CourtListener 10780786

Texto completo

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, )
F.S.B., ) N22L-05-068 FJJ
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
Zachary Pearce and Robin Pearce, )
)
Defendants, )

Submitted: January 9, 2026
Decided: January 28, 2026

OPINION AND ORDER
on Zachary Pearce’s Motion to Set Aside a Sheriff’s Sale and
WSFS’s Motion to Confirm Sheriff’s Sale

Jeffrey S. Cianciulli, Esquire, Weir, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for
Plaintiff.

Mr. Zachary Pierce and Mrs. Robin Pearce, Townsend, Delaware, Pro-Se
Defendants.

William Larson, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Party-In-Interest,
Quality Angels Real Estate, LLC.

Jones, J.
As part of a series of commercial loans made to Spring Oaks Development

LLC ("Spring Oaks"), a Delaware limited liability company, controlled by

Zachary Pearce (“Pearce”) and his then business partner, Aravindin Pratapagiri

("Pratapagiri"), WSFS extended commercial credit to the Zachery Pearce and his

wife, Robin Pearce, as joint borrowers in the amount of $312,500.00 (the "Pearce

Loan") on March 29, 2016. The Pearce Loan was secured by a Mortgage on the

Pearces’ personal residence located at 161 Masseys Church Road, Townsend, DE.

Subsequently, the following occurred:

i) The parties entered into a Forbearance Agreement on June 10,
2019 (the "FBA"), which provided the Pearces with additional
time to repay the Pearce Loan until September 30, 2019, and if
payments were current, then until December 13, 2019;
ii) on November 15, 2019, by First Amendment to Forbearance
Agreement ("First Amendment"), agreed further to extend the
time for which all obligations were due and owing under the
Pearce Loan until April 30, 2020;
iii) on April 27, 2020, the Pearces and Spring Oaks entered into a
Second Amendment to Forbearance Agreement (the "Second
Amendment") which, among other things, provided the Pearces
with an extension until July 30, 2020 to repay the Pearce Loan;
the Second Amendment also provided that the Pearces were
responsible for the payment of a $1,000 forbearance fee;
iv) on January 21, 2021, the Pearces and Spring Oaks entered into a
Third Amendment to Forbearance Agreement (the "Third
Amendment") which, among other things, provided the Pearces
with an extension until December 31, 2021 to repay the Pearce
Loan; and
v) finally, on October 7, 2022, entered into a Fourth Amendment to
Forbearance Agreement (the "Fourth Amendment") which,
among other things, provided the Pearces with a final (post-
foreclosure) extension until September 30, 2023 to repay the
Pearce Loan.

2
The Bank did not receive payment by December 31, 2021, and on May 25,

2022, WSFS filed the instant mortgage foreclosure action. Following the final

mandatory mediation of the Foreclosure Action, the parties executed the Fourth

Amendment which reaffirmed the debt obligations owed by the Pearces to WSFS

and established a new maturity date of the Pearce Loan as September 23, 2023.

The Fourth Amendment also required the Pearces to deliver to Lender a

Foreclosure Consent Judgment to be held in escrow by WSFS pending an “Event

of Default.” The Pearces defaulted under the Fourth Amendment by failing to

make the final payment by September 23, 2023, and on October 27, 2023, WSFS

filed its Motion for Entry of Consent Judgment. On December 12, 2023, this Court

entered judgment in mortgage foreclosure (the "Judgment") in favor of WSFS. No

appeal was taken of the Judgment.

On March 21, 2024, the Sheriff of New Castle County was directed to sell

the Pearce Property to satisfy the debt owed to WSFS. The sale was scheduled for

March 12, 2024, and then moved to June 11, 2024, at WSFS’s request. On June

10, 2024, Pearce moved under Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b) to be relieved from

the Judgment.

