . . . Dingwall and
failing to retain an expert to ascertain the value of the
items stolen during the residential burglary. Addition-
ally, the defendant has claimed that the three officers
who testified about the defendant’s conduct [that] led
to . . . Dingwall’s death were ‘untruthful’ in their testi-
mony. In 2022, he applied for a sentence commutation,
and it was determined that he did not meet the criteria
for a commutation. The court acknowledges and appre-
ciates the defendant’s right to pursue postjudgment
relief, however, the claims raised in these proceedings
undermine the defendant’s representations that he fully
accepts responsibility for his actions. In addition, when
presented with the opportunity to apologize to the many
victims of his crimes at the hearing on his motion, the
defendant declined to do so.” As a result, the trial court
concluded that the defendant “ha[d] not demonstrated
sincere regret for the crimes he has committed.”
The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that he is
“ ‘fully rehabilitated’.” Specifically, although the defen-
dant submitted a certificate for his general equivalency
degree (GED), the court found that he had not completed
State v. Browne

his education while incarcerated for the underlying con-
victions but, rather, obtained his GED in the 1980s while
incarcerated in Massachusetts. The court also found
that “several of the program certificates the defendant
submitted to support his claim that he is rehabilitated
were not for programs completed during his present
incarceration.”
The court noted that, even though the defendant had
“served a substantial portion of his sentence—twenty-
four . . . years—[and] . . . ha[d] maintained various
employment positions while incarcerated and received
‘good’ to ‘excellent’ ratings from his supervisors,” he
“made limited efforts to address the obstacles that have
contributed to his incarceration. The documents pro-
vided by the defendant show that, in the time that the
defendant has been incarcerated, he completed only
three programs: the People Empowering People program
(2014–2015), the Beyond Fear program (2012), and an
anger management program (2023). Several of the pro-
gram certificates the defendant submitted to support
his claim that he is rehabilitated were not for programs
completed during his present incarceration. Instead,
they are for programs that the defendant completed
prior to his present incarceration.” (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) Moreover, the court found that the defendant had
not submitted adequate documentation demonstrating
that he had “completed ‘critical drug treatment pro-
gramming’ during his present incarceration,” as “[t]he
documentation provided show[ed] that the defendant
received substance abuse treatment while incarcerated
in Connecticut and Massachusetts prior to committing
the offenses for which he was convicted.” (Emphasis in
original.) As a result, the court concluded that “[i]t [was]
evident that the defendant ha[d] demonstrated minimal
efforts to avail himself of opportunities for growth,
rehabilitation, and contribution while incarcerated for
these offenses. Moreover, it is apparent that rehabilita-
tive efforts prior to the commission of the crimes for
which he is incarcerated were not significant enough
State v. Browne

to rehabilitate him or to deter him from engaging in
criminal behavior.”
Next, the court acknowledged the letters that it had
received in support of the defendant’s sentence modifica-
tion. Specifically, the court noted that “[i]t is undisputed
that the defendant has a loving and closely connected
family who remain committed to assisting the defendant
and to supporting him upon his release. Many of the
letters suggest that the punishment that the defendant
received for his actions is disproportionate and draco-
nian. See letters from Ina Webb Bryant (the defendant
‘has not been convicted of manslaughter or murder but
for running from the police’); Alexis Soares (‘the prison
system should be one of rehabilitation, rather than per-
petual retribution . . . [and] one horrible action in a dark
moment of someone’s life should not define who they
are forever’); [and] Debra Canzater (‘I am praying that
the court finds it in their heart to grant him an early
release due to a bad decision he made over twenty years
ago’). It is obvious that these advocates are unaware of
the defendant’s robust and abhorrent criminal history.”
Finally, the court found that the defendant was not
able to “remain at liberty without violating the law” and
noted that “[t]he defendant has a multistate criminal
history that dates back to 1986.”6 Moreover, the court
emphasized the fact that the defendant was on parole
when he was arrested for the present offenses and was
involved in a police car chase one month before he engaged
in the conduct giving rise to his present incarceration.
The defendant also was convicted and sentenced for
other crimes, including, “on March 28, 2002, [he] was
6
In addition to the eleven offenses of which the defendant was convicted
with respect to his present incarceration, the court found that he had
“at least thirty-three . . . other convictions, [including] . . . twelve . . .
burglary convictions, five . . . breaking and entering convictions, four
. . . failure to appear convictions, three . . . larceny convictions, two
. . . possession of narcotics convictions, one . . . robbery conviction, one
. . . escape conviction, and one . . . engaging police in pursuit convic-
tion,” which was one of the same charges of which he was convicted of
in relation to the present matter.
State v. Browne

