Order ORDER ON RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIONS TO COMPLAINANT’S WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS AND ORDER DENYING COMPLAINANT’S CROSS-MOTION TO PRECLUDE RESPONDENT’S EXHIBITS AND ORDER STRIKING RESPONDENT’S MOTION IN LIMINE AND COMPLAINANT’S RESPONSE /pmp — 2026STA00015

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
Newport News, VA

Issue Date: 13 October 2026
Case No.: 2026-STA-00015
In the Matter of:

ALAN BROWN,
Complainant,

MCLANE FOODSERVICE, INC.,
Respondent.

ORDER ON RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIONS TO COMPLAINANT’S WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS
AND
ORDER DENYING COMPLAINANT’S CROSS-MOTION TO PRECLUDE RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS
AND
ORDER STRIKING RESPONDENT’S MOTION IN LIMINE AND COMPLAINANT’S RESPONSE

This matter arises from a complaint filed under the provisions of the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (“STAA”), and the implementing
Regulations found in the 29 C.F.R. Part 1978. It is scheduled for a formal hearing to be held
October 19-23, 2026, by video conference.

The Notice of Hearing required the parties to exchange exhibits, exhibit lists, and witness
lists with each other 30 days before the hearing date; to file objections within 7 days of receipt
of the opposing party’s exhibit list or witness list; to file prehearing statements with this tribunal
21 days before the hearing date; and to submit exhibits to this tribunal 7 days before the hearing
date.

On September 25, 2026, Respondent filed Objections to Complainant’s Witness and
Exhibit Lists. Respondent contended that Complainant’s exhibit and witness lists were untimely;
that Complainant’s witness list “identifies numerous high-level McLane executives who have no
unique, first-hand knowledge of Complainant’s alleged protected activity, played no role in
Complainant’s termination, were not identified in Complainant’s initial disclosures ..., and were
not otherwise put on notice of any potential need to testify in this proceeding”; that
Complainant’s witness lists includes former McLane employees for whom Respondent “is unable
to compel their appearance at the hearing”; that Complainant’s exhibits “constitute improper
narratives or argumentative summaries reflecting Complainant’s subjective interpretations,

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beliefs, or characterizations of other documents”; and that the “testimony and exhibits
Complainant seeks to introduce as evidence” are irrelevant to the issues before this tribunal.
On September 27, 2026, Complainant filed an Opposition to Respondent’s Objections to
Complainant’s Witness and Exhibit Lists, Motion to Overrule Respondent’s Objections, and Cross-
Motion to Preclude Respondent’s Unfiled Trial Exhibits Under 29 CFR § 18.80. Complainant’s
arguments regarding Respondent’s objections are discussed below.
I note that Complainant did not list himself on his Witness List, but he previously indicated
he intended to testify on his own behalf, and Respondent also listed Complainant on its Witness
List. This appears to have been an unintended oversight by Complainant. The parties should
anticipate direct testimony from Complainant.
Complainant included in his opposition a cross-motion to preclude Respondent’s trial
exhibits. Complainant argued that Respondent “attempted to run an evidentiary ambush” by
serving “40 separate exhibits spanning hundreds of pages” on the evening of September 18,
2026. Complainant argued this was a calculated effort to overwhelm him. Complainant moved
to exclude Respondent’s 40 exhibits on grounds that 29 CFR § 18.80 and this tribunal’s Order
required “formal, verified submission to the Court's official electronic docket.” Because
Respondent’s exhibits were served on Complainant but not filed with OALJ on September 18,
2026, Complainant moved to exclude the exhibits.
Complainant’s cross-motion lacks merit. The Notice of Hearing required the parties to
exchange their exhibits “with each other” (emphasis in original) 30 days before the hearing, and
to file the exhibits with this tribunal 7 days before the hearing. Respondent’s service of its
exhibits on Complainant on September 18, 2026, complied with that directive and provides no
basis to exclude its exhibits. Complainant’s Cross-Motion to Preclude Respondent’s Unfiled Trial
Exhibits Under 29 CFR § 18.80 is DENIED.
Timeliness
Respondent’s argument that Complainant’s exchanges were untimely because they were
made on September 19, 2026, must fail. The exchanges were due 30 days before the hearing
date. The hearing begins on October 19, 2026. The September 19, 2026 exchanges were timely.
Executives on Complainant’s Witness List
Regarding the McLane executives on Complainant’s witness list, Respondent objected
that the high-level executives listed by Complainant do not have first-hand knowledge of
Complainant’s protected activity and played no role in his termination; moreover, they were not
identified as persons with discoverable information in Complainant’s initial disclosures and were
not otherwise put on notice of any potential need to testify in this case. Respondent stated that
“employees with superior knowledge are available to testify,” and the “late identification of
numerous high-ranking McLane corporate executives—only 30 days before the hearing—causes