In his motion to be relieved from judgment, Pearce argued that the fraud of

his former business associates and his attorney, where Pearce’s electronic

signature was forged by them, caused defaults on multiple business loans. The

3
motion for relief was heard by Commissioner Salomone who denied the Motion

on the record on August 9, 2024. Commissioner Salomone ruled that the Superior

Court Civil Rule 60(b) did not provide relief to Pearce where the complaint upon

fraud was not the fraud of WSFS. No party requested that Commissioner

Salomone’s decision be confirmed by a Superior Court Judge and no order was

ever entered by a Superior Court Judge. Pearce appealed the decision to the

Delaware Supreme Court. The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on

September 12, 2024, because it had no jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a

Commissioner’s Order. 1

WSFS continued with its efforts to complete a Sheriff’s sale on the property.

The sale was scheduled for November 12, 2024. However, that was stayed on that

same date by a bankruptcy filing by Pearce.

Pearce filed three personal bankruptcy cases in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Each of these cases was dismissed

by the Bankruptcy Court on November 24, 2024, February 28, 2025, and

September 30, 2025, respectively. The last dismissal came after WSFS filed a

Motion with the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 362(c)(4)(A)(ii) on

September 18, 2025. This section of the bankruptcy code allows a creditor, such

1
While not necessary to the instant decision, out of an abundance, the Court expressly adopts and affirms the
decision of Commissioner Salomone for the same reasons articulated by her on the record.

4
as WSFS, to obtain a determination from the Bankruptcy Court as to whether the

automatic stay under the bankruptcy code is or is not in place. WSFS sought this

relief. On September 30, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order providing

in part that “the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 362 is not in effect” and that WSFS

“may proceed with exercising its rights and remedies against the Debtor and the

Debtor’s property, including by foreclosure on the Debtor’s residential real

property.”2 The Bankruptcy Court denied Pearce’s request for reconsideration.

On December 8, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order that provided the

following:

1. Mr. Pearce has filed three personal cases in this Court. All of those
cases have been dismissed by the Court. The last dismissal order
entered by the Court provided that the case was dismissed with
prejudice, with one-year bar to refiling. Following a hearing, the
Court denied Mr. Pearce’s request for reconsideration of that
dismissal by Order dated November 25, 2025.
2. The record further reflects that Mr. Pearce is a principal of Gray’s
Landing Development, LLC (“Gray’s Landing”). Gray’s Landing
is alleged to own, or have an ownership stake in, the Property.
Gray’s Landing was the subject of a pro se Chapter 11 petition
signed by Mr. Pearce in 2023 in this Court, which was dismissed
on December 18, 2023.
3. Gray’s Landing filed another Chapter 11 petition (also signed by
Mr. Pearce, and again, without counsel representing the corporate
debtor) on November 5, 2025. The next day on November 6, 2025,
a separate Chapter 7 petition for Gray’s Landing was filed by Mr.
Pearce, once again without counsel for the corporate debtor.
Following a hearing held on November 12, 2025, both the recent
Chapter 11 case and the Chapter 7 case were dismissed by the
Court by Order dated November 13, 2025.

2
Docket Item (“D.I.”) 42 in the Bankruptcy Court’s case docket, Case No. 25-11389 (BLS).

5
4. On November 17, 2025, Catherine Fry Pearce (“Mrs. Pearce”)
filed a pro se Chapter 13 petition in this court. The record reflects
that Mrs. Pearce is Mr. Pearce’s mother, and she currently resides
in the Property and asserts a lien or mortgage against the Property.
5. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Mr. Pearce has
orchestrated these many bankruptcy filings in this Court as part of
a scheme to hinder and delay his creditors. Congress has built
specific provisions into the Bankruptcy Code to address
circumstances where debtors pursue serial filings in an abuse of
the bankruptcy system and to the unfair detriment of their
creditors. …
6. None of the multiple filings made by Mr. Pearce demonstrate a
meaningful intention to utilize the rehabilitative tools of the
Bankruptcy Code, beyond obtaining a brief reprieve from his
creditors. Mr. Pearce has filed to perform his duties as a debtor in
possession in any of these cases or to make any of the basic filings,
such as schedules of assets and liabilities to facilitate the
administrative of his cases. The Court further notes that the same
maladies afflict the Gray’s Landing cases, in addition to having
been impermissibly filed without counsel for the corporate
debtor.3

