In re Ricari B.

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In re Ricari B.

IN RE RICARI B.*
(AC 49119)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgment terminating
his parental rights with respect to his minor child. The father claimed that the
court improperly determined that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from
the reunification efforts of the Department of Children and Families. Held:

The respondent father’s appeal was not moot, despite the claim of the peti-
tioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, that the father had
challenged only one of the two bases for the trial court’s determination that
the statutory (§ 17a-112 (j) (1)) requirements for the termination of parental
rights had been satisfied, as the court did not make a finding by clear and
convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts to
reunify the respondent with the child.

This court concluded that the trial court’s determination that the respondent
father was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunifica-
tion efforts was supported by sufficient evidence, including evidence that
the father had refused to communicate with the department for a five month
period, that he had failed to benefit from counseling and substance abuse
services, that he had tested positive for substances on numerous occasions,
that he was inconsistent in complying with substance use tests, and that
he had acted aggressively with probation staff, treatment providers, and
department staff.

Argued April 29—officially released May 20, 2026**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
*
In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-
142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in
this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall
be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein
and upon order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d)
(3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be
protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining
order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that
person’s identity may be ascertained.
**
May 20, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opin-
ion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
In re Ricari B.

Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport, Juvenile
Matters, where the case was tried to the court, Skyers,
J.; judgment terminating the respondents’ parental
rights, from which the respondent father appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(respondent father).
Stephen G. Vitelli, deputy associate attorney general,
with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney
general, and Nisa Khan, former assistant attorney gen-
eral, for the appellee (petitioner).
Rebecca A. Rebollo, for the minor child.

Opinion

ALVORD, J. The respondent father, Ricardo B.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in
favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating his parental rights with respect
to his minor child, Ricari B.1 On appeal, the respondent
claims that the court improperly determined that he
was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunifica-
tion efforts of the Department of Children and Families
(department).2 We affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which were found by the trial
court, and procedural history are relevant to our review.
The department became involved with the child at birth
upon receiving a referral after Dakota A. (Dakota), the
child’s mother, tested positive for marijuana and ben-
zodiazepines. “From birth [at twenty-three weeks, the
child] was a medically complex child and was considered
a micropremie. He stayed in the [neonatal intensive care
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of Dakota A., the respon-
dent mother of the child. She has not appealed from the termination
of her parental rights. All references in this opinion to the respondent
are to Ricardo B. only.
2
The attorney for the minor child filed a statement adopting the brief
of the petitioner in this appeal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and
79a-6 (c).
In re Ricari B.

unit] at Yale New Haven Hospital for over eight months:
from birth until April 12, 2021. . . .
“On January 22, 2021, the department received
[another] referral . . . due to a domestic dispute between
Dakota and [the respondent]. Dakota reported to [the
department] that [the respondent] punched, kicked and
strangled her and indicated that he was going to kill her
if he found her. The department offered her emergency
shelter services but she declined. [The respondent] was
subsequently arrested. A full no contact protective order
was issued where Dakota was the protected party.”
“On February 22, 2021, hospital staff had a medical
meeting regarding [the child’s] needs and reported that
the parents were inconsistent and sporadic with their
visits to [the child]. The hospital further reported that
the hospital visits were times when the parents could
receive education and child-specific training on [the
child’s] care. Because of the inconsistent visits, neither
parent had received the education and training required
to provide [the child] with the specialized medical care
that the child would need when discharged from the
hospital.”
On February 26, 2021, the petitioner filed a motion
for an ex parte order of temporary custody and a neglect
petition on the child’s behalf. The court, Maronich, J.,
granted the order of temporary custody. On March 5,
2021, the court sustained the order of temporary custody.
On July 8, 2021, the court adjudicated the child neglected
and committed him to the custody of the petitioner. The
court ordered specific steps for the respondent to take. On
July 30, 2024, the petitioner filed a petition to terminate
the respondent’s parental rights.
On July 11, 2025, following a trial, the court, Sky-
ers, J., issued a memorandum of decision terminating
the respondent’s rights as to the child. The court made
the following findings with respect to the child, who is
certified as medically complex, level two. “At birth, [the
child] had chronic lung disease of prematurity, persistent
In re Ricari B.

