State v. Lewis

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) I.D. Nos. 2404009772
) 2404014218
SHAKA LEWIS, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: April 7, 2025
Decided: April 16, 2025

Upon Defendant Shaka Lewis’ Motion for Postconviction Relief
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

Upon Defendant Shaka Lewis’ Motion for Appointment of Counsel
DENIED.

ORDER

Jillian Bender, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State of
Delaware.

Shaka Lewis, SBI# 449332, Howard R. Young correctional Institution, 1301 E. 12th
Street, Wilmington, DE 19809, pro se.

WHARTON, J.
The 16th day of April 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Shaka Lewis’

(“Lewis”) Motion for Postconviction Relief 1 (“PCR Motion”), his Motion for

Appointment of Counsel,2 and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:

1. Lewis pled guilty to Attempted Assault First Degree, Burglary First

Degree, and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”)

on November 12, 2024.3 He was sentenced the same day to an unsuspended

minimum mandatory period of seven years imprisonment followed by probation.4

Lewis did not appeal.

2. Lewis now moves for postconviction relief for the first time.5

Accompanying that motion is a Motion for Appointment of Counsel.6 Lewis raises

three claims. His first alleges, “Ineffective assistance of counsel. I feel like I was

pressured into taking the plea deal. Faced with a lengthy potential sentence, my

lawyer coerced me to take plea.”7 The second alleges, “Ineffective assistance of

counsel. My lawyer did not call witnesses that would have provided key evidence for

1
D.I. 15 (ID N. 2404014218); D.I. 16 (ID No. 2404009772). Subsequent docket
item references are to ID No. 2404014218).`
2
D.I. 17.
3
D.I. 11.
4
D.I. 12.
5
D.I. 15.
6
D.I. 17.
7
Id.
2
my case.”8 The third simply states, “Mental health needs. Lack of mental health

resources such as counselling or therapy.”9

3. Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction

relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule

61(i).10 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the

postconviction claim. 11 Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure,

a motion for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, repetitive

motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications. A motion exceeds time

limitations if it is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final or if it

asserts a newly recognized, retroactively applied right more than one year after it was

first recognized. 12 A second or subsequent motion is repetitive and therefore barred.13

The Court considers a repetitive motion only if the movant was convicted at trial and

the motion pleads with particularity either: (1) actual innocence; 14 or (2) the

application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied rule of constitutional law

rendering the conviction invalid.15 Grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings

leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally defaulted unless the

8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
11
Id.
12
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
13
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
14
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i).
15
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii).
3
movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation.”16 Grounds

for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the

judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a federal

habeas corpus hearing” are barred.17 The above bars to relief do not apply either to a

claim the court lacked jurisdiction or to one claiming: (1) actual innocence; or (2) the

application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied, rule of constitutional law

rendering the conviction invalid.18 None of Rule 61(i)’s bars to relief are present here.

4. To successfully bring an ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim,

a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2)

that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him of a fair trial with

reliable results.19 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 20

Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and

substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.21 “[A] court must indulge in a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” 22 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a

showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

16
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
17
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
18
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).
19
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
20
Id. at 667-68.
21
Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).
22
Strickland, 446 U.S. at 689.
4
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 23 An inmate must

satisfy the proof requirements of both prongs to succeed on an IAC claim. Failure to

do so on either prong will doom the claim and the Court need not address the other.24

5. Summary dismissal is appropriate if it plainly appears from the motion

for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the

movant is not entitled to relief. 25 Here, it is plain to the Court from the PCR Motion

and the record in this case that Lewis is not entitled to relief.

6. The Court need only review Lewis’ Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea

Form to see that he was not pressured or coerced into pleading guilty. Barring clear

and convincing evidence to the contrary, defendants are bound by the representations

they make during their plea colloquy. 26 These statements are “presumed to be

truthful”27 and pose a “formidable barrier to a collateral attack on a guilty plea.”28 At

no point during his colloquy, as reflected by the Truth-in Sentencing Guilty Plea

Form, did Lewis express that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily entered.29 He denied being forced into pleading guilty, informed the

23
Id. at 694.
24
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013)
(“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an
attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”).
25
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).
26
Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632.
27
Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632 (citing Davis v. State, 1992 WL 401566 (Del.
1992)); Bramlett v. A.L. Lockhart, 876 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1989)).
28
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 64 (1977).
29
D.I. 11.
5
Court that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, and understood the

trial rights he waived by pleading guilty.30

7. If any pressure or coercion was applied to Lewis, it was a result of the

difficult situation in which he found himself. As he acknowledges, he was faced

with a “lengthy potential sentence.” He is correct – he was facing a long potential

sentence of 75 years on just the charges to which he pled guilty. Other charges

included a second count of Attempted Assault First Degree, an additional two counts

of PFDCF, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Criminal Mischief (Felony),

Aggravated Menacing, Unlawful Imprisonment First Degree, and Criminal Mischief

(Misdemeanor). He faced an additional 93 years at Level V, eight of which were

minimum mandatory sentences, on the charges the State agreed to drop. But, his

lawyer had nothing to do with that type of pressure. Lewis has not made, much less

substantiated, any concrete claim of actual prejudice. His first claim is

SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

8. Similarly Lewis’ second claim of IAC is unsubstantiated by any evidence

of actual prejudice. He does not identify what witnesses his lawyer should have

called. Nor does he describe what evidence they would have provided. Moreover,

there was no hearing at which the witnesses would have testified. This claim too is

SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

30
Id.
6
9. Lewis’ third claim is not really a claim at all. It is simply a statement

about a lack of mental health resources. 31 It is SUMMARILY DISMISSED as

well.

10. Finally, Lewis seeks appointment of counsel. That request is denied

due to the Court’s summary dismissal of all of his PCR claims. Further, Rule

61(e)(3)(iii) precludes appointment of counsel in guilty plea cases unless the movant

sets forth a substantial claim that he has received IAC.32 Lewis’ IAC claims fail to

meet that test.

THEREFORE, Defendant Shaka Lewis’ Motion for Postconviction Relief is

SUMMARILY DISMISSED. His Motion for Appointment of Counsel is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.

31
Id.
32
Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3)(iii).
7