Donald Otis Williams v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2023-1000
____________

DONALD OTIS WILLIAMS,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

July 17, 2025

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Donald Otis Williams, was previously sentenced

to death for the 2010 first-degree felony murder of 81-year-old

Janet Patrick. Following a new penalty phase proceeding

conducted pursuant to Hurst v. State, 1 Williams was again

sentenced to death for Patrick’s murder. This is the direct appeal of

Williams’s newly imposed death sentence. We have jurisdiction.

1. Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (interpreting Hurst
v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), as requiring that a jury unanimously
recommend the death penalty), receded from in part by State v.
Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020).
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. As we explain, we affirm Williams’s

sentence of death.

BACKGROUND

In Williams’s original direct appeal, this Court detailed the

facts surrounding the disappearance and murder of Patrick, who

was last seen alive during a shopping trip at a grocery store near

her home in Lake County. See Williams v. State, 209 So. 3d 543,

548 (Fla. 2017). Eyewitness testimony and store surveillance video

footage confirmed that on October 18, 2010, Williams was seen with

Patrick inside of the grocery store and later seen getting into the

passenger seat of Patrick’s car. Id. Days later, law enforcement

took Williams into custody after finding him sitting in Patrick’s car

in Polk County. Id. Patrick’s credit cards were in Williams’s pocket.

Id.

Williams gave interviews to the media while in custody, during

which he made unsubstantiated claims that he and Patrick were

abducted by an unknown person. Id. The day after the interviews,

investigators found Patrick’s severely decomposed body under two

tires in a wooded area in Polk County. Id. The wooded area was

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located a mile and a half from a residence where Williams lived

years earlier. Id.

Although the condition of Patrick’s “partially skeletonized”

body prevented the medical examiner from determining the cause of

death, the medical examiner ruled out accidental death and

concluded that the manner of death was homicide. Id. at 548, 549.

Evidence revealed that in the days following Patrick’s

disappearance, Williams borrowed a shovel from one of his

acquaintances and never returned it. Id. at 548. Investigators

found the shovel in a cemetery in Polk County, and discovered near

the shovel was some plastic irrigation tubing that “appeared to have

been stretched and had characteristics consistent with” a piece of

such tubing found in the trunk of Patrick’s car. Id. at 549.

Various items retrieved from Patrick’s car contained DNA that

matched Williams’s DNA profile. Id. Additionally, blood evidence

retrieved from the car contained DNA that matched Patrick’s DNA

profile. Id. at 549-50.

Williams was charged with and tried for the first-degree

murder of Patrick, as well as one count of robbery and one count of

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kidnapping. Id. Williams’s defense was that he was suffering from

a mental illness or seizures at the time of the crimes. Id. at 551.

The jury found Williams guilty as charged, and the case

proceeded to the penalty phase. Id. The jury recommended by a

vote of nine to three that Williams be sentenced to death, and the

trial court subsequently sentenced Williams to death. Id. at 552,

554.

Original Direct Appeal

In 2017, this Court affirmed Williams’s convictions, as well as

his sentences for robbery and kidnapping. Id. at 567. However,

because the jury’s recommendation of death was not unanimous,

this Court reversed Williams’s death sentence and remanded for a

penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. State. Id.

Post-Hurst Developments

While Williams’s new penalty phase was pending, this Court

decided Poole and receded from the Hurst v. State requirement that

a jury’s recommendation of death be unanimous. See Poole, 297

So. 3d at 507. In response to Poole, the State filed a motion in the

trial court to reinstate Williams’s death sentence, and Williams filed

in this Court a petition for writ of prohibition to prohibit the trial

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court from doing so. Before this Court decided the petition, the trial

court granted the State’s motion and reinstated Williams’s death

sentence.

We ultimately granted Williams’s petition in light of our

decision in State v. Okafor, 306 So. 3d 930, 932 (Fla. 2020) (holding

that the “judgment vacating [the defendant’s] death sentence

[pursuant to Hurst v. State] is final, that neither we nor the trial

court can lawfully reinstate that sentence, and that resentencing is

therefore required”). As a result, Williams’s new penalty phase was

allowed to proceed.