pulmonary hypertension, and required oxygen. He is
presently diagnosed with cerebral palsy, bronchopulmo-
nary dysplasia, asthma and global developmental delays.
He was described as ‘medically fragile.’
“On June 1, 2022, [the child] had a number of proce-
dures performed at Yale surgical center including but
not limited to tonsillectomy, adenoidectomy, bilateral
ear tube placement, laryngoscopy, bronchoscopy, bron-
choalveolar lavage, and upper GI endoscopy with biop-
sies. [The child] has made significant medical progress
over the years with physical and occupational therapy
to strengthen his core muscles and feeding. He received
Birth to Three services until preschool.
“He continues to have several medical appointments
including respiratory medicine, otolaryngology, allergy
and immunology, neurology and orthopedics. [The child]
has improved verbally by saying more words, walking,
and being more independent. He has been attending the
Early Childhood Center. Although he has made improve-
ment, he still needs assistance in feeding, dressing, and
language. Pranvera Dauti, [a] teacher at [the child’s]
school, testified that [the child] has ‘come a long way.’
At age three, [the child] moved to the preschool program
and is working with the Early Childhood Center. He does
well when he has a consistent schedule and struggles if
there is a change in his schedule. There were reports that
after returning from some visits with his parents, he
became dysregulated. [The child] attends play therapy
through CT Kids Matter to help him to display a full
range of emotions without experiencing a loss of control.
“[The child] has been in only one foster home since
entering the [petitioner’s] care in 2021. [He] looks to the
foster parents for love and support. The foster parents
meet all of [his] many medical, emotional and physical
needs.”
The court made the following findings regarding the
respondent. “From January through May 2023, [the
respondent] ceased all interaction and communication
In re Ricari B.

with the department, including attending visits with
[the child]. [The respondent] never engaged in any Birth
to Three services with [the child]. He did not attend any
of [the child’s] appointments. He resumed visits with
[the child] in May 2023 and received weekly visits at the
[department’s] office. [The respondent] was also engaged
in [therapeutic family time] services from September
through December 2023. [The respondent] had positive
interactions with [the child].
“In February 2023, [the respondent] was referred to
Recovery Network for an anger management group. He
participated in the program consistently until June 2023.
However, he abruptly disengaged with the program and
was unsuccessfully discharged from the program. In
May 2023, [the respondent] violated his probation and
had pending charges, including reckless endangerment,
risk of injury to a child,3 assault [in the third degree],
and [criminal] violation of a protective order.
“He was referred by probation to an intensive outpa-
tient program at Southwest Community Health Center in
September 2023 for mental health and substance abuse.
He initially had favorable reports, which resulted in him
being ‘stepped down’ to relapse prevention. However,
on December 11, 2023, he relapsed, testing positive for
fentanyl, and, on January 3, 2024, he tested positive
for both fentanyl and cocaine. In January 2024, he was
discharged from the program due to a violation of the
program rules pursuant to the code of conduct.
“In January 2024, the department implemented an
emergency suspension of visits due to safety concerns
due to an incident with [the respondent] at the [depart-
ment’s] office. [The respondent] was verbally aggressive
and combative toward the [department’s] staff and ser-
vice providers. [The respondent] became upset and was
cursing at the social worker at the [department’s] office.
The department recommended that the respondent . . .
3
The identity of the child in relation to the charge of risk of injury
to a child is not clear from the record, but there is no indication that it
was the child involved in this appeal.
In re Ricari B.

