Andrew Richard Lukehart v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2026-0736
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ANDREW RICHARD LUKEHART,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

May 27, 2026

PER CURIAM.

Andrew Richard Lukehart was convicted and sentenced to

death for the 1996 murder of Gabrielle Hanshaw. On May 1, 2026,

Governor DeSantis issued a death warrant scheduling Lukehart’s

execution for June 2, 2026. Lukehart unsuccessfully sought

successive postconviction relief in the circuit court and now

appeals. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.;

see also State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla.

1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate jurisdiction over

sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all types
of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”). We affirm. We

also deny Lukehart’s motion for a stay of execution.

I

On February 25, 1996, Lukehart killed five-month-old

Gabrielle Hanshaw in Jacksonville. At the time, Lukehart lived with

Gabrielle’s mother, Misty Rhue, who was his girlfriend. After

Lukehart took Gabrielle to a room to change her diaper, Rhue saw

Lukehart drive away from the house. Rhue searched the house but

could not find Gabrielle. Lukehart initially told Rhue and the police

that Gabrielle had been abducted, leading to an eighteen-hour

search by the Jacksonville and Clay County Sheriff’s Offices.

Lukehart eventually told the officers that he had killed Gabrielle

and directed them to a pond where they found her body. Lukehart

told the police that he had dropped Gabrielle on her head while

changing her diaper and then shook her. He said that, realizing

Gabrielle had died, he panicked, drove to a rural area, and threw

her into the pond, injuring her head on the car door in the process.

Gabrielle’s injuries were inconsistent with Lukehart’s story.

She had suffered five separate impacts to her head, two of which

caused skull fractures and could have each been fatal. Lukehart

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testified during the guilt phase of his trial that he had lied when he

told the police that he had dropped Gabrielle on her head. He

testified that Gabrielle would not lie flat on the floor as he tried to

change her diaper. So, he repeatedly and forcefully pushed her

head and neck back onto the floor, killing her.

A jury convicted Lukehart of first-degree murder and

aggravated child abuse. Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 911

(Fla. 2000). At the penalty phase, the State established that

Lukehart had pleaded guilty to felony child abuse for injuring a

previous girlfriend’s baby and was on probation for that offense at

the time he murdered Gabrielle. Id. The jury recommended the

death sentence by a nine-to-three vote. Id. The trial court agreed

and sentenced Lukehart to death for the first-degree murder. Id.

In the trial court’s sentencing order, it found the State

established three statutory aggravators: (1) the murder was

committed during the commission of the felony of aggravated child

abuse; (2) the victim was under twelve years of age;1 and

1. We struck this aggravator on direct appeal as improperly
doubling the same aspect of the crime as the aggravator about the
murder having been committed by a person engaged in aggravated
child abuse. But we found that its inclusion was harmless beyond

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(3) Lukehart had a prior felony conviction for child abuse and was

on felony probation for that offense (two factors merged). 2 Id. at

911. The trial court found two statutory mitigators: (1) Lukehart’s

age (twenty-two) and (2) his substantially impaired capacity to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct

to the requirements of the law. Id. The trial court also found four

nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Lukehart’s alcoholic and abusive father;

(2) Lukehart’s drug and alcohol abuse; (3) his having been sexually

abused and suicidal as a child; and (4) his employment. Id.

On direct appeal, we affirmed Lukehart’s convictions and

death sentence. 3 Id. at 927. We found that while the State did not

a reasonable doubt, as Gabrielle’s age increased the weight of the
aggravated child abuse aggravator. Id. at 925.

2. We found that applying the probation aggravator to
Lukehart violated his ex post facto rights. But we found this error
to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as (1) evidence of his
probation was relevant to proving the prior violent felony aggravator
and (2) the trial court merged the probation aggravator with the
prior violent felony aggravator in its weighing decision. Id. at
924-25.

