Isaac "Ike" Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2024-0058
____________

ISAAC “IKE” PERLMUTTER, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
Respondents.

June 11, 2026

MUÑIZ, C.J.

In Florida, a claimant must make a reasonable evidentiary

showing and obtain the trial court’s permission before pleading a

claim for punitive damages. Then, at trial, the standard of proof for

punitive damages claims is clear and convincing evidence. The

question is whether the clear and convincing evidence standard

applies when the trial court evaluates the sufficiency of the

claimant’s evidentiary showing at the pleading stage. We hold that

it does not.
I

1

Harold Peerenboom initiated this lawsuit by suing Isaac and

Laura Perlmutter for defamation, alleging that the couple were

responsible for a hate mail campaign against him. The Perlmutters

countersued for defamation, theft, and invasion of privacy.

Eventually, they sought the trial court’s permission to add

counterclaims for punitive damages. The narrow issue before our

Court involves the legal standard for evaluating the evidentiary

showing that a claimant must make before being allowed to plead

such claims.

We begin by identifying some basic features of our state’s law

of punitive damages. Traditionally, those damages have been

available to address “egregious wrongdoing” that “constitutes a

public wrong.” Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla.

1986). Punitive damages are imposed not to compensate the

plaintiff, but for punishment and deterrence. Id. Given these

underlying purposes, Florida courts have long allowed juries to

consider the financial worth of the defendant in cases where the law

and facts would allow an award of punitive damages. See, e.g.,

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Jones v. Greeley, 6 So. 448, 449 (Fla. 1889). Importantly, even

when the plaintiff has established the predicate for an award of

punitive damages at trial, the decision whether to make such an

award is left to the jury’s discretion. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Watson,

428 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1983). In that sense, punitive damages

are fundamentally different from compensatory damages, which the

plaintiff is entitled to once the defendant’s liability has been

established. Id.

This case centers on section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, one of

many measures the Legislature has enacted over time to limit

overreach in the pursuit of punitive damages. It reads:

In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be
permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by
evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which
would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such
damages. The claimant may move to amend her or his
complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages as
allowed by the rules of civil procedure. The rules of civil
procedure shall be liberally construed so as to allow the
claimant discovery of evidence which appears reasonably
calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the issue of
punitive damages. No discovery of financial worth shall
proceed until after the pleading concerning punitive
damages is permitted.

Our Court has held that this provision “creates a substantive legal

right not to be subjected to a punitive damages claim and ensuing

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financial worth discovery until the trial court makes a

determination that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis for

recovery of punitive damages.” Simeon, Inc. v. Cox, 671 So. 2d 158,

160 (Fla. 1996) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So. 2d 518,

519 (Fla. 1995)). In this case, the parties’ dispute principally

involves the first sentence of section 768.72(1) and the legal

meaning of the phrase “a reasonable showing by evidence in the

record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a

reasonable basis for recovery of [punitive] damages.”

The Legislature adopted section 768.72(1) (originally

numbered section 768.72) in 1986. See ch. 86-160, § 51, Laws of

Fla. Until that time, a claimant “could first plead punitive damages

and only then begin to look for sufficient evidence to support the

claim.” Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 635 So. 2d 106, 110

(Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Defendants had limited safeguards against

unwarranted discovery of information about their financial worth,

in part because district courts were divided over the availability of

certiorari to review nonfinal orders denying motions to dismiss or to

strike punitive damages claims. See Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage,

509 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. 1987) (highlighting the conflict in

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practice among the district courts).

In Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1979), our Court

recognized that unlimited financial worth discovery could be used

unfairly to coerce settlements and to expose the “personal and

private financial affairs” of defendants “in cases where there is no

actual factual basis for an award of punitive damages.” Id. at 1170.

So we advised that, in evaluating motions for protective orders

limiting financial worth discovery under Florida Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.280(c), trial courts could “consider, among other

things, whether or not an actual factual basis exists for an award of

punitive damages.” Id. Section 768.72(1) essentially builds on the

approach our Court suggested in Tennant.