Williams’s New Penalty Phase

The State filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty

and identified five aggravating factors: (1) the capital felony was

committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and on

felony probation; (2) the defendant was previously convicted of

another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of

violence to the person (prior violent felony); (3) the capital felony

was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an

accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight

after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping; (4) the capital

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felony was committed for pecuniary gain; and (5) the victim of the

capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or

disability.

At a March 2017 status hearing, Williams stated that he

wished to represent himself during the new penalty phase

proceedings. The trial court granted Williams’s request to proceed

pro se after conducting a Faretta2 hearing, during which the court

advised Williams of the risks of self-representation. During the

several years from 2017 to Williams’s 2023 penalty phase trial and

sentencing, the court appointed a series of standby counsel.

Attorney Jason Wise, appointed as standby counsel in 2020, served

as standby counsel through Williams’s sentencing in 2023. During

this time, Williams was also appointed a series of mitigation

specialists.

Months before the trial, the court set a trial date of April 3,

2023. On February 17, 2023, Williams filed a written motion to

continue the trial for the purpose of obtaining new “evaluators”; i.e.,

mental health experts. In his written motion and at a pretrial

2. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

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motion hearing on February 28, 2023, Williams cited his inability to

secure a mitigation specialist who would arrange for experts to

evaluate him. The trial court denied the continuance and noted

that any expert witnesses for trial would have to be disclosed by

March 8, 2023.

The penalty phase began as scheduled on April 3, 2023.

Williams waived a jury trial and the presentation of mitigation. The

trial court asked attorney Wise to continue as standby counsel. In

light of Williams’s waiver of the presentation of mitigation, the court

also held a preliminary discussion with Williams, standby counsel,

and the State about the possibility of appointing special counsel to

present mitigation.

The bench trial included the live testimony of some of the

State’s original trial witnesses, and the read-back or play-back of

the original trial testimony of other witnesses. After the State

rested, Williams later rested without presenting any witnesses. The

trial court then rendered its decision not to appoint special counsel

to present mitigation, indicating that it took notice of the

“tremendous” amount of mitigation presented during the original

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trial. The court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI). Williams

later waived a Spencer 3 hearing.

On July 7, 2023, the trial court sentenced Williams to death

based on its finding of four aggravating factors: (1) Williams was

previously convicted of a felony and on felony probation (great

weight); (2) prior violent felony (great weight); (3) the capital felony

was committed while Williams was engaged, or was an accomplice,

in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after

committing or attempting to commit kidnapping (great weight); and

(4) the victim was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or

disability (great weight). Finding that Williams’s possession of

Patrick’s vehicle and credit cards was collateral to the kidnapping

and not a motive for the crimes, the court rejected the pecuniary

gain aggravating factor.

The trial court also found the existence of two statutory

mitigating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed

while Williams was under the influence of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance (considerable weight); and (2) Williams’s

3. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).

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capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform

his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired

(significant weight).

The trial court further found the existence of fifteen

nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Williams manifested

appropriate courtroom behavior (some weight); (2) Williams served

in the United States Marine Corps (slight weight); (3) Williams was a

good probationer (slight weight); (4) Williams suffered physical,

mental, and emotional abuse as a child (moderate weight);

(5) Williams was struck by a car resulting in a shattered leg (some

weight); (6) Williams has a family and personal history of alcohol

abuse (some weight); (7) Williams has a family and personal history

of mental illness (considerable weight); (8) Williams witnessed his

mother being abused by his father (some weight); (9) Williams

suffered head injuries while he was growing up (some weight);

(10) Williams was a good father (slight weight); (11) Williams was a

loving companion (slight weight); (12) Williams was a hard worker

(slight weight); (13) Williams helped others when he could (slight

weight); (14) Williams has witnessed two deaths (some weight); and

(15) Williams is in poor health (slight weight).