3. Lukehart raised the following claims on direct appeal:
(1) the trial court erred in refusing to suppress certain statements
from Lukehart; (2) the trial court erred by limiting cross-
examination; (3) Lukehart’s convictions of first-degree murder and
aggravated battery were invalid because of insufficient evidence of

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prove premeditated murder, the State had proven first-degree felony

murder, with aggravated child abuse as the underlying felony. Id.

at 921-22.4 On June 25, 2001, the United States Supreme Court

denied Lukehart’s petition for writ of certiorari. Lukehart v. Florida,

533 U.S. 934 (2001).

Lukehart unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief in state

court. See Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503 (Fla. 2011) (affirming

the denial of Lukehart’s initial motion for postconviction relief filed

premeditation and the lack of a felony independent of the homicide;
(4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on justifiable or
excusable homicide; (5) the disproportionality of Lukehart’s death
sentence; (6) the trial court erred in finding that the murder in the
course of a felony aggravator had been established; (7) the trial
court erred in applying the new aggravator of a crime committed
while on felony probation; (8) the trial court erred in finding both
murder in the course of a felony and that the victim was under
twelve as aggravators (improperly doubling); (9) the victim-under-
twelve aggravator and the standard jury instruction on the
aggravator were unconstitutional; (10) the trial court erred in
allowing a collateral crime (found to be a prior violent felony) to be a
feature of the penalty phase; (11) the prosecutor’s closing argument
comments during the penalty phase were fundamental error; and
(12) the trial court erred regarding the sentence for the noncapital
conviction and the restitution orders. Id. at 911 n.1.

4. We remanded for the trial court to resentence Lukehart for
his aggravated child abuse conviction with instructions for the trial
court to fill out a sentencing guidelines scoresheet, which it had
failed to do. Id. at 927.

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under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and denying his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus); 5 Lukehart v. State, 103 So. 3d

134 (Fla. 2012) (affirming the denial of Lukehart’s first successive

5. In his initial postconviction proceeding, Lukehart raised the
following claims before us: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the prior violent felony aggravator during the penalty
phase; (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to cease
Lukehart’s medication and a motion for continuance; (3) counsel
was ineffective for failing to present Dr. Harry Krop’s testimony
during the guilt phase; (4) Lukehart’s amended postconviction
motion should relate back to the filing of his shell motion;
(5) counsel was ineffective for failing to include an additional
argument in the motion to suppress; (6) counsel was ineffective for
failing to properly argue and object to the jury instructions and the
State’s allegedly improper arguments regarding instructions;
(7) counsel was ineffective under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320 (1985); (8) counsel was ineffective for failing to present live
testimony rather than deposition testimony during the penalty
phase; (9) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to allegedly
improper prosecutorial comments; (10) the rule prohibiting juror
interviews was unconstitutional; (11) Florida’s lethal injection
protocol was unconstitutional; and (12) cumulative error. Id. at 511
n.5. For claim (4), we concluded that Lukehart’s motion was
governed by rule 3.850 and his amended motion related back to the
date of his original filing. Id. at 517. But we denied relief on all
other claims and affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of rule
3.850 relief. Id. at 525.

Regarding Lukehart’s habeas petition, we denied relief on the
following claims: (1) this Court should have revisited its prior
proportionality review in light of a witness’s testimony at the
postconviction evidentiary hearing; (2) Florida’s lethal injection
protocol violates the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the inclusion of
pancuronium bromide in Florida’s lethal injection protocol violates
free speech. Id. at 512 n.6, 524-25.

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motion for postconviction relief filed under rule 3.851); 6 Lukehart v.

Jones, No. SC2016-1225, 2017 WL 1033691 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2017)

(denying Lukehart’s successive habeas petition seeking relief under

Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016) 7). 8 Lukehart was also one of

6. In Lukehart’s first successive postconviction proceeding, he
raised the following claims: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to
(a) learn the effects of the medication Lukehart was taking,
(b) inform the court and the jury that Lukehart was on medication
and explain its effects, (c) move the court for the medications to
cease, and (d) request a continuance; (2) Lukehart was incompetent
at trial due to medication; and (3) Lukehart was involuntarily
required to take medication. Id. at 135. We denied relief on all
claims as procedurally barred. Id. at 136.

7. In Hurst, the United States Supreme Court held that
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, in which the jury’s role was to
make a recommendation as to the death sentence, did not satisfy
the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that a jury find each fact
necessary to impose the death sentence. 577 U.S. at 94. For
Lukehart, we held that pursuant to our decision in Asay v. State,
210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), Hurst did not retroactively apply to him.
Lukehart v. Jones, 2017 WL 1033691, at *1.