convicted of [attempt to commit] assault on a public
safety officer in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-167c
[for which he was] sentenced to twenty-five . . . months
to be served concurrently to the present sentence,” and,
“[o]n November 21, 2002, [he] was convicted of reckless
endangerment in the first degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-63 [for which he was] sentenced to seven
. . . months to be served consecutively to the present sen-
tence. These convictions relate[d] to additional criminal
conduct by the defendant on January 28, 2000.”
The court also took note of the defendant’s contin-
ued “misconduct notwithstanding his incarceration,”
including his December 7, 2012, conviction of crimi-
nal contempt of court in violation of General Statutes
§ 51-33a, for which he was sentenced to six months of
incarceration, which was to be served consecutively to
the present sentence.7 Further, the court detailed the
five disciplinary tickets that were issued to the defendant
during his present incarceration, with the most recent
one having been issued in 2016.8 The court ultimately
concluded that “[t]he defendant has demonstrated that
he is not amenable to rehabilitation and is not deterred by
punishment,” thus, that he “ha[d] not established good
cause to modify [his] sentence.” This appeal followed.
We begin with our standard of review and the relevant
legal principles that guide our resolution of this appeal.
“[General Statutes §] 53a-39 (a) provides: Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section, at any time
during an executed period of incarceration, the sentenc-
ing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause
shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant dis-
charged, or order the defendant discharged on probation
7
When asked at the hearing to elaborate on the conduct that gave rise
to his conviction of criminal contempt of court, the defendant stated
that he had a “little discussion with the judge and that’s what he did.”
No further explanation was offered.
8
The court indicated that “[t]he offenses for which the tickets were
issued were for interfering with safety and security (2001), disobeying
a direct order (2003), fighting (2008), security tampering (2012), and
public indecency (2016).”
State v. Browne

or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that
to which the defendant could have been originally sen-
tenced. [I]n arriving at its sentencing determination, the
sentencing court may appropriately conduct an inquiry
broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information [it] may consider or the source from which
it may come. . . . [T]his broad discretion applies with
equal force to a sentencing court’s decision regarding a
sentence modification . . . . State v. Dupas, 291 Conn.
778, 783, 970 A.2d 102 (2009). Accordingly, we review
a court’s judgment granting or denying a motion to
modify a sentence for abuse of discretion. See id. An
abuse of discretion exists when a court could have cho-
sen different alternatives but has decided the matter so
arbitrarily as to vitiate logic, or has decided it based on
improper or irrelevant factors. . . . State v. Rivera, 200
Conn. App. 487, 493, 240 A.3d 728 (2020), aff’d, 343
Conn. 745, 275 A.3d 1195 (2022). As such, [i]n determin-
ing whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Generally speak-
ing, under this deferential standard, [w]here the trial
court has properly considered all of the offenses proved
and imposed a sentence within the applicable statutory
limitations, there is no abuse of discretion. . . . State v.
Dupas, supra, 783.” (Footnotes omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Martin G., 222 Conn. App.
395, 403–404, 305 A.3d 324 (2023), cert. denied, 348
Conn. 944, 308 A.3d 34 (2024).
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding that he did not estab-
lish good cause to warrant a sentence modification. The
defendant raises a number of arguments in support of
his claim, which we address in turn.
I
We first address the defendant’s challenge to the
weight the court afforded to evidence of his rehabilita-
tion, sobriety, and familial relationships, and to victim
State v. Browne