WSFS issued a Writ on August 19, 2025, to restart the Sheriff’s sale

process.4 The property was posted on September 23, 2025.5 An affidavit of

Service of Notice to Lienholders, Tenants, Record Owners and Persons having

Interest of Sheriff Sale of Real Estate scheduled on October 14, 2025, was filed on

October 9, 2025.6 The affidavit of service indicates that William Pearce was

served at 161-A Massey Church Road, Townsend, DE 19734.7 On October 13,

3
D.I. 56 in the Bankruptcy Court’s case docket, Case No. 25-11389 (BLS) (internal footnotes omitted).
4
D.I. 44.
5
D.I. 46.
6
D.I. 47.
7
D.I. 47, Exhibit BB.

6
2025, Pearce filed an Emergency Petition to Stay the Sheriff’s sale which was not

addressed before the sale occurred on October 14, 2025.8 The successful bidder

was Quality Angels Real Estate, LLC (“Quality Angels”) who bid $971,000.

Pearce is seeking to set aside the Sheriff’s sale for five reasons:

1. Failure under Superior Court Civil Rule 69(g) to give proper
notice to a recorded Lienholder – William P. Pearce, who is
Zachery Pearce’s father;9
2. There was a contract for sale of the property at $2.1 million
dollars, and the contract was with an entity that is related to the
entity that purchased the property at the Sheriff’s sale for
$971,000;
3. WSFS was engaged in fraudulent conduct with the successful
bidder on the property that allowed the property to sell for
$971,000 when there was a contract with a related entity for $2.1
million. Pearce specifically alleges that WSFS, through counsel,
misrepresented to the Bankruptcy Court there was no viable
contract of sale on the property;
4. The automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Court prevented the sale;
and
5. 131 Massey Landing Road is the home of Catherine Pearce,
plaintiff’s mother, and moving her from the property will put her
at risk.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has broad discretion to confirm or set aside Sheriff's sales.10

Review of a Sheriff's sale “implicates the court's inherent equitable power to

control the execution process and functions to protect the affected parties from

8
D.I. 48.
9
Originally, Mr. Pearce complained that service was defective because, in addition to his father, William C. Pearce
(his brother), Cathy Pearce (his mother) and JTPCC Development LLC (an entity where Zachary Pearce is the sole
member) did not get notice. At the hearing in this case on January 9, 2026, Mr. Pearce abandoned his claim based
on lack of notice as to his brother, mother and JTPCC Development LLC.
10
Burge v. Fidelity Bond and Mortgage Co., 648 A.2d 414, 420 (Del. 1994).

7
injury or injustice.”11 To that end, when reviewing a Sheriff's sale, the Court “must

ascertain whether there was ‘some defect or irregularity in the process or mode of

conducting the sale, or [ ] neglect of duty, or misconduct on the part of the Sheriff

or some other sufficient matter … whereby the rights of parties to, or interested in

the sale are, or may have been, prejudiced.’” 12 It is well-established in Delaware

that “mere inadequacy of price, standing alone, is an insufficient ground for setting

aside a judicial sale.” 13 Additionally, the Court “may not arbitrarily or capriciously

refuse to confirm a sale, where there are no irregularities in the sale proceedings

and no fraud, unfairness, or other extraneous matter demonstrating unfairness to

one of the interested parties is shown.” 14 Therefore, “a properly conducted sale

should be set aside only when necessary to correct a plain injustice, consistent with

the principles of equity.” 15

NOTICE ISSUE

Pearce first complains that the Sheriff’s sale should be set aside because his

father, Willaim Powell Pearce, was not on the certificate of service filed by WSFS