8. Simultaneously with his successive habeas petition,
Lukehart sought Hurst relief by filing a second successive rule
3.851 motion in circuit court and requested we hold his successive
habeas petition in abeyance or relinquish jurisdiction. See Motion
to Hold in Abeyance or Relinquish Jurisdiction to the Circuit Court
for Consideration of Successive Rule 3.851 Motion, Lukehart v.
Jones, SC2016-1225 (Jan. 10, 2017). We denied that motion. See
Order Denying Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, Lukehart v. Jones,
SC2016-1225 (Feb. 2, 2017). The circuit court denied Lukehart’s
rule 3.851 motion, and Lukehart did not appeal.

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the death row petitioners in Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla.

2000), who sought a judgment that the Death Penalty Reform Act of

2000 was unconstitutional. We held that portions of the Act were

unconstitutional and proposed new Florida Rules of Criminal

Procedure 3.851 and 3.852. Id. at 67.

Lukehart sought habeas relief in federal court, too. On April

28, 2020, the United States District Court for the Middle District of

Florida denied Lukehart habeas relief but granted a certificate of

appealability on a Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),

suppression claim. Lukehart v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No.

3:12-CV-585-J-32PDB, 2020 WL 2183150, at *59 (M.D. Fla. Apr.

28, 2020). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit expanded the certificate to include an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim and then ultimately affirmed the denial of federal

habeas relief. See Lukehart v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.4th 32,

41 (11th Cir. 2022).

Governor DeSantis signed Lukehart’s death warrant on May 1,

2026. On May 4, 2026, the Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial

Circuit held a status conference, where Lukehart was represented

by counsel. On May 5, 2026, Lukehart directed records demands to

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the District Eight Medical Examiner’s Office, the Florida

Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), and the Department of

Corrections (DOC) under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.852(h) and (i). On May 6, 2026, all three state agencies objected,

and the circuit court denied Lukehart’s demands after a hearing

that same day.

On May 8, 2026, Lukehart filed a third successive

postconviction motion and a separate motion seeking to stay his

execution. He raised three claims: (1) Florida’s lethal injection

protocol, as applied to him, constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution; (2) Florida’s lethal injection protocol is facially

unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;

and (3) Lukehart’s thirty-two-day warrant period deprives him of a

full and fair postconviction proceeding in violation of his due

process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Following a case management conference, the circuit court issued a

written order on May 12, 2026, summarily denying Lukehart relief

on each of his claims.

This appeal follows. Lukehart raises four claims before us:

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(1) the circuit court erred in denying his as-applied Eighth

Amendment method-of-execution challenge; (2) the circuit court

erred in denying his facial Eighth Amendment method-of-execution

challenge; (3) the circuit court erred in denying his warrant timeline

challenge; and (4) the circuit court abused its discretion in denying

his demands for additional public records. Lukehart asks that we

vacate his death sentence or stay his execution and remand his

case for an evidentiary hearing.

II

We have consistently said:

Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is
appropriate if the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.
We review the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny
a successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the
movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are
not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the
record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to
no relief.

Jennings v. State, 422 So. 3d 107, 113 (Fla.) (quoting Zakrzewski v.

State, 415 So. 3d 203, 208 (Fla. 2025)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 402

(2025). Applying this standard, we affirm the circuit court’s

summary denial of Lukehart’s successive postconviction motion.

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A

Lukehart argues that Florida’s lethal injection protocol, as

applied to him, is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment because of his severe kidney disease. The circuit court

summarily denied this claim as untimely and meritless. We agree.

This claim is untimely. A capital defendant must file any

postconviction claim within one year after the conviction judgment

and sentence becomes final. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1).

Lukehart’s judgment and sentence became final nearly twenty-five

years ago when the United States Supreme Court denied his

petition for certiorari review in 2001. Lukehart, 533 U.S. 934. An

exception exists for newly discovered evidence: “[f]or an otherwise

untimely claim to be considered timely as newly

discovered evidence, it must be filed within a year of the date the

claim became discoverable through due diligence.” Mungin v. State,

320 So. 3d 624, 625-26 (Fla. 2020) (citing Reed v. State, 116 So. 3d

260, 264 (Fla. 2013)). But the facts on which Lukehart predicates

this claim were discoverable more than a year ago. Florida’s

“current three-drug protocol has remained essentially unchanged

since 2017.” Randolph v. State, 422 So. 3d 166, 172 (Fla.), cert.