impact testimony and statements.9 The defendant argues
that good cause existed to modify his sentence in part
because, while incarcerated, he had engaged in programs,
received positive work assessments, and maintained
sobriety. He contends that the court, however, “mini-
mized [his] rehabilitation efforts,” especially given that
Connecticut policy restricts the availability of “certain
programs” to inmates nearing a discharge or parole date,
and improperly relied on disciplinary tickets that he had
received while incarcerated as evidence of his inability
to follow the law. He further contends that those dis-
ciplinary tickets did not undermine his claim of good
cause because they were issued for “minor administra-
tive matters” that were nonviolent in nature and not
related to drugs.10
In a similar fashion, the defendant also asserts that
the court “discounted the effort necessary for [him] to
achieve and maintain sobriety and loving relationships
with his family,” especially in light of the uncontro-
verted evidence of his sustained sobriety, the letters of
support from family and community members, and the
testimony from his brother at the hearing regarding a
plan for the defendant’s reentry into society. Finally,
although he recognizes that “victim impact statements
are an essential component of sentence modification pro-
ceedings,” the defendant argues that the court “placed
disproportionate weight on the [written statement] of . . .
Wisner” and that the victim impact statements should
have been “balanced against the broader penological
objectives of sentencing.” As a result, he contends that
the court’s “undue emphasis on these statements led to
an unbalanced evaluation of the ‘good cause’ standard.”
We are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion
in its weighing of this evidence.
9
In part II of this opinion, we address separately the defendant’s
claim that the court improperly discounted the evidence demonstrat-
ing his remorse.
10
The defendant’s assertion in his appellate reply brief that the state
mischaracterized the nature of his institutional conduct, including
his disciplinary history, is unavailing and unsupported by the record.
State v. Browne

As we have indicated, the court set forth in its deci-
sion a variety of factors that it considered in denying the
defendant’s motions for sentence modification. Many of
those factors are similar to factors that are considered by
the Board of Parole and Pardons (parole board) in review-
ing applications for parole. See State v. Brelsford, 227
Conn. App. 53, 62, 319 A.3d 763 (“in reviewing applica-
tions for sentence modifications of definite sentences,
[the sentencing court] performs a function similar to
that of a parole board . . . and [this court] has affirmed
the consideration of [factors set forth in the statute
governing parole eligibility, General Statutes] § 54-125a
(f) (4) . . . when considering sentence modifications”
(citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 912, 324 A.3d 142 (2024); see
also State v. Toste, 231 Conn. App. 866, 873, 334 A.3d
1083 (it is appropriate for trial court, when ruling on
motion for sentence modification, to consider statutory
factors considered by parole board when deciding to grant
parole), cert. granted on other grounds, 352 Conn. 908,
336 A.3d 81 (2025).11
With respect to the court’s consideration of the
evidence of the defendant’s rehabilitation, the court
acknowledged the defendant’s participation in three
11
Those factors include whether “(A) there is a reasonable probability
that such person will live and remain at liberty without violating the
law, (B) the benefits to such person and society that would result from
such person’s release to community supervision substantially outweigh
the benefits to such person and society that would result from such
person’s continued incarceration, and (C) such person has demonstrated
substantial rehabilitation since the date such crime or crimes were
committed considering such person’s character, background and his-
tory, as demonstrated by factors, including, but not limited to, such
person’s correctional record, the age and circumstances of such person
as of the date of the commission of the crime or crimes, whether such
person has demonstrated remorse and increased maturity since the date
of the commission of the crime or crimes, such person’s contributions
to the welfare of other persons through service, such person’s efforts
to overcome substance abuse, addiction, trauma, lack of education or
obstacles that such person may have faced as a child or youth in the
adult correctional system, the opportunities for rehabilitation in the
adult correctional system, whether the person has also applied for or
received a sentence modification and the overall degree of such person’s
State v. Browne