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This appeal follows.

ANALYSIS

Williams was appointed the services of the appellate public

defender. He raises four issues for this Court’s consideration,

which we address in turn. None of the issues merits relief.

I. Denial of Motion to Continue

Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

refusing to grant him a continuance to secure a new mitigation

specialist. Even if we assume that this issue as framed on appeal is

properly preserved, Williams is not entitled to relief.

Whether to grant a continuance is a matter that lies within the

trial court’s discretion. Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla.

1990). “[T]he court’s ruling will be disturbed only when that

discretion has been abused.” Id. (citing Woods v. State, 490 So. 2d

24, 26 (Fla. 1986)). Abuse of discretion is a “highly deferential”

standard of review, and “we will not find an abuse of discretion

unless the trial court makes a ruling which no reasonable judge

would agree with.” Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005, 1013 (Fla.

2023) (citing Kelley v. State, 974 So. 2d 1047, 1051 (Fla. 2007)).

Williams has not met this showing.

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As an initial matter, Williams’s argument that he is

constitutionally entitled to a mitigation specialist is without merit.

Although Williams cites several sources—a state statute relating to

the payment of mitigation specialists, American Bar Association

guidelines, a law review article, and various appellate court

decisions—none of them stand for this proposition.

We are mindful that since being granted a new penalty phase

in 2017—for reasons ranging from Williams’s multiple requests for

the appointment of a new specialist to the serious illness of one of

his appointed mitigation specialists—Williams was appointed a

series of mitigation specialists. The record reflects the extent of the

efforts to provide him with mitigation specialists and investigators

during this time.

Just weeks before the start of Williams’s new penalty phase

trial and with Williams fully aware of the April 3, 2023, start date,

Williams requested a sixty-day continuance to secure new

evaluators because he was unable to secure a new mitigation

specialist to assist in obtaining evaluators for him. At a hearing in

December 2022, the trial court discussed with Williams the

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difficulties of getting and keeping a mitigation specialist while

proceeding pro se. Standby counsel noted the following:

STANDBY COUNSEL: Your Honor, the difficulty I’ve had
when I’ve checked in with the mitigation specialists, as
Mr. Williams said, the specialist will not work with a
pro se Defendant. I commissioned one, I think that
Mr. Williams had discussions with previously. One that
might be able to do it is [C.S.], but I’m not sure where the
discussions went that Mr. Williams had with her. I’d be
happy to check with other mitigation specialists that he
may have, but all the others that I have worked with in
the past are not willing to do a pro se Defendant.

The trial court advised Williams that it would appoint another

mitigation specialist if one agreed to work on the case but also

warned Williams of the approaching March 2023 deadline for

disclosing any mental health experts for the upcoming trial. When

asked whether he wanted to continue representing himself given

these parameters, Williams said that he did:

THE COURT: And those [prior] proceedings are a nullity.
Basically we’re starting over. So my question is, as we sit
here today, do you wish to have an attorney appointed to
represent you or are you going to continue to represent
yourself?

DEFENDANT: I’m going to continue to represent myself.

THE COURT: Very well. All right. Then I’ll just wait for
the email from Mr. Wise. I have no problem with
substituting your mitigation specialist, just make sure we

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have somebody that will take the job. So we will see
what we can do.

Williams explains in his initial brief in this appeal: “The Appellant

and standby counsel could not secure a replacement mitigation

specialist by the February 2023 status conference because the

Appellant was representing himself.” Under these circumstances,

the court did not err in denying a continuance.

