Dickens v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LAWRENCE B. DICKENS, §
§ No. 221, 2024
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 79800001DI (N)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §

Submitted: December 5, 2024
Decided: February 17, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Lawrence Dickens, appeals the Superior Court’s denial

of his motions for postconviction relief and correction of illegal sentence. The State

of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is

manifest on the face of Dickens’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We

agree and affirm.

(2) In 1980, a Superior Court jury convicted Dickens of first-degree murder

for the shooting of Myrtis Handy, attempted first-degree murder for the shooting of

Elmira Handy, first-degree assault for the shooting of a bystander, and possession of
a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony (PDWDCF). Following a

penalty hearing mandated by Delaware’s death penalty statute, 11 Del. C. § 4209

(“Section 4209”), at which the State conceded that there was no statutory

aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the

Superior Court sentenced Dickens to life imprisonment without the possibility of

probation or parole for first-degree murder. Following a presentence investigation,

the Superior Court sentenced Dickens to life imprisonment for attempted first-degree

murder and to fifteen years of incarceration for first-degree assault.1 We affirmed

Dickens’ convictions and sentence on appeal.2

(3) Between 1989 and 2002, Dickens filed three unsuccessful motions for

postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.3 On September 5,

2023, Dickens filed a fourth motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he could

overcome the Rule 61’s procedural bar against repetitive motions4 because there was

legislation pending before the General Assembly that would repeal Section 4209.

1
At the time, Dickens’ convictions for first-degree assault and PDWDCF merged for sentencing
purposes. See Hunter v. State, 420 A.2d 119 (Del. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 991 (1981).
2
Dickens v. State, 437 A.2d 159 (Del. 1981).
3
State v. Dickens, 602 A.2d 95 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (denying Dickens’ first motion for
postconviction relief), aff’d, 1990 WL 43318 (Del. Mar. 22, 1990); State v. Dickens, 1994 WL
145988 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 1994), aff’d, 1994 WL 466126 (Del. Aug. 25, 1994); Dickens v.
State, 2003 WL 1922507 (Del. Apr. 21, 2003) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Dickens’
third motion for postconviction relief).
4
See Del. Super. Crim. R. 61(d)(2) (providing that a second or subsequent motion for
postconviction relief must be summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted after a trial
and pleads with particularity new evidence creating a strong inference that the movant is actually
innocent or that a new rule of constitutional law is retroactively applicable and renders his
conviction invalid).
2
The motion was referred to a Superior Court commissioner. On December 21, 2023,

Dickens filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence, arguing that his life

sentence for attempted first-degree murder is illegal because it was imposed under

Section 4209. This motion was referred to the same Superior Court commissioner.

(4) On January 11, 2024, the Superior Court commissioner issued a report

recommending that the Superior Court deny both of Dickens’ motions.5 In so doing,

the commissioner noted that the pending legislation did not seek to repeal Section

4209 in its entirety but sought to eliminate the death penalty as a possible sentence

for a first-degree murder conviction.6 Because Dickens had not been sentenced to

death, the commissioner found (correctly) that the pending legislation, if signed into

law, would have no effect on Dickens’ sentence and did not create a new

constitutional rule that was retroactively applicable to Dickens’ case. The

commissioner therefore recommended that Dickens’ motion for postconviction

relief be summarily dismissed. The commissioner also recommended that Dickens’

motion for correction of illegal sentence be denied because Dickens’ life sentence

for first-degree murder was not only legal, but mandatory.7 On May 2, 2024, the

Superior Court adopted the commissioner’s report and recommendation and denied

5
State v. Dickens, 2024 WL 165991 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2024) (“Dickens IV”).
6
Id. at *1-2.
7
Id. at *2.
3
Dickens’ motions for postconviction relief and correction of sentence. This appeal

followed.

(5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for

abuse of discretion.8 We also review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for

correction of illegal sentence for abuse of discretion.9 A sentence is illegal if it

exceeds statutory limits, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with

respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory,

omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is

a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.10

(6) Dickens’ arguments on appeal may be fairly summarized as follows: (i)

the grand jury’s indictment violated his right to due process because it failed to put

him on notice that he was being charged with capital murder; (ii) he could not be

indicted for capital murder because the indictment failed to identify an aggravating

factor justifying the imposition of the death penalty under Section 4209; and (iii) his

life sentence for attempted first-degree murder is illegal. Dickens has waived those

arguments that he made below but failed to raise in his opening brief.11

8
Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019).
9
Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014).
10
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
11
Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).
4
(7) On appeal, Dickens does not attempt to overcome Rule 61’s procedural

bar prohibiting repetitive motions for postconviction relief. In any event, there is no

merit to Dickens’ claim that the grand jury’s indictment was constitutionally

deficient. An indictment performs two essential functions: to put the accused on

notice of what he is called upon to defend, and to effectively preclude a subsequent

prosecution for the same offense.12 “These purposes are fulfilled if the indictment,

as required by [Superior Court Criminal] Rule 7(c), contains a plain statement of the

elements or essential facts of the crime.”13 Here, the indictment—which, in relevant

part, charged Dickens with “intentionally caus[ing] the death of Myrtis Handy by

shooting her with a .38 caliber pistol”14—did so.15

(8) Although Dickens is correct that the Superior Court incorrectly

interpreted his motion for correction of illegal sentence to be challenging the legality

of his life sentence for first-degree murder, we nevertheless affirm the court’s denial

of Dickens’ motion for correction of illegal sentence on the independent and

alternative basis that his life sentence for attempted first-degree murder is likewise

not only legal, but mandatory.16 That is, in 1979—when Dickens engaged in the

12
Malloy v. State, 462 A.2d 1088, 1092 (Del. 1983).
13
Id.
14
State’s Mot. to Affirm, Ex. A, DI 1.
15
State’s Mot. to Affirm, Ex. A, DI 1.
16
See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (recognizing that this
Court may affirm a trial court’s judgment based on a different rationale than that relied upon by
the trial court).
5
conduct that led to his attempted first-degree murder conviction—the Superior Court

was required to sentence Dickens to life imprisonment for that offense under 11 Del.

C. § 4205.17

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice

17
11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(1) (1979) (fixing the term of imprisonment for a class A felony conviction
at life imprisonment, “provided, however, that in the case of an attempt to commit any class A
felony, the court shall impose a term of imprisonment and may impose life imprisonment, but may
impose less than life imprisonment, except for conviction of an attempt to commit first-degree
murder, in which event the court shall impose life imprisonment”).
6