programs and his positive work assessments while incar-
cerated but, nevertheless, found that, during the course
of the twenty-four years of his incarceration that he has
served, he “made limited efforts to address the obstacles
that have contributed to his incarceration.” The court
reached this conclusion, in part, because much of the
evidence submitted by the defendant concerning his
rehabilitative efforts involved programs or education
completed prior to his present incarceration. As a result,
the court found that the efforts made by the defendant
during his present incarceration were “minimal,” and
that any prior rehabilitative efforts were insufficient in
light of his engagement in the criminal conduct underly-
ing his convictions for which he is presently incarcerated.
Although the defendant contends that he had limited
opportunities for rehabilitation during the past twenty-
four years of his incarceration, he does not contest that
he participated in only three programs during his present
incarceration; moreover, this was but one factor in the
court’s analysis of the overall degree of the defendant’s
rehabilitation.
In assessing the rehabilitation evidence, the court also
properly took into consideration the defendant’s cor-
rectional record, which included five disciplinary tickets
that were issued to the defendant during his present
incarceration, as well as his conviction of criminal con-
tempt of court and other crimes related to his criminal
conduct on January 28, 2000. Although the defendant
contends that the tickets were issued for nonviolent con-
duct, they nonetheless were evidence of the defendant’s
conduct while incarcerated, and the defendant has not
cited any authority demonstrating that they should not
have factored into the court’s decision. The court’s deci-
sion regarding the defendant’s rehabilitation also was
made with due consideration for the defendant’s multi-
state criminal history dating back to 1986, which includes
at least thirty-three other convictions in addition to the
convictions underlying his motions, as well as the fact
rehabilitation considering the nature and circumstances of the crime
or crimes.” General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (4).
State v. Browne

that the defendant was on parole when he was arrested
for the present offenses and was involved in a police chase
one month before he engaged in similar conduct giving
rise to his present incarceration. As a result of this evi-
dence, the court concluded that the defendant was not
able to “remain at liberty without violating the law,”
and that he “has demonstrated that he is not amenable
to rehabilitation and is not deterred by punishment.”
These considerations properly factored into the court’s
determination as to whether the defendant demonstrated
good cause for a modification of his sentence.
To the extent that the defendant is arguing that the
court should have given specific weight to his “rehabili-
tation efforts,” he has provided no authority to support
such an argument. Moreover, our Supreme Court rejected
a similar argument in State v. Dupas, supra, 291 Conn.
786. In Dupas, the defendant appealed from the denial
of his application for sentence modification, claiming
that the trial court abused its discretion because “the
court’s decision ‘assigned no value’ to the defendant’s
postsentence cooperation with the state. Put another
way, the defendant . . . argue[d] that because his original
sentence was determined prior to his cooperation with
the state, his subsequent cooperation required that the
sentencing court reduce his sentence, and that the court
had discretion only as to the amount of the reduction.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id. The defendant’s claim in
Dupas was based on the fact that the trial court did not
expressly state in its memorandum of decision why it
had determined that the defendant’s postsentence coop-
eration was not sufficient to warrant a reduction of his
sentence. Id., 786–87. Our Supreme Court rejected the
defendant’s claim, holding that, “although the court
did not explain precisely why it had considered evidence
of the defendant’s cooperation insufficient to justify a
reduction in the defendant’s sentence, it is clear from the
memorandum of decision that the court considered that
cooperation in ruling on the motion. The memorandum
of decision also clearly stated the basis for the court’s
denial of the motion—the heinous nature of the crime
State v. Browne

