Scarangello v. Culley

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
VIVIAN L. MEDINILLA LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
JUDGE 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10400
WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3733
TELEPHONE (302) 255-0626

Submitted: October 22, 2024
Decided: January 17, 2025

Michael R. Ippoliti, Esquire Aaron E. Moore, Esquire
Christopher Isaac, Esquire M. Claire McCudden, Esquire
Ippoliti Law Group Marshall Dennehey, P.C.
1225 N. King Street, Suite 900 1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 600
Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Wilmington, Delaware 19899

Re: Felicia Scarangello and Estate of Aletha P. Scarangello v. Mary Culley,
Esquire, and Morris James LLP
C.A. No. N23C-09-185 VLM

Dear Counsel:
This is the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Reargument (“the
Motion”) under Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e). After consideration of all pleadings
and oral arguments, for the reasons stated herein, the Motion is GRANTED.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
This matter stems from a legal malpractice action filed by Felicia Scarangello
(“Felicia”) and the Estate of Aletha P. Scarangello (the “Estate”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) against attorney Mary Culley (“Culley”) and the law firm Morris James

1
Unless otherwise noted, this Court’s recitation is drawn from Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, D.I. 12 (“Am. Compl.”) and all relevant pleadings the parties incorporated by
reference, including Defendants Mary Culley, Esquire and Morris James LLP’s Opening Brief in
Support of their Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, D.I. 18 (“MTD Opening Br.”),
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint,
D.I. 22 (“MTD Opp’n”), and Defendants, Mary Culley, Esquire’s and Morris James, LLP’s Reply
Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, D.I. 23.

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LLP (collectively, “Defendants”).2 The underlying dispute centers on Defendants’
representation of Plaintiffs in matters concerning alleged financial misconduct by
Felicia’s brother, Anthony Scarangello, II (“Anthony”), involving their mother
Aletha’s assets. 3

This Court previously provided a detailed account of the facts in its May 22,
2024 Order denying the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“the Order”).4 For the
purpose of the Motion, the relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:
In April 2015, Felicia retained Defendants to address allegations that Anthony
had misappropriated funds from various trusts and accounts belonging to Aletha
Scarangello and/or Felicia.5 On August 28, 2015, Felicia (via Culley) formally
petitioned the Court of Chancery for the Appointment of Guardian. 6 On January 18,
2017, the Court of Chancery issued a Final Report that could not recommend
Anthony’s removal as trustee.7
Plaintiffs assert that between this date and the date of Culley’s retirement, she
should have immediately filed a new action against Anthony.8 Instead, in June 2018,
Felicia learned that Culley retired without receiving any notice from either Culley
or Morris James. 9 Felicia then discharged Defendants and retained new counsel.10

2
Am. Compl. at 1.
3
Id. ¶ 12.
4
See Letter Order, D.I. 25 (“Letter Order”).
5
Am. Compl. at 1.
6
Plaintiffs assert Culley wrongly advised Felicia regarding the need to first establish a
guardianship and contend that there could have been a more prudent course of action. MTD Opp’n
at 9, n.4.
7
Id. at 11–14.
8
Id. at 14. Plaintiffs further assert Culley acknowledged the existence of a viable claim against
Anthony, provided advice that caused needless delay, and failed to file a timely action on Felicia’s
behalf.
9
Id. at 17, n.29.
10
Id. at 17.

2
Represented by new counsel, Felicia filed a second action. 11 Through
subsequent legal proceedings in both the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court,
Plaintiffs’ claims against Anthony were ultimately found to be time-barred under the
doctrine of laches. 12
In September of 2020—pending the Supreme Court’s ruling—the parties
entered into their first tolling agreement (the “First Tolling Agreement”), which was
followed by two subsequent agreements in 2021 and 2022 (respectively, the “Second
Tolling agreement” and “Third Tolling Agreement”). 13 Unable to reach resolution,
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint alleging legal malpractice against
Defendants on September 21, 2023, 14 later amended on December 15, 2023. 15

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing primarily that the claims were barred
by Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions.16 After
full briefing and oral arguments, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.17
On May 30, 2024, Defendants filed the present Motion under Superior Court
Rule 59(e), specifically challenging the Court’s treatment of the Estate’s claims.18
Plaintiffs filed their response in opposition on July 16, 2024.19 The Motion has been
fully briefed, oral arguments have been heard, and it is now ripe for decision.

11
Id. at 18.
12
MTD Opp’n at 20.
13
MTD Opening Br., Exs. C (“First Tolling Agreement”), D (“Second Tolling Agreement”), and
E (“Third Tolling Agreement”).
14
See generally Plaintiff’s Malpractice Complaint, D.I. 1.
15
See generally Am. Compl.
16
See MTD Opening Br. at 7–11.
17
See generally Letter Order.
18
See Defendants Mary Culley, Esquire’s and Morris James, LLP’s Mot. for Reargument, D.I. 26
(“MFR”).
19
See generally Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion for Reargument, D.I. 30 (“MFR
Opp’n”).

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for reargument permits a trial court to reconsider its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, or judgment. 20 “Delaware law places a heavy burden on a [party]
seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59.”21 The moving party has the burden to
demonstrate that the Court must correct an error of law or prevent manifest injustice
deriving from its judgment.22 “A Rule 59(e) application is not an avenue for the
moving party to raise new arguments or to rehash arguments already decided by the
Court.”23 And such motion will be denied unless the Court has “overlooked a
controlling precedent or legal principles,” or “has misapprehended the law or facts
such as would affect the outcome of the decision” challenged.24

DISCUSSION
A. MOTION FOR REARGUMENT

Plaintiffs maintain Rule 59 consideration is improper because Defendants
merely rehash what has already been considered here. 25 Defendants, however,
indicate that this Court did not specifically address the issue as to whether the
Estate’s claims should be dismissed because it was not a party to the Tolling
Agreements—and even if it did as to the First Tolling Agreement—its claims are still
time barred because it was not a party in the Second and Third Tolling Agreements.26
Defendants have met the burden under Rule 59(e).