Moreover, the cases on which Williams relies to argue that the

trial court erroneously denied his motion to continue—Brown and

Hill 4—provide no support for his claim. In both cases, the district

court concluded that the denial of a continuance was an abuse of

the trial court’s discretion. However, these cases are

distinguishable from Williams’s case in one key respect: they both

involve a motion to continue that was sought for the purpose of

seeking an attorney, not for the purpose of seeking a mitigation

specialist. See Brown, 38 So. 3d at 214 (holding that the trial court

abused its discretion, observing that “Mr. Brown requested the

continuance to seek private counsel. . . . Denying a defendant the

4. Brown v. State, 38 So. 3d 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Hill v.
State, 157 So. 3d 481 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

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right to counsel of his choice, without good cause, is prejudicial per

se.”); Hill, 157 So. 3d at 483 (holding that the trial court abused its

discretion where the record did not support the denial of a

continuance to seek private counsel, there had been no prior

continuance, and the State did not object to the request).

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Williams a continuance, he is not entitled to relief.

II. Voluntariness of Williams’s Waivers

Williams also contends that the trial court erred by accepting

his waiver of a penalty phase jury and his waiver of the

presentation of mitigation. Under this Court’s precedent, Williams

is foreclosed from challenging the jury waiver on direct appeal,

because he did not seek to revoke the waiver in the trial court. See

Griffin v. State, 820 So. 2d 906, 913 (Fla. 2002). In any event, both

claims are without merit.

About ten days before the penalty phase began, Williams

participated in a discussion at a March 24, 2023, motion and

status hearing about the implications of waiving a jury:

PROSECUTOR: Mr. Williams, let me just ask you a
couple of other things; if I could.

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Just—again, just make sure, this is your decision,
and your decision alone, to waive a jury, right?

DEFENDANT: That’s correct.

PROSECUTOR: And this is what you want to do, to waive
a jury?

DEFENDANT: It’s not entirely my want. It is—although,
it’s voluntarily, but it’s not entirely a clear case of I want
to do this. It’s a little bit more complicated than that, but
I voluntarily waive the participation of jury in this
resentencing phase.

PROSECUTOR: Mr. Williams, you understand that if you
have a jury trial, that a single juror can vote for a
sentence of life without parole and prevent a death
sentence from being imposed. You do know that, right?

DEFENDANT: Well, yes, I do. I’m very aware that eleven-
one recommendation or eleven-one vote would put me in
life in prison rather than in death, but you have to
understand that I have been on death row. Even though
I have not been legally sentenced to death, I have been on
death row and treated as a death row prisoner. I have
been denied physical access into the law library, ever
since I’ve been on death row, and that was March the 3rd
of 2014. No matter how many times that we went to
court where the State has wrongly put a motion in to
impose the death sentence back on March the 5th, 2020
by Poole—State versus Poole, I have been treated as a
death row prisoner. The reason that—one of the reasons
is that I’m choosing to waive the right to jury, is because
I have not had time to prepare for a jury trial. So, there
would be no sense in me asking the Court to go with a
jury trial when I have no way of presenting my case for
mitigation to a jury.
So, the Court knows, as well as anyone, of all the
facts of this case. It’s not simply going over to a jury and

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saying where’s your mitigation specialist, where are your
experts, where is that when I had no reason—I had no
way to actually bring them into court.

PROSECUTOR: So, Mr. Williams, it sounds to me as if
you are telling us that because you have not had the
opportunity to get your mitigation in order, that you feel
it necessary to waive the jury and proceed to a bench
trial. Is that what you’re saying?

DEFENDANT: Again, it’s not as simple as you may—as
that sounds. But again, I wanted to go back—this is part
of the court record, it’s part of the Supreme Court record
back in August the 1st of 2019. I was threatened and my
family was threatened and by a verbal warning and a
verbal assurance by a member of this court and the
member of the State of Florida that if I called them, if I
subpoenaed them, that my witnesses and myself would
be killed. That is a fact, that is an irrefutable fact, that is
something that I would take a polygraph on, but that is
another reason, among the many others, basically of
what you said that the reason I could not get the
mitigation specialist to—to even once we got court
appointed, many, many of them and they just quit on
their own without notifying me or notifying the Court that
they were quitting and it cost me thousands of dollars of
my own money to find out where they were and what
they did. I had no way to present this Court with
mitigation elements to properly prepare for a jury trial.
So therefore, one of the other reasons was that, that
what I had stated on the motion for continuance that I
provided this Court with, is I was not prepared to present
anything to the jury, when I was denied the right to [a]
mitigation specialist.