and the defendant’s involvement in it. A reasonable
interpretation of the memorandum of decision is that
the court considered the defendant’s cooperation, but
deemed that cooperation insufficient, in light of the
heinous nature of the crime . . . .” Id., 787.
Similarly, in State v. Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn. App.
63, this court held that, “[a]lthough the defendant argues
that the [trial] court should have relied more heavily
on his rehabilitation and certain other factors, he does
not cite any legal authority that governs the degree of
weight a court must afford factors that it considers in
determining whether good cause has been established, nor
are we aware of any. Here, the court expressly considered
the steps the defendant has taken toward rehabilitation
but concluded that those steps did not outweigh other
factors that it considered. The court’s consideration of
all of these factors was consistent with the broad discre-
tion afforded to courts in ruling on motions for sentence
modification.” (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
In the present case, the defendant also has not directed
this court to any authority governing the degree of
weight that a trial court must afford to the factors it
considers in its good cause determination. Likewise, it
is clear from the court’s memorandum of decision that
it did consider the defendant’s rehabilitation but found
that the defendant did not establish good cause in light of
other factors, including the serious nature of his crimes,
which the court found to be “an important factor in its
determination,” and because the defendant’s rehabilita-
tion was minimal and the materials he provided did not
sufficiently demonstrate that he had “avail[ed] himself
of opportunities for growth, rehabilitation, and contri-
bution while incarcerated for these offenses.” See State
v. Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn. App. 63; see also State v.
Martin G., supra, 222 Conn. App. 406 (trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant did not
establish good cause for sentence modification in light
of gravity of defendant’s conduct and its continuing
effect on victim and victim’s family, which outweighed
State v. Browne

defendant’s rehabilitative efforts). Consequently, we
are unpersuaded by the defendant’s argument that the
court improperly weighed the rehabilitation evidence
against the nature and circumstances of his crimes and
the impact of the defendant’s crimes on his victims.
The record also shows that the court specifically
acknowledged the defendant’s remarks to the court at
the hearing that he has remained sober and his “good to
excellent” work ethic during incarceration, as well as
his positive work appraisals. The court also “considered
the numerous letters written in support of the defen-
dant’s” motions for sentence modification and recognized
that it was “undisputed that the defendant has a loving
and closely connected family who remain committed to
assisting the defendant and to supporting him upon his
release.” Nevertheless, the court also found that the
contents of many of the letters suggested that the defen-
dant’s punishment was disproportionate to his actions,
and, in making that finding, it specifically referred to
statements in letters submitted by the defendant, which
led the court to conclude that the persons making the
statements were “unaware of the defendant’s robust and
abhorrent criminal history.”12 The defendant’s sobriety
and his familial support system did factor into the court’s
decision, but as we have indicated, the court considered
a multitude of factors in reaching its decision, and it
necessarily must have determined that other factors
outweighed the progress the defendant has made with
his sobriety and the support system he would have from
family members upon his release from incarceration. In
his appellate briefs, the defendant fails to explain how,
or provide support for why, the court abused its discre-
tion in this respect.
12
At the hearing, the court stated that, when it read the letters, a few
of them stood out because they suggested that the conduct underlying
the defendant’s convictions and sentences was “a one-time event . . . .”
The court noted further that the persons who submitted the letters were
perplexed that someone would receive sentences like the one imposed on
the defendant “for a one-time event . . . .” After making those comments,
the court asked the defendant’s counsel if those people were aware of
the defendant’s history, to which counsel replied: “I don’t believe they
were fully as aware . . . .”
State v. Browne

The defendant’s briefing of his argument that the court
placed disproportionate weight on the victim impact
testimony and statements is equally devoid of authority
or legal analysis demonstrating how the court abused its
discretion in its weighing of this evidence. In his appellate
reply brief, the defendant asserts that Ҥ 53a-39 (a) makes
clear that sentence modification remains available even
for serious crimes, provided good cause is shown,” and
that “[t]o allow victim impact alone to eclipse rehabilita-
tion evidence would render the statutory scheme illusory
for any individual convicted of a violent or high-profile
offense.” (Emphasis added.) This argument lacks merit
for two reasons. First, there is nothing in the record
establishing that the court relied solely on the victim
impact testimony or statements in reaching its deter-
mination that good cause had not been established, as
it is clear from the court’s decision that it considered a
number of factors and all of the evidence and informa-
tion before it. Second, even if the court afforded more
weight to the victim impact testimony and statements,
the defendant has not directed this court to any author-
ity demonstrating why that would constitute an abuse of
the court’s discretion. See State v. Brelsford, supra, 227
Conn. App. 63. In fact, this court previously has found
no abuse of discretion in a trial court’s weighing of the
relevant sentencing factors when the trial court “con-
cluded that the circumstances the defendant presented in
support of his [requested sentence modification] did not
rise to the level of good cause in light of the seriousness
of the offenses [and] the impact on the victim’s family . . .
notwithstanding the fact that [the defendant had] served
in excess of the twenty-five year mandatory minimum
. . . . See . . . State v. Martin G., [supra, 222 Conn. App.
406] (the court conducted an appropriate review of the
information before it and determined that the gravity
of the defendant’s conduct, and its continuing effect on
the victim and her family, outweighed the rehabilitative
efforts he has undertaken since his incarceration) . . . .”
(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Toste, supra, 231 Conn. App.
875–76.
State v. Browne

