111 Clearview Drive, LLC v. Patrick

***********************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the be-
ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-
lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-
ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-
tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
111 CLEARVIEW DRIVE, LLC v. LOIS PATRICK ET AL.
(AC 45702)
Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Cradle, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff property owner sought, by way of a summary process action,
to recover possession of certain real property occupied by the defen-
dants. A tax foreclosure action related to the property had previously
been brought against, inter alia, J and H. The defendants were not named
in the foreclosure action. The defendant L filed multiple motions in
the foreclosure action attempting to intervene, claiming that she had
acquired a two-thirds interest in the property upon J’s death and that,
after the court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, she had
acquired the remaining one-third interest in the property from the heirs
of H. The court in the foreclosure action denied L’s motion to intervene
on behalf of the two-thirds interest in the property as untimely and
dismissed L’s motion to open and vacate the foreclosure judgment on
behalf of the one-third interest in the property as moot. The property
was subsequently sold and, after the sale was approved by the court in
the foreclosure action, the buyer conveyed the property to the plaintiff.
L subsequently commenced a quiet title action regarding the property,
which was dismissed by the court as an improper collateral attack on
the foreclosure judgment. The plaintiff initiated the present summary
process action while the quiet title action was pending before the trial
court, seeking immediate possession of the property. After the trial court
dismissed the quiet title action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
and while the appeal from that dismissal was pending before this court,
the plaintiff filed a motion in limine in the present action seeking to
exclude from the trial of the summary process action any evidence that
contradicted or collaterally attacked the foreclosure judgment or the
quiet title action. The court granted the motion in limine, and, during
the subsequent trial in the summary process action, the court sustained
the objections of the plaintiff’s counsel to exhibits and evidence associ-
ated with the foreclosure action. The court subsequently rendered judg-
ment for possession of the property for the plaintiff, and the defendants
appealed to this court. Held that the defendants could not prevail on
their claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion
in limine, this court having concluded that it was legally and logically
correct for the trial court to grant the motion in limine because the
record dispositively established that the defendants’ evidence of an
ownership interest in the property was irrelevant as a matter of law:
although the defendants claimed that the trial court improperly relied
on the doctrine of collateral estoppel when it granted the motion in
limine, the record did not support that assertion, as the trial court stated
several times during the trial that the motion in limine was related to
a collateral attack on a prior judgment; moreover, as explained further
in the companion case of Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC (224 Conn.
App. 401), the trial court correctly determined that the only purpose of
the evidence was to support nonjusticiable claims and, therefore, the
defendants’ challenge to the foreclosure judgment was improper because
the court could offer no practical relief to the defendants; furthermore,
for the reasons discussed in Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC,
supra, 224 Conn. App. 418–419, the defendants’ claim that L retained
an ownership interest in the property as an omitted party from the
foreclosure action pursuant to statute (§ 49-30) was without merit, as
§ 49-30 was not relevant given that L attempted to directly attack the
foreclosure judgment in the foreclosure action but was unsuccessful in
those efforts.
Argued September 14, 2023—officially released March 26, 2024

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, Housing Ses-
sion, where the court, Hon. William Holden, judge trial
referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion in limine to pre-
clude certain evidence; thereafter, Justin Patrick and
Julian Patrick were substituted for the defendants John
Doe and John Doe; subsequently, the matter was tried
to the court, Hon. William Holden, judge trial referee;
judgment for the plaintiff, from which the named defen-
dant et al. appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Earle Giovanniello, for the appellants (named defen-
dant et al.).
James R. Winkel, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ELGO, J. In this summary process action, the defen-
dants Lois Patrick, Justin Patrick, and Julian Patrick1
appeal from the judgment of possession rendered by
the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, 111 Clearview
Drive, LLC. On appeal, the defendants claim that the
trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion in
limine, which precluded them from presenting certain
evidence to support their claim that Lois was an omitted
party in the related foreclosure action of Benchmark
Municipal Tax Services, Ltd. v. Roundtree, Superior
Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-16-
6059553-S (Benchmark action and/or Benchmark judg-
ment), and thus maintained a legitimate and legally
viable interest in the property in question. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC, 224 Conn. App.