engage in mental health treatment to address his trauma,
anger, and history of [intimate partner violence] before
visits could resume. As a result of this incident, the
department moved the [visitation] service office from
Bridgeport to Norwalk after completing a threat assess-
ment. On February 29, 2024, the court suspended [the
respondent’s] visits with [the child]. In February 2024,
[the respondent] was referred again to Recovery Network
of Programs for anger management and psychiatric
evaluation. On April 19, 2024, he completed the anger
management program.” (Footnote added.)
In light of the foregoing findings, the court concluded
that the petitioner had demonstrated by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the respondent was unable or
unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts of
the department. Specifically, the court stated: “The
respondent . . . refused to communicate with the depart-
ment for five months from January through May 2023.
He was referred to anger management at Recovery Net-
work of Programs, Southwest Community Center for
substance abuse services, individual counseling and
supervised visitation. Both parents have failed to benefit
from counseling and services and failed to maintain suf-
ficient consistency and stability that would enable them
to reunify them with their children.”
The court further found that the respondent had failed
to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation
that would encourage the belief that, within a reason-
able time, considering the age and needs of the child,
he could assume a responsible position in his life. In the
dispositional phase of the proceedings, the court made
findings as to each of the criteria set forth in General
Statutes § 17a-112 (k),4 and determined that terminating
4
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: “Except in the case where
termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining
whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall
consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness,
nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to
the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the
child with the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and
In re Ricari B.

the respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interest. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment ter-
minating the respondent’s parental rights and appoint-
ing the petitioner as the child’s statutory parent.5 This
appeal followed.
I
As a threshold matter, we address the petitioner’s
contention that this appeal is moot. The petitioner argues
that the respondent’s appeal should be dismissed as moot
because the respondent challenges only one of the two
bases for the court’s determination that the require-
ments of § 17a-112 (j) (1) had been satisfied. We dis-
agree with the petitioner that the court made a finding
by clear and convincing evidence that the department
made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with
the minor child, and, accordingly, we conclude that the
respondent’s appeal challenging the court’s finding that
the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
such efforts is not moot.
Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to
the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from
time to time; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into
and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the
extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such
order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to
the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person
who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for
at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant
emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent has
made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the
foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which
the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to
reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight
to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the
maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian
or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent
has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with
the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the
child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic
circumstances of the parent.”
5
The court also denied the respondent’s motion for posttermination
visitation.
In re Ricari B.

“Mootness raises the issue of a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction . . . . Mootness is a question of justiciability
that must be determined as a threshold matter because
it implicates [a] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .
We begin with the four part test for justiciability . . . .
Because courts are established to resolve actual con-
troversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to
a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. Justi-
ciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy
between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that
the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the
matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated
by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of
the controversy will result in practical relief to the com-
plainant. . . . [I]t is not the province of appellate courts to
decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting
of actual relief or from the determination of which no
practical relief can follow. . . . In determining mootness,
the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal
would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.”
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Natalia M., 190 Conn. App. 583, 587–88, 210 A.3d
682, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 912, 211 A.3d 71 (2019).
As part of a termination of parental rights proceeding,
§ 17a-112 (j) (1) requires the petitioner to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the department “has made
reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the
child with the parent, unless the court finds . . . that the
parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunifica-
tion efforts . . . .
“Because the two clauses are separated by the word
unless, [§ 17a-112 (j) (1)] plainly is written in the conjunc-
tive. Accordingly, the [petitioner] must prove either that
[the department] has made reasonable efforts to reunify
or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable
to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112
(j) clearly provides that the [petitioner] is not required
to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is
sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.” (Internal
In re Ricari B.