PROSECUTOR: So, are you telling the Court,
Mr. Williams, that because you were not given a
continuance, you have decided to waive a jury?

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DEFENDANT: Again, Mr. Nunnelley, that’s one of several
reasons.

PROSECUTOR: I’m not satisfied with this, Judge.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I ask a question,
please?

PROSECUTOR: Judge, if we could confer just for a
moment, please?

THE COURT: Just one moment, Mr. Williams, and I’ll
give you an opportunity to speak.

(There was a pause.)

PROSECUTOR: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: I just want to say, from my perspective, the
question here is whether Mr. Williams has a jury make a
recommendation to the Court or whether the Court hears
the evidence directly and makes it’s [sic] own findings
without the benefit of a jury recommendation. Whether
the continuance was granted or not, that issue will be
there with a jury or without a jury. So, it seems to me
kind of not really relevant to the question of, are you
waiving your right to a jury for these proceedings versus
a bench trial, which you had requested on Monday? I’m
not changing my position on the motion to continue. It
was objected to by the State and I believe I have good
grounds for denying that motion to continue, as this case
has been pending for a very long time and Mr. Williams
has always had the right to have counsel.
He has said the mitigation folks that are on the
[Justice Administrative Commission’s] list won’t work
with pro se defendants. I will take that as a true
statement because I have no contrary evidence to that.
But obviously, the answer to that is have counsel and
don’t be pro se. Same for I can’t get to the law library

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because I’m on death row. Again, I have no
contrary evidence to that, I’ll assume that is true.
The answer to that would be have a professional
represent you during the trial.
So, having said that, Mr. Williams, you wanted
to make some statements about the jury trial versus
bench trial? I mean, obviously, whether I erred in
granting or denying a motion to continue is going to
be pending however we go forward with these
proceedings for an appellate purpose.

After further discussion, the Court continued:

THE COURT: Well, it’s a simple question. Do you wish to
be represented by an attorney, or not?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: State, anything else that you wish to
inquire, as far as the jury goes? I’m gonna proceed
ahead as if we may be having a jury trial and continue
with qualifications and—general qualifications and
hardships next week. There will be a pool available,
should Mr. Williams change his mind. If he does not,
we’ll release them and schedule from there for as soon as
we can get your witnesses in.

...

PROSECUTOR: . . . Are you reserving ruling, as far as
making a determination as to Mr. Williams’ willing, freely
and voluntary waiver of jury trial until April 3rd on
Monday when he is in court?

THE COURT: I think that is the best course of action at
this time. You had sort of prefaced that on Monday.
Like, his right to an attorney, I can’t—I’m not going to
deny him a fundamental Constitutional right, so we will
be prepared either way.

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I will put on the record, I am about knee deep in
transcripts from prior trials, so if it is a bench trial, I
can—I will at that time be able to certify that I have read
everything. And if it’s not, then we’ll go on with jury
selection.
So yes, I am reserving, anticipating it will be a
bench trial, but with a back-up that we’ll be ready for a
jury trial, if need be.

Then, at the beginning of the penalty phase, the trial court

again addressed Williams’s pro se status and inquired about his

intent to waive a jury trial:

THE COURT: Okay. You know Mr. Wise is here as
standby counsel and if you change your mind, by all
means at any time during the proceedings, please let me
know.
I will ask you every morning as we come in whether
or not you wish to continue to represent yourself, but if
it’s sometime in the middle of a proceeding, please let me
know if you change your mind.

DEFENDANT: I will, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So the next question I have is
Mr. Williams had indicated he would like this as a bench
trial. I went ahead and did qualifications. I anticipated
this.

DEFENDANT: I apologize, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That’s all right. No, I figured. So,
Mr. Williams, do you still wish to have a bench trial or
have you changed your mind about that and want to
have a jury trial?

