Fripp v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 12, 2025

S25A0604. FRIPP v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

Jeremiah Fripp appeals his convictions for malice murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Sherman

Ratliff and the armed robbery of Qwondez Calvert. 1 Fripp contends

1The crimes occurred on November 27, 2020. On June 25, 2021, a
Laurens County grand jury returned an indictment charging Fripp with malice
murder (Count 1); felony murder (Counts 2-3); armed robbery of Ratliff (Count
4); armed robbery of Calvert (Count 5); aggravated assault of Ratliff (Counts
6-7); aggravated assault of Calvert (Counts 8-9); and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 10). At the conclusion of a jury trial
that began on June 14, 2023, the jury found Fripp guilty on all counts. On July
31, 2023, the trial court sentenced Fripp to life in prison without the possibility
of parole for the count of malice murder (Count 1). The felony murder counts
(Counts 2-3) were vacated by operation of law. The court imposed a 20-year
prison term for the armed robbery of Ratliff (Count 4), to run consecutively to
Count 1, and a 20-year prison term for the armed robbery of Calvert (Count 5),
to run consecutively to Counts 1 and 4. The court merged each of the
aggravated assault counts (Counts 6-9) into Counts 4, 6, 5, and 8 respectively.
The court imposed a five-year prison term for the firearms charge (Count 10),
to run consecutively to Counts 1, 4, and 5.
Prior to his sentencing, Fripp filed a premature motion for new trial,
which ripened upon entry of the final disposition order. See Tavarez v. State,
that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that

his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance for

failing to pursue an alibi defense, and that the trial court erred by

giving a misleading jury instruction on the defense of coercion that

was not tailored to the evidence. For the reasons explained below,

we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

evidence presented at trial showed that, on November 27, 2020,

Ratliff and his cousin, Calvert, drove from Collins, Mississippi to

Dublin, Georgia to pick up an AK-style gun that belonged to Ratliff.

Calvert testified that, at some point during the drive, Ratliff spoke

on the phone with someone Ratcliff called “Baby Four,” who told

Ratliff where to meet them in Dublin. When Ratliff and Calvert

arrived at the meeting place, they drove into a recreational ballpark

319 Ga. 480, 480 n.1 (2024). He filed another motion for new trial, which he
amended through new counsel. On June 4, 2024, Fripp filed a second amended
motion for new trial and brief in support. Following a hearing on the motion,
the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on November 12,
2024. Fripp filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this
Court to the April 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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where they parked and waited. Ratliff received a phone call, and

soon thereafter, a red car pulled up next to them, and a short man

got out of it. Ratliff got out of his car to speak with the man while

Calvert remained in the car. Ratliff was carrying a pistol when he

got out of the car. Moments later, a black car pulled up, and Ratliff

handed the gun to Calvert, who placed the pistol on the driver’s side

floor. “Four to five” men got out of the black car wearing all black

clothing and ski masks, and Calvert rolled up the windows and

locked the doors. The man who arrived in the red car was “[s]till

there” at this time, and when Calvert locked the doors, the men,

including the man from the red car, drew their weapons and pointed

them at Ratliff and Calvert.

Calvert testified that one man attempted to open the locked car

door and threatened to shoot Calvert if he did not unlock the car

door, so Calvert complied. Two men dragged Calvert out of the car,

and one man rummaged through the car and took Calvert’s cell

phone while another—the short man from the red car—pistol-

whipped Calvert until Calvert fell to his knees. While Calvert was

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still on his knees, Ratliff attempted to run away. One of the men,

who was holding a “Draco”-style gun, shot Ratliff in the back, and

Ratliff collapsed to the ground. Moments later, Calvert heard sirens

in the distance. The man from the red car got in his car and “left

after the shooting,” and the men from the black car threw their guns

in the trunk, “jumped in [the car,] and pe[e]led out.” After the

assailants drove away, Calvert put Ratliff in their car and tried to

find a hospital. He flagged down a paramedic who called for police

and additional EMS assistance. Ratliff later died at the hospital, and

his cause of death was determined to be the gunshot wound to the

back.

When officers arrived to the scene of the shooting, Calvert told

them that the “leader” of the group was about six feet tall with a

long “dreads” hairstyle. He held the Draco-style gun and was the one

who was instructing others what to do. Although Calvert did not see

who shot Ratliff, he believed it was the man with the Draco-style

gun.