In the present case, the court viewed the seriousness
of the defendant’s crimes to be an important factor,
stating that the defendant’s actions, which evidenced “a
pure disregard for others and the law,” “set into motion
a series of events [that] significantly impacted the lives
of many,” including the owners of the home he burglar-
ized, law enforcement personnel, “members of the public
who witnessed the traumatic events, and the multiple
victims of [his] crimes . . . .” The statement submitted by
Wisner and the testimony from Raymond impressed on
the court the dangerousness of the defendant’s conduct
and the enduring painful impact it has had on their lives,
as well as the lives of fellow law enforcement officers
and Dingwall’s children, who, as the court found, were
“cheated out of the opportunity to have a relationship
with their father.”
As we have stated in this opinion, the trial court has
wide discretion in determining whether a defendant’s
sentence should be modified. See State v. Martin G.,
supra, 222 Conn. App. 404. The record demonstrates
that the court reasonably considered all of the infor-
mation before it and determined that the defendant
failed to establish good cause to modify his sentence after
weighing the various factors concerning the defendant’s
rehabilitation, sobriety, familial relationships and sup-
port system, his extensive criminal history and behavior
while incarcerated, the serious nature of the crimes of
which he was convicted, and the impact of the defendant’s
crimes on the victims, law enforcement personnel and
Dingwall’s widow and children. In doing so, the court,
which noted that “[t]he defendant’s actions have had, and
continue to have, a profound impact on the victims and
the community,” necessarily determined that any reha-
bilitative efforts by the defendant were outweighed by
the gravity of his conduct and its impact on the victims.
Contrary to the defendant’s claims, the court’s decision
in that respect does not undermine the rehabilitative
efforts that he has achieved or any positive steps he has
taken during his period of incarceration; rather, those
efforts must be considered in light of the other factors,
State v. Browne

which, in this case, weighed heavily against a sentence
modification.
We conclude that the court’s weighing of the factors
was “consistent with the broad discretion afforded to it
in ruling on a motion for sentence modification. See, e.g.,
State v. Martin G., [supra, 222 Conn. App. 406] (court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that defen-
dant failed to establish good cause to warrant sentence
modification where gravity of defendant’s conduct and
its continuing effect on victim and her family outweighed
defendant’s rehabilitative efforts) . . . see also State v.
Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn. App. 63–64 (rejecting defen-
dant’s claim that court should have relied more heavily
on rehabilitative efforts and holding that court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that defendant failed
to establish good cause to warrant sentence modification
where defendant’s rehabilitative efforts did not outweigh
factors weighing against sentence modification).” State
v. Reyes, 229 Conn. App. 121, 128, 326 A.3d 589, cert.
denied, 350 Conn. 934, 327 A.3d 385 (2024); see also
State v. Toste, supra, 231 Conn. App. 875 (“[i]t was
within court’s discretion to weigh all of the information
before it to determine whether the defendant established
good cause to justify a modification of his sentence”).
It appears from the arguments raised in the defen-
dant’s appellate briefs that he is, in effect, asking this
court to reevaluate and weigh the evidence to reach a
different conclusion. That, however, is not our role on an
appeal from a denial of a sentence modification. Rather,
as we already have indicated, “we review a court’s judg-
ment granting or denying [a motion for a] . . . sentence
[modification] for abuse of discretion. An abuse of dis-
cretion exists when a court could have chosen different
alternatives but has decided the matter so arbitrarily as
to vitiate logic, or has decided it based on improper or
irrelevant factors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Toste, supra, 231 Conn. App. 870. “[E]very
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation
State v. Browne