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specific prejudice: Respondent has limited time to investigate the proposed testimony or secure
the executives’ availability to attend the hearing.”
Respondent objected to the following witnesses listed by Complainant: Tony
Frankenberger (President and CEO, McLane); David Leach (Senior Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer, McLane); Susan Adzick (President – Restaurant, McLane); Wilson Warner
(Regional Vice President, McLane); Stuart Masters (Vice President – Human Resources, McLane);
and Paula Hubbard (Chief Human Resources Officer, McLane). Respondent does not object to
witnesses Charity Nash, Chris Kangas, and Shannon Bellamy being called to testify, but does
object to questions that go beyond the scope of the alleged STAA violation.
With regard to the Mr. Frankenberger (President and CEO), Respondent stated that “Mr.
Frankenberger has no unique, first-hand knowledge of the facts and circumstances giving rise to
Complainant’s claims, and employees with superior knowledge are available to testify.” It argued
that courts “routinely prohibit parties from seeking testimony from high-level corporate
executives who possess no unique, noncumulative, personal knowledge of the claims at issue
when lower-level employees with superior knowledge are available.” (Citations omitted.)
Respondent asserted that Charity Nash and Chris Kangas on Complainant’s witness list, and
Keshia Newsome and Kathy Cortner-Mercer on Respondent’s witness list, all have superior
knowledge of Complainant’s alleged protected activity and his termination. Complainant did not
identify Mr. Frankenberger as a person likely to have discoverable information in this case before
including him on his witness list, and “any testimony from Mr. Frankenberger would be unhelpful,
cause a waste of time, undue delay of the proceedings, unfair prejudice to Respondent, and be a
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Respondent also objected that certain subjects
of proposed testimony are irrelevant to this proceeding.
In his Witness List, Complainant stated that Mr. Frankenberger would testify regarding (1)
“Sharon Good's comprehensive, documented written timeline detailing 54 consecutive days of
targeted stalking, harassment, sexual harassment, and physical intimidation by commercial
motor vehicle driver Kendall Crawford”; (2) “systemic commercial motor vehicle safety defects,
severe yard and terminal hazards, routine non-compliance with DOT/FMCSA standards, and the
pervasive toxic work environment perpetuated by local and regional management”; (3) “Failure
of executive leadership to intervene, protect facility personnel, remediate known safety
violations, or enforce zero-tolerance workplace violence policies despite direct written
escalations”; (4) “Institutional knowledge, executive oversight, and corporate ratification of
management's unsafe operational actions, bad faith discipline, continuous retaliatory hostility,
and the June 12, 2025, de facto digital termination and ultimate separation of Complainant for
reporting safety noncompliance”; and (5) “Corporate culture and systemic chain-of-command
failure regarding STAA disclosures, employee complaints, and institutional noncompliance
across McLane operating companies.”
The first three subjects are not relevant to whether Complainant’s employment was
terminated in violation of the STAA. On proposed topics (4) and (5), Complainant stated in his
response to the objections that Mr. Frankenberger was “on direct notice” that “documented life-

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safety hazards were ignored while the reporting supervisor was targeted for termination,” as
shown by a December 23, 2022 email sent by Sharon Good to Mr. Frankenberger describing her
issues (which are not relevant here), and a March 18, 2023 email sent by Complainant to Mr.
Frankenberger, Mr. Masters, and Amy Koresdoski “documenting active shooter violence and
systemic commercial vehicle fraud.” However, in the material described as “Exhibit D” of
Complainant’s response, Complainant stated that Mr. Frankenberger never acknowledged his
email, never brought it up, and never responded at all.
This does not establish that Mr. Frankenberger has any unique personal knowledge as to
the facts and circumstances relevant to the determination whether Complainant’s employment
was terminated in violation of the STAA. Respondent’s objection is SUSTAINED, and Mr.
Frankenberger is STRICKEN from Complainant’s witness list.
With regard to Mr. Leach (Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer), Respondent
similarly argued that Mr. Leach “has no unique, personal knowledge of Complainant’s claims”
and Respondent has made “lower-level employees with superior knowledge” available.
Respondent also objected that certain subjects of proposed testimony are irrelevant to this
proceeding.
Complainant stated in his Witness List that Mr. Leach would testify regarding (1)
“Corporate operational reporting structures, executive oversight of commercial motor vehicle
compliance, and corporate handling of terminal-level safety disclosures”; (2) “Receipt and
handling of escalated notices regarding recurring fleet equipment safety violations, out-of-
service defects, and hazardous yard conditions”; (3) “Operational failure to correct reckless
terminal management practices, failure to ensure standard safe procedures for driver
separations, and toleration of retaliatory operational assignments”; and (4) “Institutional
oversight and ratification of adverse actions taken against Complainant following safety
disclosures, leading directly to the June 12, 2025, de facto digital termination and separation.”
In his response to Respondent’s objections, Complainant advanced the same argument
as he did for Mr. Frankenberger: that “every named corporate officer was on direct notice,
leaving the C-suite as the only witnesses who can testify to why these documented life-safety
hazards were ignored while the reporting supervisor was targeted for termination.” Complainant
included as an “Exhibit C” the language of an email he sent to Paula Hubbard, Susan Adzick, David
Leach, and Dale Nester, but there is no indication of any kind of response by any of these
individuals. Mr. Leach was also “cc’d” on emails sent on June 27, 2025, after Complainant’s
termination, but he was neither the author nor primary recipient of any of these
communications, and did not respond to them.
Complainant has not demonstrated that Mr. Leach was personally involved in the
termination of his employment or has any unique personal knowledge of the facts relevant to
determining whether his employment was terminated in violation of the STAA. Respondent’s
objection is SUSTAINED, and Mr. Leach is STRICKEN from Complainant’s witness list.