quotation marks omitted.) In re Elijah C., 326 Conn. 480,
493, 165 A.3d 1149 (2017). Thus, when a trial court finds
that the petitioner has proven both statutory elements, a
“respondent’s failure to challenge both findings on appeal
renders the appeal moot because either one constitutes
an independent, alternative basis for affirming the trial
court’s judgment.” Id., 494.
In the present case, the petitioner contends that the
trial court made findings that the petitioner had proven
both statutory elements. With respect to whether the
department made reasonable efforts toward reunifi-
cation, the petitioner contends that such finding was
made (1) expressly in the court’s “official termination
of parental rights order,” and (2) “impliedly” within
the court’s memorandum of decision. The petitioner
contends that “a fair reading of the trial court’s written
memorandum of decision shows that it not only made the
subordinate factual findings to support its express find-
ing in the termination order, but it impliedly made the
finding within the decision itself.” The petitioner notes
that some of the findings on which she relies are located
outside of the reasonable efforts section of the court’s
memorandum of decision but argues that the opinion
must be read as a whole. The respondent emphasizes that
“nowhere in the adjudicatory phase of the decision does
the trial court state that the department made reason-
able efforts to reunify.”
Having reviewed the decision as a whole, we conclude
that the court did not make a finding by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify the respondent with the child. First, the
section of the court’s memorandum of decision captioned
“Reasonable Efforts” did not contain a finding that the
petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that
the department made reasonable efforts at reunification.
In that section, the court set forth the legal principles
governing such a determination, made findings regarding
referrals involving the respondent, and then concluded
with an express finding that the petitioner proved by clear
In re Ricari B.

and convincing evidence that the respondent is unable
or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. The
court then turned to the statutory ground for termina-
tion of the respondent’s parental rights and concluded
that the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage
the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the
age and needs of the child, he could assume a responsible
position in the child’s life. Finally, in the section of the
court’s memorandum of decision captioned “Disposi-
tion,” the court made findings as to each of the criteria
set forth in § 17a-112 (k). See footnote 4 of this opinion.
Specifically, as to the statutory factor of whether the
department had made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family, the court determined that the department “has
made reasonable efforts to reunite the family by offering
case management, supervised visitation and referrals
for services. The department provided substance abuse
referrals, referrals for counseling and court-ordered
evaluations.” The court, however, did not state that
it made this finding by clear and convincing evidence.6
See In re Ryder M., 211 Conn. App. 793, 818, 274 A.3d
218 (no requirement that each § 17a-112 (k) factor be
proven by clear and convincing evidence), cert. denied,
343 Conn. 931, 276 A.3d 433 (2022). Instead, the court
expressly noted at the outset of its written findings as
to the § 17a-112 (k) factors that “ ‘[t]here is no require-
ment that each factor be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.’ ” Thus, there is no finding within the court’s
6
The absence of language stating that the court made this finding
by clear and convincing evidence is significant given that the court,
throughout its memorandum of decision, specifically stated that it was
making certain findings by clear and convincing evidence. For example,
the court expressly stated: “[T]he department has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that . . . [the respondent is] unable or unwilling to
benefit from reunification efforts.” The court also stated: “The clear and
convincing evidence further shows that [the respondent] was unable to
appropriately address the issues that led to [the child’s] removal by the
time of the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights or
by the time of the trial. The clear and convincing evidence shows that [the
respondent] failed to achieve [sufficient] personal rehabilitation . . . .”
In re Ricari B.

memorandum of decision that the petitioner had proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the department
had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent
with the child.
With respect to the petitioner’s contention that the
court made subordinate factual findings and “impliedly”
made the finding that reasonable efforts had been made,
we decline to speculate as to what ultimate finding the
court might have reached on the basis of these findings,
additionally keeping in mind that any subordinate find-
ings contained within the best interest determination
were not required to be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. See In re Christina C., 221 Conn. App. 185,
220, 300 A.3d 1188 (“Although the court made several
findings concerning the respondent pursuant to § 17a-112
(k), which are strongly suggestive that termination of
the respondent’s parental rights would be in [the child’s]
best interests, it did not state an ultimate finding with
respect to what was in [the child’s] best interests as far
as the respondent’s parental rights are concerned. Simi-
larly, although the court’s factual findings are strongly
suggestive of termination, we cannot speculate as to
what ultimate finding the court might have reached on
the basis of these findings.”), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
907, 301 A.3d 1056 (2023).
Finally, we are not persuaded by the petitioner’s reli-
ance on form JD-JM-31, titled “Order, Termination of
Parental Rights and Appointment of Statutory Parent/
Guardian.” The fact that the form contains a box checked
for the statement, “the court finds clear and convincing
evidence that . . . [the department] has made reasonable
efforts to reunify the child with the . . . parent,” does
not overcome the absence of an express factual finding
contained within the court’s memorandum of decision.
To the extent that the court had intended to make such
a finding in its memorandum of decision, and neglected
to do so, we take this opportunity to reiterate the impor-
tance of express factual findings in juvenile proceedings,
“where the stakes are significant and appellate review
In re Ricari B.