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DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I hate—I hate to start off
these proceedings with would you give me a minute, but
would you give me just one minute, just one small
minute?

THE COURT: Sure.

DEFENDANT: Your Honor, the defense waives mitigation.

THE COURT: Okay. Can I get an answer to my first
question which is are we doing this as a bench trial or a
jury trial?

DEFENDANT: We’re doing this as a bench trial, Your
Honor.

PROSECUTOR: May I approach, Your Honor? We have a
signed waiver that was executed by Mr. Williams on
March 24th. I signed it this morning.

THE COURT: And that is for the waiver of jury trial?

PROSECUTOR: Waiver of a jury trial.

THE COURT: Okay.

PROSECUTOR: If we could get a copy of that at some
point in time over the week that would be good.

THE COURT: Yes, sir. It will be e-filed today. Will that
work or do you still want a copy?

PROSECUTOR: Good enough, Judge.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Williams, do you feel you’ve had
adequate time to talk to your standby counsel about the
benefits, pros and cons, of a bench trial versus a jury
trial?

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DEFENDANT: I hate to say to be honest because that
means that everything that I said before is a lie, but I—
I stress that fact to say, Your Honor, I have not spoken to
Attorney Wise concerning any of this trial.

THE COURT: Okay.

DEFENDANT: I have consulted others of my defense team
before making this decision.

THE COURT: I think we did go over this briefly, that a
recommendation from 12 impartial jurors, all you need is
one to forestall the death penalty and get a life sentence.
I will tell you I’ve spent countless hours reading all
of the prior trial transcripts. I think I have one closing
argument to finish, but other than that I have read
everything, so I feel pretty apprised of what had
previously been presented. So it is completely up to you.
I don’t want to sway you one way or the other, but if it’s a
bench trial you want, then that’s fine.

Subsequently, the trial court addressed whether Williams

knowingly and voluntarily waived the presentation of mitigation.

The court noted Williams’s objection to the denial of the motion to

continue as Williams’s rationale for waiving mitigation:

THE COURT: All right. Well, I am satisfied both [sic] with
Faretta. I am not so satisfied with the knowingly and
voluntarily waiving of mitigation. So what I’d like to do is
proceed with the state’s case. I will ask Mr. Williams
again if he has changed his mind or is going to be
declining to put on any new mitigation for this
proceeding.

After further discussion, the court continued:

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THE COURT: I think so. I think at this point, I mean,
there is an affirmative waiver of wanting to put on any
mitigation, but as I’m beginning to understand
Mr. Williams’ argument, he feels he’s unable to present
any additional mitigation due to various reasons.
So what I’m going to do is let’s proceed with the
state’s case this afternoon and I will ask Mr. Williams
again. If he decides that he does have some information
he wants the Court to be aware of and present as
mitigation, I’m certainly not going to preclude him from
doing that. If he has no witnesses and no additional
evidence, then he has none. . . .

After the State presented its case, Williams determined that he

would not present any witnesses and rested. Additionally, Williams

stated the following:

DEFENDANT: The defense would like to waive every
entitled right that we have from now on. If it’s a Spencer
hearing, if it’s a PSI, if I could waive the PSI I will. If the
Court perceives this is going to take a couple weeks or a
month, I would ask that the Court order my transfer
back to [prison] as quickly as possible and that’s—unless
Mr. Wise has something to say about the end of this,
other than the state’s closing arguments, I have nothing
more that I can say.

These exchanges notwithstanding, Williams argues that the

totality of the circumstances renders his waivers involuntary and

cites three factors: (1) lack of law library access; (2) threats against

Williams and members of his family; and (3) his inability to secure a

new mitigation specialist as trial approached. Under this Court’s

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precedent, in a challenge to the waiver of a penalty phase jury, we

ask whether the record affirmatively shows that the waiver was

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Boatman v. State, 402 So. 3d

900, 922 (Fla. 2024). And we apply the abuse of discretion

standard to review a trial court’s acceptance of a death penalty

defendant’s waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence.