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With regard to Ms. Adzick (President – Restaurant), Respondent again argued that she
“has no unique, personal knowledge of Complainant’s claims,” that Respondent has made
“lower-level employees with superior knowledge” available, and that certain subjects of
proposed testimony are irrelevant to this proceeding.
Complainant stated in his Witness List that Ms. Adzick would testify regarding (1)
“Contemporaneous receipt of safety reporting, notifications of non-compliant fleet equipment,
out-of-service defects, and hazardous distribution center yard conditions as a direct copy
recipient on escalated notices”; (2) “Knowledge of Pervasive Hostile Work Environment:
Executive notice regarding local terminal leadership misconduct, retaliatory harassment, and
systemic failure to address employee disclosures within the Foodservice division”; (3) “Executive
Inaction and Failure to Remediate: Failure to take corrective operational action upon receiving
direct warnings of commercial motor vehicle non-compliance and workplace safety threats”; (4)
“Executive oversight, knowledge, and corporate ratification of the ongoing retaliatory campaign
against Complainant, culminating in the June 12, 2025, de facto digital termination and discharge
following protected activities.”
In his response to Respondent’s objections, Complainant stated the same argument
noted above, that all corporate witnesses are “the only witnesses who can testify to why these
documented life-safety hazards were ignored while the reporting supervisor was targeted for
termination.” While Complainant argued that Ms. Adzick and others have “direct, personal, and
nondelegable knowledge of Complainant’s protected safety disclosures, the resulting corporate
audits, and executive-level containment strategies,” he has not pointed to any such knowledge.
Specifically regarding Ms. Adzick, Complainant relied upon an email chain on June 27, 2025, after
his employment ended, in which Mr. Masters informed Ms. Adzick that Complainant had sent
emails “to the CEOs of our Newnan brands” and the recipients may want to “do some proactive
communications to each of these brands,” including a new alleged issue with a “Wendy’s load.”
Ms. Adzick responded on June 27, 2025, to ask Mr. Masters: “Stuart, Have we investigated all of
his assertions?” This is the only communication from Ms. Adzick.
Contrary to Complainant’s argument, he has not shown that Ms. Adzick was involved in
his termination or that she was “actively investigating” any of his protected disclosures prior to
his termination. He has not shown that she has any unique personal knowledge relevant to the
issues for adjudication. Respondent’s objection is SUSTAINED, and Ms. Adzick is STRICKEN from
Complainant’s witness list.
With regard to Mr. Warner (Regional Vice President), Respondent argued that he “has no
unique, personal knowledge of Complainant’s claims,” that Respondent has made “lower-level
employees with superior knowledge” available, and that certain subjects of proposed testimony
are irrelevant to this proceeding. Additionally, with regard to Complainant’s allegations
regarding a lost promotion opportunity in August 2024, Respondent argued that Complainant did
not allege an adverse action based on that event, that his alleged adverse action occurred in June
2025 as stated in his Objections to the Secretary’s Findings, and that any arguments concerning
an alleged adverse action in August 2024 are untimely and not administratively exhausted.