This case also involves section 768.72(2) and (3), which the

Legislature added in 1999 (without changing the text of what is now

section 768.72(1)). See ch. 99-225, § 22, Laws of Fla. Section

768.72(2) says in relevant part that: “A defendant may be held liable

for punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and

convincing evidence, finds that the defendant was personally guilty

of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.” It then goes on to

define the terms “intentional misconduct” and “gross negligence.”

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Section 768.72(3) sets out the conditions under which punitive

damages can be imposed against an employer for the conduct of its

employee or agent.

By enacting section 768.72(2), the Legislature heightened the

trial-level standard of proof for punitive damages from the common-

law “greater weight of the evidence” test to “clear and convincing

evidence.” Section 768.72(2) also altered the law by codifying and

defining substantive legal standards (“intentional misconduct” and

“gross negligence”) to govern the availability of punitive damages.

Before then, the common law had provided that “[a] legal basis for

punitive damages exists where torts are committed in an

outrageous manner or with fraud, malice, wantonness or

oppression.” Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 435-36

(Fla. 1978).

2

The parties here disagree over whether, under section

768.72(1), Isaac and Laura Perlmutter should be permitted to plead

punitive damages in their counterclaims against Harold

Peerenboom and two other parties. As we have mentioned, the case

started when Peerenboom sued the Perlmutters for defamation and

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related claims. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla.

4th DCA 2023). Peerenboom and the Perlmutters had been

involved in acrimonious disputes over the management of Sloan’s

Curve, the Palm Beach community where they all lived.

Peerenboom alleged that the Perlmutters had orchestrated a series

of mailings falsely telling his friends, neighbors, and business

associates that he had committed vile acts, including murder and

child molestation.

The Perlmutters counterclaimed, alleging conversion, civil

theft, abuse of process, defamation, invasion of privacy, and civil

conspiracy. The couple maintained that Peerenboom’s accusations

about their involvement in the hate mail campaign were knowingly

false and that Peerenboom intended to intimidate them and to hurt

Isaac Perlmutter professionally. They alleged that Peerenboom and

William Douberley (an insurance company lawyer representing

Peerenboom in a different lawsuit) had used a pretextual deposition

in that case to collect the Perlmutters’ DNA from items they touched

at the deposition and then left behind. According to the

Perlmutters, Peerenboom later bullied a private lab into producing

false test results linking Laura Perlmutter’s DNA to DNA found on

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the hate mail; then, armed with the flawed test results, Peerenboom

allegedly lied about the Perlmutters to the Palm Beach Police

Department and to two media outlets.

Eventually, the Perlmutters filed a motion in the trial court

asking permission to amend their counterclaims to seek punitive

damages against Peerenboom, Douberley, and Douberley’s

employer, Federal Insurance Company. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(f)

(implementing section 768.72(1)). Each of the counterclaim

defendants opposed the motion. Peerenboom argued that he did

not know there was anything wrong with collecting and testing the

Perlmutters’ DNA, since both his lawyer (Douberley) and the Palm

Beach Police Department knew about it and did not object. He also

denied that there was any impropriety in the testing process itself.

Douberley argued that collecting items the Perlmutters had touched

and discarded at a deposition was not improper and that he was

not involved in either the subsequent DNA testing or the

dissemination of the results to the police and the media. And

Federal Insurance maintained that its management had no

contemporaneous knowledge of Douberley’s role in attempting to

collect the Perlmutters’ DNA.

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After a hearing at which it considered the Perlmutters’ written

evidentiary submission and heard legal argument from the parties,

the trial court granted the Perlmutters’ motion to amend their

counterclaims to seek punitive damages. Peerenboom, Douberley,

and Federal Insurance appealed the trial court’s order to the Fourth

District Court of Appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(G). The

district court then took up the appeal en banc and reversed, with

two judges dissenting. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d at 28.

