State v. Lewis

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) I.D. No. 2402003067
)
MASHAWN LEWIS, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: June 24, 2025
Decided: June 27, 2025

Upon the State of Delaware’s Request to Sentence Defendant Pursuant to 11 Del.
C. § 1448(e)(1)(b)
GRANTED.

ORDER

Stephen McCloskey, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State
of Delaware.

John S. Edinger, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, OFFICE OF DEFENSE
SERVICES, PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, 820 North French Street,
Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defendant Mashawn Lewis.

WHARTON, J.
Upon consideration of the State’s request to sentence Defendant Mashawn

Lewis(“Lewis”) pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(b), Lewis’ opposition and the

record in this case, it appears to the Court that:

1. Lewis was found guilty by a jury of a single count of Possession of a

Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”). After trial, this Court determined that

his bail must be revoked pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 2104(f)(1)(b)1 because he was

subject to an enhanced minimum mandatory sentence pursuant to 11 Del. C. §

1448(e)(1)(a) due to his prior conviction of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon -

Firearm (“CCDW”).2 The Court rejected Lewis’ argument that under Erlinger v.

United States3 an enhancement based on a prior conviction is a fact that must be

proven to a jury’s satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 The Court held that

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 5 an exception to the general rule and left

untouched by Erlinger, allowed the Court to find the fact of his prior conviction.6

But, that was all the Court decided.

2. The Court left open the question of whether the three-year minimum

mandatory sentence of § 1448(e)(1)(a)7 or the five-year minimum mandatory

1
State v. Lewis, 2025 WL 1531489 (Del. Super. Ct. May 29, 2025).
2
See, 11 Del. C. §§ 1448(e)(1)(a) and (b).
3
602 U.S. 821 (2024).
4
State v. Lewis, at *3.
5
523 U.S. 224 (1998).
6
State v. Lewis, at *1.
7
“Three years at Level V if the person has previously been convicted of a violent
felony.” 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(a).
2
sentence of § 1448(e)(1)(b) applied.8 It directed the State to advise the Court under

which provision of § 1448(e)(1) it sought to have Lewis sentenced. The State

informed the Court that it seeks the five-year minimum mandatory sentence under §

1448(e)(1)(b). The Court now addresses the question it previously left open.

3. By way of background, Lewis was indicted on three counts – PFBPP,

Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PABPP”) and Receiving a

Stolen Firearm. At the pre-trial conference on April 24, 2025, the State advised the

Court that it would be entering a nolle prosequi on the Receiving a Stolen Firearm

charge. The Court was advised further that the parties anticipated entering into a

stipulation regarding Lewis’ status as a prohibited person. At trial, the parties did

stipulate that Lewis was prohibited by law from possessing a firearm and

ammunition. At the end of the trial, the jury found Lewis guilty of the PFBPP charge

but not guilty of the PABPP charge. The Court ordered a pre-sentence investigation.

8
State v. Lewis, at *3. Sec. 1448(e)(1)(b) provides:

Notwithstanding any provision of this section or Code to
the contrary, any person who is a prohibited as described
in this section and who knowingly possesses, purchases,
owns, or controls a firearm, projectile weapon, or
destructive weapon while so prohibited shall receive a
minimum sentence of…

b. Five years at Level V, if the person does so within
10 years of the date of conviction for any violent felony or
the date of termination of all periods of incarceration or
confinement imposed pursuant to said conviction.
3
4. After the verdicts were returned, the Court asked if there were any

applications. Neither party made any. Later, the State called chambers asking about

a bail revocation. The Court held a teleconference on May 5th. At that

teleconference, the State asked that Lewis’ bail be revoked. Lewis opposed that

request. The Court ordered the parties to submit letter memoranda, the last of which

was filed on May 22nd. The Court decided that issue on May 29th and revoked Lewis’

bail.9

5. Lewis allows that a sentencing court may make a determination of what

crime and with what elements the defendant was convicted of. But, he contends that

is the limit of what a sentencing court can do. Were the Court to go beyond finding

the fact of conviction to finding that it occurred within 10 years so as to impose the

five year minimum mandatory sentence required by § 1448(e)(1)(b), such finding

would contravene Erlinger. 10

6. The State, on the other hand, denies that any such fact finding is

required based on court documents already reviewed by the court to determine the

fact of Lewis’ conviction. Those documents show that he was convicted on

December 12, 2022, well within the last 10 years.

