J-E-L-

page
605
Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4190
Matter of J-E-L-, Respondent
Decided May 4, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The respondent did not establish a claim for protection under the Convention Against
Torture because he did not show a clear probability of harm rising to the level of torture by
gang or cartel members in Mexico and did not establish the requisite state action for
government acquiescence to torture.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Pro se
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Stacy Norcross, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; GEMOETS
and CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judges.
CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security (“DHS”) appeals 	from 	the
Immigration Judge’s February 26, 2024, decision granting the respondent’s
application 	for 	protection 	under 	the 	regulations 	implementing 	the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 The respondent, a native and citizen
of Mexico, has not responded to the appeal. DHS’ appeal will be sustained.
I. BACKGROUND
The respondent seeks protection from removal based on his fear of being
tortured in Mexico by the Surenos gang and the Jalisco New Generation
cartel (“CJNG”) for his role as an informant against them while living in the
United States in 2009.
In 2009, the respondent worked with authorities in the United States to
incarcerate two gang members, one of whom is the respondent’s relative.
The respondent was then removed from the United States and lived in
Mexico for about 13 years. 	In Mexico, the respondent received threats via
1 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2026); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4190
page
606
phone calls and posters. His house was shot at in 2010 when he was living
in Zacatecas, and in 2015 when he was living in Jalisco. 	The respondent
relocated each time he started to receive threats. 	His United States citizen
wife and children intermittently lived with him in Mexico, most recently
from 2018 to 2023. 	The respondent and his family never had any direct
contact with the people threatening him, but he believes Surenos and CJNG
members were responsible. In March 2023, the respondent and his wife went
to the public ministry to report the threats. 	The following month, the
respondent was kidnapped outside his home in Jalisco. 	He does not know
who kidnapped him. 	The respondent was held for several days and
mistreated, but he managed to escape. He relocated to Colima, where he had
no problems. He entered the United States in November 2023 at a designated
port 	of 	entry 	after 	scheduling 	an 	appointment 	through 	the 	CBP 	One
application.
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent generally testified
credibly and granted him deferral of removal under the CAT. 	On appeal,
DHS contends that the Immigration Judge erred in finding the respondent
credible and concluding that he met his burden of proof for CAT deferral.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A respondent seeking CAT protection has the burden to establish that it
is more likely than not he will be tortured in the proposed country of removal
if removed and that the torture would involve sufficient state action.
Aviles-Tavera v. Garland, 22 F.4th 478, 486 (5th Cir. 2022); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2). 	Torture is defined as severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, that is intentionally inflicted for a proscribed purpose by,
or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. 	Tabora Gutierrez v.
Garland, 12 F.4th 496, 502 (5th Cir. 2021); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
Acquiescence to torture requires a public official to have awareness of, or
remain 	willfully 	blind 	to, 	torturous 	conduct 	and 	breach 	their 	legal
responsibility to prevent it. Iruegas-Valdez v. Yates, 846 F.3d 806, 812 (5th
Cir. 2017).
The inquiry into whether a respondent is eligible for CAT protection is
forward-looking. 	In assessing CAT claims, “all evidence relevant to the
possibility of future torture” is considered, including evidence of past torture,
evidence that the respondent could relocate to another part of the prospective
country of removal where he is not likely to be tortured, and evidence of
gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human rights within the country of
removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). The question of what is likely to happen

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4190
page
607
to a respondent is a factual finding that we review for clear error. Matter of
A-A-R-, 29 I&N Dec. 38, 39 (BIA 2025); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2026).
Whether the predicted outcome satisfies the definition of torture is a legal
determination that we review de novo. See Matter of A-A-F-V-, 29 I&N Dec.
118, 122 (BIA 2025) (concluding the applicant did not show a clear
probability 	of 	suffering 	harm 	amounting 	to 	“torture”); 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026).
Assuming 	the 	respondent 	testified 	credibly, 	we 	will 	reverse 	the
Immigration Judge’s grant of deferral of removal under the CAT. 	The
Immigration Judge’s predictive findings about what is likely to happen to the
respondent upon his removal to Mexico do not support the legal conclusion
that the respondent is more likely than not to suffer harm constituting torture
by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.
In concluding that the respondent would more likely than not be tortured
in Mexico, the Immigration Judge found there to be an escalating pattern of
violence against him and found that he would be unable to relocate to avoid
harm by the CJNG and the Surenos. However, while the Immigration Judge
found that the respondent faced years of threats and intimidation in Mexico,
including a kidnapping in Jalisco in 2023, the Immigration Judge properly
determined that the past harm to the respondent in Mexico did not constitute
past torture.
The respondent lived in Mexico for approximately 13 years without any
physical harm or direct contact with cartel or gang members despite the
threats and the shootings. He did not allege any in-person contact with cartel
or gang members in Mexico until the kidnapping in 2023. 	He also offered
only speculation about who was targeting him. 	While he assumed the
perpetrators were people he knew, he never saw who shot at his home or left
posters, nor does he know who kidnapped him. 	After escaping from his
kidnappers, he relocated and had no problems. 	During his 13 years in
Mexico, he had his U.S. citizen wife and children intermittently living with
him. 	The Immigration Judge discussed the country conditions evidence,
finding that it illustrated high levels of violence perpetrated by criminal
organizations, high levels of impunity, targeting of perceived informants, and
collusion between public officials and criminal elements. 	However, this
evidence is not particularized to the respondent or his situation. Moreover,
the country conditions evidence does not reflect that the CJNG and the
Surenos control all territory in Mexico.