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Complainant stated in his Witness List that Mr. Warner would testify regarding (1)
“Authorization of Fuel Theft Ring Investigation: Direct corporate authorization and mandate
granted immediately to Complainant to conduct the internal fuel investigation, which
successfully identified, interrupted, and exposed a multi-party felony RICO fuel theft ring
operating within the fleet infrastructure”; (2) “Direct recipient of regular written reporting and
email escalations regarding commercial motor vehicle equipment defects, out-of-service safety
violations, and hazardous terminal operating conditions”; (3) “Restoration of Improperly Pulled
Promotion Interview: Direct personal knowledge and executive intervention regarding local
management's bad-faith sabotage in canceling Complainant's promotion interview, including his
affirmative action ordering local leadership to restore the interview process, which local
management subsequently executed as a pretextual sham interview to block career
advancement”; (4) “Direct knowledge of local management's targeted hostility, including his
repeated behind-the-scenes executive interventions to overturn disparate work schedules (such
as forcing Complainant onto six-day work weeks while peer supervisors worked five)”; (5)
“Regional executive standards governing safe terminal dispatch, standard operating procedures
for fleet compliance, and direct testimony contrasting his corrective actions against the
subsequent retaliatory campaign leading to Complainant's June 12, 2025, de facto digital
termination.:
In his response to Respondent’s objections, Complainant argued that Mr. Warner’s
proposed testimony regarding a June 2023 promotion opportunity is admissible under a
“continuing violation” theory and/or as background evidence establishing retaliatory animus.
Complainant did not otherwise specifically address Mr. Warner’s proposed testimony.
I previously ruled that Complainant’s allegation of adverse action based on a promotion
opportunity in June 2024 was not properly raised and put at issue in this case in an Order denying
Complainant’s motion to compel. In this case, Complainant’s complaint alleged an adverse action
on June 23, 2025, when he was notified by a co-worker by telephone that Respondent’s
transportation manager had said he quit his job; Complainant’s objection to the Secretary’s
Findings and Request for a Hearing similarly alleged that he suffered adverse employment action
on or about June 23, 2025, in retaliation for protected whistleblower activity. Complainant’s
proposal to elicit testimony from Mr. Wilson on this issue is not relevant to this proceeding.
Regarding Complainant’s other proposed topics of testimony for this witness,
Complainant has not demonstrated that Mr. Warner was personally involved in the termination
of his employment or has any unique personal knowledge of the facts relevant to determining
whether his employment was terminated in violation of the STAA. Respondent’s objection is
SUSTAINED, and Mr. Warner is STRICKEN from Complainant’s witness list.
With regard to Mr. Masters (Vice President – Human Resources), Respondent argued that
he has “no unique, personal knowledge of Complainant’s claims and would only be able to testify
to information relayed to him by those with superior knowledge, which is improper.”
Respondent again noted that it has made lower-level employees with superior knowledge

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available, and argued any testimony from Mr. Masters would be unhelpful and cumulative.
Respondent also objected that certain subjects of proposed testimony are irrelevant to this
proceeding, including proposed testimony regarding Complainant’s allegation of Title VII
violations.
Complainant stated in his Witness List that Mr. Masters would testify regarding (1) his
“Contemporaneous Receipt” of Complainant’s “extensive, recurring email escalations regarding
commercial motor vehicle equipment defects, out-of-service violations, terminal safety
hazards, and pervasive hostile work environment/Title VII violations”; (2) a “Direct collaboration,
communication, and conspiracy with Deputy HR Director Kathy Cortner-Mercer to fabricate,
draft, and intentionally pocket off the official record a bad-faith ‘final corrective action’ designed
to silence Complainant following protected activities”; (3) “Direct knowledge, tactical
concealment, and omission from the official record of an indefensible disciplinary write-up
attempting to penalize Complainant for refusing to physically force a driver to certify
accumulated backlogged logs; specifically concealing management's tolerance of drivers
routinely accumulating multiple days of uncertified logs in violation of daily DOT/FMCSA
requirements and attempting to make Complainant the scapegoat for fleet compliance failures”;
(4) “Direct knowledge and omission from the record of a manufactured, bad-faith two-page
disciplinary reprimand authored by Brad Brown regarding an 8:00 AM email instructing
Complainant to set aside five scanners located two feet behind Complainant's desk; specifically
concealing that Complainant's scheduled shift did not begin until 12:00 PM, that the message
was buried beneath hundreds of unread operational emails, and that Brown repeatedly
encountered Complainant in person throughout the shift without ever mentioning the
instructions”; and (f) his alleged “Complete failure as an executive HR officer to remediate
reported safety non-compliance, active condoning of local terminal hostility, and formal
ratification of the adverse actions culminating in Complainant's June 12, 2025, de facto digital
termination and discharge.”
In his response to Respondent’s objections, Complainant included Mr. Master’s in his
assertions that all executive-level witnesses are “the only witnesses who can testify to why these
documented life-safety hazards were ignored while the reporting supervisor was targeted for
termination,” and that the executive witnesses have “direct, personal, and nondelegable
knowledge of Complainant’s protected safety disclosures, the resulting corporate audits, and
executive-level containment strategies.” Complainant included in his response an email dated
March 18, 2023, sent to Mr. Masters (and Mr. Frankenberger, as discussed above) (referenced
as Exhibit B), and an email chain dated June 27, 2025 (referenced as Exhibit E), in which Mr.
Masters notifies other employees of emails sent by Complainant on June 26, 2025, to
Respondent’s customers, and answers an inquiry regarding whether his assertions were
investigating by stating, “Yes, several of these have been investigated multiple times to include
Safety coming in to investigate the OSHA and DOT concerns. Overall, we have found no validity
to his allegations, or while some of the unfortunate events did occur, they did not occur in the
course and scope of the teammate's employment or were properly investigated and addressed.”

