Fitzgerald v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JASON I. FITZGERALD, §
§ No. 257, 2024
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ C.A. No. N24C-06-139
FEDERAL BUREAU OF §
INVESTIGATION and NEW §
CASTLE COUNTY POLICE §
DEPARTMENT, §
§
Defendants Below, Appellees. §

Submitted: January 24, 2025
Decided: February 27, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

ORDER

(1) The appellant, Jason I. Fitzgerald, filed a complaint in the Superior

Court alleging that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New Castle County

Police Department (“NCCPD”) 1 failed to investigate (i) “possible employment

scams charging [Fitzgerald] to ‘work’ and/or making [him] ‘work’ for free” and (ii)

his claims that people were spying on him, making up lies about him, gaslighting

him, and depriving him of employment opportunities. Fitzgerald sought $50,000 for

emotional distress and mental anguish. The complaint was accompanied by a

1
NCCPD’s counsel states that the correct name of the appellee is the New Castle County Police
Division.
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint,

concluding that the complaint was factually and legally frivolous and plainly failed

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

(2) On appeal to this Court, Fitzgerald asserts that he needs the appellees

to investigate his claims so that he can decide whether to continue working for the

companies that are allegedly defrauding him. NCCPD argues that it is a division of

New Castle County that cannot be separately sued. It also argues that the complaint

failed to allege any facts or legal principles indicating that NCCPD had a duty, or

jurisdiction, to investigate Fitzgerald’s claims. Finally, NCCPD contends that the

County and Municipal Tort Claims Act bars Fitzgerald’s claims.2

(3) Title 10, Section 8803(b) of the Delaware Code provides that, if the

Superior Court grants an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must

review the plaintiff’s complaint and shall dismiss the complaint if the court finds

that the action is factually frivolous, legally frivolous, or malicious. 3 “Dismissal of

an indigent plaintiff’s complaint as legally frivolous is warranted in those cases in

2
See 10 Del. C. § 4011(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all governmental
entities and their employees shall be immune from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery
of damages. That a governmental entity has the power to sue or be sued, whether appearing in its
charter or statutory enablement, shall not create or be interpreted as a waiver of the immunity
granted in this subchapter.”); id. § 4011(b)(3) (providing that “a governmental entity shall not be
liable for any damage claim which results from . . . [t]he performance or failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion be abused and whether or
not the statute, charter, ordinance, order, resolution, regulation or resolve under which the
discretionary function or duty is performed is valid or invalid”).
3
10 Del. C. § 8803(b).
2
which either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff’s complaint lacks an arguable

basis in law or that the defendants are clearly entitled to immunity from suit.” 4 We

have reviewed Fitzgerald’s complaint in light of the applicable standard and agree

with the Superior Court that dismissal under 10 Del. C. § 8803(b) was warranted. 5

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice

4
Price v. Boulos, 2022 WL 3222340, at *2 (Del. Aug. 9, 2022) (internal quotations omitted).
5
See generally Ashley v. Stiller, 2012 WL 5818322, at *2 (Del. Nov. 15, 2012) (“We have
reviewed Ashley’s complaint in light of the applicable legal standards. We agree with the Superior
Court that Ashley’s complaint was legally frivolous under Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8803(b) and
that dismissal was warranted. As such, we conclude that there was no error or abuse of discretion
on the part of the Superior Court.”).
3