7. Erlinger involved the application of the federal Armed Career Criminal

Act (“ACCA”). ACCA provides:

9
Id.
10
Id. at 5-6.
4
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this
title and has tree previous convictions by any court
referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent
felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another, such person shall be
fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 15 years,
and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court
shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary
sentence to such person with respect to the conviction
under section 922(g).11

In Erlinger, the parties disputed whether Erlinger’s prior crimes had occurred “on

occasions different from one another.”12 Erlinger contended whether his prior

crimes occurred on distinct occasions or in a single criminal episode was a factual

determination to be made by a jury.13 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that

determination is a ‘“fact laden task”’ which must be undertaken by a jury.14

8. Erlinger had this to say about the scope of what a Court may consider

consistent with Almendarez-Torres:

To conduct the narrow inquiry Almendarez-
Torres authorizes, a court may need to know the
jurisdiction in which the defendant's crime occurred and
its date in order to ascertain what legal elements the
government had to prove to secure a conviction in that
place at that time. And to answer those questions, a
sentencing court may sometimes consult “a restricted set
of materials,” often called Shepard documents, that
include judicial records, plea agreements, and colloquies
between a judge and the defendant. Descamps, 570 U.S.,
at 262, 133 S.Ct. 2276; see Sheppard, 544 U.S., at 20-21,

11
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
12
State’s Op. Mem. at 2, D.I. 56.
13
Id.
14
Id. (quoting Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834.)
5
26, 125 S.Ct. 1254; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990).

None of that, however, means that a court may
use Shepard documents or any other materials for any
other purpose. To ensure compliance with the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, a sentencing judge may use the
information he gleans from Shepard documents for the
“limited function” of determining the fact of a prior
conviction and the then-existing elements of that
offense. Descamps, 570 U.S., at 260, 133 S.Ct. 2276.
[N]o more” is allowed. Mathis, 579 U.S., at 511, 136 S.Ct.
2243. In particular, a judge may not use information
in Shepard documents to decide “what the defendant ...
actually d[id],” or the “means” or “manner” in which he
committed his offense in order to increase the punishment
to which he might be exposed. 579 U.S., at 504, 510-511,
136 S.Ct. 2243; see Descamps, 570 U.S., at 269, 133 S.Ct.
2276. To sanction that practice would be to allow a
sentencing court to do exactly what the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments forbid. Ibid.

The sentencing court in this case disregarded these
constraints. To determine what legal elements attached to
Mr. Erlinger’s decades-old offenses, the court might have
needed to consult Shepard documents to ascertain the
jurisdiction in which they occurred and the date on which
they happened. But the court had no need or authority “to
go any further,” Mathis, 579 U.S,, at 511, 136 S.Ct. 2243,
and assume for itself the responsibility of deciding
whether Mr. Erlinger’s past offenses differed enough in
time, location, character, and purpose to have transpired
on different occasions. Let alone undertake that inquiry
all with an eye toward increasing his punishment. The
Fifth and Sixth Amendments “contemplat[e] that a jury—
not a sentencing court—will find such facts, unanimously
and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Descamps, 570 U.S., at
269, 133 S.Ct. 2276.15

15
Erlinger, 602 U.S., at 839-40.
6
9. Applying the above instructions, it is clear that, consistent with

Almendarez-Torres and Erlinger, this Court may look to the date of Lewis’

conviction. But, here it is not necessary to do even that. All the Court need do is

look to the indictment that contained the charge for which he was convicted. The

indictment alleges Lewis committed the crime of CCDW on or about February 3,

2022. 16 Obviously, if Lewis committed the crime within 10 years, he was convicted

of that crime within 10 years also. In looking at the indictment to determine whether

Lewis qualifies for sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(b), the Court has not

engaged in any factfinding resembling the “occasions” determination that Erlinger

requires be made by a jury. Nor, has it strayed beyond the very document that

contains the elements of the offense.17

THEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, the State’s request to sentence

Lewis pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(b) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.

16
See State’s letter dated May 21, 2025, at Ex. A, D.I. 59.
17
A different result might obtain if the Court were required to determine if a
defendant’s conviction under 11 Del. C.§ 1448 occurred within 10 years of the “date
of termination of all periods of incarceration or confinement imposed pursuant to
said conviction” under § 1448(e)(1)(b).
7