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4190
page
608
Considering the totality of the record, the facts of this case do not
establish an individualized risk of future torture to the respondent that is more
likely than not. See L.N. v. Garland, 109 F.4th 389, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2024)
(requiring particularized evidence that shows an individualized risk of
torture). The basis for the respondent’s fear is his cooperation with United
States law enforcement that ended in 2009, and he was able to live in Mexico
for roughly 13 years thereafter without suffering the torture he fears he will
now suffer if removed. He also remained unharmed in Mexico for 7 months
after his kidnaping and was able to wait for a CBP One appointment. We do
not discount the incidents the respondent endured in Mexico over the years;
however, he has not shown that gang or cartel members “will more likely
than not torture [him], rather than leave him unharmed or subject him to
lesser harms.” 	Matter of J-C-A-G-, 29 I&N Dec. 331, 332 (BIA 2025).
Given the lack of past torture, the passage of time, and the respondent’s
ability to relocate, the respondent has not shown a clear probability of harm
rising to the level of torture by gang or cartel members. See, e.g., id. at 333
(concluding that cooperation with United States law enforcement, country
conditions evidence, and other factors did not establish a clear probability of
torture by the cartel).
Moreover, based on the Immigration Judge’s findings, the respondent’s
claim rests on his fear of cartel and gang members rather than public officials
in Mexico. Even if we were to assume the respondent faced an individualized
risk of harm rising to the level of torture based on his ties to the CJNG and
the Surenos, the respondent has not met his burden to show that the harm he
fears by gang or cartel members would be inflicted with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official.
The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent would more likely
than not be tortured with the acquiescence of a public official based on the
respondent’s assertion that he was kidnapped after filing a police report in
Jalisco. The Immigration Judge also relied on general evidence of collusion
between criminal organizations and some Mexican authorities unconnected
to the respondent’s specific circumstances. The Immigration Judge made no
finding that Mexican authorities were or would be involved in any harm to
the respondent. 	Rather, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent
assumed his kidnappers were police officers and noted the general existence
of collusion between some Mexican authorities and criminal groups.
The record does not contain evidence beyond speculation about who
targeted the respondent, and there is no specific evidence as to collusion
between the police in Jalisco and the CJNG or the Surenos. 	The record
reflects that, despite receiving threats for over 13 years, the only time the

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4190
page
609
respondent contacted Mexican authorities was in 2023, and he was able to
file a report. The facts and evidence in this case do not establish that a public
official would more likely than not consent or acquiesce to torture of the
respondent. See, e.g., Matter of A-A-R-, 29 I&N Dec. at 46 (concluding that
the factual findings did not support the determination that a public official
would likely acquiesce to torture); Matter of O-A-R-G-, 29 I&N Dec. 30, 36
(BIA 	2025) 	(describing 	“acquiescence”). 	The 	Immigration 	Judge’s
conclusion to the contrary relies on unsupported inferences that fall short of
demonstrating the respondent satisfied his burden of proof.
III. CONCLUSION
The respondent has not met his burden to establish his eligibility for CAT
protection. He was not tortured in the past. His speculation about what could
happen, his fear of gang and cartel members, and the general country
conditions evidence are insufficient to establish a clear probability that the
respondent will be tortured wherever he relocates in Mexico. 	In addition,
unsupported inferences do not establish the requisite state action. We will,
therefore, sustain DHS’ appeal and vacate the Immigration Judge’s decision
granting the respondent deferral of removal under the CAT.
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The Immigration Judge’s February 26, 2024,
grant of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture is vacated,
and the respondent is ordered removed from the United States to Mexico.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See section
274D of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1324d;
8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14). 	Further, any respondent that has been denied
admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States while an order
of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and thereafter enters,
attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States shall be fined
or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 	See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a).