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denied, 146 S. Ct. 819 (2025). And Lukehart admits that his

medical records show deteriorating kidney values starting in 2023.

Lukehart’s assertion that this claim only became discoverable when

his kidney disease grew more severe in January 2026 is without

merit. We repeatedly reject arguments that method-of-execution

claims are ripe during warrant litigation when the worsening

medical condition was discovered years earlier. See Cole v. State,

392 So. 3d 1054, 1064 (Fla.) (Parkinson’s disease since 2017), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 109 (2024); Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 392

(Fla.) (medical conditions since 2009), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914

(2025); Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257, 1266-67 (Fla.) (porphyria

diagnosis), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (2025); Randolph, 422 So.

3d at 172-73 (lupus diagnosis since 1990).

This claim is also meritless. The Eighth Amendment, made

applicable to Florida through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits

“cruel and unusual punishments.” Amend. VIII, U.S. Const. 9 To

9. The Florida Constitution also prohibits cruel and unusual
punishments and directs that the prohibition “be construed in
conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.” Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.

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succeed on an as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge to his

method of execution, Lukehart must “(1) establish that the method

of execution presents a substantial and imminent risk that is sure

or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering and

(2) identify a known and available alternative method of execution

that entails a significantly less severe risk of pain.” Asay v. State,

224 So. 3d 695, 701 (Fla. 2017) (citing Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S.

863, 877 (2015)). Lukehart has done neither.

Lukehart claims that due to his kidney disease, Florida’s lethal

injection protocol’s use of etomidate “may” create the “potential” for

exaggerated negative consequences in his heart and lungs. 10 These

conclusory speculations do not present an imminent risk that

Florida’s lethal injection protocol is sure or very likely to cause

Lukehart needless suffering. This is especially true given the DOC

“is entitled to the presumption that it will comply with the lethal

injection protocol,” which includes “safeguards to ensure the

10. Lukehart also claims that his allergy to diphenhydramine,
an antihistamine, could result in a severe allergic reaction during
his execution. Not so. As Lukehart admits, that drug is not used in
Florida’s lethal injection protocol, and, moreover, the antihistamine
that DOC allegedly offers the condemned to reduce anxiety before
their execution is entirely optional.

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condemned is unconscious throughout the execution.” Cole, 392

So. 3d at 1065 (first citing Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 203

(Fla. 2013); and then citing Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938, 945 (Fla.

2019)). It is also worth repeating that “the Eighth Amendment ‘does

not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out

executions.’ ” Tanzi, 407 So. 3d at 392-93 (quoting Bucklew v.

Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 134 (2019)). And Lukehart has not

sufficiently pled how his kidney disease would cause him to feel

pain over “the well-established fact that the administration of

etomidate will render him unconscious likely within one minute,”

Rogers, 409 So. 3d at 1268 (citing Asay, 224 So. 3d at 701), after

which “a consciousness check is required and ‘the execution cannot

proceed until [he] is rendered unconscious,’ ” King v. State, No.

SC2026-0336, 2026 WL 672101, at *5 n.9 (Fla. Mar. 10) (quoting

Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d 1223, 1233 (11th Cir. 2011)), cert. denied,

No. 25-7018, 2026 WL 730666 (U.S. Mar. 16, 2026). Moreover,

Florida’s lethal injection protocol does “take into consideration the

individual physical attributes of each inmate and provide for

individualized procedures in light of any health concerns.” Tanzi,

407 So. 3d at 393 (quoting Grossman v. State, 5 So. 3d 668 (Fla.

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2009)).

Lukehart has also not “establish[ed] the existence of a known

and available alternative method of execution that would entail a

significantly less severe risk” than Florida’s lethal injection protocol.