marks omitted.) Id.; see also id. (§ 53a-39 (a) “does not
limit the information a court may consider in determin-
ing whether a defendant has shown good cause for the
requested modification, nor does it suggest that the
court’s discretion is somehow limited” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). In the present case, affording every
reasonable presumption in favor of the court’s ruling,
we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion
in how it weighed the various factors.
II
Next, the defendant argues that the court improp-
erly “discounted” evidence of his remorse. Specifically,
he contends that the court discounted the remorse he
expressed in his letter, and that the court’s analysis of
the remorse evidence was improperly influenced by its
reliance on the defendant’s postconviction efforts to chal-
lenge his convictions through appeals and habeas corpus
proceedings. In a few sentences in his principal appellate
brief, without citation to legal authority or substantive
analysis, the defendant asserts that, although “the court
acknowledged the [defendant’s] right to seek postjudg-
ment relief, it improperly concluded that such actions
undermined [the defendant’s] expression of remorse,”
and that “[t]he pursuit of legal remedies is a constitu-
tionally protected right and does not inherently negate
genuine remorse for one’s actions.” In his appellate reply
brief, he further asserts that he “cannot be penalized”
for having invoked his constitutional rights, and he
cites North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89
S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), overruled on other
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S. Ct.
2201, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1989), for the proposition that
“[d]ue process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully attacked
his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he
receives after a new trial.”
Our analysis of this argument requires little discus-
sion. In its decision, the court stated that “[r]emorse is
not just a feeling or expression; it is a genuine change
State v. Browne

in behavior or attitude. While words can be easily said,
actions require effort and commitment that demonstrate
a true willingness to change and make amends. Consistent
actions that show accountability, empathy, and efforts to
repair harm caused by the wrongdoing provide tangible
evidence of remorse.” Although the defendant contends
that his letter and the letters from his family submit-
ted in support of his motions sufficiently demonstrate
his remorse for his actions, the court also had before it
Wisner’s letter, in which he stated: “I would like to think
in retrospect [the defendant] feels as if the decisions he
made that day were the worst he has made in life. I am
unaware of any show of remorse on his behalf directed
toward any of the law enforcement officers and affected
family members since this occurrence. In this case, his
failure to extend any type of remorseful message has
worked against him, as any apologetic indication would
have substantially tempered my remarks in this venue.”
Moreover, although, at the hearing, the defendant’s
brother offered an apology to the Dingwall family on
behalf of the defendant’s family, the defendant himself,
in his statements to the court at the hearing and in his
written statement, offered no such apology. It was within
the court’s discretion to weigh the information before it
and determine whether it deemed any remorse expressed
by the defendant to be genuine.
The court also stated that “[t]he defendant’s claim
that he accepts responsibility for his actions is under-
mined by the many efforts [he has taken] to challenge
the propriety of his convictions.” As examples, the court
referenced the defendant’s appeal from his convictions
and the multiple habeas petitions that he has pursued.
The court stated further: “The court acknowledges and
appreciates the defendant’s right to pursue postjudgment
relief, however, the claims raised in [those] proceedings
undermine the defendant’s representations that he fully
accepts responsibility for his actions. In addition, when
presented with the opportunity to apologize to the many
victims of his crimes at the hearing on [these] motion[s],
the defendant declined to do so. The court finds that the
State v. Browne