as to the lienholders and other interested parties. In October 2024, the Pearces

caused certain mortgages to be filed in favor of family members. A mortgage was

11
Id. at 420 (citing Petition of Adair, 190 A. 105, 107 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936)).
12
Id. at 419 (quoting Petition of Adair, 190 A. 105, 107 (Del. Super. 1936)).
13
Id. (citing 2 Victor B. Woolley, Practice in Civil Actions in Delaware, §1121 (1906)).
14
Id. at 420.
15
Id. at 421 (citing Karel v. Davis, 194 A. 545, 546 (N.J. 1937).

8
given to William Pearce in the amount of $104,000, and another mortgage was

given to William Christopher Pearce in the amount of $70,000. Both mortgage

agreements were filed and recorded in the same document. That document

provided the following:

9
It is not at all clear that the two separate mortgages applied to two different people.

The first agreement for $104,000 references William Pearce, and the second

agreement for $70,000 references William Christopher Pearce. What is clear is

10
that the only address listed in either agreement for William Pearce or William

Christopher Pearce is 161 A Massey Church Road, Townsend, DE.

There is no dispute that the Certificate of Service to Lienholders and other

interested parties as required by the Sheriff’s sales listed only a William Pearce at

161 A Massey Church Road, Townsend, DE. The Certificate of Service reflects

that someone signed the postal service green card on September 27, 2025, for

William Pearce at 161 A Massey Church Road, Townsend, DE. The question is

whether this constitutes proper service on William P. Pearce requiring the sale to

be voided. Under the facts of this case, it does.

Superior Court Rule 69(g) provides for Notice of Sheriff’s Sales of Real

Estate. The Rule states that “[t]he notice shall be addressed to holders of liens at

the address which appears upon the recorded or filed instrument creating the lien

or upon the record of the lien.” The only address on either of the mortgages to

William Pearce or Willaim Christopher Pearce is 161 Massey Church Road,

Townsend, DE. This is the address where the notice was sent.16 WSFS complied

with the requirements of Rule 69 in serving either Mr. Pearce’s father or brother.

In addition, the property was posted by the Sheriff. Finally, and perhaps

more critically, Mr. Pearce testified that both his brother and father were made

16
WSFS has supplied the Court with the postal service return receipt.

11
aware, by Mr. Pearce himself, of the filing of the writ and of the scheduling of the

Sheriff’s sale before the actual sale.

To pass constitutional muster “notice must … be reasonably calculated to

apprize interested parties of the pendency of the action.” 17 Due process does not

always require actual notice. The authority attempting to serve notice must address

the “practicalities and peculiarities of the case” and act reasonably.18 “When

considering whether the authority attempting to serve notice has acted reasonably,

the court should balance ‘the interest of the … authority[] and the individual …

sought to be protected.’”19

When the competing interests are balanced, the Court concludes that notice

was proper. Rule 69(g) provides that service should be provided to the address

indicated on the mortgage documents. The mortgage documents in this case were

prepared by Zachery Pearce and they do not clearly reflect that two different

William Pearce’s had a mortgage interest. The only address listed on the document

was the Massey Lane address, which is where the certified mail was sent.

Additionally, the property was posted by the Sheriff. Most importantly, Zachary

17
Shipley v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Delaware, 619 F. Supp. 421, 437 (D. Del. 1985) (citing Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311 (1950)).
18
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
19
New Castle Cnty. v. Gallen, 2003 WL 21739069, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 27, 2003), aff'd, 839 A.2d 665 (Del.
2003) (citing Holland v. King, 500 N.E.2d 1229, 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).

12
Pearce made it clear at the hearing that both his father and brother were aware of

the scheduled Sheriff’s sale before the sale occurred.

