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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 732 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4213
Matter of T-D-E-, et al., Respondents
Decided June 29, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
An Immigration Judge may not determine that a respondent is credible solely because
the respondent was candid in admitting he previously lied to obtain immigration benefits.
FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Tito A. Saavedra, Esquire, New York, New York
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Eileen M. McCrohan,
Assistant Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER and GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judges.
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security (“DHS”) appeals 	from 	the
Immigration Judge’s March 17, 2025, decision granting the respondents,
who 	are 	natives 	and 	citizens 	of 	Burkina 	Faso, 	asylum 	under 	section
208(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (2024).1 	The respondents oppose the appeal. 	We will
sustain the appeal and remand the record to the Immigration Court.
The Board reviews findings of fact determined by an Immigration Judge,
including credibility findings, under a “clearly erroneous” standard. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2026). 	We reverse the Immigration Judge’s favorable
credibility determination because, as presently constituted, it is clearly
erroneous. 	See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)
(2024). A remand is required for the Immigration Judge to properly assess
the respondent’s credibility. See Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462, 465 (BIA
2002) (the Board must defer to the factual determinations of an Immigration
1 	The respondents are the lead respondent, his spouse, and their minor child. The spouse
and minor child seek asylum as derivative beneficiaries of the lead respondent. See INA
§ 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(a)(1) (2026). The
spouse and minor child do not seek relief or protection separate from the lead respondent’s
application and are not entitled to assert a derivative claim for statutory withholding of
removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture. See Matter of A-K-, 24 I&N
Dec. 275, 279–80 (BIA 2007). 	References to a singular respondent are to the lead
respondent.

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Judge absent clear error); Matter of A-P-, 22 I&N Dec. 468, 477 (BIA 1999)
(stating that the Immigration Judge is responsible for the substantive
completeness of the decision).
The respondent’s application for asylum is dependent on his claim that
he served in the Regiment of Security Presidential (RSP), a military division
responsible for protecting the President of Burkina Faso, from 2009 until the
RSP’s dissolution in 2015. The respondent twice applied for visas to enter
the United States, first on December 5, 2015, and again on August 24, 2016.
In each of these applications, he denied ever having served in the military or
having received specialized weapons training.
The Immigration Judge noted that the respondent testified that he lied on
his 2015 visa application because “he was trying to hide the fact that he had
been in the military.” Regarding the 2016 visa application, the Immigration
Judge observed that the respondent first testified “that he was not asked about
serving in the military or firearms training,” and “later testified that he
provided . . . incorrect information on his visa application because he was in
despair and danger and just wanted to leave Burkina Faso . . . .”
The 	Immigration 	Judge 	explicitly 	found 	the 	respondent’s
misrepresentations on these visa applications indicative of a propensity to
engage in dishonesty in pursuit of an immigration benefit. Nonetheless, the
Immigration Judge determined that the respondent was credible. 	The
Immigration Judge reasoned that the respondent was forthcoming and
“readily admitted that he purposely failed to disclose” details in his visa
applications that might prevent him from obtaining a visa. 	Thus, the
Immigration Judge “credit[ed] the [r]espondent’s explanation for these
discrepancies.”
The INA affords no presumption of credibility to the respondent, who
bears the burden of establishing he is credible. Matter of H-C-R-C-, 28 I&N
Dec. 809, 811 (BIA 2024). In determining credibility, the Immigration Judge
may consider many factors, including demeanor, candor, responsiveness, the
inherent plausibility of the account, consistency between written and oral
statements, internal consistency of statements, consistency of statements
with other evidence of record, and any inaccuracies in statements. 	INA
§§ 	208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 	240(c)(4)(C), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1158(b)(1)(B)(iii),
1229a(c)(4)(C) (2024). The Immigration Judge may also find a respondent
credible only in part. Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 366 (2021) (noting
that an Immigration Judge, “like any reasonable factfinder, is free to credit
part of a witness’ testimony without necessarily accepting it all” (citation
modified)).