Glossip, 576 U.S. at 878 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 57-60

(2008)). Before us, Lukehart has not offered any alternative

method. Instead, he argues that he should not have to provide one

because doing so is morally repugnant, against his religion, and

impossible to realistically offer.11 Yet “it is settled that capital

punishment is constitutional,” and “there must be a [constitutional]

means of carrying it out.” Glossip, 576 U.S. at 869 (alteration in

original) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 47). So, because Lukehart

chooses to raise a method-of-execution claim, he “must make the

11. Lukehart also argues that Glossip wrongly requires that
he provide an alternative method because doing so would violate his
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But we have
rejected the claim that the test articulated in Glossip “incorrectly
requires a prisoner scheduled for execution to prove the existence of
an available alternative method of execution.” Correll v. State, 184
So. 3d 478, 489 (Fla. 2015). That is because we are “bound by the
conformity clause of the Florida Constitution to construe the state
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment consistently
with pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court.” Id.
(citing Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 538-39 (Fla. 2011)).

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case that the State really can put him to death, though in a

different way than it plans.” Heath v. State, 426 So. 3d 1253, 1262

(Fla.) (quoting Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 169 (2022)), cert.

denied, No. 25-6746, 2026 WL 363902 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2026). He

fails to do so. 12 We affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim.

B

Lukehart next argues that Florida’s lethal injection protocol is

facially unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment under

the Eighth Amendment. The circuit court summarily denied this

claim as untimely and meritless for the same reasons as Lukehart’s

first claim. We agree.

As for timeliness, Lukehart has not justified his delay in

bringing this claim given that, as we have said, Florida’s lethal

injection protocol “has remained essentially unchanged since 2017.”

12. In the circuit court below, Lukehart pointed to other
states that begin their lethal injections with analgesics and still
others that use electrocution or lethal gas. But he failed to say how
any of these methods are “feasible, readily implemented, and
[would] in fact significantly reduce[] a substantial risk of severe
pain” compared to Florida’s lethal injection protocol. Tanzi, 407 So.
3d at 393 (second alteration in original) (quoting Glossip, 576 U.S.
at 877). And he does not argue for any alternative method on
appeal.

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Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 172. As for the argument’s merits, “[o]nce

we have upheld the constitutionality of a lethal injection protocol,

that protocol is facially constitutional as a matter of law.” Banks v.

State, 150 So. 3d 797, 801 (Fla. 2014). In Asay, 224 So. 3d at 702,

we approved Florida’s current three-drug protocol against an Eighth

Amendment challenge. We have repeatedly rejected invitations to

hold otherwise and do so again here. See Jimenez v. State, 265 So.

3d 462, 474-75 (Fla. 2018); Long, 271 So. 3d at 945-46; Cole, 392

So. 3d at 1064-65; Tanzi, 407 So. 3d at 392-93; Rogers, 409 So. 3d

at 1268-69; Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 173; Heath, 426 So. 3d at

1262-63. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim.

C

Lukehart also argues that his thirty-two-day warrant period

deprives him of his due process rights under the United States and

Florida Constitutions. The circuit court summarily denied this

claim as meritless. We agree.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” Amend. XIV, U.S. Const.

Florida’s Constitution similarly ensures that “[n]o person shall be

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deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”

Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. We have consistently said “[d]ue process

requires that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be

heard on a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1,

5 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 982 (Fla. 1993)).

Lukehart has not identified any matter in his warrant litigation

about which he was denied notice or an opportunity to be heard

before it was decided. Lukehart argues that his expedited warrant

litigation schedule nevertheless deprives him of a meaningful

opportunity to challenge his execution. We have repeatedly rejected

similar claims and have held that “an expedited warrant litigation

schedule does not deprive a defendant of his right to due process.”

Windom v. State, 416 So. 3d 1140, 1150 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S.

Ct. 66 (2025); see also Knight v. State, No. SC2026-0718, 2026 WL

1361316, at *7-8 (Fla. May 15), cert. denied, No. 25-7415, 2026 WL

1425695 (U.S. May 21, 2026); Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 173;

Jennings, 422 So. 3d at 119; Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619, 625-26

(Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025); Bates v. State, 416 So. 3d

312, 321 (Fla.) (“A thirty-day warrant period does not, in and of

itself, deprive a capital defendant of the rights [to due process and

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counsel].”), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 66 (2025); Zakrzewski, 415 So.