Added to these facts is that there has been no evidence offered that William

P. Pearce suffered real prejudice as a result of any alleged deficiency in the notice

process. There is simply no evidence that William P. Pearce would have been

“ready, willing, and able” 20 to out-bid WSFS if he had received timely notice by

certified mail. Absent such evidence, the sale should not be set aside for notice

reasons.21 On these facts notice was proper. 22

Neither William Pearce appeared at the hearing. In this analysis, the Court

has addressed the merits of the notice argument. Even had there been improper

notice, Zachery Pearce has no standing to raise objections that are personal to both

his brother and father. As such, the notice arguments are denied on that basis as

well.23

The Court held a hearing in this case on December 9, 2025. At the time of

that hearing, the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for January 9, 2026, on

20
Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc., FSB v. Saint Annes Club, LLC, 2010 WL 663948, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29,
2010).
21
Id.
22
William Pearce submitted an affidavit in this case maintaining that notice was not given to him.
23
MidFirst Bank v. Mullane, 2022 WL 4460810, at *1, n. 1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2022) (“it is well established
by Delaware law that a party does not have standing to challenge a sale on behalf of other interested persons who
are not part of the suit.”); see also Dumler v. Mabe, 1979 WL 193424, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 5, 1979) (“[t]he
second issue is whether the purchasers may assert the creditors' right to notice as grounds for voiding the sale. The
authority is overwhelming that constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously.”); see also
Mills v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 272 A.2d 702, 703 (Del. 1970) (“[t]he general rule is that one person may
not assert the constitutional rights of another.”); see also In Re: Team Sys. Int'l, 2022 WL 4371097, at *5 (Bankr.
D.Del. Sept. 21, 2022).

13
the motion to set aside the Sheriff’s sale. At the December 9, 2025 hearing, the

Court advised Mr. Pearce that any evidence he wanted to present in support of this

motion needed to be presented at the January 9, 2025. Prior to and at the January

9, 2026 hearing, Pearce presented documents in support of his motion. During the

January 9, 2026 hearing, he testified and made arguments in support of his motion.

At that hearing, Pearce referenced statements made by counsel for WSFS during

certain bankruptcy hearings which he claimed were made in bad faith by WSFS.

Pearce claimed this bad faith supported his position to set aside the Sheriff’s sale.

This claim had been raised to the Court by Pearce on a number of occasions

prior to January 9, 2026. When the Court questioned Pearce about the existence

of the relevant bankruptcy proceeding transcripts, he first maintained that the

transcripts had been ordered and then admitted that they had not. On January 12,

2026, Pearce filed a motion to supplement the record to allow him to submit

additional material which included the prior referenced transcripts and other

arguments about communications he had post-January 9, 2025, with his family

members. According to Pearce, his family members indicated that their signatures

were not on the postal receipts and that they never received notice.

The Court made it plain to Mr. Pearce in December 2025, that the January

9, 2026, hearing was the time for Pearce to present the evidence in support of his

14
motion. Pearce’s attempt to supplement the record post-January 9, 2026, is

improper and his request is DENIED.

Even if the Court were to consider the post-January 9, 2026 submissions,

the submissions do not alter the Court’s conclusion on the notice issue. First, the

post-January 9, 2026 affidavits are not signed. Second, the Court’s review of

WSFS’s Affidavit of Service of Notice to Lienholders, Tenants, Record Owners

and Persons Having an Interest in Sheriff’s Sale of Real Estate leads me to

conclude that each of the items were signed for by the same person. Pearce

acknowledged that he received service. To the extent Pearce is arguing that notice

was not sent to the addresses indicated and not signed for by someone at the

address, those arguments are simply not credible. Given the undisputed testimony

that Pearce’s family members were aware of the Sheriff’s sale prior to its

occurrence, if someone else signed for one the family members, which appears to

have occurred, that does not make the notice deficient under the terms of Rule

69(g) or the constitution.

INADEQUACY OF PRICE

The record is undisputed at in February 2025 there was a contract of sale

between the Pearces and Michaeline James for $2.1 million. Quality Angels was

the successful bidder at the Sheriff’s sale and the price paid by Quality Angels at

the Sheriff’s sale was $971,000. Ms. James is the principle of Quality Angels. Mr.

