DOBROTVORSKII

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 2025) 	Interim Decision #4124
Matter of Iurii DOBROTVORSKII, Respondent
Decided September 5, 2025
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) In bond proceedings, the existence of a valid, reliable, and credible sponsor is relevant
to the determination of flight risk.
(2) Immigration Judges may take into consideration all relevant and probative evidence,
regardless of which party filed it, to determine if the evidence establishes custody
factors.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mikhail Arsentiev, Esquire, Sacramento, California
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Roksana Gallus, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER and GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judges.
GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security (“DHS”) appeals 	from 	the
Immigration Judge’s January 8, 2025,1 order granting the respondent’s
release on a payment of a bond of $10,000 and alternatives to detention at
DHS’ discretion.2 	We will sustain the appeal, vacate the Immigration
1 	On February 11, 2025, the Immigration Judge issued a written memorandum in support
of the bond order.
2 	The 	Immigration 	Judge 	held 	the 	bond 	hearing 	under 	Rodriguez 	v. 	Robbins,
804 F.3d 1060, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281
(2018), which, under the authority of a permanent injunction issued by the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, placed the burden on DHS to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that an alien’s continued detention is justified. Ordinarily,
the alien in a custody determination under section 236(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018), has the burden of proof to show that he or she
merits release on bond. Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I&N Dec. 803, 804 (BIA 2020); see also
Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006) (explaining that a respondent “must
establish to the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge and this Board that he or she does not
present a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national security, and does not
pose a risk of flight”). In Jennings, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed and
remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for
consideration of the constitutionality of prolonged detention but did not vacate the

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Judge’s order granting the respondent’s release on bond, and order the
respondent held in DHS’ custody without bond.
Whether an alien poses a flight risk is a question of judgment that we
review de novo, but the factual findings underlying the judgment are
reviewed for clear error. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii) (2020). 	The
factors relevant to this custody redetermination analysis include, but are not
limited to: 	(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States;
(2) the alien’s length of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s family
ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the alien to reside
permanently in the United States in the future; and (4) the alien’s manner of
entry into the United States. Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 40.3 Under
our de novo review, we hold that the Immigration Judge erred in determining
that DHS did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent is a flight risk.
The Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding that the documents relating
to a family friend identified by the respondent as intending to offer him
support, Mr. G-, who we informally identify as a “sponsor,” sufficiently
reduced the flight risk in these proceedings such that a bond of $10,000 will
ensure the respondent’s presence at future hearings. 	See Cooper v. Harris,
581 U.S. 285, 309 (2017) (stating that, under clear error review, reversal is
appropriate only when the appellate adjudicator is “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” (citation omitted)). The
permanent injunction. 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312, 314. 	The Ninth Circuit, in turn,
remanded the record to the United States District Court for the Central District of California
but declined to vacate the permanent injunction. Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256
(9th Cir. 2018) (“Like the Supreme Court, we do not vacate the permanent injunction
pending the consideration of these vital constitutional issues.”). 	On remand, the
Government moved the Federal district court to vacate the permanent injunction, and the
Federal district court denied the motion because it interpreted the Ninth Circuit’s remand
as an instruction to keep the permanent injunction in place pending a determination of the
constitutional issues. 	See Rodriguez v. Barr, No. 20-55770, 2021 WL 4871067, at *1
(9th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021). The Government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth
Circuit remanded back to the Central District where the case remains unresolved. Id. at
*1.
3 	The Immigration Judge determined that DHS did not meet its burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that the respondent’s release would pose a danger to the
community, and DHS does not appeal that holding. Therefore, the sole issue presented on
appeal is whether, as the party delegated the burden of proof in these specific proceedings,
DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a flight risk. 	See
Matter of Voss, 28 I&N Dec. 107, 108 n.2 (BIA 2020) (noting that an issue addressed in
an Immigration Judge’s decision is waived when a party does not challenge it on appeal).

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record documents related to the proposed sponsor include a driver’s license
issued by the State of New Jersey, a section of a residential lease in
Hallandale, Florida, Mr. G-’s lawful permanent resident card, a Federal tax
return, an electric bill, and a statement reflecting a payment made on an
automobile loan. 	The record does not, however, include any statement or
affidavit from Mr. G- expressing his willingness to provide support to the
respondent that could assist in his appearance at future hearings. See Matter
of R-A-V-P-, 27 I&N Dec. at 806 (affirming the Immigration Judge’s flight
risk finding when, among other things, a proposed sponsor’s letter “does not
include any information regarding how [the sponsor] knows the respondent
or the nature of their relationship”).
The 	respondent’s 	attorney 	claimed 	that 	he 	did 	not 	have 	sufficient
opportunity to obtain an affidavit before the bond hearing. This explanation
is not persuasive because the respondent, in response to DHS’ opposition to
custody redetermination, was able to obtain Mr. G-’s driver’s license, his
lawful permanent resident card, his Federal tax return, other documents
related to his monthly expenses and income, and limited evidence of a
residential lease before the bond hearing.
Further, the Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding that because DHS
bears the burden of proof in these specific bond proceedings, and because
bond proceedings in general are less formal than removal hearings, the lack
of any affidavit from the proposed sponsor is not as relevant to determining
the respondent’s degree of flight risk. While DHS bears the burden in these
bond proceedings under the ongoing injunction in Rodriguez, the respondent
introduced relevant evidence into the proceedings and asserted a proposed
sponsor who would ensure his appearance at future hearings. 	In bond
proceedings, Immigration Judges may take into consideration all relevant
and probative evidence, regardless of which party filed it, to determine if the
evidence establishes custody factors. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (2025); see
also Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 40–41. We note that while DHS may
have the burden of proof in these proceedings, the respondent is always
afforded the opportunity, and may be inclined, to present evidence to contest
DHS’ claims. See, e.g., Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 40–41. The fact
that bond proceedings are less formal than removal proceedings does not
alleviate the burden on either party to present evidence in support of the
arguments they are making in the bond proceedings.
The existence of a valid, reliable, and credible sponsor is relevant to the
determination of flight risk. Although sponsorship is not a flight risk factor
specifically enumerated in Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 40, evidence of
a legitimate sponsor relates directly to whether the alien has a fixed address,