3d at 210-11; Bell v. State, 415 So. 3d 85, 106-07 (Fla.), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 2872 (2025); Hutchinson v. State, 416 So. 3d

273, 279-80 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1980 (2025); Tanzi, 407

So. 3d at 390-91; Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 789-91 (Fla.

2023). 13

Lukehart has challenged his death sentence numerous times

over nearly twenty-five years. See supra pp. 5-8 (outlining

Lukehart’s postconviction litigation). His current thirty-two-day

warrant litigation schedule does not deprive him of due process.

We affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim.

D

Lukehart argues that the circuit court wrongly denied his

various demands for additional public records under rule 3.852.

We review such claims for abuse of discretion. Dailey v. State, 283

So. 3d 782, 792 (Fla. 2019). We find none.

13. To the extent that Lukehart argues that his warrant
schedule deprives him of effective counsel, such a claim is not
cognizable because “[u]nder Florida and federal law, a defendant
has no constitutional right to effective collateral counsel.” Zack v.
State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1203 (Fla. 2005).

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Lukehart made demands under rule 3.852(h) and (i), which

permits “counsel for a defendant subject to a death warrant to

request the production of certain public records.” Cole, 392 So. 3d

at 1065-66 (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(h)(3)). This “discovery tool

is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition

for records unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.”

Id. at 1066 (quoting Asay, 224 So. 3d at 700). Accordingly,

records requests under Rule 3.852(h) are limited to
persons and agencies who were the recipients of a public
records request at the time the defendant began his or
her postconviction odyssey, whereas, records requests
under Rule 3.852(i) must show how the requested
records relate to a colorable claim for postconviction relief
and good cause as to why the public records request was
not made until after the death warrant was signed.

Id. (citation modified) (quoting Dailey, 283 So. 3d at 792).

Lukehart demanded records related to recent and scheduled

administrations of Florida’s lethal injection protocol from the

District Eight Medical Examiner’s Office, FDLE, and DOC. The

circuit court denied these demands as either not related to a

colorable claim or as overly broad and burdensome. These denials

were far from being the type of “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable”

decision that is an abuse of discretion. State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d

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120, 137 (Fla. 2003) (quoting White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799, 806

(Fla. 2002)). Indeed, we have said that “requests related to actions

of lethal injection personnel in past executions do not relate to a

colorable claim concerning future executions because there is a

presumption that members of the executive branch will perform

their duties properly.” Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 203 (citing Valle,

70 So. 3d at 549). Moreover, “because we have upheld the

constitutionality of the current lethal injection protocol, such

records ‘are unlikely to lead to a colorable claim for relief.’ ” Dailey,

283 So. 3d at 792 (citation modified) (quoting Hannon v. State, 228

So. 3d 505, 512 (Fla. 2017)).

It bears repeating that in Lukehart’s method-of-execution

claim described above, he makes no attempt to allege an alternative

to Florida’s lethal injection protocol—making the claim legally

insufficient. So, this method-of-execution claim that he argues is

related to his records demands cannot proceed. Lukehart

acknowledges our precedent against his position but argues that

redacted records obtained in a federal lawsuit by Frank Walls, who

was recently executed, justify his additional records requests here.

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We have rejected this argument. See Heath, 426 So. 3d at 1263-64;

King, 2026 WL 672101, at *5-6.

To the extent that Lukehart contends that rule 3.852 violates

his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment, we have “previously rejected efforts to morph a

challenge to the denial of a public records demand into a

constitutional challenge.” King, 2026 WL 672101, at *6 (citing

Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 172). The limitations imposed by rule

3.852 are “reasonable in the context of capital postconviction

claims.” Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 111 (Fla. 2011).

III

We affirm the summary denial of Lukehart’s motion for

postconviction relief, along with the circuit court’s denial of his

demands for additional public records. Accordingly, we also deny

his motion for a stay of execution.

No oral argument is required, no motion for rehearing will be

entertained, and the mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
SASSO, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.

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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
Mark Jeffrey Borello, Judge
Case No. 161996CF002645AXXXMA

Dawn B. Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Adrienne
Joy Shepherd, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and
Alicia Hampton, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel,
Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Jason W. Rodriguez, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Special
Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

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