15
Pearce maintains that this demonstrates an inadequate price for the property

requiring this Court to set aside a sale.

The general Delaware rule of law is that a price which is less than half of

the fair market value of the property will be considered per se “grossly inadequate,

shocking the conscious of the Court.”24 It is the fair market value of the property

at the time of the Sheriff’s sale that controls the analysis. 25 The burden to prove

an inadequate price lies with Pearce.

It is undisputed that as of February 2025, there was a contract on the

property for $2.1 million. That is the best evidence of the value of the property as

of that time period. The question is whether that was the value of the property at

the time of the Sheriff’s sale. Two witnesses were called by WSFS at the hearing

to address the value question. The first witness was Charles “Pat” Patterson.

Patterson is a real estate agent and broker licensed in Pennsylvania and New

Jersey. He was worked extensively with Ms. James. He was the referring Real

Estate agent for the property in question and was involved in the contract

negotiations in early 2025. Patterson confirmed the sales price in the February

2025 contract which was contingent on settlement within 17 days and that the

24
E.g., Burge v. Fid. Bond & Mortg. Co., 648 A.2d 414, 419 (Del. 1994) (internal quotations omitted); see also JP
Morgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Shea, 2019 WL 4071855, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2019) (citing Home
Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Blue Rock Shopping Ctr., Inc., 379 A.2d 1147 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977)).
25
Felton Bank v. Wicks, 1998 WL 283377, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 1998) (citing Cent. Nat. Bank of Wilmington
v. Indus. Tr. Co., 51 A.2d 854, 858 (Del. Super. Ct. 1947)).

16
buyers would obtain a clear title. He testified that there were numerous extensions

to the sales contract, the last of which expired on October 15, 2025.

Patterson stated that there were serious lien issues with the property

effecting title. He was also concerned that as time dragged on, the condition of

the property was not the same as it was in February 2025. Patterson testified that

the title company attorneys advised that to proceed to settlement in the normal

course would require the parties to come up with $3.7 million dollars to satisfy all

judgments and liens of record. This meant that Mr. Pearce would have to come up

with $1.6 million himself beyond the $2.1 million contract price. Patterson opined

that the value of the property was greatly reduced by the time of the Sheriff’s sale

from the time of the contract in February 2025. According to Patterson, the

property was greatly reduced from the contract price because (1) the seller could

not deliver clear title; (2) he was uncertain of the condition of the property in

October 2025; (3) the fact that the property had to go through the Sheriff’s sale

process in and of itself caused the property value to decrease; and (4) the owner

was still occupying the property. He suggested that at most the property was worth

$1.2 million at the time of the Sheriff’s sale. Patterson also attended the Sheriff’s

sale at issue in this case.

James is the principle of Quality Angels. Ms. James testified at the January

9, 2026 hearing. She was obviously involved in the sales contract process in

17
February 2025, and she attended the Sheriff’s sale at issue. With respect to the

sales contract of $2.1 million, it called for a quick sale and a clear title. A clear

title could not be produced which caused the matter to drag out. By the time of

the Sheriff’s sale, she was not willing to go through with the original contract nor

agree to any type of modifications to the contract, because the only way she could

be assured of getting a clear title would be to acquire the property at the Sheriff’s

sale instead of going through with a traditional sale. James testified, as did

Patterson, that there were no communications of any kind between them and

WSFS about their bidding strategy. WSFS was in no way involved in the actions

of Quality Angels regarding how they bid on the property at the Sheriff’s sale.

Both James and Patterson testified that there were a number of bidders at

the Sheriff’s sale, but at the end it was just Quality Angel and WSFS bidding. The

bidding stopped when the price got to $1,000 over the amount of the payout to the

first lien holder (U.S. Bank) and WSFS.