The Fourth District framed its analysis by announcing two

conclusions about the interpretation of section 768.72(1). It first

held that “a trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all

parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in

the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’ ” Id. at 33

(underscoring in original). Second, the district court explained that

it would look to the trial-level standard of proof set out in section

768.72(2) to inform its understanding of the evidentiary showing

required by section 768.72(1). Reading section 768.72(1) and (2)

together, the district court held: “[W]e interpret section 768.72(1)

and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary

determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of

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proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could

find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are

warranted.” Id. at 34 (underscoring in original). The district court

emphasized that the trial court, in making its “preliminary

determination,” should not itself decide whether the evidence is

clear and convincing, should not weigh evidence, and should not

determine witness credibility. Id.

Against that interpretive backdrop, the district court explained

why it thought the trial court had erred by allowing the Perlmutters

to plead punitive damages claims. At the threshold, the district

court observed that the Perlmutters had alleged “intentional

misconduct” under section 768.72(2). Id. at 35. It then explained

its conclusions that the evidence was “ambiguous” on the issue of

Peerenboom’s and Douberley’s intent and that the Perlmutters’

claims impermissibly depended on the “stacking of circumstantial

inferences,” which “could never meet the clear and convincing

evidence standard at trial.” Id. As to Federal Insurance, the district

court held that there was insufficient evidence to show that the

company had known about and approved Douberley’s acts. Id. at

37.

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The Fourth District certified that its decision conflicted with

five other district court decisions, two from the Second District

Court of Appeal and three from the Fifth. 1 In contrast to the Fourth

District, the district courts in the conflict cases did not apply the

“clear and convincing evidence” standard when assessing the

reasonableness of a claimant’s evidentiary submission in a

proceeding under section 768.72(1). For example, in Werner

Enterprises, the Fifth District said that the court’s task is simply “to

determine if there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports

the plaintiff’s position.” 362 So. 3d at 283.

The Fourth District also certified a question of great public

importance that mostly overlaps with the conflict issue. The

certified question is:

On a motion to amend to add a punitive damages claim,
does section 768.72(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, when
read in pari materia, require a trial court to make a
preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury,
viewing the totality of evidence identified in support of or
opposition to the motion, and in the light most favorable

1. The conflict cases are: Deaterly v. Jacobson, 313 So. 3d 798
(Fla. 2d DCA 2021); Wiendl v. Wiendl, 371 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA
2023); Estate of Despain v. Avante Group, Inc., 900 So. 2d 637 (Fla.
5th DCA 2005); Werner Enterprises, Inc. v. Mendez, 362 So. 3d 278
(Fla. 5th DCA 2023); and Cook v. Florida Peninsula Insurance Co.,
371 So. 3d 958 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

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to the movant, could find by clear and convincing
evidence that punitive damages are warranted?

Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d at 38 (underscoring in original).

We accepted jurisdiction upon the Perlmutters’ notice invoking

our discretionary review of the Fourth District’s decision. As we

explain below, we agree with the Perlmutters that the Fourth

District erred in its interpretation of section 768.72(1). Our answer

to the certified question is no. We quash the decision below and

remand for the district court to apply the standard for section

768.72(1) that we explain in our decision today.

II

1

Recall the disputed sentence in section 768.72(1): “In any civil

action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless

there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered

by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery

of such damages.” The certified question raises two related but

distinct issues about the operation and meaning of this provision.

The first issue is whether a trial court applying the statute should

consider only evidence identified or put forward by the claimant, or

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whether the court should also consider an evidentiary submission

by the opponent. The second issue is whether the trial court

should consider the “clear and convincing evidence” standard of

proof when determining if the evidence shows a reasonable basis for

the recovery of punitive damages. For clarity, we will begin by

stating our conclusions on these two issues, and then we will

explain our reasoning.

First, for the reasons we set out below, in a proceeding under

section 768.72(1), the trial court should consider only the evidence

identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an

evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent.