401, A.3d (2024), is a companion case that we
also release today. The facts, procedural history, and
legal analysis relevant to resolving the two cases are
substantially similar. The relevant facts and procedural
history are as follows: ‘‘On August 29, 2016, Benchmark
Municipal Tax Services, Ltd. (Benchmark), recorded a
notice of lis pendens on the Bridgeport land records
for the property known as 44 Wentworth Street (prop-
erty).2 On September 26, 2016, Benchmark commenced
a tax foreclosure action involving the property against
Erma Jean Roundtree (Erma Jean), Eunice H.
Roundtree (Eunice), and others not relevant to this
[summary process] action. See Benchmark Municipal
Tax Services, Ltd. v. Roundtree, [supra, Superior Court,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S]. The [defendants were
not] named . . . in the Benchmark action. A judgment
of foreclosure by sale was rendered in the Benchmark
action on December 12, 2016. After the judgment was
opened, a second judgment of foreclosure by sale was
rendered on December 4, 2017, and the court ordered
a sale date of May 5, 2018. The sale of the property
proceeded as scheduled, with Khurram Ali emerging as
the successful bidder. The court approved the sale on
August 28, 2020, and Ali conveyed the property to [the
plaintiff] on February 6, 2021, by quitclaim deed. During
and after the pendency of the Benchmark action, [Lois]
filed multiple motions with the court in an attempt to
intervene, asserting an ownership interest in the prop-
erty. [Lois] claimed that she had acquired a two-thirds
interest in the property on October 29, 2017, upon the
death of Erma Jean by descent as Erma Jean’s only
heir, and a one-third interest in the property by quit-
claim deed on April 17, 2021, from the heirs of Eunice,
who died on June 5, 2020. The court denied [Lois’]
motion to intervene on behalf of the two-thirds interest
in the property as untimely and dismissed [her] motion
to open and vacate the Benchmark judgment on behalf
of the one-third interest in the property as moot.3 [Lois]
made additional attempts to litigate her alleged interest
in the property, all of which were unsuccessful.4
‘‘[Lois] commenced [a] quiet title action in May, 2021,
and, in July, 2021, filed a revised complaint in accor-
dance with General Statutes § 47-315 regarding her
alleged interests in the property.’’ (Footnotes in origi-
nal.) Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC, supra, 224
Conn. App. 403–405. ‘‘In a memorandum of decision
issued on March 7, 2022, the court dismissed [the quiet
title] action as ‘an improper collateral attack on the
foreclosure judgment.’ ’’ Id., 406, 407. Lois appealed
from that decision, and the resulting opinion by this
court is substantially related to the resolution of the
defendants’ motion in limine claim in this appeal. See
id., 407.
The present action was initiated in September, 2021,
while the quiet title action was pending before the trial
court. The plaintiff initiated a summary process action
against the defendants and others living at the property,
seeking immediate possession of the property. Lois filed
an answer to the complaint, along with special defenses
alleging that (1) ‘‘[t]he plaintiff does not have good title
to the property’’ and (2) ‘‘[t]he defendant [Lois] is the
owner of the property.’’ The plaintiff denied the allega-
tions made in the special defenses. After the trial court
dismissed the quiet title action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because it constituted an improper collat-
eral attack on a final judgment, and while the appeal
from that dismissal was pending before this court, the
plaintiff filed the motion in limine at issue. The motion
in limine sought ‘‘to exclude certain evidence at the
trial of this summary process action . . . [s]pecifically
. . . to preclude any evidence . . . that contradicts or
collaterally attacks the . . . [Benchmark judgment], as
well as the . . . [quiet title action].’’ The court granted
the motion on May 25, 2022.
The court held a trial on the summary process action
over the course of two days. During the first day of
that trial, on June 15, 2022, Lois’ counsel asked the court
to respond to her motion for clarification regarding the
grant of the plaintiff’s motion in limine, specifically, to
articulate the scope of what was to be precluded as
well as the basis for the exclusion. The court stated that
Lois was precluded from presenting evidence attacking
the Benchmark judgment, the Benchmark foreclosure
proceedings, ‘‘[t]he committee deed by which Ali took
title, [and] the quiet title action, as such would consti-
tute an impermissible collateral attack on a final judg-
ment . . . .’’ The court stated that ‘‘the motion in limine
stands’’ over the objection that Lois was an omitted
party to the Benchmark action.6
Accordingly, at the trial on both June 15 and August 3,
2022, the court sustained the objections of the plaintiff’s
counsel to exhibits and evidence associated with the
Benchmark action. At the conclusion of the summary
process trial, the court rendered judgment for posses-
sion of the property in favor of the plaintiff. From that
judgment, the defendants now appeal.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the applicable
standard of review is dependent upon the characteriza-
tion of the trial court’s ruling. ‘‘Evidentiary claims ordi-
narily are governed by the abuse of discretion standard.