defendant has not demonstrated sincere regret for the
crimes he has committed.”
Our Supreme Court has held that, despite the broad
discretion afforded to a trial court at sentencing, “the
[a]ugmentation of [a] sentence based on a defendant’s
decision to stand on [his or her] right to put the [g]over-
nment to its proof rather than plead guilty is clearly
improper.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 758, 91 A.3d
862 (2014). The court has explained that, “[a]lthough
a court may deny leniency to an accused who . . . elects
to exercise a statutory or constitutional right, a court
may not penalize an accused for exercising such a right
by increasing his or her sentence solely because of that
election.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 762; see also State v. Angel M., 337 Conn.
655, 678, 255 A.3d 801 (2020) (“there is a meaningful
difference between increasing a sentence solely on the
basis of the exercise of a constitutional right and denying
leniency for invoking that right and declining to accept
responsibility”). Notwithstanding the defendant’s claim
to the contrary, the court, in denying the defendant’s
requested sentence modification, neither punished him
nor increased his sentence as a result of his exercising his
constitutional and statutory rights to challenge his con-
victions. At issue in the present case is the court’s denial
of the defendant’s request for a sentence modification,
which, in effect, was a request for leniency. See State v.
Roman, 335 A.3d 782, 785 (R.I. 2025) (“[a] motion to
reduce a sentence . . . is essentially a plea for leniency”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United
States v. Moritz, Docket No. 96-1612, 1997 WL 216211,
*3 (2d Cir. April 29, 1997) (decision without published
opinion, 112 F.3d 506) (same); Shakur v. United States,
44 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); State
v. Wallette, 27 N.W.3d 441 (N.D. 2026) (same); State v.
Carrasco, 566 P.3d 474, 477 (Idaho App. 2025) (same).
Thus, the court’s denial of the requested sentence modi-
fication was a denial of leniency, not a punishment. In
his sparse briefing of this issue, the defendant has failed
State v. Browne

to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
We, therefore, reject this argument.
III
The defendant next argues that the court erred because
it “placed undue emphasis” on static factors such as the
seriousness of the underlying offenses and the defen-
dant’s criminal history and “overlooked mitigating
evidence” supporting his motion, including the letters
of support from family, which showed his “strong sup-
port system and his potential to lead a productive life
upon release.” Our analysis of these arguments requires
little discussion. First, in making these arguments, the
defendant is essentially reformulating his first argu-
ment, which challenged, without supporting authority,
the court’s weighing of the various factors. See State
v. Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn. App. 63. As we stated in
part I of this opinion, the court “reasonably considered
all of the information before it and determined that the
defendant failed to establish good cause to modify his
sentence after weighing the various factors concerning
the defendant’s rehabilitation, sobriety, familial rela-
tionships and support system, his extensive criminal
history and behavior while incarcerated, the serious
nature of the crimes of which he was convicted, and
the impact of the defendant’s crimes on the victims,
law enforcement personnel and Dingwall’s widow and
children.” As we also indicated in part I of this opinion,
the court did not “overlook” the “mitigating evidence”
of the letters that were submitted by the defendant but,
rather, considered that information and determined
that it was outweighed by the gravity of the defendant’s
conduct13 and its continuing effect on the victims, as well
13
We find no merit to the defendant’s contention that, by taking into
consideration the seriousness of his conduct and past criminal history,
the court engaged in a “backward-looking” analysis, which he contends
this court has cautioned against in State v. Brelsford, supra, 227 Conn.
App. 53. This court did not suggest in Brelsford that consideration of
the severity of a defendant’s case is “backward-looking” or inappropri-
ate. Indeed, in Brelsford, this court upheld the trial court’s denial of
the defendant’s motion for a sentence modification in part because of
State v. Browne

as the defendant’s extensive criminal history. See State
v. Dupas, supra, 291 Conn. 785 (trial court “ultimately
considered the ‘heinous nature of [the defendant’s] crime
and the [defendant’s] involvement,’ to be the determining
factor in denying the defendant’s motion for modification
of his sentence,” and “[i]t was not an abuse of discretion
for the court to rely on the horrific nature of [the] crime
in denying the defendant’s motion for modification”
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, these arguments fail.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

the severity of the case. State v. Brelsford, supra, 62; see id. (“[T]he
defendant contends that the court improperly relied solely on the severity
of the defendant’s offense when denying his modification. The court’s
decision, which plainly reflects that it weighed several factors, belies
that contention and does not merit further discussion.” (Emphasis
added.)); see also State v. Martin G., supra, 222 Conn. App. 406 (“the
court conducted an appropriate review of the information before it and
determined that the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, and its continu-
ing effect of the victim and her family, outweighed the rehabilitative
efforts he has undertaken since his incarceration”).