Second, the test for deciding evidentiary sufficiency under

section 768.72(1) is whether a reasonable person could conclude,

based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed

“intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence,” as defined in section

768.72(2). Cf. Bric McMann Indus. Inc. v. Regatta Beach Club

Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 378 So. 3d 652, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (asking

whether the claimant’s “proffered evidence provided facts from

which one could reasonably conclude that the [defendant’s]

conduct” met the statutory definition of intentional misconduct). If

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the claimant seeks to plead punitive damages against an employer

under a theory of vicarious liability, the evidentiary sufficiency test

also must ask whether a reasonable person could conclude that the

claimant’s evidence satisfies the substantive legal criteria set out in

section 768.72(3). Finally, “[b]ecause punitive damages never stand

alone,” the trial court must “review the request for punitive

damages in the context of the underlying claims.” LoanFlight

Lending, LLC v. Wood, 388 So. 3d 1027, 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024);

see also Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 187 So. 3d 1219, 1221

(Fla. 2016) (“[A] demand for punitive damages is ‘not a separate and

distinct cause of action; rather it is auxiliary to, and dependent

upon, the existence of an underlying claim.’ ” (quoting Liggett Grp.,

Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003))). In all

events, however, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence under

section 768.72(1) at the pleading stage, the trial court should not

apply the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.

The trial court does not act as a fact-finder in a proceeding

under section 768.72(1). It must not weigh the claimant’s evidence,

meaning that its role is not to decide the truth of the matter. In

conducting its review, the trial court must “consider the record

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evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.” Hosp. Specialists, P.A. v. Deen, 373 So. 3d 1283,

1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023). Of course, the allegations contained in

the claimant’s proposed amended complaint are not themselves

evidence—the whole point of a proceeding under section 768.72(1)

is to determine whether the claimant can show reasonable

evidentiary support for those allegations.

2

In fairness to the Fourth District, this is not a case where the

statute’s legal meaning springs clearly from the bare language of

the text. Section 768.72(1) is unusual in that it “mixes pleading

and evidence.” Henry P. Trawick, Trawick’s Florida Practice and

Procedure § 6-22 (1987 ed.). To complicate matters further, the

statute employs vague standards (“reasonable showing” and

“reasonable basis”) that lack an established legal meaning in this

context. And our task requires us to determine the relationship

between subsections of section 768.72, subsections that the

Legislature enacted at different times without giving express

instructions about how to harmonize the old and new provisions.

Nonetheless, the words and context of section 768.72(1) lead us to

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conclude that the statute mandates a procedure that is less

complex—both procedurally and substantively—than what the

Fourth District envisioned.

On the issue of the evidence to be considered by the trial

court, we note that the text of the statute expressly contemplates a

burden of production for the claimant but mentions no role for the

opponent. The thrust of the statute is to ensure that the claimant

itself can show evidentiary support for a proposed punitive damages

claim—not to require an evaluation of the claimant’s showing in the

light of contrary evidence submitted by the opponent. Even though

section 768.72(1) undoubtedly departs from the norm by requiring

a pre-pleading evidentiary showing at all, we adopt the

interpretation that is most consistent with the ordinary rules of civil

procedure. One would expect an express command if the

Legislature intended for the trial court to evaluate competing

evidentiary submissions at the pleading stage. Cf. Debra Salisbury,

Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure § 11:10 (2026 ed.) (On a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[a]ffidavits, discovery,

oral statements, or testimony cannot be used to support or attack

the pleading.”).

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Similarly, on the issue of the evidentiary sufficiency standard

under section 768.72(1), we note that the express words of the text

do not tie the reasonableness inquiry to the trial-level standard of

proof. On the contrary, the phrase “reasonable showing by

evidence . . . which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of

[punitive] damages” suggests a more straightforward and less

technical analysis. Our interpretation is anchored in reading the

words in the context of a law that governs the pleading stage of

litigation, which, of course, involves a less-than-complete record

and occurs early in the proceedings. Absent express instructions

from the Legislature, we are reluctant to read into the section

768.72(1) inquiry a consideration—the trial-level standard of

proof—that ordinarily plays no role at the pleading stage.