. . . That deferential standard, however, does not apply
when the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine
. . . was based on [a] legal determination . . . .’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Grovenburg v. Rustle Meadow Associates, LLC, 174
Conn. App. 18, 68, 165 A.3d 193 (2017). At the trial on
June 15, 2022, in response to the defendants’ request
to clarify the basis of the court’s ruling on the motion
in limine, the court stated, ‘‘what we have here [is] a
collateral attack on the judgment of the court.’’ The
court’s reasoning for granting the motion in limine was
thus based on a legal determination that the admission
of the proffered evidence would ultimately permit a
collateral attack on a final judgment. ‘‘Accordingly, the
applicable standard of review requires this court to
determine whether the trial court was legally and logi-
cally correct when it decided, under the facts of the
case, to exclude evidence of [the Benchmark action
and the quiet title action]. . . . Our review, therefore,
is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Grovenburg v. Rustle Meadow Associates,
LLC, supra, 68.
On appeal, the defendants claim that the court
improperly based its decision to grant the motion in
limine on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which the
defendants argue does not apply to this case because
(1) they were not parties to the underlying Benchmark
action, and (2) the quiet title action was on appeal at
that time. The defendants thus ask this court to remand
the case for further proceedings to allow them to ‘‘pres-
ent evidence supporting their claim that [Lois] was an
omitted party in the [Benchmark] action . . . .’’
Although the defendants assert that the court improp-
erly relied on the doctrine of collateral estoppel when
granting the motion in limine, that assertion is not sup-
ported by the record. During the June 15, 2022 proceed-
ings, the court stated five separate times that the motion
in limine was related to a collateral attack on a prior
judgment.7 Therefore, the record demonstrates that the
court’s basis for granting the motion in limine was to
exclude evidence that would result in an improper col-
lateral attack on the Benchmark judgment.
Next, we must determine if the court’s decision to
grant the motion in limine was legally and logically
correct. ‘‘The purpose of a motion in limine is to exclude
irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial evidence from
trial . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Lo Sacco, 26 Conn. App. 439, 444, 602 A.2d 589 (1992).
It follows that a court properly may determine that
evidence proffered by a party is irrelevant when its only
purpose is to support a claim that is nonjusticiable.
‘‘Because courts are established to resolve actual con-
troversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to
a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . .
Justiciability requires . . . that the determination of
the controversy will result in practical relief to the com-
plainant. . . . [J]usticiability comprises several related
doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the
political question doctrine.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Peck v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 198
Conn. App. 233, 247, 232 A.3d 1279 (2020).
The legal analysis contained in parts I and II of the
companion case, Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC,
supra, 224 Conn. App. 409–19, is dispositive of the claim
presented in this appeal. There is no useful purpose to
repeat that legal analysis here. For the reasons
explained in that opinion; see id., 409–18; we conclude
that the court correctly granted the motion in limine
because the only purpose of the evidence was to sup-
port nonjusticiable claims. As we explained in that com-
panion opinion, the defendants’ challenge to the Bench-
mark judgment was improper because ‘‘the court can
offer no practical relief to the party collaterally
attacking the prior judgment, rendering the action non-
justiciable.’’ Peck v. Statewide Grievance Committee,
supra, 198 Conn. App. 248.
Furthermore, for the reasons discussed in the com-
panion case, the defendants’ claim that Lois retains an
ownership interest in the property as an omitted party8
from the Benchmark judgment is without merit. See
Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC, supra, 224 Conn.
App. 418–19. As we discussed in that opinion, General
Statutes § 49-30 is not relevant given that Lois attempted
to directly attack the Benchmark judgment in the under-
lying action but was unsuccessful in those efforts. Id.
We therefore conclude that it was legally and logically
correct for the court to grant the motion in limine
because the record dispositively establishes that the
defendants’ evidence of an ownership interest in the
property was irrelevant as a matter of law.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1
The operative complaint named Lois Patrick, John Doe, John Doe, Jane
Doe, and Jane Doe as defendants. The court subsequently granted motions
to substitute Justin Patrick and Julian Patrick as defendants for John Doe
and John Doe. A motion for default for failure to appear was granted against
defendants Jane Doe and Jane Doe. For purposes of clarity, we refer to the
defendants individually by first name and collectively refer to Lois Patrick,
Justin Patrick, and Julian Patrick as the defendants.