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which is a flight risk factor enumerated in Matter of Guerra, as well as the
alien’s degree of community ties. 	See Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I&N Dec. at
806 & n.3 (stating that in assessing flight risk, the Immigration Judge may
consider a sponsor’s immigration status and ability to financially support an
alien and ensure his or her presence at future immigration hearings because,
while the Board’s reasoning in Matter of Guerra, did not specifically
enumerate those factors, those factors are relevant to whether the alien will
have a fixed address during the immigration proceedings and the likelihood
that the alien will appear at future hearings).
The Immigration Judge also clearly erred in finding that the proposed
sponsor has a fixed address in Hallandale, Florida. The documents provide
three different addresses for the sponsor, two in Hallandale, Florida, and
another in Hopatcong, New Jersey. The documentation for a residential lease
in Hallandale, Florida, provides a different address than the bill for electric
services in the same location. 	There is no explanation from either the
respondent or the sponsor as to which of the multiple addresses, if any, is
Mr. G-’s fixed address, and whether the respondent will be residing with him
at the address upon release from custody. Further complicating this factual
analysis is the submission of a different address in New Jersey, without
clarification by the respondent or Mr. G-. 	Thus, the Immigration Judge
clearly erred in finding that the sponsorship documents reflected that the
sponsor has a fixed address in Hallandale, Florida, and that the respondent
would reside with him there. 	Accordingly, the Immigration Judge clearly
erred in finding that the sponsorship documents reduced the respondent’s
flight risk such that he merits release on bond.
The Immigration Judge also clearly erred in finding that the respondent’s
“willingness to patiently wait in Mexico” for his CBP One appointment and
to attend the scheduled border interview demonstrates that he is likely to
appear for future court hearings. 	This finding is based on speculation,
because the respondent recently entered the United States and has no
established work history or any record of appearances in any courts in the
United States. 	See Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 454 (BIA 2011)
(holding that an Immigration Judge’s findings may be “based on reasonable
inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence of the record as a whole,”
but not on “rank speculation and conjecture” (citation omitted)), remanded
on other grounds by Radojkovic v. Holder, 599 F. App’x 646 (9th Cir. 2015).
The Immigration Judge correctly found that the respondent does not have
any family ties that 	may entitle him to remain in the United 	States
permanently, or in fact any family ties to the United States at all. 	The
Immigration Judge further determined without error that the respondent is

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eligible only for humanitarian relief. Any grant of such relief is speculative
at this stage and on this record. 	See Matter of Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 488,
490 (BIA 1987) (“A respondent with a greater likelihood of being granted
relief from deportation has a greater motivation to appear for a deportation
hearing than one who, based on a criminal record or otherwise, has less
potential of being granted such relief.”).
Accordingly, we hold that the Immigration Judge erred in determining that
DHS did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that the respondent is a flight risk. 	DHS correctly identified unreconciled
inconsistencies 	in 	residential 	evidence 	presented 	by 	the 	respondent’s
proposed sponsor that undermines the assertion that this respondent is not a
flight risk. 	The respondent has a very limited length of residence in the
United States, he lacks family ties to the United States, his eligibility for
relief is speculative, and he has not established that he has a fixed address, a
sponsor willing to provide him a fixed address, nor any acknowledgment
from the sponsor of an offer of support for expenses to ensure that the
respondent appears at future immigration hearings. See Matter of R-A-V-P-,
27 I&N Dec. at 806–07 (assessing flight risk factors); Matter of Guerra,
24 I&N Dec. at 40 (describing factors relevant to bond determinations).
While we acknowledge the Immigration Judge’s broad discretion in
deciding whether to release an alien on bond, the facts in the record
presented establish that the respondent is a significant flight risk. 	See
Matter 	of 	E-F-Y-G-, 	29 	I&N 	Dec. 	103, 	104 	(BIA 	2025) 	(reversing
Immigration Judge’s grant of bond when the record reflected, among other
flight risk factors, that the respondent had a short length of residency in the
United States); see also Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I&N Dec. at 806–07
(affirming 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	decision 	that 	the 	respondent’s 	limited
avenues for relief, minimal ties to the United States, and absence of a sponsor
that will clearly provide a fixed address, financial assistance, and assurances
that the respondent will appear at future immigration hearings demonstrate
that the respondent poses too high a flight risk to merit release on bond).
Thus, upon our de novo review, we conclude that DHS has met its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a flight risk
such that his continued detention is justified.
ORDER: 	DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s
January 8, 2025, order granting the respondent’s release on a payment of a
bond of $10,000 and alternatives to detention at DHS’ discretion is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: The respondent is ordered held in DHS’ custody
without bond.