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Complainant alleges that Mr. Masters was involved in both the investigation of
Complainant’s protected disclosures, and Complainant’s termination. The email chain in Exhibit
E gives some support to the assertion that Mr. Masters had personal involvement. Therefore,
the objection to the inclusion of Mr. Masters on Complainant’s witness list is OVERRULED.
With regard to Ms. Hubbard (Chief Human Resources Officer), Respondent argued that
she “has no unique, personal knowledge of Complainant’s claims,” that Respondent has made
“lower-level employees with superior knowledge” available, and that certain subjects of
proposed testimony are irrelevant to this proceeding.
Complainant stated in his Witness List that Ms. Hubbard would testify regarding (1) “her
suspected physical presence at the facility on June 9th and June 10th for the specific operational
purpose of planning, structuring, and setting up the retaliatory disciplinary ambush executed
against Complainant on June 11th,” which Complainant alleges Respondent has admitted “by
omission through repeated refusals to confirm or deny her onsite presence despite formal
discovery requests”; her “Executive-level knowledge of escalating safety complaints, protected
whistleblowing disclosures under the STAA, and systemic retaliatory hostility by local
management, coupled with a complete, calculated refusal to intervene, investigate, or initiate
direct contact or communication with Complainant”; “Condoning and ratifying bad faith
disciplinary maneuvers, discriminatory work scheduling, and the bad-faith handling of Title VII
and STAA grievances across the human resources chain of command”; and “Ultimate corporate
human resources accountability and ratification of the coordinated sequence of retaliatory acts
leading directly to Complainant's June 12, 2025, de facto digital termination and separation from
employment.”
In his response to Respondent’s objections, Complainant did not cite any specific personal
knowledge by Ms. Hubbard, and instead included her in his assertions that all corporate
witnesses are “the only witnesses who can testify to why these documented life-safety hazards
were ignored while the reporting supervisor was targeted for termination.” As with other
executive witnesses discussed above, Complainant argued that Ms. Hubbard and others have
“direct, personal, and nondelegable knowledge of Complainant’s protected safety disclosures,
the resulting corporate audits, and executive-level containment strategies,” but he did not point
to any such specific personal knowledge. Ms. Hubbard was one of the recipients of an email
communication sent by Complainant on January 25, 2025 (referenced in his response as Exhibit
C), but there is no indication that she responded in any way or was otherwise involved, and
indeed Complainant asserted that he would elicit testimony that she did not “intervene,
investigate, or initiate direct contact or communication with Complainant.”
Complainant has not demonstrated that Ms. Hubbard was personally involved in the
termination of his employment or has any unique personal knowledge of the facts relevant to
determining whether his employment was terminated in violation of the STAA. Respondent’s
objection is SUSTAINED, and Ms. Hubbard is STRICKEN from Complainant’s witness list.