Calvert’s trial testimony about the timing of the departure of

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the two cars was not entirely consistent with his initial statement to

police. In the police body-camera footage from the night of the

shooting that was played for the jury, Calvert told the officer at the

scene that the red car pulled up first, and then it “pulled off, and

another car pulled up,” indicating that the red car had left before the

shooting occurred. On cross-examination, Calvert conceded that, in

his initial statement to police on the night of the shooting, he said

that the red car had left before the black car pulled up, that he could

not give detailed descriptions of any of the men from the black car,

and that he did not mention them wearing ski masks. Calvert also

testified that, in his initial statement to police, he said that he

believed that the person with dreadlock-style hair was called “Baby

Four,” was taller than 5’ 9”, and was the leader of the group. Calvert

also testified that the leader was the one holding the AK-style or

Draco-style gun and was the one who shot Ratliff.

During their canvas of the crime scene, law enforcement

officers did not locate Calvert’s cell phone that the assailant had

grabbed out of the car, but law enforcement did find a cell phone

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belonging to Jeremiah Salter. Officers visited Salter’s residence and

informed Salter’s brother that Salter was wanted for questioning

related to a murder.

On November 29, 2020, Fripp and Salter went to a police

station in Columbia, South Carolina. They arrived in a red car,

which they parked in the station parking lot. Upon entering the

station, they told an officer that they were wanted for questioning

involving the murder of a man named Sherman Ratliff in Dublin,

Georgia.

Officer Timothy Carpenter testified that he asked Fripp what

his involvement was, and Fripp responded, “I did it.” The officer

asked for clarification, and Fripp stated, “I killed him.” The officer

asked, “The Sherman guy?” to which Fripp nodded his head

affirmatively and stated, “Yeah.” Officer Carpenter testified that,

at that time, Fripp and Salter were not under arrest and were free

to leave but that, while trying to obtain a body camera, Officer

Carpenter spoke with Investigator James Fisher, who wanted to

detain them for further questioning. Officer Carpenter was never

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able to retrieve a body camera and did not otherwise record the

conversation with Fripp. He testified that Salter’s only statement

was that he came to the police station because officers showed up at

his house stating that Salter’s phone was found at the scene.

Investigator Fisher testified that when he encountered Salter

and Fripp in the police station lobby, Fripp repeated his statement

that he had been involved in Ratliff’s shooting, and Salter did not

say anything. Investigator Fisher then placed Salter and Fripp in

two separate interview rooms until the Dublin police could arrive to

continue the investigation but did not conduct his own custodial

interviews.

The South Carolina police officers contacted law enforcement

in Dublin and secured a warrant to search Fripp’s car, which was

still in the Columbia police station parking lot. While searching the

car, the officers recovered a Draco-style rifle gun from the trunk and

a pistol from the backseat. A GBI firearms examiner test-fired the

weapons and compared the markings on the test-fired bullets and

shell casings with the markings on the shell casing recovered from

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the crime scene and the bullet fragment recovered from Ratliff’s

body. He determined that the Draco-style gun retrieved from Fripp’s

trunk was the same gun that killed Ratliff. A gun trace performed

on the gun that was used to kill Ratcliff showed that Ratliff was its

original purchaser.

Fripp testified at trial to the following. Fripp, Ratliff, and

Salter were friends. On the night of the shooting, he received a

phone call from Ratliff informing him that Ratliff and Calvert were

at the ballpark, and that he came to the park to speak briefly with

Ratliff. While they talked for about five minutes, Ratliff informed

Fripp that Ratliff was waiting on someone else to arrive. He then

left the park and drove to his mother’s house before anyone else

arrived and was not present for the shooting.

The next day, Salter called Fripp requesting a ride. When

Fripp arrived to pick him up, Salter asked Fripp to open his trunk

so that he could put something in it. Fripp did not see Salter carrying

a weapon. However, he believed Salter had a gun concealed on his

person and that Salter put that gun in Fripp’s trunk. Salter then put

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a second gun in the backseat. They then drove to visit Fripp’s cousin,

Lashonda Dupree, in Columbia. When they arrived, they were

hanging out in front of Dupree’s apartment, and Salter was “jittery.”

Without testifying as to what was said, Fripp testified that,

following the conversation that took place, Dupree advised them to

turn themselves in. From there, they drove to the police station, and

on their way to the police station, Salter aggressively threatened

Fripp in a way that made Fripp feel that his family members’ lives

were in danger if he did not admit to the shooting.

After receiving Salter’s threat, he and Salter drove to the police

station where he gave his false statement. He did not kill Ratliff and

did not have any animosity or anger toward him. He was shocked

and saddened to learn that Ratliff had died and did not know

anything about Calvert’s testimony regarding the stolen cell phone,

the pistol-whipping, or the taking of a gun that belonged to Ratliff.

