State v. Hollingsworth

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE

MARTIN B. O’CONNOR LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
COMMISSIONER 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3733
TELEPHONE: (302) 255-0661

October 2, 2025
Thomas Hollingsworth
SBI # 00318086
James T. Vaughn Correctional Institution
1181 Paddock Road
Smyrna, DE 19977

Re: Thomas Hollingsworth v. State of Delaware
Motion for Postconviction Relief
Case No. 1703020039

Dear Mr. Hollingsworth:

On June 30, 2025, this Court received a Motion for Postconviction Relief
(“Motion”) you filed in the above-referenced case.1 On October 18, 2018 you
entered a guilty plea to two counts of Murder Second Degree and one count of
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.2 On March 15, 2019,
this Court sentenced you to an aggregate sentence of 68 years Level V, suspended
after serving 48 years, followed by probation supervision.3 You did not appeal your
conviction or sentence, but have filed at least three motions for sentence
modification, all of which have been denied.4
In the motion for postconviction relief, you present three claims. First, you
argue a violation of your right to due process – specifically that you were “sentenced
on materially false and misleading information.”5 Second, you claim the prosecutor
1
Docket Item (“D.I.”) 30.
2
D.I. 21.
3
D.I. 22.
4
See D.I. 25, June 6, 2019 Order denying motion for sentence reduction; D.I. 27, January 25,
2021 Order denying second motion for sentence reduction; and D.I. 29, Order denying motion for
correction of illegal sentence.
5
D.I. 30, p. 3.
1
presented “uncharged, inflammatory conduct at sentencing,” where he introduced a
prejudicial statement from your girlfriend alleging you “killed a cat [the] day prior
[to the homicide].”6 Third, you assert this Court relied on “false and unsubstantiated
information to determine [your] sentence.”7 Finally, you contend “these
constitutional violations undermine[d] the fundamental fairness, reliability and
integrity of the proceedings, satisfying [Superior Court Criminal] Rule 61(i)(5)’s
standard for miscarriage of justice.”8
Before considering the merit(s) of any postconviction relief motion, this Court
must first apply Superior Court Criminal Rule (“Rule”) 61’s procedural bars. A
motion for postconviction relief can be procedurally barred as untimely filed,
repetitive, formerly adjudicated, or procedurally defaulted.9 The bars to relief also
do not apply to a defendant who has been convicted after a trial and pleads with
particularity: (a) that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the
movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he
was convicted; or (b) that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme
Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the conviction or death sentence
invalid.10 Upon consideration of your Motion, it is apparent your claims are
procedurally barred.
Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1), a motion for postconviction relief must be filed no
more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final.11 Because you entered
a guilty plea and did not appeal the conviction and sentence, the judgment of
conviction was final thirty days after this Court imposed sentence, on April 15, 2019.
Your Motion is procedurally barred as untimely filed by more than six years.

Second, Rule 61(i)(3) prohibits the filing of “any ground for relief not asserted
in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction . . . unless the movant shows
(A) cause for relief from the procedural default, or (B) prejudice from a violation of
the movant’s rights.”12 You did not raise any of the three claims asserted in your

6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Washington, 2021 WL 5232259, at *4.
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
11
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
12
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
2
postconviction motion in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, so
they are procedurally barred for this second, independent reason.

Finally, to the extent you assert the Motion is not procedurally barred because
it meets Rule 61(i)(5)’s standard for demonstrating a “miscarriage of justice,” the
“miscarriage of justice” analysis was eliminated when Rule 61(i)(5) was amended
on June 4, 2014.13 It is well established that this Court is required to apply the
version of Criminal Rule 61 that was in effect at the time of a defendant’s filing of
a postconviction motion.14 According to the version of Rule 61(i)(5) in effect when
the present Motion was filed, to avoid the application of the procedural bars stated
in Rule 61(i)(1)-(4) you are required to assert, after having been convicted after a
trial, that this Court lacked jurisdiction, or a claim that satisfies the pleading
requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i)-(ii).15 Because you entered a guilty plea, you are
ineligible to apply Rule 61(i)(5) as a basis to excuse your claims from the procedural
bars noted supra.16

As the postconviction claims are procedurally barred, I will not address the
merit(s) of the claims.17 It is worth noting, however, that Rule 61 requires you to
submit to this Court any “ground that is a sufficient factual and legal basis for a
collateral attack upon a criminal conviction,” and you must “set forth in summary
form the facts supporting each of the grounds this specified.” Your Motion fails to
provide the requisite factual background, at least in claims one and three, to assert
valid postconviction claims.18

13
See Jones v. State, 2015 WL 6746873, at *1 (Del. Nov. 4, 2015).
14
State v. Jones, 2016 WL 7338591, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2016) (citing Younger v. State,
580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990)), aff’d Jones v. State, 2017 WL 4535974, at *1 (Del. Oct. 10, 2017).
15
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
16
Rule 61(d)(2) provides, in pertinent part: A second or subsequent motion under this rule shall
be summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion either:
(i) pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference
that the movant is actually innocent-in-fact of the acts underlying the charges of
which he was convicted; or
(ii) pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the
Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the conviction
or death sentence invalid.
17
See State v. Johnson, 2025 WL 883031, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2025).
18
See generally Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1) and Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(2).
3
Based upon a review of the record and the Motion, I recommend that your
Motion for Postconviction Relief be SUMMARILY DISMISSED as procedurally
barred.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

/s/ Martin B. O’Connor
Martin B. O’Connor
Commissioner
Cc: Prothonotary
Abigail Rodgers, State Prosecutor

4