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Former Employees on Complainant’s Witness List
Regarding the former employees on Complainant’s witness list—Tiffany Sinkfield and
Nicole Robinson—Respondent argued that Complainant’s proposed areas of testimony “go far
beyond the limited question of whether Complainant was terminated in violation of the STAA.”
Complainant seeks to have Ms. Sinkfield and Ms. Robinson testify regarding alleged Title VII EEOC
Charges each of them filed against Respondent and the facts underlying their Charges.
Complainant also seeks to have Ms. Robinson testify regarding alleged “road test fraud,” which
is not relevant to Complainant’s allegation that he was fired in violation of the STAA.
Additionally, Respondent noted that neither witness is currently employed by
Respondent, and Respondent is “unable to compel” their appearance at the hearing.
Complainant responded that he is in touch with Ms. Sinkfield and Ms. Robinson and they
will appear voluntarily; and their testimony will corroborate Complainant’s allegations of
protected activity and counter Respondent’s defense as pretextual.
As an initial matter, Respondent is not responsible for securing the attendance of Ms.
Sinkfield or Ms. Robinson to testify in this matter. If Complainant desires their testimony, it is his
responsibility to arrange for the attendance and participation of his witnesses.
Regarding Ms. Sinkfield, the objection to her testimony is SUSTAINED IN PART and
OVERRULED IN PART. Most of the topics identified by Complainant for this witness are not
relevant to this proceeding, including her own alleged “pretextual discharge”; her EEOC charge
against Respondent, including her allegations of “Title VII violations, pervasive racial hostility,
disparate treatment, and targeted intimidation within the facility”; her “Photographic Evidence
of Racial Intimidation by Chris Moore” submitted in her EEOC charge; and the “the day-to-day
targeting, severe emotional distress, and intimidation she endured at the distribution center.”
None of these subjects are relevant to this case and whether Complainant’s employment was
terminated in violation of the STAA.
The final topic Complainant listed for Ms. Sinkfield is her “[p]ersonal knowledge of daily
dispatch logs, internal communications, paperwork handling, and management’s shifting, hostile
posture toward Complainant following protected reporting.” This subject is relevant to
Complainant’s allegations under the STAA, and Ms. Sinkfield may testify in this regard.
Regarding Ms. Robinson, the objection to her testimony is SUSTAINED IN PART and
OVERRULED IN PART. Complainant similarly listed topics for her testimony including her own
“pretextual discipline,” and her own EEOC charge against Respondent, including allegations of a
“systemic, pervasive hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and discriminatory culture
maintained by terminal leadership.” As stated above, these subjects are not relevant to this
proceeding, and this testimony will not be permitted.

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Complainant also proposed that Ms. Robinson would testify to her “[d]irect eyewitness
testimony regarding widespread commercial motor vehicle safety and regulatory fraud;
specifically testifying to management instructions requiring supervisors and staff to complete
official DOT road test evaluation forms, which Director of Operations Brad Brown then knowingly
signed and certified as the examining evaluator for commercial drivers he had never actually
road-tested or evaluated, in clear violation of federal motor carrier safety standards.” This
tribunal has jurisdiction only over Complainant’s claim of retaliation under the STAA. To the
extent Complainant seeks to establish motor vehicle safety violations that were not the subject
of his own reporting (that is, his own protected activity), such evidence is not relevant to this
proceeding. Complainant may elicit evidence regarding his alleged protected activity, but the
witness’s testimony will be limited to that scope.
Complainant also proposed that Ms. Robinson would testify to her “[d]irect observation
and contemporaneous knowledge of the deliberate operational burdens, schedule
manipulations, and targeted animus directed at Complainant by terminal leadership following
protected safety disclosures and internal reporting.” This subject may be relevant to
Complainant’s allegations under the STAA, and Ms. Robinson may testify in this regard.
Respondent’s Counsel on Complainant’s Witness List
Complainant also listed Respondent’s counsel, Jaslyn Johnson, on his witness list.
Respondent objected that “the testimony sought by Complainant is protected from disclosure by
the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.” Respondent also objected
that Ms. Johnson has “no personal knowledge of the alleged facts and circumstances giving rise
to Complainant’s claims in this matter,” as she was retained after Complainant’s termination.
“Any information known by [Ms. Johnson] is from communications with Respondent throughout
the duration of the instant proceeding and is covered by the attorney-client privilege.
Additionally, the undersigned’s legal theories, impressions, and preparation of documents for
Respondent are covered by attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine and are not
admissible.”
Complainant’s witness list describes the subject matter of Ms. Johnson’s testimony to
include her involvement in advising Respondent regarding Complainant’s termination, her
handling of disclosures made to her and her advice to Respondent regarding safety concerns, her
preparation of documents for Respondent in this matter, guidance she may have provided
Respondent in the past regarding another employee, and information relevant to the “crime-
fraud exception” to attorney-client privilege.
Complainant responded to the objection to this witness by arguing that attorney-client
privilege and work product privilege protect only confidential legal advice, and not investigations
and communications undertaken “in an operational, non-legal capacity.”
Ms. Johnson is counsel for Respondent in this matter. She was not retained until after
Complainant’s employment had been terminated, and has no personal knowledge to which to