He did not have a dreadlock hairstyle, himself, and he was neither

six feet tall, nor was he the short man from the red car who pistol-

whipped Calvert. Further, he was not aware that Salter arrived at

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the park after he left.

2. Fripp contends that the evidence was legally insufficient

to support his convictions as a matter of constitutional due process.

He argues that Calvert’s testimony, upon which the State largely

depended, was impeached by Calvert’s prior inconsistent statements

to the police. Specifically, Fripp asserts that, on the night of the

shooting, Calvert told officers that the red car had left before the

shooting occurred. Two years later, however, Calvert changed his

story and testified that the red car was still there during the

shooting. Additionally, Fripp contends that there was no physical

evidence collected at the scene related to him and that “the murder

weapon was found in his car” only because Salter placed it in Fripp’s

trunk before they headed to the police station. He argues that he

was unable to provide any details about the shooting to law

enforcement because he was not present, that he only admitted to

the shooting because Salter “coerc[ed]” him to, and that, accordingly,

the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish Fripp’s

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

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“When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,

we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most

favorable to the verdict and ask whether any rational trier of fact

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

the crimes of which he was convicted.” Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594,

598 (2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318-19 (1979)).

“This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in

testimony but rather defers to the jury’s assessment of the weight

and credibility of the evidence.” Davis v. State, 316 Ga. 418, 420

(2023).

Fripp first argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict

because the State relied on Calvert’s trial testimony which

contradicted his statements to the police as depicted in the body

camera video from the night of the shooting. But just as the court

instructed, it was the jury’s role to determine the credibility of the

witnesses and to decide whether there was a reasonable explanation

for any inconsistencies in a witness’s pre-trial statements. See

Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225, 229 (2022) (“We leave to the jury the

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resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, . . . and we

do not reweigh the evidence.” (citations and punctuation omitted)).

Here, the evidence was sufficient to support Fripp’s

convictions. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts,

Fripp’s own testimony that he arrived at the scene to meet with

Ratliff, his own admission that he “did it,” his arrival at the police

station in a red car with the gun that was used to kill Ratcliff inside,

and Calvert’s testimony at trial all support the jury’s finding Fripp

guilty of the counts beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jones, 304 Ga.

at 598; see also Davis, 316 Ga. at 420 (evidence sufficient to convict

for felony murder because it showed defendant shot and killed the

victim in front of eyewitnesses, admitted the shooting to his uncle,

and was in possession of the gun that was used to kill the victim two

days after the shooting); see also Matthews v. State, 311 Ga. 531,

536–37 (2021) (defendant’s admission to stabbing the victim and

possession of a steak knife set matching the knife blade used to stab

the victim constituted sufficient evidence to authorize defendant’s

convictions of malice murder and possession of a knife during the

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commission of a crime). It was the jury’s role to assess the credibility

of witnesses and resolve inconsistencies, and here, the jury was

entitled to believe Calvert’s trial testimony, even if it was

inconsistent with a prior statement, and to disbelieve Fripp’s

testimony that he had left the scene before the shooting. See Harris,

313 Ga. at 229.

Fripp next contends that there was no physical evidence

collected at the scene related to him and that “the murder weapon

was found in his car” only because Salter put it in his trunk before

they went to the police station. But the State “was not required to

produce any physical evidence.” Jackson v. State, 307 Ga. 770, 772

(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Although the State is

required to prove its case with competent evidence, there is no

requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of

evidence.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

Finally, as to Fripp’s argument that he was “coerc[ed]” to make

the statement to police, while the jury heard Fripp’s testimony that

Salter threatened him on the way to the police station, the jury also

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heard testimony that Fripp and Salter were friends, that Fripp

drove his own car and Salter to the police station, and that Fripp

made the statement twice, to two separate officers, while he was not

under arrest and was still free to leave the police station. It was the

jury’s duty to assess credibility and weigh the evidence of Fripp’s

testimony about the alleged threat against the police officer’s

testimony about Fripp’s giving of the statement and the other

evidence of his guilt. The jury was authorized to disbelieve or give

less weight to Fripp’s testimony that he was “coerc[ed]” into

admitting to the crimes, and this Court does not reweigh evidence.

See Harris, 313 Ga. at 229; Davis, 316 Ga. at 420.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdicts, we conclude that it was sufficient to authorize a rational

trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Fripp was guilty

of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Harris, 313 Ga. at 229;

Jones, 304 Ga. at 598.

3. Fripp next contends that his trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective for failing to pursue an alibi defense.