The textual contrast between section 768.72(1) and a related

statute supports our interpretation. Section 400.0237, Florida

Statutes, governs the pleading of punitive damages in the nursing

home context. When the Legislature enacted the initial version of

section 400.0237 in 2001, the text of the statute was materially the

same as section 768.72(1). Ch. 2001-45, § 9, Laws of Fla. Then, in

2014, the Legislature substantially amended the nursing home

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punitive damages provision. See ch. 2014-83, § 2, Laws of Fla. It

now reads:

The court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether
there is sufficient admissible evidence submitted by the
parties to ensure that there is a reasonable basis to
believe that the claimant, at trial, will be able to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
recovery of [punitive] damages is warranted . . . .

§ 400.0237(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Unlike section 768.72(1), this provision

expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties.” And it

expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a

reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and

convincing evidence” standard at trial.

The respondents and the Fourth District read section

768.72(1) as if it mandates essentially the same procedure and

evidentiary sufficiency standard as section 400.0237(1)(b). We find

that untenable. By respecting and giving effect to the substantial

textual differences between these related provisions, our

interpretation of section 768.72(1) honors the Legislature’s choices

and protects the coherence of Florida’s statutory law. See W. Va.

Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) (“Where a

statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we

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construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most

logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and

subsequently enacted law.”).

3

Though we ultimately disagree with the Fourth District and

the respondents about the best interpretation of section 768.72(1),

we acknowledge that their arguments are not without force. Like

the Fourth District, the respondents emphasize that section

768.72(1) and (2) must be read together. They maintain that the

question whether there is a “reasonable basis for recovery of

[punitive] damages” necessarily requires the trial court to decide

whether a reasonable jury could find that the claimant can satisfy

the trial-level standard of proof.

The Fourth District and the respondents are undoubtedly right

that individual provisions in a statutory scheme must be

interpreted with due regard for the other parts of the legislative

plan. Indeed, one cannot apply section 768.72(1) without

accounting for the substantive punitive damages law established in

section 768.72(2) and (3). Nonetheless, we do not think it follows

that section 768.72(1) implicitly incorporates the trial-level

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standard of proof referred to in section 768.72(2). After all, the

pleading stage—even under the unique procedure mandated by

section 768.72(1)—is not the time for the claimant to prove its case.

Pleading is remote from the “trier of fact” and the factual “find[ings]”

mentioned in section 768.72(2).

To support their position, the respondents invoke an analogy

to the analysis a trial court conducts when evaluating a summary

judgment motion. Specifically, they rely on the seminal case of

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), where the

Supreme Court held that “the determination of whether a given

factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the

substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case.” Id. at

255. Indeed, perceptive observers have noted that “[t]he language

used [in Perlmutter] is strikingly similar to the Florida standard for

summary judgment under Rule 1.510 or a directed verdict under

Rule 1.480.” Bruce J. Berman & Peter D. Webster, Berman’s

Florida Civil Procedure § 1.190:21 n.13 (2025 ed.).

But we do not think the text mandates treating a proceeding

under section 768.72(1) as something like a preemptive summary

judgment hearing. Cf. State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Plantation Square

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Assocs., Ltd., 761 F. Supp. 1569, 1580 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (“Without

attempting to determine precisely what type of showing is required

by § 768.72, the court believes it must ultimately be a lesser

standard than that required for summary judgment.”). Under our

rules of civil procedure, pleading a claim is about setting forth “a

short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2). Section

768.72(1) complements that standard in the punitive damages

context by requiring the claimant to show that there is a reasonable

evidentiary basis underlying the ultimate facts that it seeks to

plead. Summary judgment, which would remain available as a

screening device later in the litigation, involves different questions

and serves a different purpose (i.e., to determine, usually based on

a more complete record, whether there are genuine factual disputes

that need resolution by the fact-finder).