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testify. Complainant has not shown that at any time Ms. Johnson was working for Respondent
in a “non-legal capacity.” It is clear that the desired testimony from Ms. Johnson is privileged,
under both attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The objection to the
inclusion of Ms. Johnson on Complainant’s witness list is SUSTAINED, and Ms. Johnson is
STRICKEN from Complainant’s witness list.
Complainant’s Exhibits
Respondent objected to all of Complainant’s exhibits (CX 1-7) on grounds that they were
served on September 19 and 20, 2026, and were untimely. As stated above, this argument fails.
Respondent also objected to CX 1-7 “to the extent they constitute improper narratives or
argumentative summaries reflecting Complainant’s subjective interpretations, beliefs, or
characterizations of other documents.” Respondent argued that while Complainant may testify
regarding facts within his personal knowledge, he “may not introduce self-serving narrative
exhibits to present argument, interpretation, or unsupported inferences to the Tribunal.”
Respondent further objected that “the proposed exhibits appear to compile excerpts copied and
pasted from multiple purported documents without identifying the source of each excerpt or
providing competent evidence authenticating the underlying materials.” Respondent also
objected to the inclusion of hearsay within the exhibits.
Specific to Complainant’s Exhibit 5, Respondent objected that this exhibit “purports to
include a disciplinary action dated August 10, 2024,” which was not included as part of
Complainant’s instant complaint under the STAA (which alleged an adverse action on June 23,
2025), and which was not timely raised or administratively exhausted under the STAA (which
requires a complaint to be filed within 180 days after the alleged violation occurred). Respondent
argued the purported August 2024 disciplinary action is therefore irrelevant to the case before
this tribunal.
Specific to Complainant’s Exhibit 6, Respondent objected “to the extent that it references
a separate legal proceeding involving alleged Title VII retaliation.” Respondent argued: “This
Tribunal does not possess jurisdiction over Title VII retaliation claims. Moreover, Complainant’s
Title VII allegations are not relevant to the limited question before the Tribunal – whether
Complainant was terminated in violation of the STAA.”
Specific to Complainant’s Exhibit 7, Respondent objected “to the extent that it references
a separate legal proceeding involving alleged Title VII retaliation.” Respondent argued: “This
Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over Title VII retaliation claims. Moreover, Complainant’s Title VII
allegations are not relevant to the limited question before the Tribunal: whether Complainant
was terminated in violation of the STAA.”
Complainant responded that his evidence is derived from Respondent’s own production
of documents; that emails from management constitute non-hearsay statement of a party
opponent; that Respondent cannot challenge the authenticity of its own business records; that

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his exhibits “directly substantiate motive, opportunity, intent, and retaliatory hostility under the
STAA”; and that Respondent waived any objection that the exhibits are irrelevant or time-barred.
CX-1 are documents relating to a separate lawsuit Complainant has filed against Pilot
Travel Centers, which Complainant described in an introductory summary as “an active, ongoing
catastrophic personal injury case originally filed in November 2018.” This exhibit has no
relevance to the current proceeding. Respondent’s objection is SUSTAINED and CX-1 is
EXCLUDED.
CX-2 is a five-page narrative of arguments presented by Complainant as “rebuttal” to
Respondent’s Exhibits 6, 7(b), 7(d), and 8(a). These are arguments, not evidence. Respondent’s
objection is SUSTAINED and CX-2 is EXCLUDED.
CX-3 is a six-page summary of “Recorded May 27, 2025, Conference Rebutting
Respondent’s Exhibits 6, 7(b), 8, 8(a), and 13.” It contains, among other things, Complainant’s
arguments that “this meeting was a calculated attempt to sanitize the record and build a
pretextual baseline during Respondent's countdown to eliminate Complainant, leading directly
to the June 11 setup memo and the June 12 termination triggered by Complainant's 9:22 AM
protected filing.” It sets forth excerpts from the conference recording and Complainant’s
characterizations of the discussion and arguments about what the recording shows and doesn’t
show. While the recorded material itself might have been admissible if submitted in a complete
and proper format, the exhibit as submitted is argument, not evidence. Respondent’s objection
is SUSTAINED and CX-3 is EXCLUDED.
Complainant noted at the conclusion of CX-3 that the audiovisual recording exceeds the
file size limitations of DOL’s e-filing system. It appears Complainant intends to submit the
recording itself into evidence. That issue will be addressed at the hearing.
CX-4 is a document written by Complainant to “impeach the credibility of Sabrina Murphy,
local terminal leadership, and the corporate C-suite by contrasting her sanitized findings against
Respondent's binding discovery admissions, contemporaneous public emergency logs, and the
attached evidentiary record.” It contains Complainant’s arguments that other materials
produced or received in discovery contradict Respondent’s Exhibit 20, which was authored by
Ms. Murphy. Here again, these are arguments, not evidence. This narrative is Complainant’s
account of what happened and his arguments as to what other documents show. While some of
the other materials are excerpted or quoted, the original documents themselves are not
included. The materials set out in full within CX-4 are two documents also setting out
Complainant’s own arguments, and one document setting out the stalking and harassment
complaint of Sharon Good, which is not relevant to this proceeding. Complainant’s narrative and
arguments are not admissible as an evidentiary exhibit. Respondent’s objection is SUSTAINED
and CX-4 is EXCLUDED.
CX-5 is a document written by Complainant as a “chronological evidentiary proffer”
“proving that executive leadership possessed actual, documented notice of severe safety failures,