2
‘‘We note the well established principle that a court ‘may take judicial
notice of the file in another case, whether or not the other case is between
the same parties . . . .’ . . . Rogalis, LLC v. Vazquez, 210 Conn. App. 548,
556, 270 A.3d 120 (2022).’’ Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC, supra, 224
Conn. App. 404 n.2.
3
‘‘On April 6, 2018, after acquiring the two-thirds interest in the property
from Erma Jean, [Lois] filed motions to intervene and to open and vacate
the Benchmark judgment. Those motions were denied as untimely under
General Statutes § 52-325 (a) on May 1, 2018, and [Lois] did not appeal those
determinations. On May 10, 2021, after obtaining Eunice’s one-third interest
in the property by quitclaim deed, [Lois] filed a motion to open and vacate
the Benchmark judgment. That motion was dismissed as moot ‘[p]er oral
record’ on June 2, 2021. On June 16, 2021, [Lois] filed a motion to reconsider
the court’s dismissal of the motion to open and vacate the judgment. The
court issued an order on June 16, 2021, stating that it had ‘reviewed this
motion for reconsideration and [was] not changing its ruling on the underly-
ing motion.’ [Lois] did not appeal that order.’’ Patrick v. 111 Clearview
Drive, LLC, supra, 224 Conn. App. 404–405 n.3.
4
‘‘[Lois’] additional attempts to challenge the Benchmark judgment
included the following. On August 31, 2020, [Lois] filed a request to stay
the proceedings until a legal representative could be appointed to represent
the interests of Eunice, who died on June 5, 2020. That request was dismissed
on September 16, 2020. [Lois] filed another motion to open the judgment
and vacate orders on September 8, 2020, which was dismissed on September
16, 2020, because [she] was not a party to the underlying action. On Septem-
ber 16, 2020, [Lois] filed a motion to reargue and reconsider the order
approving the sale of the property, which was denied on September 30,
2020. From that decision, [Lois] filed an appeal with this court, which was
dismissed on January 13, 2021, for lack of standing as [she] was not a party
to the underlying action.’’ Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC, supra, 224
Conn. App. 405 n.4.
5
‘‘General Statutes § 47-31 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘An action [to
settle title or claim an interest in real property] may be brought by any
person claiming title to, or any interest in, real . . . property . . . against
any person who may claim to own the property . . . or to have any interest
in the property . . . for the purpose of determining such . . . interest or
claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes and to quiet and settle the
title to the property. Such action may be brought whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to the immediate or exclusive possession of the property.’ ’’
Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC, supra, 224 Conn. App. 405 n.5.
6
Upon request of the plaintiff and over the objection of the defendants,
the court applied that ruling to Justin and Julian on August 3, 2022. During
oral argument before this court, the defendants’ counsel acknowledged that
Justin and Julian are in privity with Lois and may only have an interest in
the property if she has a viable ownership interest. Accordingly, any holding
relating to Lois’ ownership interest in the property extends to Justin and
Julian as well.
7
The court mentioned collateral estoppel one time during the June 15,
2022 proceedings. The record indicates that this mention was in the context
of quoting language from the plaintiff’s motion in limine and not as the basis
for granting that motion. Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘I’m reading from
the request of the plaintiff: ‘introducing testimony seeking to attack the
foreclosure judgment or the foreclosure action proceedings, the committee
deed by which Ali took title, or the quiet title action as such would constitute
an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment, and it’s precluded,
and the collateral estoppel . . . would be inequitable given the actions.’ ’’
Read in context, it appears that the court was merely quoting and/or para-
phrasing the plaintiff’s motion in limine, which had included collateral estop-
pel as an alternative ground on which evidence related to the Benchmark
action should be excluded.
8
General Statutes § 49-30 is titled ‘‘Omission of parties in foreclosure
actions’’ and provides in relevant part: ‘‘When a mortgage or lien on real
estate has been foreclosed and one or more parties owning any interest in
. . . such real estate . . . has been omitted or has not been foreclosed
. . . because of improper service of process or for any other reason . . .
[s]uch omission or failure to properly foreclose such party or parties may
be completely cured and cleared by deed or foreclosure or other proper
legal proceedings to which the only necessary parties shall be the party
acquiring such foreclosure title, or his successor in title, and the party or
parties thus not foreclosed, or their respective successors in title.’’