Finally, we do not agree with the respondents’ suggestion that

rejecting the Fourth District’s interpretation of section 768.72(1)

will render meaningless the trial court’s gatekeeping role. Courts

applying section 768.72(1) under evidentiary sufficiency tests like

the one we announce today have frequently upheld orders denying

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leave to add punitive damages claims, and they have reversed

orders granting leave to add such claims. See, e.g., McLane

Foodservice Inc. v. Wool, 400 So. 3d 757 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024); Deen,

373 So. 3d 1283; Wiendl, 371 So. 3d 964; Five Fran, LLC v. Davis,

404 So. 3d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025); Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Levi,

399 So. 3d 1212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024); Friedler v. Faena Hotels &

Residences, LLC, 390 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). The existence

of these precedents bolsters our confidence that our interpretation

of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute

in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.

III

For the reasons we have explained, our answer to the certified

question is no. Without expressing any view on the application of

section 768.72(1) to the facts here, we quash the decision under

review and remand so that the Fourth District can reexamine the

case under the construction of the statute we have explained today.

We express no view on the merits of the Fourth District’s analysis

as it relates to any distinct issues presented by the application of

section 768.72(3) to the Perlmutters’ claims against Federal

Insurance. We decline to address the Perlmutters’ request that we

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rule on the standard of review in appeals from orders granting or

denying leave to amend under section 768.72(1), an issue outside

the scope of the certified question and on which the district courts

are not in conflict. We approve the decisions of the Second and

Fifth Districts in the certified conflict cases 2 to the extent those

decisions are consistent with our opinion today.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, SASSO, and
TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Certified Great Public Importance
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions

Fourth District - Case Nos. 4D2022-1558, 4D2022-1560, and
4D2022-1562

(Palm Beach County)

Elliot B. Kula and William D. Mueller of Kula & Associates, P.A.,
Miami, Florida; Jesse Panuccio and Jason Hilborn of Boies Schiller
Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Roy Black and Jared M.
Lopez of Black Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf, P.A., Miami, Florida;
and Joshua E. Dubin of Joshua E. Dubin, P.A., Miami, Florida,

2. Deaterly, 313 So. 3d 798; Wiendl, 371 So. 3d 964; Est. of
Despain, 900 So. 2d 637; Werner, 362 So. 3d 278; Cook, 371 So. 3d
958.

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for Petitioners

Jordan S. Cohen and Victoria N. Sosa of Wicker Smith O’Hara
McCoy & Ford, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Ethan A. Arthur
of Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., Tampa, Florida,

for Respondent Harold Peerenboom

Brandt Roen and Kenneth R. Drake of Cruser, Mitchell, Novitz,
Sanchez, Gaston & Zimet, LLP, Coral Gables, Florida; and Joseph
H. Lang, Jr. and Jeffrey A. Cohen of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa,
Florida,

for Respondent Federal Insurance Company

Steven J. Rothman, Travis J. Foels, and Danielle L. Jakeman of
Jones Foster P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; and Dina M. Contri
and Robert L. Johnson of Sellars, Marion & Bachi, P.A., West Palm
Beach, Florida,

for Respondent William Marvin Douberley, Esq.

Elizabeth M. Locke, Joseph R. Oliveri, Jered T. Ede, and Eric D.
Hageman of Clare Locke LLP, Alexandria, Virginia,

for Amicus Curiae Michael D. Black MD, MBA

Michael M. Brownlee and Grace Zogaib of The Brownlee Law Firm,
P.A., Orlando, Florida; and William W. Large of Florida Justice
Reform Institute, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Amici Curiae Florida Justice Reform Institute, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, and American Tort
Reform Association

Frank Cruz-Alvarez and David M. Menichetti of Arnold & Porter
Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; and Cory L.
Andrews of Washington Legal Foundation, Washington, District of
Columbia,

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for Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Foundation

Wendy F. Lumish and Alina Alonso Rodriguez of Bowman and
Brooke, LLP, Coral Gables, Florida,

for Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council

L. Martin Reeder, Jr. of Atherton Galardi Mullen & Reeder, PLLC,
West Palm Beach, Florida; and Charles D. Tobin of Ballard Spahr
LLP, Washington, District of Columbia,

for Amicus Curiae Cable News Network, Inc.

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