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regulatory violations, and active-shooter workplace violence hazards, yet chose to suppress them
and execute a retaliatory conspiracy.” Within the document, Complainant references other
documents, including “Exhibit 18” (presumably Respondent’s Exhibit 18), Exhibit 3, Exhibit 17(b),
and other Bates-numbered documents, but those documents are not included in the exhibit. The
bulk of the exhibit itself is Complainant’s arguments about what the documents show and do not
show. This is argument, not evidence, and will be excluded.
In pages 7-15 of the exhibit, Complainant appears to set out in full the language of two
purported communications to McLane executives, but the letters or emails themselves are not
attached. Complainant may submit the originals of these two communications as CX-5D and
CX-5E. The submissions must be submitted by October 15, 2026.
With that exception, the objection to CX-5 is SUSTAINED and CX-5 is EXCLUDED.
CX-5A is a Separation Notice dated June 20, 2025, submitted to the Georgia DOL regarding
Complainant’s separation from McLane.
CX-5B is the position statement dated August 22, 2025, submitted by Respondent to the
OSHA investigator, including Exhibits 1-10 of that submission.
CX-5C is a Teammate Corrective Action Record dated August 10, 2024, in which
Complainant was cited for failing to get a driver’s log certified when checking in the returned
route.
The objections to CX-5A, CX-5B, and CX-5C are OVERRULED.
CX-6 is a document written by Complainant to “impeach” the June 11, 2025 document
titled “Leadership Conduct Concerns” and “Performance Expectations.” Complainant argues in
CX-6 that the June 11, 2025 document “was not authored by General Manager Toney Slocumb.
It was an engineered corporate instrument drafted at executive headquarters and transmitted
to the Newnan facility to execute a pre-planned termination of an active safety whistleblower.”
In support of this contention, Complainant presents several arguments throughout CX-6 as to
why he believes the documents were “ghostwritten” and the “fraudulent nature of the
presentation.” While Complainant references other documents apparently exchanged in
discovery in support of his arguments, the originals of such documents are not included. Instead,
CX-6 is an aggregation of Complainant’s arguments, referencing other documents in support, as
to why the June 11, 2025 document is not accurate or legitimate. This exhibit, like others
discussed above, is argument, not evidence. Respondent’s objection is SUSTAINED and CX-6 is
EXCLUDED.
Pages 6-7 of CX-6 appear to be the text of an email Complainant sent to the OIG and the
response he received. Complainant may submit the originals of these communications as CX-
6A and CX-6B. The submissions must be submitted by October 15, 2026.

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CX-7 is a document written by Complainant to establish that his separation “was an
engineered corporate containment action directed from the C-suite,” and not a “a localized,
routine disciplinary decision handled by field supervisors.” Complainant presents several
arguments throughout this exhibit, referencing materials he believes support his arguments.
Again, the exhibit is argument, not documentary evidence. Respondent’s objection is
SUSTAINED and CX-7 is EXCLUDED.
In pages 5-7 of the exhibit, Complainant appears to set out in full the language of the
Georgia DOL Appeals Tribunal decision. Complainant may submit the original of that document
marked as CX-7A. The submission must be submitted by October 15, 2026.
In pages 7-8, Complainant appears to set out in full the language of his EEOC charge
alleging discrimination based on age, disability, race, and retaliation. This was filed after his
employment was terminated and is not relevant to the STAA complaint.
In pages 8-9, Complainant appears to set out in full the language of the Separation Notice
filed with the Georgia DOL. This document appears in CX-5A.
In pages 9-12, Complainant appears to set out in full documents related to a medical
absence and short-term disability benefits. Complainant may submit the original of those
documents marked as CX-7B through 7E. The submission must be submitted by October 15,
2026.
Respondent’s Motion in Limine
While this Order on the evidentiary objections was pending, Respondent filed a Motion
in Limine on October 9, 2026, making many of the same arguments already under consideration
as part of its objections. Complainant filed a response in opposition on October 12, 2026. Neither
document has been considered for purposes of this Order. Due to the redundancies with the
subject covered by the prior Objections, Response, and this Order, the Motion in Limine and
Complainant’s response to the motion are STRICKEN.
Respondent may re-file its motion, limited to any arguments not addressed or mooted by
this Order. If the motion is re-filed, Complainant may file a response limited to the issues raised
in the new motion. A ruling may be deferred to the hearing, which commences next week.
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SO ORDERED.

MONICA MARKLEY
Administrative Law Judge

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