Jackson v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CARLOS D. JACKSON, §
§ No. 203, 2025
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 0107004921A (S)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §
§

Submitted: July 3, 2025
Decided: September 17, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Carlos D. Jackson appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for

the correction of an alleged clerical error in his May 24, 2002 sentence order. The

State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground

that it is manifest on the face of Jackson’s opening brief that his appeal is without

merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) In 2002, a Superior Court jury found Jackson guilty of one count of

second-degree rape, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of

a felony, one count of second-degree assault, one count of aggravated menacing, one
count of first-degree unlawful imprisonment, two counts of second-degree

conspiracy, one count of misdemeanor theft, and one count of resisting arrest.

Following a presentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Jackson to an

aggregate of 33 years of unsuspended incarceration followed by decreasing levels of

community supervision. We affirmed Jackson’s convictions on direct appeal.1

(3) In June 2024, Jackson moved for modification or reduction of his

sentence, arguing that exceptional circumstances justified his late filing,2 including

that: (i) the Department of Correction (DOC) will never petition for his early release

under 11 Del. C. § 4217 because DOC policy excludes Tier 3 sex offenders from

consideration; (ii) because of the nature of the conduct that led to Jackson’s rape

conviction, he does not suffer from the same high likelihood of reoffending as other

sex offenders; and (iii) his rehabilitative efforts, when considered together with the

length of time that he has been incarcerated, warrant a reduction of sentence. On

April 7, 2025—almost one year later, and before the Superior Court ruled on his

motion for sentence modification—Jackson filed a letter captioned “Clerical Error,”

claiming that he was sentenced to 28 years of prison (not 33 years) and enclosing

this Court’s decision affirming his convictions as evidence of this alleged error. The

1
Jackson v. State, 2002 WL 31728746 (Del. Dec. 2, 2002).
2
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b) (“The court will consider an application made more than 90 days
after the imposition of sentence only in extraordinary circumstances or pursuant to 11 Del. C. §
4217.”).
2
Superior Court deemed Jackson’s letter to be a motion for sentence modification and

denied it, finding that Jackson is required to serve 33 years in prison. This appeal

followed.

(4) On appeal, Jackson argues that the Superior Court erred when it (i)

considered his motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35, which governs

motions for the modification and correction of sentences, instead of Superior Court

Criminal Rule 36, which governs the correction of clerical errors;3 and (ii) rejected

his argument that there was a clerical error in the DOC database. Jackson asks us,

in the event that we disagree with his claim of error, to remand the matter to allow

the Superior Court to consider the merits of his motion for sentence modification

filed in June 2024 because he is prohibited by Rule 35 from filing another motion

for sentence modification.

(5) In support of Jackson’s argument that there is a clerical error in the

DOC database he cites this Court’s summary of his sentence, which we incorrectly

described as being suspended after 28 years.4 We regret the error. Unfortunately

for Jackson, the record is clear: the Superior Court sentenced him to a 33-year term

3
Del. Super. Crim. R. 36 (“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time
and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.”).
4
Jackson, 2002 WL 31728746, at *1 (“After a presentence investigation, Jackson was sentenced
to fifty-four years at Level V, suspended after serving twenty-eight years, for six months at Level
IV Work Release, followed by twenty-five years and six months of probation.”).
3
of unsuspended incarceration.5 Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s denial

of Jackson’s motion, albeit on the independent and alternative basis that it lacked

merit under Rule 36.6

(6) Although we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment, we nevertheless

agree with Jackson that the proper course of action is to remand the matter to permit

the Superior Court to consider the merits of Jackson’s motion for sentence

modification. To do otherwise would, as Jackson notes, preclude him from moving

for sentence modification in the future because Rule 35 does not allow the court to

consider repetitive requests for modification7—even though it appears that the court

did not consider the merits of Jackson’s motion filed in June 2024.

5
State’s Mot. to Affirm, Ex. B.
6
See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (recognizing that
this Court may affirm a lower court’s judgment on the basis of a different rationale than that which
was articulated by the trial court).
7
State v. Culp, 152 A.3d 141, 144 (Del. 2016) (“Rule 35(b) does not set forth any exception to the
repetitive motion bar.”).
4
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm be

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED. The matter is

remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Jurisdiction is not retained.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice

5