Juan Carlos Alvarado-Balmaceda v. State of Florida

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida

Opinion filed June 3, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D24-0977
Lower Tribunal No. F23-17332
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Juan Carlos Alvarado-Balmaceda,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida,
Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Laura Anne
Stuzin, Judge.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER and GOODEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.
Juan Carlos Alvarado-Balmaceda (“Alvarado”) appeals his convictions

and sentences for burglary and petit theft. Alvarado argues that pursuant to

Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024) 1 his enhanced sentence is

constitutionally invalid because the trial court, not a jury, made the required

factual findings that he is a habitual violent felony offender (“HVFO”). We

affirm.

This Court has held that Erlinger errors are subject to harmless error

review. See Madison v. State, 51 Fla L. Weekly D875, (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 29,

2026); Mesa v. State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D503 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 18, 2026);

Tucker v. State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D170 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 28, 2026). “A

harmless error analysis in this context looks to ‘whether the record

demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury’ would have

found the requisite facts.” Avalos v. State, 419 So. 3d 299, 300 (Fla. 6th DCA

2025) (quoting Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 523 (Fla. 2007)). “Indeed,

if the record plainly and unequivocally establishes that the defendant

1
While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided
Erlinger. Prior to filing his initial brief, Alvarado filed a motion to correct
sentencing error in the trial court. See Fla. R. Crim P. 3.800(b)(2) (“If an
appeal is pending, . . . [t]he motion [to correct a sentencing error] . . . must
be served before the party’s first brief is served.”). In the motion, Alvarado
argued that Erlinger requires a jury to make the required factual findings that
the HVFO statute applies. Alvarado’s motion also argued that “the State
failed to offer evidence indicating that [his] convictions had not been set
aside.” The trial court denied the motion.

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qualifies for the enhancement, it is not necessary for the court to delve into

the Erlinger constitutional issue, because any resulting error would be

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Madison, 51 Fla L. Weekly D875, at

*1.

At sentencing, the State introduced evidence of Alvarado’s prior

conviction2 establishing that he qualified as a habitual violent felony offender

under section 775.084(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Alvarado did not contend that

the prior conviction was not his, that the date of the prior conviction was

incorrect, or that the prior conviction had been set aside or pardoned. At the

hearing, Alvarado’s counsel conceded that the State “has established that .

. . Alvarado has one qualifying prior.”

However, Alvarado’s counsel argued at sentencing that the State failed

to offer evidence indicating: (1) the date of Alvarado’s release from probation;

and (2) Alvarado’s prior conviction had not been set aside or pardoned. First,

the State provided evidence that on August 7, 2020, Alvarado was sentenced

to one year of probation for the prior conviction. Because the burglaries and

theft for which Alvarado was to be sentenced in this case occurred just over

2
The trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced Alvarado to one year of
probation. Per section 775.084(2), Florida Statutes, “[f]or the purposes of this
section, the placing of a person on probation or community control without
an adjudication of guilt shall be treated as a prior conviction.”

3
three years later, on August 9, 2023 and August 13, 2023, it is undisputed

that the August 7, 2020 prior conviction clearly occurred within the five years

required by section 775.084(1)(b)(2), Florida Statutes. See §

775.084(1)(b)(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (requiring that “the felony for which the

defendant is to be sentenced was committed . . . [w]ithin 5 years of the date

of the conviction of the last prior enumerated felony, or within 5 years of the

defendant’s release from . . . probation . . . that is imposed as a result of a

prior conviction for an enumerated felony, whichever is later.”). Second,

Alvarado did not assert his prior conviction had been set aside or pardoned,

nor did he, or the State, introduce any evidence reflecting the prior conviction

had been set aside or pardoned. Hence, absent such evidence, it is

undisputed that Alvarado’s prior conviction had not been set aside or

pardoned. See State v. Rucker, 613 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 1993) (finding that

“where the State has introduced unrebutted evidence . . . of the defendant’s

prior convictions, a court may infer that there has been no pardon or set

aside”).

Thus, based on the record before us, we conclude that any error in

failing to submit the habitual violent felony offender factors to a jury was

4
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and affirm. 3 See Moore v. State, 424

So. 3d 586, 586-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (“Appellant claims that having the

judge rather than a jury determine the underlying facts of whether he

qualified for designation and sentencing as a Habitual Violent Felony

Offender pursuant to section 775.084(1)(b), Florida Statutes, is contrary to

Erlinger . . . , and thus unconstitutional. We affirm on this issue because if

there was any error regarding the application of Erlinger, the record before

this Court demonstrates conclusively that it was harmless error.”).

3
See Tucker, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D170 (affirming where “based on the record
before this Court . . . error, if any, D170 or 2026 WL 216386 *1 was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt”); see also Hicks v. State, 422 So. 3d 607, 608
(Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (affirming on finding “any error in this case is harmless”);
Flournoy v. State, 415 So. 3d 806, 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025) (affirming on
finding that “there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to
the sentence” where “the State read [defendant]'s prior record at the
sentencing hearing and that [defendant]'s certified department of corrections
packet . . . was filed below and is contained in our record[,] and where
defendant “did not dispute his prior record . . . . And defense counsel
conceded at sentencing that [defendant] qualified for the PRR
enhancement.”); Kenyon v. State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D441 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar.
11, 2026) (affirming on finding “that any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because no rational jury would have found the qualifying
facts differently than the sentencing court”); Ashford v. State, 407 So. 3d 537,
537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (affirming on finding any error “would be harmless”);
Combs v. State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D640, D640 (Fla. 6th DCA Mar. 27, 2026)
(affirming on finding that “[t]he record reflects [a]ppellant had [a] . . . criminal
record that clearly qualified him for the enhanced sentence” and that
“because a rational jury would have arrived at the same conclusion as the
trial court regarding [a]ppellant’s prior convictions, any error is harmless”).

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Affirmed.

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