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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 195 (BIA 2025) 	Interim Decision #4119
Matter of J-A-F-S-, Respondent
Decided August 28, 2025
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
An Immigration Judge generally should not continue an individual hearing based on a
respondent’s speculative assertion that he or she may be eligible for a new form of relief
from removal not previously raised.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Monica N. Ganjoo, Esquire, San Jose, California
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Jessica E. Long, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge; MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate
Immigration Judge.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	(“DHS”) 	has 	filed 	an
interlocutory appeal from the Immigration Judge’s June 5, 2025, decision
granting the respondent’s motion to continue the individual hearing. 	The
appeal will be sustained, the Immigration Judge’s decision will be vacated,
and the record will be remanded.
Although the Board does not generally entertain interlocutory appeals,
we have ruled on the merits of interlocutory appeals to address important
jurisdictional questions regarding the administration of immigration laws and
to correct recurring problems in the handling of cases by Immigration Judges.
See Matter of M-D-, 24 I&N Dec. 138, 139 (BIA 2007). 	This case raises
important 	issues 	regarding 	continuances 	in 	the 	context 	of 	individual
hearings. Because these issues often become moot prior to a case appeal and
therefore evade review, we deem it appropriate to exercise jurisdiction over
this interlocutory appeal.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
DHS placed the respondent in removal proceedings in 2015. In 2017, the
respondent filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding
of Removal. 	Later, in August 2022, the respondent filed a motion for

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extension of time to seek prosecutorial discretion with DHS, and the
Immigration Judge granted the motion. This case was set for an individual
hearing on January 2, 2025. 	After the respondent filed a motion for
continuance due to counsel’s unavailability, the individual hearing was
rescheduled for June 5, 2025. 	On May 21, 2025, the respondent filed a
second motion for continuance of the individual hearing, this time to gather
evidence in support of an application for special rule cancellation of removal
for battered spouses under section 240A(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A) (2018). 	DHS filed a
brief opposing the motion. 	The Immigration Judge ordered the parties to
appear at the scheduled hearing date and converted the hearing to a case
status conference, in effect granting the request for a continuance of the
individual hearing.
At the hearing, the respondent’s counsel stated that the respondent had
been physically abused recently by his wife and requested additional time to
ascertain the facts, gather evidence, and pursue appropriate relief. 	The
respondent’s counsel also explained that he was considering filing a motion
to withdraw because of a past lack of communication and cooperation by the
respondent. DHS opposed the motion for continuance for lack of good cause
shown. 	Specifically, DHS argued that relief was speculative because the
respondent had not filed a cancellation application and may not be able to
establish good moral character or that he merits a favorable exercise of
discretion because of his criminal history. 	DHS further argued in its reply
brief that the respondent failed to describe the type of documents he sought
a continuance to obtain, specify the amount of time necessary to gather the
desired evidence, or 	explain why the documents were not previously
submitted. 	Further, DHS emphasized that the respondent had been in
removal proceedings for a decade, and the respondent’s current counsel had
already sought and been granted a motion for continuance.
The Immigration Judge granted the motion to allow the respondent to
further investigate whether he would have relief available to him and to
obtain and submit a record of his criminal history, including conviction
documents. DHS then filed this interlocutory appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
An Immigration Judge may, in the exercise of discretion, grant a motion
for continuance for good cause shown. 	8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2025). 	The
Attorney General has specified that the primary factors an Immigration Judge
should consider in assessing whether good cause exists to grant a continuance
to seek additional relief are: “(1) the likelihood that the alien will receive

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the . . . relief, and (2) whether the relief will materially affect the outcome of
the removal proceedings.” 	Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405, 413
(A.G. 2018). 	Immigration Judges must also consider relevant “secondary
factors,” which include, but are not limited to, the respondent’s diligence in
seeking the additional relief, DHS’s position on the motion for continuance,
administrative efficiency, the length of the continuance requested, the
number of hearings held and continuances granted previously, and the timing
of the motion to continue. 	Id. at 415–17. 	It is also relevant to consider
whether the respondent merits a favorable exercise of discretion. 	See
Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 790 (BIA 2009).
At the same time, it is well settled that “Immigration Judges and the Board
have a duty to promptly and fairly bring removal proceedings to a close.”
Matter of B-N-K-, 29 I&N Dec. 96, 100 (BIA 2025); see also Matter of
Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982) (observing that Immigration
Judges have a “duty” to resolve immigration proceedings “in an expeditious
manner”). 	“There 	is 	an 	important 	public 	interest 	in 	the 	finality 	of
immigration 	proceedings.” 	Matter 	of 	W-Y-U-, 	27 	I&N 	Dec. 	17, 	19
(BIA 2017).
Having certainty in individual hearing dates is important, as it allows the
parties and court staff to plan and prepare for the hearing and promotes timely
adjudication of applications for relief. 	See generally Tucci v. Tropicana
Casino and Resort, Inc., 834 A.2d 448, 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)
(explaining 	that 	rules 	intended 	to 	establish 	credible 	trial 	dates 	are
undermined by last-minute or “eve of trial” adjournments). 	Immigration
Judges should closely scrutinize any request for a continuance that is made
close to or on the day of an individual hearing.1 	Individual hearings for
non-detained cases are frequently scheduled far in advance due to the
Immigration Courts’ extremely high caseloads. Individual hearings that are
continued close to or on the date they are scheduled often cannot be replaced
with other cases and may result in wasting valuable resources, including the
time of judges, opposing counsel, and hearing witnesses, the cost of
interpreters, and the burden on other court personnel to reschedule the
hearing. 	See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 407 (recognizing the
burden that continuances place on Immigration Court operations).
1 	It may not be in a respondent’s best interest to have their hearing for asylum or other
relief repeatedly delayed for long periods of time given that country conditions or personal
circumstances may change during the pendency of proceedings. 	See INS v. Ventura,
537 U.S. 12, 17–18 (2002) (recognizing that the passage of time may result in changed
country conditions relevant to assessing eligibility for relief).