must be tethered to discernible, reviewable findings.”7
7
We also take this opportunity to remind trial courts that there is a
statutory scheme governing termination of parental rights proceedings,
which sets forth the specific findings that the court must make in support
of a decision terminating a respondent’s parental rights. “[P]roceed-
ings to terminate parental rights are governed by . . . § 17a-112 . . . .
Because a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his or her child is
at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly complied with before
termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun. . . .
Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights
consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional
phase.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.
D., 232 Conn. App. 714, 723–24 n.12, 337 A.3d 786, cert. denied, 352
Conn. 959, 336 A.3d 1250 (2025).
Under § 17a-112 (j), a trial court, in granting a petition to terminate
parental rights, first must find “by clear and convincing evidence that
(1) the [department] has made reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child
with the parent . . . unless the court finds . . . that the parent is unable
or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . . .” See In re Niya
B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 476 and n.5, 308 A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348
Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024). “In construing that statutory lan-
guage, our Supreme Court has explained that, [b]ecause the two clauses
are separated by the word unless, this statute plainly is written in the
conjunctive. Accordingly, the [petitioner] must prove either that [the
department] has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively,
that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification
efforts. . . . [E]ither showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory ele-
ment. . . . [I]n cases in which the trial court concludes that both findings
have been proven, a respondent on appeal must demonstrate that both
determinations are improper.” (Emphasis in original; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Ariella M., 234 Conn. App. 502, 512, 343
A.3d 876 (2025).
Thereafter, “the . . . court must determine whether one or more of the
. . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a-112
[(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. . . . If the trial court
determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it
proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the
trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests
of the child.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re J. D., supra, 232 Conn. App. 724 n.12.
In the present case, therefore, to the extent that the court intended to
make a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the department had
made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent, best
practices would dictate that the court make that finding explicitly and
under the section captioned “Reasonable Efforts” within the “Adjudi-
cation” portion of its memorandum of decision. “We emphasize that a
court should set forth its reasoning and make express findings as to the
specific facts on which it relies in reaching its ultimate determination.
In re Ricari B.

In re Janeleah I., 233 Conn. App. 633, 654 n.14, 341
A.3d 390 (2025).
Accordingly, we conclude that the respondent’s appeal
is not moot.
II
We turn, therefore, to the respondent’s sole claim on
appeal. The respondent claims that the court improperly
determined that he was unable or unwilling to benefit
from the department’s reunification efforts. We dis-
agree.
“[I]n evaluating a trial court’s ultimate finding that
the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
rehabilitation efforts for evidentiary sufficiency, we ask
whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded,
upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evi-
dence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . .
When applying this standard, we construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to sustaining the judgment of
the trial court. . . . [An appellate court does] not examine
the record to determine whether the trier of fact could
have reached a conclusion other than the one reached
. . . . [Rather] every reasonable presumption is made in
favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Jadiel B., 228 Conn. App. 290,
297, 324 A.3d 211, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 921, 325
A.3d 217 (2024). “The trial court’s determination of this
issue will not be overturned on appeal unless, in light of
all of the evidence in the record, it is clearly erroneous
. . . . [W]e review the trial court’s subordinate factual
findings for clear error. . . . We review the trial court’s
Indeed, a complete and thorough statement of the court’s factual find-
ings in child protection cases provides the best illustration that the trial
court properly considered all of the elements of § 17a-112 (j) in arriving
at its ultimate conclusion that the respondent’s parental rights should
be terminated. . . . Issuing a comprehensive decision also facilitates
appellate review of the judgments rendered in these significant cases.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Matthew
W., 231 Conn. App. 21, 31 n.6, 331 A.3d 1239 (2025).
In re Ricari B.

