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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 865 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4239
Matter of A-Q-R-K-, Respondent
Decided by Board July 31, 2026 1
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The Immigration Judge erred in finding the respondent credible and granting asylum
based on his claimed fear of the Taliban in Afghanistan without adequately addressing
numerous inconsistencies between the respondent’s testimony and evidence, including the
credible fear interview.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Humira M. Noorestani, Esquire, Washington, D.C.
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Julio C. Manjarrez, Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge; WHITE, Temporary Appellate Immigration
Judge.
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security (“DHS”) appeals 	from 	the
Immigration Judge’s November 18, 2025, decision granting the respondent’s
application for asylum under section 208(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2024). The respondent,
a native and citizen of Afghanistan, opposes the appeal. The appeal will be
sustained, and the record will be remanded.
In granting asylum, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent
credibly established past persecution in Afghanistan on account of his
imputed political opinion. 	The Immigration Judge, thereafter, applied a
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution and determined that DHS
did not rebut the presumption. On appeal, DHS argues that the Immigration
Judge clearly erred in finding the respondent credible. 	We conclude that
remand is warranted.
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 7118-2026, dated September 1, 2026, the Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of A-Q-R-K- (BIA July 31, 2026), as precedent
in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2026).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.

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The Immigration Judge found the respondent credible. 	However, the
Immigration Judge’s decision does not contain factual findings or legal
analysis concerning numerous inconsistencies between the respondent’s
testimony and evidence. 	An Immigration Judge’s analysis must reflect
consideration of the totality of the circumstances in evaluating credibility.
See Matter of E-N-N-, 29 I&N Dec. 586, 586–87 (BIA 2026) (concluding
that an Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding the respondent credible
without addressing inconsistencies and implausibilities that were present in
the record); see also INA § 240(c)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (2024).
A remand is thus warranted for the Immigration Judge to address the
discrepancies in the record. 	The Immigration Judge should then reassess
whether the respondent is or is not credible and has presented sufficient
evidence to meet his burden of proof. See Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462,
465 	(BIA 	2002). 	We 	note 	some 	of 	these 	insufficiently 	addressed
discrepancies below.
The respondent’s testimony and evidence are inconsistent as to the
existence of his marriage certificate and the birth certificates of his children.
At the September 30, 2025, hearing, the respondent testified that there was
no marriage certificate and there were also no birth certificates for his
children. The Immigration Judge left the record open for the respondent to
provide 	evidence 	of 	his 	marriage 	and 	his 	children’s 	births. 	On
October 29, 2025, the respondent filed a marriage certificate and birth
certificates, documents he previously claimed did not exist.
The record also reflects inconsistencies in the respondent’s testimony and
evidence 	as 	to 	when 	his 	problems 	with 	the 	Taliban 	began. 	At 	the
September 11, 2025, hearing, the respondent testified he had no problems
with the Taliban when working as a teacher but that the problems began when
he started advocating for women’s rights in January 2016. The respondent
also testified at the September 30, 2025, hearing that his problems with the
Taliban started in 2011 when he began working with Senator Pashtoon. The
supporting letter from Senator Pashtoon states that “[w]hen the Taliban
regained control of Afghanistan, he was targeted and punished for his past
work in defending women’s rights . . . .” 	The respondent testified that the
Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 2021.
The respondent’s testimony and record evidence are inconsistent as to
when he worked for the Youth National Combination. 	The respondent
testified he started working for the Youth National Combination in 2016.
However, the letter he provided verifying his employment with the Youth
National Combination is dated 2016 and states that the respondent worked
for that organization “for a period exceeding three years.”

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The respondent’s testimony is also internally inconsistent as to whether
he was paid for his work as a women’s rights activist. He initially testified
that he was not paid for this work. The respondent later testified that he was
receiving payment for his work, specifically that someone “was paying us
money and he was motivating us to work for the rights of the women.” He
also testified that the job “did not have any payment” and that “when [an
individual] was giving us money, we were spending those money on the
activities.”
The respondent’s testimony and credible fear interview are inconsistent
as to how he knew the identity of the individuals who arrested him at his
home on June 2, 2022. At the September 30, 2025, hearing, the respondent
testified that the individuals identified themselves as Taliban intelligence
officers to him when they took him to detention. 	However, during his
credible fear interview, when asked how he knew they were Taliban
intelligence officers, the respondent stated that “[w]hen elders of my tribe
came to them, they requested for me to be released, and at that time I found
out that it was the intelligence of the [T]aliban.”
The respondent’s testimony regarding the harm he feared following his
June 2, 2022, arrest is internally inconsistent. 	The respondent initially
testified he feared the Taliban would kill him. 	When later asked why the
Taliban would kill him in 2023 when they had the opportunity to do so in
2022, he testified that at that time the Taliban would detain people but not
kill them.
The respondent’s testimony regarding the type of harm he experienced in
Mexico 	and 	where 	and 	when 	he 	experienced 	the 	harm 	is 	internally
inconsistent. 	Additionally, 	the 	respondent’s 	testimony 	contradicts 	his
credible fear interview, in which the respondent stated he did not experience
any threats or harm while traveling to the United States. 	The Immigration
Judge did not credit the respondent’s testimony regarding his time in Mexico.
On remand, the Immigration Judge should reassess and more fully analyze
the testimony of the respondent to determine whether his testimony is
sufficient to establish his claim in light of the conclusion that portions of the
respondent’s testimony were false.
The 	testimony 	and 	record 	evidence 	also 	contain 	omissions 	and
inconsistencies as to the respondent’s travel and living arrangements prior to
arriving in the United States. 	The respondent testified that he lived in
Germany for approximately 11 months prior to arriving in the United States
and was given a temporary card to live and work there. He testified that he
left Germany when his asylum application was rejected. 	The respondent

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testified that he flew from Germany to Costa Rica, then traveled through
Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. 	He later testified that he
moved to Pakistan in July 2022 and traveled to Austria in 2024. 	On his
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Form I-589), the
respondent stated he lived in Pakistan from July 2022 to December 2024 and
in Germany from January 2024 to December 2024. 	He also claimed he
received a student visa to travel to Austria. 	On remand, the Immigration
Judge should make clear factual findings regarding where the respondent
lived and traveled prior to arriving in the United States, consider any
documentation supporting his assertions, and assess the impact this has on
his overall credibility. 	The Immigration Judge should also determine how
the respondent obtained a student visa to enter Austria and permission to
reside in Germany and how the respondent’s ability to obtain such documents
impacts his claim to be a refugee in flight. Further, the Immigration Judge
should address the respondent’s assertions that his spouse, children, parents,
and siblings all remain in Afghanistan with no indication of harm.
In sum, remand is warranted for the Immigration Judge to further
consider the respondent’s credibility considering the many inconsistencies
which were not sufficiently addressed. 	On remand, the Immigration Judge
should 	allow 	the 	parties 	the 	opportunity 	to 	update 	the 	record. 	The
Immigration Judge should then provide a comprehensive decision that
includes specific credibility findings addressing the inconsistencies in the
record and any other issues necessary for the adjudication of the asylum
claim.
The Immigration Judge should also address the respondent’s claims for
withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A) (2024), and protection under the regulations implementing
the 	Convention 	Against 	Torture 	(“CAT”)2 	in 	the 	first 	instance. 	In
remanding, we express no opinion as to the ultimate outcome of this case.
ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further
proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new
decision.
2 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2026); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).