20
See Ramon v. Ramon, 963 A.2d 128, 136 (Del. 2008) (“A motion for reargument is the proper
device for seeking reconsideration by the Trial Court of its findings of fact, conclusion of law, or
judgment.”) (internal citations omitted).
21
Kostyshyn v. Comm’rs of Town of Bellefonte, 2007 WL 1241875, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 27,
2007).
22
See Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 260 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1969) (“manifest purpose of all Rule 59
motions is to afford the Trial Court an opportunity to correct errors”).
23
Maravilla-Diego v. MBM Construction II, LLC, 2015 WL 5055955, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 27,
2015) (citing cases).
24
Cummings v. Jimmy’s Grille, Inc., 2000 WL 1211167, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 9, 2000).
25
See MFR Opp’n.
26
MFR at 3–5.

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In its Order, this Court acknowledged Defendants’ assertion that “Felicia’s
designation as Administrator was false when [the parties] entered into the first
agreement [making] the tolling agreements voidable.”27 It weighed this argument
against the parties’ course of conduct and concluded that “Defendants had proceeded
as if Felicia was indeed authorized to negotiate, file, and act on behalf of the
Estate.”28 Plaintiffs’ response to the Motion focuses only on the Order’s ruling as it
relates to the First Tolling Agreement and does not reference Defendants’ arguments
as to the remaining agreements. 29

Upon review, the three tolling agreements are indeed linked—yet with
distinction. While the Court’s analysis addressed the validity of the First Tolling
Agreement, it did not separately consider that the Estate was facially not a party to
the Second Tolling Agreement or the Third Tolling Agreement. This difference
proves dispositive.

The Estate was not established until June 2022. 30 While it was named as a
party in the First Tolling Agreement, it was explicitly not included in the Second or
the Third Tolling Agreement. 31 “When interpreting a contract, the role of a court is
to effectuate the parties’ intent.” 32 “When the language of a…contract is clear and
unequivocal, a party will be bound by its plain meaning because creating an
ambiguity where none exists could, in effect, create a new contract with rights,

27
Letter Order at 8.
28
Id.
29
See MFR Opp’n at 2–5.
30
See MTD Opening Br., Ex. B.
31
“This Tolling Agreement (the “Agreement”) is entered into on this the 9th day of September,
2021 [2022] (the “Effective Date”) by and between Morris James LLP and Mary M. Gulley,
Esquire (collectively “Moms James”) and Felicia Scarangello (“Felicia”).” Second Tolling
Agreement at 1; Third Tolling Agreement at 1. Contra First Tolling Agreement at 1. “This Tolling
Agreement (the “Agreement”) is entered into on this the 9th day of September, 2020 (the
“Effective Date”) by and between Morris James LLP and Mary M. Culley, Esquire (collectively
“Morris James”) and Felicia Scarangello (“Felicia”) and The Estate of Aletha P. Scarangello (the
“Estate”).”
32
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006).

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liabilities and duties to which the parties had not assented. . . .” 33 Therefore, absent
any ambiguity, the plain language of the contract governs, and the Court will not
substitute its own understanding on the contract terms.

B. MOTION TO DISMISS

Since the Estate was not a party to the Second or Third Tolling Agreement,
the Court must revisit the Statute of Limitations analysis.

Under Delaware law, legal malpractice claims accrue “at the time of the
alleged malpractice,”34 and Delaware has not adopted the continuous representation
rule. 35 The timing of events is therefore crucial to this analysis. The alleged
malpractice, according to Plaintiffs, occurred between 2015 and March 2018.36

The First Tolling Agreement, executed on September 9, 2020, expired one
year after its inception. 37 The Estate’s claim was not brought until Plaintiffs filed
their original Complaint on September 21, 2023. 38 Attorney Culley retired, and
Felicia retained new counsel no later than June 15, 2018. Under Delaware’s three-
year statute of limitations, 39 these malpractice claims needed to be filed on or before
June 15, 2021. Even accounting for the one-year tolling provided by the First
Agreement, the Estate’s claims remain untimely. Consequently, the Estate’s claim
in the Amended Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.

33
Id. (citing Rhone–Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195
(Del. 1992)).
34
Sammons v. Anderson, 968 A.2d 492, 492 (Del. Mar. 9, 2009).
35
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP v. OKi Data Corp., 2014 WL 4102139, at *3 (Del.
Super. Aug. 1, 2014) (“Defendants counter that the continuous representation rule tolled the statute
[of limitations] … the Court is not willing to stretch the statute of limitations to the degree argued
by Defendants…”).
36
Am. Compl. at 6–14.
37
See First Tolling Agreement at 1.
38
See generally Plaintiff’s Malpractice Complaint, D.I. 1.
39
“The three year statute of limitations set forth in 10 Del. C. § 8106 governs legal malpractice
actions in Delaware.” Sammons, 968 A.2d at 492 (citing 10 Del. C. § 8106).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Reargument is
GRANTED. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the
Estate’s claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sincerely,

/s/ Vivian L. Medinilla
_____________________
Vivian L. Medinilla
Judge
cc: Prothonotary-Civil

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