State v. Watkins

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
KATHLEEN M. MILLER LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
JUDGE 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10501
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801
TELEPHONE (302) 255-0669

September 23, 2025

William H. Leonard, Esq. Paige C. Chapman, Esq.
Department of Justice Office of Defense Services
820 North French Street, 7th Floor 820 North French Street, 3rd Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19801

Re: State v. Anthony L. Watkins
Case No.: 1609021468

Dear Counsel:

After supplemental submissions by the parties, the State’s request for
restitution is ripe for decision.

Background
On May 5, 2025, Mr. Watkins pled guilty to Burglary 3rd and was immediately
sentenced, which included payment of restitution. The State was given 60 days to
submit a Restitution Memorandum, which it filed on July 3. The memorandum
detailed $4,652.05 in out-of-pocket losses suffered by victim Amanda Coen.1 The
State seeks restitution in this amount.

Mr. Watkins requested a restitution hearing, which the Court set for August
21, 2025. Mr. Watkins failed to appear. However, based on Pratt v. State,2 his
counsel requested that the Court consider Mr. Watkins’ inability to pay when setting
the amount of restitution.

The parties’ contentions
The defense argues that prior to resolution of the Burglary charge, Mr.
Watkins was incarcerated in Pennsylvania for eight years. Upon completion of that
sentence, he was extradited to Delaware, where he was held until sentencing in this

1
There is no factual dispute over the amount sought in the restitution memorandum.
2
486 A.2d 1154 (Del. 1984).
Page 2 of 4

matter.3 Since being released to probation on the Burglary charge, Mr. Watkins has
been living in a halfway house. Because of his felony convictions and being out of
the job market for almost 10 years, the prospects for employment are diminished.
Additionally, the defense argues, after his release from the halfway house, Mr.
Watkins will need to find housing, which will come with its own set of financial
responsibilities. Thus, the end of his punishment for this crime will be pushed “too
far out of sight.” The defense seeks a 50% reduction in the amount of restitution.

The State argues that Section 4106 “appears to demand full restitution.”4 And,
even though the Supreme Court articulated restitution guidelines in Pratt, the court
affirmed the restitution ordered in that case, which was in an amount greater than
the amount requested here.5 Finally, the State asserts that Mr. Watkins’ current
financial circumstances are a result of his criminal history and therefore, he should
not be relieved from making the victim whole.

Discussion
Section 4106 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Any person convicted of stealing, taking, receiving, converting,
defacing or destroying property, shall be liable to each victim of the
offense for the value of the property or property rights lost to the victim
and for the value of any property which has diminished in worth as a
result of the actions of such convicted offender and shall be ordered by
the court to make restitution….

(b) In accordance with the evidence presented to the court, the court
shall determine the nature and amount of restitution, if any, to be made
to each victim of the crime of each convicted offender. The offender
shall be ordered to pay a fixed sum of restitution ….

There is no statutory requirement that the court consider a defendant’s ability
to pay when determining the amount of restitution. If a defendant is unable to pay

3
The charges stem from events in 2016, for which Watkins was indicted in 2017. He was
sentenced on the Burglary 3rd charge to 3 years at Level V, suspended for time-served (165 days),
followed by probation.
4
A person convicted of stealing, “shall be liable to each victim” for restitution.
5
The Superior Court ordered restitution in the amount of $22,955.48. The Supreme Court also
noted that the defendants were “transient servicemen stationed in Delaware” and that the primary
beneficiaries of the restitution were insurance companies.
Page 3 of 4

restitution, the court may order the defendant to work for the Department of
Correction as a substitute.6

The Supreme Court in Pratt v. State,7 provided guidelines when ordering
restitution. First, the court recognized that ordering restitution is discretionary, but
it should be ordered when the victim has “suffered an actual monetary loss.”8
Second, “[t]he defendant’s ability to pay is an element to be considered in
determining the amount of restitution and the schedule of payments.”9 Finally, it is
the defendant’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, his financial
condition and lack of resources.10

While Section 4106 provides that a defendant “shall” be liable, the amount of
restitution ordered is within the discretion of the court.11 A defendant’s inability to
pay is a consideration, but is not determinative of the amount of restitution
imposed.12 Mr. Watkins bears the burden of proving his inability to pay and why a
reduction in the amount requested is appropriate here. He failed to do so.

Mr. Watkins’ employment opportunities will undoubtedly be impacted by
having served a lengthy prison sentence and his previous felony convictions. He did

6
11 Del. C. § 4105(b)(1).
7
486 A.2d 1154 (Del. 1983).
8
Id. at 1161.
9
Id. The guidelines, taken from the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restitution, provide in
full:
(1) Victim loss statements used by the police and/or the Presentence Office must
be changed to ask for market value, as opposed to replacement value or replacement
cost.
(2) Whenever possible, victim loss statements should be completed by the victim,
who must include a receipt or other verification of the loss statement.
(3) A letter informing the victim of the right to seek restitution must accompany the
loss statement.
(4) Restitution is discretionary and its imposition shall be governed by 11 Del.C. §
4106(a).
(5) Restitution should be ordered when the victim has suffered an actual monetary
loss through personal injury, damage to or destruction or theft of property.
(6) Restitution should cover the victim's own out-of-pocket expenses and losses as
a first priority; losses covered by insurance are the lowest priority.
(7) The defendant’s ability to pay is an element to be considered in determining the
amount of restitution and the schedule of payments.
10
Benton v. State, 711 A.2d 792, 800 (Del. 1998); State v. Casella, 2005 WL 1004768, at *2 (Del.
Super. Apr. 29, 2005).
11
See Pratt, 486 A.2d at 1161.
12
Casella, 2005 WL 1004768, at *2.
Page 4 of 4

not, however, appear at the sentencing hearing, and so, the Court has no factual basis
to further evaluate his ability to pay.

Moreover, the court has inherent authority to readjust a defendant’s payment
schedule at any time.13 The Court finds that it is premature to assess Mr. Watkins’
ability to pay. Mr. Watkins was released to probation only a few months ago. The
Court has no factual record of attempts to find employment, employment history,
good faith attempts to make payments, or any other factor that may bear on his
inability to pay. Under Mr. Watkins’ theory, any defendant who recently completed
a long prison term would be eligible for a reduction in restitution. The Court,
however, is not willing to reduce a victim’s restitution simply due to the defendant’s
criminal history.

Mr. Watkins is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $4,652.05. A
modified sentencing order will be entered.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Kathleen M. Miller
Kathleen M. Miller, Judge
Original to Prothonotary

13
Pratt, 486 A.2d at 1160.