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However, 	the 	respondent’s 	admission 	that 	he 	previously 	lied 	on
applications for visas to enter the United States does not establish credibility.
As the Immigration Judge correctly found, these admissions are merely
“indicative of a propensity to engage in dishonesty for purposes of seeking
an immigration benefit.” 	It is clear error for an Immigration Judge to find
the respondent credible based solely on a finding that the respondent was
candid about making prior false statements. 	Accordingly, we will remand
for the Immigration Judge to more fully assess the respondent’s credibility.
Remand is also warranted for further fact-finding and legal analysis
regarding corroboration. See Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 519 (BIA
2015) (explaining that, whether credible or not, an asylum applicant has the
burden to corroborate the material elements of the claim where corroborating
evidence is reasonably obtainable). The respondent testified that he provided
false information on his second visa application because he was desperate to
leave Burkina Faso to escape capture and imprisonment. 	However, that
explanation is undermined by the respondent’s testimony that he did not
leave Burkina Faso until 2021, approximately 5 years after filing his second
visa application. Moreover, the admittedly false information provided on the
respondent’s visa applications is not ancillary to his claim. 	Rather, those
falsehoods are indicative of the respondent’s willingness to lie to U.S.
immigration officials about any military service or training, which is an
integral part of his claimed fear. See generally Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d
160, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2007) (describing impact of false testimony on other
testimony and evidence).
Additionally, as argued by DHS on appeal, while the Immigration Judge
found that the respondent’s witness was not persuasive and afforded his
testimony limited weight, the Immigration Judge did not make an explicit
determination of the witness’ credibility. See generally Matter of O-D-, 21
I&N Dec. 1079, 1081 (BIA 1998) (noting that credibility is a threshold
issue). 	Thus, the respondent’s witness is entitled to a presumption of
credibility on appeal. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
However, the respondent’s witness falsely testified during the hearing that
he was never wanted for arrest or charged with a crime when, in fact, an
international arrest warrant was entered against him and he was convicted in
absentia for alleged involvement in a military coup in 2015. 	When
confronted with evidence of this arrest warrant and conviction, the witness
conceded that he learned about the arrest warrant and conviction on the
Internet in 2019, though he disputes the underlying charges. 	As the
respondent’s witness provided false testimony under oath, we conclude the
presumption of credibility has been rebutted. 	On remand, the Immigration

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Judge must assess the credibility of the witness’ testimony and affidavit and
determine what, if any, weight to afford them. See id.
DHS further argues that the documentary evidence in the record does not
corroborate the respondent’s claims. The Immigration Judge found that the
respondent’s affidavits substantiate his claims of past persecution, that
certificates and photographs corroborate his military service, and that the
record contains a search warrant for the respondent due to his failure to
appear for military service. 	However, the Immigration Judge does not
address the lack of detail in these documents and does not specifically
analyze whether these documents corroborate the respondent’s testimony
that 	he 	was 	in 	military 	confinement 	and 	surveilled 	by 	soldiers 	for
approximately 3 months beginning in October 2015, that he sustained a knee
and back injury from an attack on his convoy, that he was threatened with
death after being transferred back to a camp in Po, and that the alleged past
and feared future harm was and will be motivated by his status as a former
RSP member. See Matter of F-S-N-, 28 I&N Dec. 1, 5 (BIA 2020) (according
limited evidentiary weight to statements from relatives that only make
generalized and nonspecific references to the respondent’s harm); Matter of
H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (affording diminished
weight to unsworn letters from the alien’s friends and family because they
lacked detail and were from interested witnesses not subject to cross-
examination).
In 	conclusion, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	must 	further 	assess 	the
respondent’s credibility under the totality of the circumstances and may not
determine the respondent is credible solely because he was candid in
admitting he previously lied to obtain immigration benefits. Thereafter, the
Immigration 	Judge 	should 	determine 	if 	the 	respondent 	has 	presented
sufficient corroborative evidence and otherwise established eligibility for the
relief and protection he seeks. In remanding, we express no opinion as to the
ultimate outcome of these proceedings.
Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
ORDER: 	The appeal is sustained, and the record is remanded to the
Immigration Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing
opinion and for the entry of a new decision.