Robertson v. State, 187 So. 3d 1207, 1212 (Fla. 2016). There being

no error under the governing standards of review, we will not

disturb the trial court’s acceptance of Williams’s waivers.

Having been repeatedly offered the assistance of counsel and

fully informed as to the challenges that may arise during pro se

representation, Williams cannot now use those challenges to

undermine his valid waivers. During the Faretta inquiry in March

2017, the trial court explained to Williams that “your attorney

would have access, a lot more access to legal research.” Williams

stated that he understood, and throughout the proceedings, he

repeatedly rejected the assistance of counsel.

Moreover, having received the appointment of multiple

mitigation specialists by late 2022, Williams was aware of the

difficulty in securing a mitigation specialist or maintaining the

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assistance of one while proceeding pro se. Nonetheless, Williams

continued to represent himself, and, while he had the right to do so,

he also assumed the attendant risks.

Further, even if the trial court erred in accepting Williams’s

waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence, any such error

would be harmless. Consistent with its obligation to consider

mitigation anywhere in the record, the court relied on the fully

developed mitigation from Williams’s original penalty phase as well

as the most recent PSI. See Robinson v. State, 684 So. 2d 175, 177

(Fla. 1996) (“It is well settled that mitigating evidence must be

considered and weighed when contained anywhere in the record, to

the extent it is believable and uncontroverted.”). Indeed, the court

found not only fifteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances of

varying weights, but two statutory mitigating circumstances—

extreme mental or emotional disturbance (considerable weight), and

substantial impairment of the capacity to appreciate the criminality

of conduct or to conform conduct to the requirements of law

(significant weight). In fact, the court found one more statutory

mitigating circumstance and two more nonstatutory circumstances

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than did the original trial court. See Williams, 209 So. 3d at

553-54. As such, Williams is not entitled to relief.

III. Discovery

Next, Williams asserts that he was deprived of access to

discovery materials provided by the State. He further maintains

that he was not informed of the risks of self-representation and that

he did not knowingly and intelligently forgo the benefits of having

the assistance of counsel. Williams’s arguments are without merit.

First, the record reflects that the State satisfied its discovery

obligation by providing the defense with discovery. Second, the trial

court provided Williams with an opportunity to review evidence

during the penalty phase trial. Third, to the extent that Williams

argues “the trial court failed to warn [him] of the pitfalls of self-

representation,” the record soundly refutes this claim.

We also decline Williams’s invitation to recede from Wilcox, 5

and we reject Williams’s suggested interpretation of that opinion.

5. Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 376 (Fla. 2014) (concluding
that the State was not required to provide a pro se defendant a
transcript of a witness interview where the State only had a DVD
recording of the interview, and stating that “[t]he [criminal
discovery] rules do not require the State to produce and disclose

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IV. Constitutionality of Florida’s Death Penalty

Williams challenges the constitutionality of Florida’s capital

sentencing scheme, arguing that (1) it does not sufficiently narrow

the class of individuals eligible for the death penalty, and (2) the

elimination of comparative proportionality review removed a

necessary safeguard against arbitrary and inconsistent sentencing.

We have considered and repeatedly rejected Williams’s arguments.

See Miller v. State, 379 So. 3d 1109, 1127 (Fla. 2024) (rejecting

challenges to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme based on

“aggravator creep” and the elimination of comparative

proportionality review).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm Williams’s sentence of death for

the murder of Janet Patrick.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

information which is not within the State’s actual or constructive
possession”).

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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting

opinion in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020)

(abandoning this Court’s decades-long practice of conducting

comparative proportionality review in cases involving the direct

appeal of a sentence of death).

For this reason, I concur in result as to the affirmance of

Williams’s death sentence.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lake County,
Heidi Davis, Judge
Case No. 352011CF000105AXXXXX

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and George D.E. Burden,
Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit of Florida,
Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Naomi
Nichols, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Appellee

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