ultimate determination . . . [that a parent is unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification services] for
evidentiary sufficiency . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Maci S., 229 Conn. App. 734, 742, 328
A.3d 269 (2024).
In the present case, the court found that the respon-
dent refused to communicate with the department for
five months, from January through May 2023, and that
he was referred to anger management, substance abuse
services, individual counseling, and supervised visita-
tion. The court found that the respondent had “failed
to benefit from counseling and services and failed to
maintain sufficient consistency and stability . . . . There-
fore, the [petitioner] has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that . . . [the respondent is] unable or unwilling
to benefit from reunification efforts.”
A careful review of the record reveals that there was
clear and convincing evidence to support the court’s
finding that the respondent was unable or unwilling to
benefit from the department’s reunification efforts.8
First, there was evidence that the respondent stopped
all interaction with the department, including visits
with the child, for a period of five months, from January
through May 2023. Second, there was evidence that the
respondent tested positive for substances on numerous
occasions, including amphetamines in May 2023, and
cocaine, fentanyl, and marijuana in January 2024. There
also was evidence that he was inconsistent in complying
with substance use tests, at times refusing to provide a
sample.
8
The respondent also challenges the constitutionality of General
Statutes §§ 17a-111b and 17a-112 (j). Specifically, he contends that the
“statutory interplay between [these statutes] allows for an impermissible
end run around the clear and convincing evidentiary standard required,
as a matter of due process, in all termination hearings.” In the present
case, the court expressly found, on the basis of clear and convincing
evidence, that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts, and, thus, we need not address the respondent’s
constitutional claim. See In re Jadiel B., supra, 228 Conn. App. 296 n.6.
In re Ricari B.

The court also had before it ample evidence of the
respondent acting aggressively with probation staff,
treatment providers, and department staff. The respon-
dent’s probation officer testified that, in April 2023,
the respondent yelled “derogatory terms at the staff
member” supervising the rendering of his urine sample.
The department’s social worker testified that phone
calls “usually resulted in [the respondent] yelling and
cursing at me if things didn’t go [his] way.” In October
2023, the respondent became loud and began cursing in
the waiting room of the child’s medical appointment.
When a positive urine test reported by probation caused
the respondent’s visits to be changed from community
visits to office visits in June 2023, the respondent again
yelled and cursed at the social worker. In January 2024,
the respondent’s visits with the child were suspended for
a period of time after he engaged in an altercation at the
department’s office. Also, in January 2024, the respon-
dent was discharged from Southwest Community Health
Center after making aggressive comments toward a staff
member attempting to facilitate a Breathalyzer test.
The respondent argues that the trial court improperly
relied on the January 2024 incident at the department’s
office, given that he subsequently completed an anger
management program in April 2024.9 We are not per-
suaded that the court could not reasonably conclude that
the respondent had been unable or unwilling to benefit
9
The respondent also argues that the court improperly considered
an incident in November 2024 when his employment was terminated
following an incident in which he had yelled at a manager after he
was reprimanded for breaking a piece of equipment. As the petitioner
emphasizes, the respondent’s termination of employment occurred
following the adjudicatory date; see In re Cameron W., 194 Conn.
App. 633, 660, 221 A.3d 885 (2019) (in determining “whether there is
sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts, the court is required in the adjudicatory phase
to make its assessment on the basis of events preceding the date on
which the termination petition was filed” (emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 918, 222 A.3d 103
(2020); and there is no indication that the court considered that incident
in determining that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit
from reunification efforts.
In re Ricari B.

from reunification efforts despite his recent completion
of an anger management program. We are reminded that
“we do not examine the record to determine whether
the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other
than the one reached. . . . Rather, we ask whether the
trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon the
facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence
was sufficient to justify its ultimate conclusion . . . .”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Ava M., 223 Conn. App. 590, 600, 309 A.3d 383,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 962, 312 A.3d 38 (2024).
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the judgment of the trial court, we conclude
that the court’s determination that the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s
reunification efforts is supported by sufficient evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.