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Specifically, he asserts that he would have benefitted from an alibi

witness’s testimony that could support Calvert’s original

statement—and Fripp’s testimony—that Fripp had left before the

shooting. Further, he argues that his counsel admitted at the motion

for new trial hearing that there were “a couple of people that

probably could have served as alibi witnesses” but that his counsel

failed to call any of them and even failed to pursue Salter as a

potential alibi witness based only on his assumption that Salter

would not testify. But because Fripp does not name who the alibi

witnesses would have been and has failed to show how his trial

counsel’s decision to forgo pursuing an alibi defense prejudiced him,

his ineffective assistance claim fails.

In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance, Fripp

must prove both that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient

and that there is a reasonable probability that the trial result would

have been different if not for the deficient performance. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984); see also McKelvey v. State,

311 Ga. 34, 42 (2021). To satisfy the deficiency prong, Fripp “must

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show that counsel performed his duties in an objectively

unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in light of

prevailing professional norms.” Bowman v. State, 319 Ga. 573, 576

(2024) (citations and punctuation omitted). To satisfy the prejudice

prong, Fripp “must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Palmer v. State, 310 Ga. 668, 678 (2021).

“If an appellant fails to meet his burden of proving either prong of

the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine

the other prong.” Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga. 576, 578 (2008).

Here, Fripp has failed to demonstrate prejudice. At the hearing

on Fripp’s motion for new trial, he failed to identify a single witness

who “would have given him a solid and complete alibi for the time of

the murder.” McKelvey, 311 Ga. at 44. This failure to present the

testimony of Salter, any other alibi witness, or a legally acceptable

substitute, “as required to demonstrate prejudice in the context of

ineffective assistance of counsel,” is detrimental to his claim of

ineffective assistance. Palmer, 310 Ga. at 678; see also Lupoe, 284

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Ga. at 578 (explaining that there can be no ineffective assistance

where “[t]he alleged alibi witness that [the defendant] claims should

have been investigated by his trial counsel did not testify at the

motion for new trial hearing”); see also McIlwain v. State, 287 Ga.

115, 118 (2010) (Attorney “could not be ineffective for failing to . . .

call a potential alibi witness of whom she was not informed.”).

Because Fripp has failed to present the testimony of any such alibi

witness that would have been favorable to his defense, we conclude

that Fripp has not shown that the failure to call an alibi witness

prejudiced him. See Palmer, 310 Ga. at 678

4. In Fripp’s final enumeration of error, he contends that the

court erred by giving a misleading jury instruction on coercion that

was not tailored to the evidence presented at trial. At one point

during Fripp’s testimony about the threat Salter made while on

their way to the police station, Fripp’s counsel asked Fripp, “How

would you characterize the demeanor or the way the person was

looking at you or when y’all – were y’all –.” The court interrupted

and asked counsel to approach, and the following transpired at a

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bench conference.

The court asked Fripp’s counsel, “[I]s this some coercion

defense?” and explained that “coercion is not a defense to murder.”

Fripp’s counsel said he understood but explained that Fripp had

gone into the police station out of fear. The court asked how this line

of questioning was relevant since coercion was not a defense to

murder. Fripp’s counsel explained that it was relevant to why Fripp

made the statement to law enforcement. The court replied, “Well,

I’ve got to give a jury charge that coercion is not a defense to murder”

but stated that it would allow the line of questioning for the limited

purpose of explaining Fripp’s conduct. Fripp’s counsel explained:

“[H]e’s not using that to try to say that he was coerced at that scene

and did something at the scene,” but rather, only to say why he made

a statement to police.

During the charge conference, the court asked the parties if it

needed to instruct the jury regarding the coercion argument they

discussed at the bench conference. The State requested a charge

related to the bench conference and argued that coercion is not a

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defense to murder. The court initially explained its intention to give

the instruction, but after Fripp’s counsel argued against it, the court

acknowledged the concern in giving it. After taking a break, the

court stated that it intended to give the coercion instruction from

OCGA § 16-3-26. 2 Defense counsel objected on the basis that the

charge was not tailored to the evidence presented, as there was no

evidence that Fripp was coerced to commit any act other than to

make a statement.

During the jury charge, the court instructed the jury, among

other things, on the presumption of innocence, the credibility of

witnesses, inconsistencies in a witness’s pre-trial statements when

compared to the witness’s testimony at trial, the voluntariness of the

defendant’s statement, and the coercion defense under

OCGA § 16-3-26.