Pearce presented his own view as to the value of the property. His testimony

was that the property at the time of the Sheriff’s sale was at least the contract price

of $2.1 million, and probably closer to $2.5 million. In support of his view, Pearce

submitted a document both pre- the January 9, 2026 hearing, and post-January 9,

2026 hearing as support for his view. The documents presented take the form used

by an appraiser. While an owner is permitted to testify as to the value of his

18
property, he may not use the method relied upon by an appraiser when he is not an

appraiser.26 For purposes of this motion, I accept that it is Pearce’s view that the

property was worth at least $2.1 million at the time of the Sheriff’s sale given the

contract that existed in February 2025.

Given Patterson’s testimony and Pearce’s testimony, I must resolve the

conflict between them. I find Patterson’s testimony to be more credible. To

suggest that the property has not decreased in value given the events post-February

2025, and their effect on value as described by both James and Patterson is simply

not credible. I accept Patterson’s view of value over that of Pearce. As such, the

value of the property at the time of the Sheriff’s sale ($1.2 million) versus the sale

price of $997,000 does not require that the sale be set aside. In short, Pearce has

not carried his burden of establishing that the price at the Sheriff’s sale was

inadequate.

REMAINING ALLEGATIONS

Pearce asserts three additional arguments in support of his claim to set aside

the Sheriff’s sale. First, he complains of collusion between WSFS and Quality

Angels in the bidding process. There are simply no facts to support this claim.

26
State v. Lesko, 2015 WL 7776636, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2015) (discussing the Record Owner Rule and
the limitations of a non-expert witness).

19
Second, Pearce claims that WSFS acted in bad faith. Pearce’s attempt to

supplement the record, with as still unproduced transcripts of bankruptcy

proceedings, comes too late. In fact, the record demonstrates that WSFS attempted

to work with Pearce for years to get the debt paid. When that did not occur, WSFS

followed the appropriate procedures which included the unusual step of seeking

affirmative relief from the bankruptcy court to get a ruling on whether the

automatics stay was in place. WSFS bid exactly up to the point to protect its

interest and no further. Finally, once Pearce defaulted on the loan, WSFS was

within its rights to force a Sheriff’s sale absent Pearce paying what WSFS was

owed. Pearce’s allegation that WSFS somehow misled the Bankruptcy Court is

that, an allegation. He was required to offer such proof. Pearce made no timely

attempt to support this allegation with any facts at the time.

Pearce next asserts that the automatic stay of the bankruptcy code prevented

the sale from going forward. This argument is belied by the Bankruptcy Court’s

order of September 30, 2025, indicating that the automatic stay did not prevent the

property from proceeding to a Sheriff’s sale.

Finally, Pearce maintains that by confirming the Sheriff’s sale this Court

will put the health of his mother and family in jeopardy. The Court is sympathetic

to the plight of Pearce and his family. However, that is not a valid reason to set

aside the Sheriff’s sale.

20
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 28th day of January, 2026 that:

1. Defendant’s motion to set aside the Sheriff’s sale of 161 Masseys Church

Road, Townsend, DE 19734 is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s motion to confirm the Sheriff’s sale of 161 Masseys Church

Road, Townsend, DE 19734 is GRANTED;

3. Any lis pendens filed and/or recorded by Defendant as to 161 Masseys

Church Road, Townsend, DE 19734 be and hereby are STRICKEN.

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

cc: File & ServeXpress

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, )
F.S.B., ) N22L-05-068 FJJ
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
Zachary Pearce and Robin Pearce, )
)
Defendants, )

Submitted: January 9, 2026
Decided: January 28, 2026

OPINION AND ORDER
on Zachary Pearce’s Motion to Set Aside a Sheriff’s Sale and
WSFS’s Motion to Confirm Sheriff’s Sale

Jeffrey S. Cianciulli, Esquire, Weir, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for
Plaintiff.

Mr. Zachary Pearce and Mrs. Robin Pearce, Townsend, Delaware, Pro-Se
Defendants.