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Moreover, 	it 	is 	important 	for 	Immigration 	Judges 	not 	to 	allow
continuances to be used as “a dilatory tactic.” Id. This risk is greater when a
continuance is requested at the time of the individual hearing. 	See INS v.
Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 450 (1985) (“One illegally present in the United
States who wishes to remain already has a substantial incentive to prolong
litigation in order to delay physical deportation as long as possible.”)
With those considerations in mind, we conclude upon de novo review that
the Immigration Judge erred in finding the respondent demonstrated good
cause for a continuance. 	See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii), 1003.29 (2025).
The respondent requested a continuance to investigate his possible eligibility
for special rule cancellation of removal, a form of relief he had not previously
raised before the Immigration Judge. While a continuance to investigate and
gather evidence regarding a respondent’s eligibility for relief is often
appropriate at the start of removal proceedings, an Immigration Judge
generally should not continue an individual hearing based on a respondent’s
speculative assertion that he or she may be eligible for a form of new relief
from removal not previously raised.
We agree with DHS that the respondent’s eligibility for special rule
cancellation of removal is highly speculative. 	The respondent has not
presented 	a 	reasonable 	likelihood 	that 	he 	will 	be 	able 	to 	satisfy 	the
requirements for this relief. See Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176,
1179 (9th Cir. 2023) (clarifying the standard for prima facie eligibility). The
respondent’s motion for continuance was not accompanied by a cancellation
of removal application or even evidence that he is married to a United States
citizen or lawful permanent resident and has been battered or subjected to
extreme 	cruelty. 	See 	INA 	§ 	240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II); see also INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183,
188 n.6 (1984) (noting that statements by counsel are not evidence and are
not entitled to evidentiary weight). 	Nor has the respondent provided any
evidence that he would be able to establish that he is a person of good moral
character or that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion, particularly
considering the evidence submitted by DHS that indicates he was convicted
in 2023 for spousal battery, false imprisonment, preventing or dissuading a
witness from reporting, and damaging a wireless communication device. See
INA § 240A(b)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.8(d) (2025) (stating that an alien has the burden of establishing
statutory eligibility and that he or she warrants a favorable exercise of
discretion).
In addition to likelihood of success on the requested relief, secondary
factors, including diligence and administrative efficiency, may be highly

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significant in determining whether there is good cause to continue an
individual hearing. See Matter of L-N-Y-, 27 I&N Dec. 755, 758 (BIA 2020).
Respondents and counsel need to evaluate avenues for relief promptly after
proceedings are initiated rather than waiting until close to or at the time of
the individual hearing. While the motion asserts that the respondent revealed
his abuse to his counsel less than a month before the individual hearing, it is
not clear when this alleged abuse occurred. 	Thus, the evidence does not
demonstrate that the respondent acted diligently in pursuing special rule
cancellation of removal.2 Likewise, while the Immigration Judge granted the
continuance to allow the respondent to present records of his criminal
history, his failure to present such evidence prior to the scheduled individual
hearing demonstrates a lack of diligence and was actually a basis to deny the
motion, not grant it. See Matter of Sibrum, 18 I&N Dec. 354, 356 (BIA 1983)
(concluding that an alien seeking a continuance based on an asserted lack of
preparation “at least must make a reasonable showing that the lack of
preparation occurred despite a diligent good faith effort to be ready to
proceed”).
Moreover, 	administrative 	efficiency 	weighs 	against 	the 	grant 	of 	a
continuance in this case. At the time of the present motion for continuance,
the respondent had been in removal proceedings for over a decade and had
requested and been granted prior continuances. 	In fact, the respondent’s
individual hearing had previously been continued and thus the present
motion was a request for another continuance of the individual hearing.
Additionally, in requesting another continuance, the respondent did not
specify the amount of time needed to investigate his potential eligibility for
special rule cancellation of removal. 	See Matter of L-N-Y-, 27 I&N Dec.
at 759 (noting that administrative efficiency weighed against a continuance
where the respondent was “requesting a continuance for an unknown and
potentially lengthy period of time”). 	The fact that the respondent could
potentially demonstrate eligibility for relief in the future is not good cause to
continue an individual hearing.
“[C]ontinuances 	are 	themselves 	intended 	to 	promote 	efficient 	case
management.” 	Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 416. 	In granting the
continuance of the individual hearing in this case, the Immigration Judge’s
decision had the opposite effect. 	Thus, for the reasons discussed, we will
sustain DHS’ interlocutory appeal and remand the record for the Immigration
2 	The lack of due diligence may have been the fault of the respondent for not adequately
communicating with his counsel, although the Immigration Judge did not inquire why the
respondent had not previously raised his possible eligibility for special rule cancellation of
removal.

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Judge to promptly schedule a final individual hearing to consider any
applicable relief from removal.
ORDER: 	DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s
June 5, 2025, order granting a continuance is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the foregoing opinion.