2 OCGA § 16-3-26 provides that:

A person is not guilty of a crime, except murder, if the act
upon which the supposed criminal liability is based is performed
under such coercion that the person reasonably believes that
performing the act is the only way to prevent his imminent death
or great bodily injury.
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Fripp contends the coercion defense instruction the trial court

gave was misleading because there was no evidence that Fripp was

coerced to participate in the criminal conduct. This instruction,

Fripp argues, could have confused the jury by suggesting that Fripp

was trying to assert an affirmative defense of coercion, in

contradiction to his theory of defense that he was not present at the

time of the shooting. Finally, he contends that the court’s instruction

on the voluntariness of Fripp’s statement increased the harm of the

coercion instruction because a jury would believe the coercion

instruction to be related to the committing of the crimes instead of

the making of the statement to police.

Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred by giving

this instruction, we conclude that any error was harmless. “Even

when we find error in a jury charge, we will not reverse when the

error is harmless, that is, when it is highly probable that the

instruction did not contribute to the verdict.” Jones v. State, 316 Ga.

481, 486 (2023). “To figure out whether an instructional error was

harmless, we assess it in the context of the instructions as a whole.”

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Id. “And as with other trial errors, in assessing harm we review the

record de novo, and we weigh the evidence as we would expect

reasonable jurors to have done so.” Id. (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Under this standard, the question then becomes whether the

court instructing the jury on the coercion defense was harmless. See

Jones, 316 Ga. at 486. Here, it is highly probable that the instruction

on the coercion defense did not contribute to the verdict given the

strong evidence of Fripp’s guilt and the totality of the instructions

provided.

As to the evidence presented, the jury heard Fripp’s own

testimony that he was at the scene, at least shortly before the

shooting occurred, Calvert’s testimony that a man matching Fripp’s

description was still present at the scene during the shooting and

pistol-whipped Calvert, and law enforcement’s testimony that Fripp

arrived at the police station the next day with the gun that was used

to kill Ratcliff in the trunk of Fripp’s red car—the same vehicle in

which he arrived to the shooting scene. See Jones, 316 Ga. at 487

21
(any error in giving an instruction about evidence of other crimes

was harmless where “the evidence against Jones was quite strong”).

As to the other instructions given, Fripp argues that the

harmful nature of the coercion instruction was worsened by the

court’s instruction on the voluntariness of the defendant’s

statement. He contends that the instruction went to the

voluntariness of Fripp’s statement, which thereby implied that the

coercion instruction went to a different issue—whether Fripp was

coerced into committing the murder—which was inconsistent with

Fripp’s contention at trial that he left the scene before the shooting

occurred.3 We disagree. When analyzed in “the context of the

3 The court instructed the jury:

A statement that the Defendant allegedly made has been offered
for your consideration. Before you may consider this as evidence
for any purpose, you must determine whether the Defendant’s
statement was voluntary. To be voluntary, a statement must be
freely and willingly given and without coercion, duress, threats,
use of violence, fear of injury, or any suggestions or promises of
leniency or reward. A statement induced by the slightest hope of
benefit or the remotest fear of injury is not voluntary. To be
voluntary, a statement must be the product of a free will and not
under compulsion or any necessity imposed by others.

.
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instructions as a whole,” Jones, 316 Ga. at 486, the coercion defense

instruction was harmless because Fripp did not assert that he was

coerced into committing the murder and the jury was adequately

instructed on other aspects for their deliberations.

The jury was instructed on, among other things, the

presumption of innocence, the credibility of witnesses,

inconsistencies in a witness’s pre-trial statements when compared

to the witness’s testimony at trial, and the voluntariness of the

defendant’s statement. Regarding the voluntariness of the

statement instruction, the jury was instructed to determine whether

it believed that Fripp’s statement was voluntarily given and, only

then, could it consider the statement as evidence. Fripp does not

challenge the correctness of the voluntariness charge, and “[i]t is

presumed that the jury, which was under oath, followed the trial

court’s instructions unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.”

Brooks v. State, 309 Ga. 630, 636 (2020). Seeing no evidence that the

jury did not follow the court’s instruction to analyze whether the

statement was voluntarily given before considering it as evidence or

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any of the other proper instructions, we conclude that the

voluntariness instruction did not make giving of the coercion

defense instruction any more harmful and, thus, the coercion

defense instruction was harmless. See Jones, 316 Ga. at 486.

Accordingly, when considered in the context of the jury

instructions as a whole, the jury instructions clearly informed the

jury of its duty to weigh the evidence presented at trial and make

determinations as to credibility and voluntariness of statements,

and it was highly probable that the coercion defense instruction did

not contribute to the jury’s verdict. See Jones, 316 Ga. at 486.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Land, J., not
participating.

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